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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is a systematic presentation of William Desmond’s philosophical system 
and an argument for its viability and superiority relative to dominant alternate visions, 
here represented by that of John D. Caputo.  Desmond, I argue, provides a viable and 
preferable alternative to—and an alternative narrating of— the kind of late twentieth 
century “postmodern” anti-metaphysical frame represented by Caputo.  Desmond’s 
vision is viable in that it answers Caputo’s critiques—showing that they need not be 
the case.  Here Desmond shows how metaphysics (and ethics and religion informed 
by metaphysics) escapes Caputo’s narration/location.  Desmond defeats Caputo’s 
defeaters in order to make Desmond’s vision a possible position.  On a deeper level, 
Desmond’s vision is arguably preferable inasmuch it can be used to critique Caputo’s 
vision—largely in that it (Desmond’s vision) as it can be seen to fulfill Caputo’s 
motivating concerns in a more satisfying manner than Caputo’s own vision.  It does 
this in two ways.  First, from Desmond’s vision one can see how such a 
“LeviNietzschean” vision tends to betray its own motivating concerns.  Second, 
Desmond’s position shows how a metaphysical vision/stance/picture (like 
Desmond’s) is, in fact, necessary for one to fulfill these concerns (…or simply 
necessary, as such).  In this manner, Desmond out-narrates the “postmodern” 
“LeviNietzschean” position, showing Desmond’s as a preferable position—as 
possessing a broader and greater explanatory reach. 
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Introduction 
 
I encountered William Desmond’s work as a young would-be Derridean.  It 
found me preoccupied, tracing the question—from Derrida to Levinas, Heidegger, 
Nietzsche—of how metaphysics became such a pervasive and malevolent force from 
which thought is to be freed with strange stratagems.  Timely, Desmond’s writing 
struck me such as to loosen the fetters and blinders—the assumed answers and latent 
liturgies—of these queer liberations so as to present me with an engaging and 
surprising (curious, perplexing, astonishing) vision…opening another way to see, an 
heterological speculum.   
 This work is intended to be an orienting opening into this other way—at once 
a systematic presentation of William Desmond’s philosophical system and an 
argument for its viability and superiority relative to dominant alternate visions, here 
represented by that of John D. Caputo.  The broad issue addressed is the status of 
religion and/or God-talk in the context of “postmodernity.”  It attends to the question: 
How think of religion and God today?  How now—in the context of recent continental 
(“postmodern”) philosophy—God?  Within the broad outlines of this question, I wish 
to address the more particular issue of the relationship between religion and 
metaphysics—and, secondarily, ethics. 
With regard to this relationship, there is a broad consensus within 
contemporary continental philosophy that sometimes called “postmodern.”  There is a 
kind of post-metaphysical orthodoxy.  The issue of the relevance of metaphysics for 
talk of God and religion is more often a non-issue.  It is taken as given that 
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“metaphysics” is no longer a live option for serious thinkers today, and that the task of 
thinking about religion relative to metaphysics is to learn to think God and/or do 
religion without or “after” it.  Indeed, “metaphysics” seems to have become, in many 
quarters of contemporary continental thought, a pejorative term—a dirty word—
meaning something like “what’s been wrong with philosophy hitherto.” 
Put more precisely, within the context of much contemporary continental 
philosophy the issue of the nature of religion and God-talk has been treated in a post- 
or anti-metaphysical manner, being informed by a certain “postmodern” philosophical 
framework.  This particular treatment of this issue is worth addressing for several 
reasons.  First, the question of the relation of metaphysics to religion in the context of 
postmodernity merits examination because of the perennial significance of the issue 
of the nature of religion and God-talk itself.  Second, it is worth addressing because of 
the prevalence of a post- or anti-metaphysical treatment of/perspective on religion, as 
is evidenced in various ongoing conferences and publications in this vein (along with 
those going against the flow, as it were).  Third, it is worth addressing because of the 
prevalence of the informing philosophical framework of “postmodern” continental 
philosophy on the contemporary philosophical scene. 
It could be said that the vast majority of contemporary so-called “postmodern” 
continental philosophy of religion is post- or anti-metaphysical.  Beyond this, the 
more explicitly deconstructive form of “postmodern” philosophy of religion is 
likewise more explicitly and stridently anti-metaphysical.  Thus, any metaphysical 
alternative that wishes to break into the discourse with any kind of plausibility should 
be able to deal with the strongest objections and critiques leveled against metaphysics 
from something like this most skeptical of quarters—from deconstruction.  Thinkers 
that might fit in this dominant hitherto anti-metaphysical frame would include the 
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likes of Mark C. Taylor, Gianni Vattimo, Jean-Luc Marion and John D. Caputo who 
largely take their point of departure from Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida.  
For the purposes of this study, I will be largely limiting the scope of the discussion of 
such a post- or anti-metaphysical treatment of religion and God-talk to the particular 
work of John D. Caputo as a representative of the broader post- or anti-metaphysical 
trend in contemporary continental philosophy of religion as well as its more strident 
deconstructive form, incorporating and presenting clearly the anti-metaphysical 
religious ramifications of say Heidegger or Derrida (though the readings of such are, 
of course, a matter of contention).   
Caputo treats the issue of the nature of religion and God-talk in a post- or anti-
metaphysical manner, being so informed by a “postmodern” philosophical framework.  
Why Caputo?  Caputo is a prime representative of the “Religion and Postmodernism” 
discourse in that he has hosted the Villanova “Religion and Postmodernism” 
conferences and edited the collections of essays that have come from them.  He is also 
a prolific and broadly read thinker who has edited a reader on religion and 
postmodernism (The Religious) and has written works popularizing this position (On 
Religion and Deconstruction in a Nutshell).  He has also written numerous scholarly 
works, such as Radical Hermeneutics, Against Ethics and The Prayers and Tears of 
Jacques Derrida.  Further, Caputo has a position of prominence in the Anglo-
American continental philosophical arena as the representative of Derrida—especially 
bringing Derrida's thought into the field of religious studies and/or philosophy of 
religion.   
Caputo can be seen as representing one presently prevalent way of answering 
the question of how to think about God and religion in contemporary continental 
philosophy—a way, in particular, that uses more deconstructive thought as a 
 4 
framework.  He eloquently represents a “religious turn” in some postmodern 
philosophy.  This prevalent way of thinking turns on two points, one negative and one 
positive.  First (on the more Nietzschean side), there is the rejection of metaphysics 
and of any metaphysical notion of God as expressed in the pronounced death of the 
metaphysical God and the critique of “onto-theology”—being use or 
instrumentalization of the idea of God to function as an univocal explanation/ 
foundation that is primarily a projection of our power, a means of securing ourselves 
in the world.  All metaphysics are considered to be one form or another of “onto-
theology.”  Second (on the more Levinasian side), there is an affirmation of religion 
and God-talk inasmuch as there is reduction of religion/God-talk to one’s (largely 
contentless) ethical obligation to the other.  Taken together, these two points represent 
a particular configuration of the relations between metaphysics, ethics and 
religion/God-talk in which religion/God-talk is divorced from metaphysics (rejection) 
and fused—without remainder—with ethics (reduction) to produce a kind of “Levi-
Nietzschean” religiousness.  
 
That much said, in this work I will present a position that stands in contrast to 
this kind of broad post- or anti-metaphysical position in general and to Caputo’s 
position in particular.  I will lay out a dissident metaphysical position on how to talk 
about religion and God today.  Toward this end, I will examine the work of 
contemporary philosopher, William Desmond.  I will represent Desmond as providing 
a significantly different perspective—a dissident voice—in the contemporary 
continental discussion regarding God and religion.  More specifically, Desmond treats 
the issue of religion/God-talk in a different, metaphysical manner, being informed by 
his own particular philosophical framework.  The result is an alternative configuration 
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of the relations between metaphysics, ethics and religion/God-talk—an alternative 
whose difference is owed to a different, more positive (yet different than other 
metaphysical thinkers like Deleuze or Badiou) view of metaphysics than that of much 
of continental philosophy today and of John D. Caputo in particular. 
 
 The thesis of this work is that William Desmond’s approach to thinking about 
religion and God in relation to the domains of metaphysics and ethics provides a 
viable and preferable alternative to the like position represented in the work of John 
D. Caputo.  To speak of the position represented in Desmond’s work as “alternative” 
implies a way for one today (in the midst of “postmodernity”) to look at the same 
thing (religion and God) differently (metaphysically…or at least post-post-
metaphysically).  Beyond this main thesis—of the superiority of a theistic 
metaphysical frame (such as Desmond’s) over the kind of late twentieth century 
“postmodern” anti-metaphysical frame represented by Caputo—I suggest that 
Desmond’s work can be seen as part of a larger, emerging scholarly movement 
advocating such a theistic metaphysical frame.   
Indeed, it must be recognized that, as Caputo represents a broader field of 
work, Desmond’s work stand in the midst (though being quite independent of) an 
emerging ,though diverse, metaphysical field of thinkers.  This field divides into (1) 
very explicitly theistic thinkers, such as Desmond and those under the (bold) banner 
of Radical Orthodoxy, who all (Desmond and RO) draw principally from the 
Christian, Platonic and Thomistic traditions (though they are quite eclectic) and (2) 
very explicitly atheistic thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou, who 
largely take their point of departure from Marx and Nietzsche (though they too are 
eclectic intensively and extensively).  Mindful of this, I address throughout the 
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following the resonances (and possible dissonances) between Desmond’s thought and 
its parallels in that of Milbank, Pickstock, et al.  Such subsidiary discussions suggest 
the fecundity and relevance of Desmond’s thought for thinking about God, 
metaphysics and ethics in this early twenty-first century.  Part of the parallel here 
between Desmond and RO is a retrieval of certain pre-modern and counter-modern 
voices.1  Beyond this, I consider briefly (in an admittedly minimal and initial manner) 
other presently ascendant (and either metaphysical or theistic) theorists such as 
Marion (a confessional anti-metaphysical thinker), Badiou and Deleuze.  Through 
these largely footnoted excurses, I occasionally locate Desmond’s distinctive 
metaphysical perspective relative to these other projects. 
The general strategy of the central argument of the work is as follows:  
Caputo, again as representing a kind of “postmodern” orthodoxy, is motivated by 
certain concerns, such as wanting to avoid false totalities/absolutes (closure) and 
wanting to be honest to the way things are and to affirm concrete 
actuality/reality/existence and genuine otherness (openness).  Caputo critiques 
metaphysics, ethics and religion insofar as metaphysics, in his understanding, stands 
in opposition to his motivating concerns, and thus should be rejected and extricated 
from ethics and religion.  Caputo provides an alternative, postmodern 
LeviNietzschean vision (a radical hermeneutics, an ethics without ethics, religion 
without religion) that he sees as addressing his concerns.  Desmond, I argue, provides 
a viable and preferable alternative to—and an alternative narrating of—this 
LeviNietzschean vision. Desmond’s vision is viable in that it answers Caputo’s 
critiques—showing that they need not be the case.  Here Desmond shows how 
metaphysics (and ethics and religion informed by metaphysics) escapes Caputo’s 
                                                
1
 See Thomas A. F. Kelly, ed., Between System and Poetics: William Desmond and Philosophy after 
Dialectic (Ashgate, 2006), pp. 4-5. 
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narration/location.  Desmond defeats Caputo’s defeaters, as it were—negates 
Caputo’s negations in order to make Desmond’s vision a possible position.  On a 
deeper level, Desmond’s vision is arguably preferable inasmuch it can be used to 
critique Caputo’s vision—largely in that it (Desmond’s vision) as it can be seen to 
fulfill Caputo’s motivating concerns in a more satisfying manner than Caputo’s own 
LeviNietzschean vision.  It does this in two ways.  First, from Desmond’s vision one 
can see how the LeviNietzschean vision tends to, in fact, betray its motivating 
concerns.  Second, Desmond’s position shows how a metaphysical 
vision/stance/picture (like Desmond’s) is, in fact, necessary for one to fulfill these 
concerns (…or simply necessary, as such).  In this manner, Desmond out-narrates the 
“postmodern” LeviNietzschean position, showing Desmond’s as a preferable 
position—as possessing a broader and greater explanatory reach. 
 More concretely, I will follow following this methodological path in outline.  
In the first chapter, I will systematically examine John D. Caputo’s work to make 
clear his positions regarding metaphysics, ethics, religion/God and their interrelation.  
I will also (in this first chapter) analyze Caputo’s position relative to his critiques (of 
metaphysics, ethics and religion), his motivating concerns and his strong conclusions.  
In the second, third and fourth chapters, I will systematically lay out William 
Desmond’s thought regarding metaphysics, ethics and religion/God, respectively.  
After this (in each chapter), I will display how Desmond’s thought can answer 
Caputo’s critiques, address his motivating concerns, and critique his strong 
conclusions.  I will conclude this work by drawing together the preceding results and 
considering the significance of Desmond’s alternate “divine hyperbolics” relative to 
the question of how to think of religion and God in the wake of postmodernity—
indeed in the wake of its passing.   
 8 
 This work is intended to contribute to the present on-going scholarly 
discussion by presenting the potential significance of Desmond’s work as providing a 
theistic metaphysical alternative to (indeed a kind of test case for putting into question 
the post- or anti-metaphysical “postmodern” “orthodoxy” of) a major strain in 
contemporary continental philosophy of religion.  Developing out of this more general 
point, the specific contribution of this work is first and foremost its more systematic 
and unified presentation of Desmond’s thought.  Desmond’s work can be complex, 
dense, meditative and full of neologisms and, as such, can sometimes difficult to 
penetrate and understand fully.  Thus, the present work operates on a dual level of 
presentation, as it were: first, there is my own synthetic and systematic presentation of 
Desmond’s thought in my own words; second, this is accompanied by representative 
selections of Desmond’s own beautiful if sometimes enigmatic idiom in the copious 
(over 1,400) footnotes.  Along with these quotes in the footnotes, there are references 
to locations in Desmond’s corpus where the ideas presented can be explored more in 
depth in their original context.  As such, the systematic portions of chapters two, three 
and four (which can stand on their own apart from the engagement with Caputo) are, 
at once, a digest Desmond’s ideas and a series of doorways into Desmond’s texts.  
Secondarily, this work makes the original contribution of the specific confrontation of 
Desmond and Caputo as presenting two emergent (increasingly popular) 
yet conflicting voices in Anglo-American contemporary continental philosophy that 
are writing about the same kinds of things—as in the relations between metaphysics, 
ethics and religion.  
Regarding a preliminary assessment of this project’s broader contribution to 
scholarship, this project will contribute to several different discussions.  This project 
will contribute to the current “Religion and Postmodernism” discourse within the 
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broader field of contemporary continental philosophy.  Within the context of this 
discussion, Desmond advocates what has been (up until recently) the largely un-
entertained option of a metaphysical way of thinking about religion and God that yet 
resonates with certain basic “postmodern” concerns.  This project will also introduce 
and recommend Desmond’s still somewhat unknown work as fruitful resource.  
Finally, this project has the potential to contribute to the fields of religious studies and 
systematic theology (more particularly to what is call “foundations” or “fundamental 
theology” or “prolegomena” or “philosophical theology”) inasmuch as its subject 
matter relates to the proper way—the ground rules, so to speak—to talk about God 
today.
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Chapter One: Caputo 
John D. Caputo’s philosophical work over the last decade and a half can be 
organized around the task of exorcising a “faithless” metaphysics from our thinking.  
Such a metaphysics is not faithful to life—to the factical reality of human existence— 
losing the task of living in the labyrinth of speculative thought.  It is not faithful to the 
human other—losing the particular person in the matrices of universal laws.  It is not 
faithful to “faith”—losing a properly religious faith and relation to “God” in its 
fixation on crafting properly proportioned propositions about the divine, as a “thing” 
to be examined.  This entanglement with the dishonesty and “bad faith” of such a 
“faithless” metaphysics—as it worms its way from metaphysics to ethics to religion—
is the nemesis against which a new and postmodern way of thinking and being 
struggles.  This way, for Caputo, is a truly honest, ethical and religious (and religious 
most of all) faithfulness without metaphysics.   
 
Caputo’s Critique of Metaphysics 
 
For Caputo, the problem with metaphysics can be summarized as follows:  
Metaphysics is not faithful to life insofar as it is an abstract system that privileges 
static unity in order to provide a stable foundation for life.  Metaphysics endeavors to 
lift one above (“meta”) the flux (“physis”) of actuality—providing one with “a fast 
way out of the back door of the flux.”1  Such a metaphysics involves the elevation of 
knowledge of reality to a kind of absolute knowledge—a privileged access to the real.  
Caputo sees this metaphysical self-elevation as a fundamental tendency of philosophy 
                                                
1
 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987) pp. 3, 1. 
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as such.2  Metaphysics is fundamentally a metaphysics of presence, bent on giving 
“elegant assurances about Being and presence even as factical existence was being 
tossed about by physis and kinesis.”3    
Metaphysics, for Caputo, is not faithful to life in that metaphysics’ pretentious 
self-elevation supplants factical existence.  Metaphysics claims a privileged access—a 
capitalized “Knowledge” of the fundament of reality, or ourselves, or whatever—of 
the capitalized Secret.4  Caputo describes such metaphysics as an “essentialism”—as 
“the various claims to be in on The Secret and thereby to have surpassed the limits of 
offering a mere mortal interpretation.”5  This pretentious claim, for Caputo, is 
unjustified and ultimately dishonest to our severely finite human situation.  In fact, 
metaphysics is a kind of code word for Caputo for just this arrogant philosophical 
posturing.6  “The secret,” Caputo rejoins, “is that there is no Secret, no capitalized 
Know-it-all Breakthrough Principle or Revelation that lays things out the way they 
Really Are.”7  We humans have to deal with existing in a situation of “disaster”—of 
the loss of “one’s star (dis-astrum),” of being “cut loose from one’s lucky or guiding 
light.”8   
                                                
2
 “Philosophy is only possible as meta-physics.” John D. Caputo, “Heidegger, Kierkegaard and the 
Foundering of Metaphysics,” International Kierkegaard Commentary, Vol. 6: “Fear and Trembling” 
and “Repetition,” ed. by Robert Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1993) p. 207. 
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Metaphysics’ pretension and concomitant lack of fidelity to life, for Caputo, 
largely arises out of metaphysics’ abstraction.  Metaphysics, for Caputo, is an 
essentially abstract enterprise seeking to achieve understanding through disinterested 
speculation.  Taking (Platonic) recollection and (Hegelian) mediation as the basic 
forms of metaphysical thinking, Caputo sees them both as a turn toward abstraction—
“to pure thought and disengaged speculation.”9   This, however, is metaphysics’ 
downfall—“the great mistake of metaphysics,” Caputo writes, is “to think that we can 
come up with a pure, interest-free rationality.”10  Thus, the Western metaphysical 
tradition, from its opening gesture to its consummation, is a grand “intellectual 
illusion.”11  
Metaphysics, for Caputo, is an abstract system that, as such, entails a certain 
fixation on universality.  For Caputo, a philosophical system entails a fixed set of 
universal rules.12  Such universals obtain to reality in a necessary way that cannot be 
otherwise—following “the rule of essence and necessity.”13  A system of necessary 
and universal propositions presents, for Caputo, a violent hierarchy—being a set of 
structures “that flatten out, and level off, and exclude, and marginalize, and silence.”14 
What is “flattened out” and “leveled off” in the system is the particularity, singularity 
and individuality that pervade and complicate concrete existence.  Such “ineffable” 
                                                
9
 Radical Hermeneutics 32. 
10
 Ibid. 262. 
11
 Ibid. 19. 
12
 “The desire of philosophy is to bring the flow to a halt in the system, to confine the rushing river 
within the fixed borders of its categories, to lay a systematic grid over it to contain its movements and 
allay our fears.” “Kierkegaard, Heidegger,” 207. 
“The real obstacle to understanding human affairs lies in the tendency to believe that what we 
do…admits of formulation in hard and irrevocable rules.” Radical Hermeneutics 212. 
13
 Radical Hermeneutics 32.  “Thought can flourish only in the element of necessity and essence, and it 
can appropriate becoming only at the expense of what is definitive for it, viz., its very contingency.” 
Ibid. 19. 
14
 John D. Caputo, "Metanoetics: Elements of a Postmodern Christian Philosophy," Christian 
Philosophy Today (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999) p. 223. 
 13 
singularities constitute “a breach in the surface of philosophy.”15  Thus, metaphysical 
systems seek to “contain what they cannot contain”—that is, the singular, the 
individual, the fragment.16 
Such an abstract metaphysical system, fixated on universality, functions in 
such as way that it privileges static unity.  Caputo claims that philosophy, as 
metaphysics, from its beginning has sought intelligibility at the expense of movement 
and difference.17  Metaphysics is the “metaphysics of presence” that defines reality in 
stark terms as pure, present being and its negation.  Insomuch as any movement 
would call this binary opposition into question, movement as such is suppressed.18  
With the suppression of movement, metaphysics can impose an order that escapes 
and/or arrests the chaotic flux of existence.19  Both recollection and mediation are 
examples of this movement against movement: Recollection is a spurious 
“backwards” movement,20 while mediation is a more cunning yet ultimately illusory 
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movement in that it mimics movement under the guiding hand of a necessary logic.21  
This privileging of static unity culminates in philosophy-as-metaphysics’ drive toward 
an abstract static system in which knowledge of reality is elevated to absolute 
knowledge—a unified totality and a totalizing unity.  
Finally, metaphysics, presenting such a total knowledge of reality, gives an 
absolutely stable foundation for life.  Because of this, Caputo charges that 
metaphysics effectively makes light of the difficulty of existence—it allays our fears 
with the “assurances of the same.”22  The motivating concerns behind Caputo’s 
critique of metaphysics and his seeking an alternative are twofold.  First, Caputo—
seeking a properly humble way of thinking that is appropriate to where we in fact find 
ourselves—wants a way of thinking that avoids elevating knowledge of reality to a 
falsely absolute status.  Second, Caputo—wanting to be true to life and to enjoin an 
active engagement in life—seeks to avoid any way of thinking that ultimately 
supplants the living of life (in the midst of the flux of actuality) with the knowledge of 
reality (so falsely elevated—against the first concern).  In Caputo’s understanding, 
metaphysics fails on both scores. 
 
Caputo’s Radical Hermeneutics: Metaphysics without Metaphysics 
 
Against such a metaphysics (and, for him, metaphysics as such), Caputo 
presents a radical hermeneutics as an alternative way to think about reality and our 
place therein.  Radical hermeneutics is a way of thinking about reality—a kind of 
“metaphysics”—that intends to be otherwise than traditional Western metaphysics —
“without metaphysics.”  As such an alternative (to) metaphysics, radical hermeneutics 
                                                
21
 Radical Hermeneutics 17-19; “Kierkegaard, Heidegger” 210-11. 
22
 Radical Hermeneutics 1;  John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion 
without Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997) p. 5. 
“Metaphysics, from beginning to end, from Plato to Hegel, systematically searches for  a way to arrest 
the play and allay our fears.” “Kierkegaard, Heidegger” 213-14. 
 15 
is faithful to life insofar as it is a way of thinking that is involved (interested, in the 
midst) in life in its particularity and difference toward the end of directing one toward 
the difficulty of one’s existence. 
The task of radical hermeneutics is to reexamine and rethink the situation (and 
situatedness) of human existence—“to reconstitute a more radicalized notion of this 
being ‘which we ourselves are’”—to get a fix on “the radicality of the fix in which we 
poor existing individuals find ourselves.”23  This reappraisal of human existence 
focuses on the necessity, the inescapability, of interpretation.24  Further, Caputo 
describes radical hermeneutics as “a hermeneutic more deeply construed” in that it 
provides no grounding or foundation for interpretation to guide it and ensure its 
stability and fidelity.25  But, on the telling of radical hermeneutics, this precisely is the 
fidelity of radical hermeneutics—for we have no access to a reality outside of 
interpretation.  Thus, radical hermeneutics stands as a kind of bulwark—a strange, 
foundationless, slippery thing—against the assurances of traditional metaphysics that 
are betrayals of factical human existence.26 
Caputo’s radical hermeneutics takes its bearings from Heidegger and 
Derrida—with continual reference to Nietzsche.  The “hermeneutics” of radical 
hermeneutics largely takes its meaning from Heidegger as an examination of human 
facticity and the “the groundless play of Being’s comings and goings.”27  However, 
the increasingly dominant resource for Caputo’s work is Jacques Derrida.  Derrida, 
for Caputo, is “the philosopher of the flux par excellence.”28  With Derrida, “radical” 
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hermeneutics takes on a Nietzschean affirmation of flux and becoming, of the endless 
play of signs and texts, that stands against metaphysics’ stabilizing the flux and 
stopping the play.29  It is thus that radical hermeneutics “situates itself in the space 
which is opened up by the exchange between Heidegger and Derrida.”30 
For Caputo, radical hermeneutics provides a minimalist understanding of 
human existence.  Recognizing that one cannot fully do away with metaphysics 
altogether, Caputo seeks a “minimalist metaphysics”—for it is best “to hold 
metaphysics to a minimum.”31 A minimalist metaphysics does not overestimate the 
status and scope of its knowledge.32  It is concerned with staying with modest “finite 
facts” as they appear, if indefinitely, on the surface of experience—not speculating 
about founding depths.33  In order to accommodate this restrained posture, the 
minimalist seeks a minimally restrictive or constraining idiom.34  This minimalist 
metaphysics follows “the logic of the sans” that Caputo appropriates from Blanchot 
and Derrida.35  Thus, radical hermeneutics seeks to present a “metaphysics without 
metaphysics”—the minimalist metaphysics of a “postmetaphysical rationality” that 
acknowledges (contrary to traditional metaphysics) “the uncircumventable futility 
involved in trying to nail things down.”36  This minimalist metaphysics without 
metaphysics favors such constitutionally inadequate basic metaphorics as flux, 
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fluidity, movement, free play, instability, events and happenings as providing the best 
vocabulary for talking about reality—if we must.37 
Whereas, for Caputo, the representative philosophical (non-)movements of 
metaphysics are recollection and mediation, the representative movement (and 
movement indeed) of radical hermeneutics is repetition.  Recollection, taken as the 
exemplary movement of traditional metaphysics, seeks an original and pure presence 
that is uncontaminated by the arbitrariness of our all too fluid human existence.  
Repetition, however, sees every “presence”—rather than something “prior” to lesser, 
shadowy copies or repetitions thereof that one must trace back to their pure source—
as an effect of “repetition.”38  This is a break with metaphysics’ drive toward a static 
unity insulated from the vagaries of life and an embracing of a creative and productive 
movement into the difficulties of life.39  Repetition points to the fact that any unity, 
identity or actuality in life is one that is produced and not found.40  With repetition 
there is the possibility (contrary to metaphysics) of novelty and movement.41   
Repetition is a movement that makes its way in and through and not out of the flux.  
As occupying the core of a radical hermeneutics, repetition entails coping with the 
flux of life without metaphysical “certification” and facing up to the difficulty of 
life.42   
A radical hermeneutics seeks to be faithful to life—to be honest about the 
situation in which we find ourselves.  As such, radical hermeneutics is a “work of dis-
illusionment” that frees from illusory comforts and leaves one exposed to the hard 
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(difficult) truth that there is no hard (solid) truth—“the cold, hermeneutic truth, the 
truth that there is no truth, no master name which holds things captive.”43  Before 
such a realization of our “poverty” as individuals within the limits of existence, 
radical hermeneutics provides a “lesson in humility” regarding the kind of finish we 
can put on our ideas—not to put “too high a polish” or “a more sanguine gloss” on 
our grasp of reality that we ought—for it “understands the power of the flux to wash 
away the best-laid schemes of metaphysics.”44  The modesty of this “ascetic ideal” 
that is faithful to life revolves around a basic “non-knowing” or “structural 
blindness”—a lack (want) that gives rise to desire (want)—that gives rise to a passion 
driven by not knowing who we are or where we are going.45 
The faithfulness of radical hermeneutics to our existence counters 
metaphysics’ abstraction, seeking to get above the flux, with a basic interestedness, in 
the midst of the rush of things.  “The existing spirit,” Caputo writes, “exists (esse) in 
the midst (inter) of time…in the midst of the flux.  Its esse is inter-esse; its being is 
being-between, being-in-the-midst-of.”46  The repetition at the heart of radical 
hermeneutics embraces this basic locatedness in the midst of temporal becoming (this 
passive inter, being-in-the-midst) and takes up the proper task of forging ahead in this 
situation (as an active being, esse in the context of the between).47  This repetition as 
interestedness is “the way of the existing individual.”48  As aware of our being-
between, radical hermeneutics brings a new emphasis on difference and otherness as 
occupying a space of priority—as that of which we find ourselves in the midst. 
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Radical hermeneutics counters metaphysics’ urge to subsume everything 
within a singular, universal system with the awareness of abiding difference—it is “a 
philosophy of ‘alterity,’” with “a relentless attentiveness and sensitivity to the 
‘other.’”49  Caputo describes radical hermeneutics as a philosophy of difference in 
terms of its being an “heterology.”  This heterology takes two forms: the heteronomic 
and the heteromorphic.  Heterology in the sense of heteronomism views difference in 
terms of the particular and singular other that stands against metaphysics’ universal 
system of sameness—it is the serious “Rabbi” vigilantly on the look out for the 
singular other.50  Here, humility takes the form of restraint toward the singular.  
Heteronomic heterology continues the minimalist project of radical hermeneutics as 
seeing reality as being made up of particulars and undigestable singularities.51  Such a 
singular is “marked by its idiosyncrasy, its idiomaticity, its uniqueness, its anomaly, 
its unclassifiability, its unrepeatability.”52  Reality is to be seen in terms of concrete, 
singular, idiosyncratic events happening to particular individuals (as the subjects of 
particular events) without there being any deeper structure.53 
Heterology in the sense of heteromorphism views difference in terms of the 
plural, the multiple, the diverse that stands against metaphysics’ unity—it is the 
exuberant “Dionysiac” celebrating alteration and the many.54  Heteromophic 
heterology continues the minimalist project of radical hermeneutics as seeing reality 
in terms of “a kind of felicitous nominalism” that keeps things open-ended, celebrates 
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diversity and alteration, and happily greets unanticipated pluralities—it is a 
“minimalism” that seeks to “maximize the possibilities and keep the door open to 
results that have not come in yet.”55  Here, humility takes the form of caution so as “to 
keep as many options open as possible.”56  Radical hermeneutics as heteromorphic 
heterology is liberating—for oneself as freeing one to a multiplicity of options57 and 
for the other as keeping the free-play of diverse and changing reality free of the 
closure of metaphysics’ urge to static unity.58  As a fundamentally “otherwise” way of 
speaking, radical hermeneutics as heterology in both its heteronomic, “Rabbinic” 
mode and its heteromorophic, “Dionysian” mode, is what Caputo calls a “jewgreek” 
metaphysics without metaphysics.59 
Radical hermeneutics’ awareness of difference leads away from metaphysics’ 
stabilizing function toward a proper understanding of the difficulty of life.  Factical 
life—anxious because of its lack of hard truths—is difficult, not made safe by a 
metaphysical canopy.60  Life is difficult, for we poor existing individuals have to 
make judgments, but such judgments or decisions are made against the backdrop of 
“undecidability.”  Undecidability—signaling the inescapability of the flux—is the 
condition of the possibility of real decision.61  Real decision is difficult precisely 
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because we do not know the right answer in advance.62  Living life and making 
decisions in the face of the flux and undecidability brings us back to radical 
hermeneutics’ central (quasi-)concept of repetition which moves from thought to 
existence—to the task of moving ahead as an existing individual63 and forging a 
self—of seeing one’s self not as a thing to know (via metaphysics) but as a task.64 
Radical hermeneutics as a thinking about reality after metaphysics, a 
metaphysics without metaphysics, moves in the opposite direction of metaphysics—
from an abstract escape from the vagaries of existence to an interested involvement in 
the living of life.  As such, radical hermeneutics as an awareness of the difficulty of 
life leads one from metaphysics (as thinking about reality) to ethics (as regarding how 
one is to relate to others)—from “what” to “how.”65  This much is evident in the 
strong conclusions of Caputo’s radical hermeneutics.  The first conclusion is the 
denial of the possibility (and/or propriety) any robust knowledge of reality (or 
metaphysics) because such is a mask for absolute knowledge of reality—that the only 
acceptable “metaphysics” is one that recognizes that we do not (and cannot) know 
who we are or what is going on or what is true—in short, “without metaphysics.”  The 
second conclusion is the denial of the importance of such a robust knowledge 
(metaphysics) for life—that metaphysics stands in a position of fundamental 
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opposition to our living of life as it truly is, in all of its ambiguity and difficulty, and 
we can and should (and ultimately cannot but) make our ways without it. 
 
Caputo’s Critique of Ethics 
 
While radical hermeneutics presses powerfully toward ethics as its goal and 
consummation, Caputo admits that he has serious problems with ethics as well—so 
serious that he could be said to be “against ethics.”  The basic problem with ethics for 
Caputo is that it is based upon metaphysics and functions toward the same end—to 
give (false) stability to life.  In brief, Caputo contends that not being faithful to life 
leads to not being faithful to the human other. 
For Caputo, ethics is fundamentally dependent on metaphysics.  Ethics is “a 
certain episteme”—“a (certain) metaphysics (of morals), a metaphysics charged with 
making obligation safe.”66  Ethics seeks to elevate knowledge of its subject matter 
through metaphysics.  Caputo sees the situation now as the “end of ethics.”67  Ethics 
as depending on failed metaphysics for its grounds ends up being groundless—as 
being “without why.”68 
As traditional metaphysics is not faithful to life for Caputo, so ethics—as 
building upon and complicit in such a faithless metaphysics—is not faithful to the 
other.  Ethics, like metaphysics, ends up supplanting (ethical) existence with a kind of 
abstract knowledge.  Caputo contends that life and one’s relation to the other is more 
difficult and risky than ethics would allow.69  Caputo writes regarding the difficulty of 
ethical existence that “we always proceed in the blind, divested of the sure guidance 
theoretical seeing feigns to lend in advance as we negotiate the ups and downs of 
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existence.”70 As with metaphysics, ethics’ abstraction from ethical existence entails a 
preoccupation with unity, sameness and universality. 
Ethics, for Caputo, seeks to be a system of universal rules.  The “mainstream 
metaphysics of morals” must “invoke universal, rational, or natural laws.”71  Ethical 
systems, like and as metaphysics, privilege a kind of static unity to make its 
knowledge absolute—and this by finding a fixed point of reference to absolve ethical 
reflection from the arbitrariness of existence.  Yet this belief “that what we 
do…admits of formulation in hard and irrevocable rules” is an obstacle to 
understanding truly ethical living.72  The problem with ethical laws and principles is 
that they have to say something about individuals making particular choices in 
particular situations,73 but such ethical rules (1.) do not directly apply to singular 
situations (they must be interpreted), (2.) do not get away from the internal instability 
that shadows any universal structure, and (3.) are not available as fully understood 
and fully justified in time for the individual to use them.74  Ethical existence is instead 
entangled in groundlessness, singularity, particularity, novelty, transcendence and 
incomprehensibility that resist any kind of universal ethical rules.75  This focus on 
unity, sameness and universality intends but fails to provide a stable foundation for 
ethical relations. 
Ethics, like and as metaphysics, seeks to provide a stable foundation for life 
but ends up making light of life’s difficulty.  Ethics seeks to make ethical relations 
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“safe.”76  “But judgment,” Caputo contends, “is not safe.”77  Life (and obligation) is 
more difficult and risky than ethics would allow—“a film of undecidability creeps 
quietly over the clarity of decisions.”78   
For Caputo, the (metaphysical) knowledge of ethical norms supplants the 
difficulty of ethical living.  Thus, the conclusion of Caputo’s critique of ethics and the 
motivating concerns behind his seeking an alternative can be understood in terms of 
the following:  First, he wants a humble and realistic approach to ethics that avoids 
elevating the knowledge of ethical guides to a falsely absolute status.  Second, Caputo 
wants honesty and engagement that avoids the supplanting genuine ethical existence 
in all its difficulty with the knowledge of ethical guides (so falsely elevated).  
Metaphysically buttressed ethics fail with regard to both of these concerns. 
 
Caputo’s Post-Metaphysical Ethics: Ethics without Ethics 
 
For Caputo, a post-metaphysical ethics—as an ethics (a way of thinking about 
relating to the other) without ethics (without any metaphysical ethical system)—is 
faithful to the other insofar as it is a way of thinking that is involved in the relation to 
the other in its particularity and difference toward the end of directing one toward the 
difficulty of such a relation. 
A post-metaphysical ethics proceeds from the foundationless foundation of 
radical hermeneutics—it takes place in the withdrawal of foundations, of any deeper 
grounding, of any metaphysical certification.79  Following radical hermeneutics, a 
post-metaphysical ethics is ethical repetition—the task of constituting, producing, 
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forging, becoming oneself as an ethical self in the midst of the flux of existence 
without the knowledge of any prior guide or foundation.80  The ethical self that is 
forged is a self in relation to the other without metaphysics.  With the end of 
metaphysics comes “the end of ethics” which “clears the way for a more ethical 
ethics, allowing the ethicalness of ethics to break out, while insisting that most of 
what passes itself off as ethics is an idol.”81  Such an ethics after the end of ethics—“a 
morals without a metaphysics of morals”—is, as following the project of radical 
hermeneutics, a minimalism—seeking a maximally “open and undetermined” and 
“weak and nonconstraining” notion of the Good.82  Such a post-metaphysical ethics 
succeeds in being more faithful to the other than its metaphysical counterpart. 
Post-metaphysical ethics seeks to be faithful to the other.  The project of 
radical hermeneutics, of seeing the fundamental instability of life, calls on the 
virtue—not only of humility regarding our knowledge of reality, of a “generalized 
Gelassenheit” which lets “all things be what and how they are”83—but also the virtue 
of compassion arising from our common, comfortless fate with others.84  This 
compassion fundamentally entails a sensitivity—“a hyperbolic sensitivity or 
hypersensitivity”—to the other.85 This sensitivity to and interestedness in the other 
entails a deeper awareness of difference—of the other as other. 
An “otherwise” ethics, a post-metaphysical ethics, for Caputo, is an 
heterology.  Caputo summarizes such an heterological ethics using Augustine’s 
dictum: “Dilige, et  quod vis fac”—“Love, and do what you will.”86  This dictum—as 
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a kind of “principle without principle” proposing “a maximally weak and 
nonconstraining notion of the Good”—follows the dual trajectory of the heterology of 
the project of radical hermeneutics, that of heteronomism (dilige) and 
heteromorphism (et quod vis fac).87   
The first kind of difference, of heteronomism, is the sober, self-effacing, 
Rabbinical posture of being responsive to the call of the other and the call to love 
(dilige) the other—of placing one in the position of a “non-coercive heteronomy.”88  
For Caputo, this ethical heteronomism—displaying heavily Levinasian overtones—
takes the form of obligation.  Obligation “happens to” one inasmuch as something—
some transcendent alterity—seizes and disrupts one from without and demands one’s 
response.89 
Caputo reiterates the minimalism of radical hermeneutics in the “event” or 
“happening” of obligation.  “Obligation,” Caputo writes, “happens”—and this 
happening is groundless, in a void, without any evident further “why.”90  Obligation is 
a “responsible anarchy”—a “perspective” or “hermeneia” that grapples with the abyss 
(being without any first principle or arche) in seeing or hearing in it the call of the 
other upon one.91  Beyond this, we cannot—or, at least, Caputo admits that he does 
not—know what obligation “is.”92  On this minimalist account of obligation, the locus 
of the event or happening of obligation is simply the vulnerable and suffering “flesh” 
of the other.93 
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This first kind of difference, of heteronomic obligation, finds expression in a 
radical partiality to the singular, individual other that is before one.94  Caputo, 
following Derrida, speaks of this obligation to the singular other in terms of “the 
undeconstructibility of justice”—that the ideal of justice is to respond to needs of the 
radical singularity of the particular other.95  This ethical privileging of radical, 
ineffable, unanticipated singularity in obligation is stated—by Caputo, following 
Derrida, in the “hyperbolic” statement: tout autre est tout autre—“every other is 
wholly other.”96  
A post-metaphysical ethics is an ethics of obligation.  “Obligation,” Caputo 
argues, “is what is important about ethics, what ethics contains without being able to 
contain.”97  Obligation is the core of ethics that metaphysical ethics is based upon and 
betrays, that scandalizes metaphysical ethics, and to which post-metaphysical seeks to 
be faithful.98 
The second kind of difference or heterology, that of heteromorphism, is the 
exuberant, carnivalistic, Dionysiac posture of celebrating difference (et quod vis fac) 
as multiplicity and diversity.99  Such an ethical heteromorphism is an “ethics of 
Gelassenheit” which enjoins humility and caution before the play of things—a 
“letting be” that is maximally nonconstraining and proceeds “in such a way as to keep 
as many options open as possible.”100  This “ethics of Gelassenheit” (from the 
Heideggerian side of radical hermeneutics) also opens toward an equally 
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heteromorphic “ethics of dissemination” (from the Derridean side).  The humble 
letting-be makes one a more active advocate of toleration of plurality—of 
nonexclusionary egalitarianism that seeks “to let many flowers bloom.”101  
For Caputo, such a heterological, post-metaphysical ethics—an ethics without 
ethics that follows radical hermeneutics’ metaphysics without metaphysics—
functions to place an accent on the difficulty of ethical relation.  Post-metaphysical 
ethics sees that we act lacking unshakable metaphysical foundations and thus with a 
heightened awareness of our insecurity—of our “fear and trembling.”102  We are, 
again, in a situation of undecidability, in which we have to make ethical decisions and 
judgments without any sure guidelines that would answer our questions ahead of 
time.103 
Caputo’s post-metaphysical ethics effectively re-inscribes ethics within the 
“repetition” of radical hermeneutics.  In ethical repetition the individual seeks to 
constitute, to produce the self (whose existence precedes its essence).104  However, in 
seeking to constitute the self as ethical, ethical repetition presses toward a privilege 
for the other that is also a de-centering of the self.  Ethical repetition is in need of—
focused/centered around—the other.105  Thus, ethical repetition deconstructs its own 
project, in that in order to achieve itself it has to become something else.  Put 
otherwise, if the other is only a function of a project of self-becoming, it is not truly 
other—ethics is not ultimately about self-becoming (even this constructed stability is 
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too stable).  This “something else” is a “hyperbolic” ethics—a religious ethics—that 
is even further purified of metaphysics.  It is thus that an awareness of the difficulty of 
ethical life leads one to the use of religious language.  Disentangling oneself from a 
faithless metaphysics in order to be faithful to life and to the other brings one more 
and more into the realm of “faith”—the domain of properly religious faith. 
This further disentanglement of ethics from metaphysics can be seen in the 
strong conclusions of Caputo’s post-metaphysical ethics (without ethics).  The first 
strong conclusion is the denial of ethics inasmuch as it entails a metaphysical 
knowledge of ethical guides—the only acceptable ethics is one that operates without 
metaphysics—that is, without the aforementioned “ethics.”  Following closely is the 
second strong conclusion of Caputo’s post-metaphysical ethics—echoing that of his 
radical hermeneutics—which is the denial of the significance of metaphysical 
knowledge for truly ethical living. 
 
Caputo’s Critique of Religion 
 
Religion, for Caputo, is also susceptible to metaphysical faithlessness.  Such 
metaphysical religion is detrimental to a properly religious faith insofar as it is an 
abstract system of certain propositions that privileges static unity in order to provide a 
stable foundation for life that undercuts a properly religious faith. 
Metaphysical religion elevates the knowledge of God or the divine or the 
absolute to an absolute level.  Such metaphysical religion inscribes God into an onto-
theo-logical (metaphysical) framework in which God functions as a highest being and 
first cause.  It forgets that religion is a human practice, and that all such onto-theo-
logical frameworks are never more absolute than their finite makers.106  This 
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metaphysical religion is detrimental to a properly religious faith in that it supplants 
religious existence with a metaphysical knowledge fixated on abstract propositions—
confusing “religious life with assenting to certain propositions.”107  
Metaphysical religion’s fixation on abstract propositions entails talking of God 
in terms of a systematic universality and sameness.  Metaphysical religion absolutizes 
propositions about God which are but contingent human artifacts—it confuses the 
infinite transcendence of God with human religion, elevating the latter to the status of 
the former.108  Such religious systems present themselves as attaining a rigorous and 
certain status which is, in fact, beyond human capacities.109  This kind of theological 
system presents God as an ultimate static unity—as a “God of the same”—that is 
subordinated to Greek ontology.110  For Caputo, such a systematically constructed 
“God of the same” functions to privilege an exclusivist hierarchy.111 
Metaphysical religion’s fixation on conceiving of God in terms of unity, 
sameness and universality functions to give life a stable foundation that makes light of 
and thus undercuts the difficulty of a properly religious faith.  Metaphysical religion 
seeks a “Secret” or a “heavenly hook” to “bail us out and lift us above the flux of 
undecidability.”112  The radically finite situation of human life in the midst of the flux 
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that is recognized in the radically hermeneutical concept of repetition severely limits 
the kind of claims theology can make.113 
For Caputo, the metaphysical knowledge of God supplants religious life—
living religious faith.  Thus, the conclusion of Caputo’s critique of religion can be 
summarized in that metaphysical religion (1) elevates the knowledge of God to a 
falsely absolute status and (2) ultimately supplants a properly religious faith.  The 
motivating concerns behind his seeking an alternative to this kind of religion are (as 
with metaphysics and ethics), first, a desire for a properly/realistically humble regard 
for our knowledge of God and, second, an interest in preserving the properly 
existential/lived character of religious faith. 
 
Caputo’s Post-Metaphysical Religion: Religion without Religion 
 
For Caputo, post-metaphysical religion, or “religion without religion,” is 
faithful to “God”—is a properly religious faith—insofar as it denies the knowledge of 
God and the significance of such knowledge for religious faith and thus opens the way 
for a passionate love of God that is embodied in the love of the other.  Post-
metaphysical religion, as a “more chastened” notion of religious faith, begins with the 
death of the God of metaphysics—of onto-theo-logy—the God that is tailored to fit 
knowledge.114  This post-metaphysical religion consists of a properly religious faith 
that is free from faithless (to life, to the other, to faith) metaphysics.  Such religion is a 
“religion without religion” in that here one can “be deeply and abidingly ‘religious’ 
with or without theology, with or without the religions”—that is, with or without any 
particular or determinate claims to religious knowledge.115 
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Experience and The Love of God 
Properly religious faith is fundamentally concerned with passion or, more 
specifically, a “passion of non-knowing”116—a passion for the impossible that 
constitutes a (if not the) structure of experience.  This structure of experience is a 
passion for and affirmation of the tout autre, of a wholly other that breaks open the 
present horizon of possibility—that looks forward to something new and un-looked 
for, to the impossible.117  Caputo goes so far as to say that the religious is what 
constitutes experience as experience—in that only with the impossible does one truly 
experience something new.118  This “religious edge to experience,” Caputo writes, 
“that notion of life at the limit of the possible, on the verge of the impossible, 
constitutes a religious structure, the religious side of every one of us.”119  We can thus 
see a similar movement in Caputo’s treatment of repetition as a fundamental structure 
of experience that is religious insomuch as genuine repetition only occurs when one 
sees that repetition is not possible for one to achieve—when one sees that repetition is 
impossible—and then opens to that beyond the self for the transformation of the 
self.120  Following Derrida, Caputo names this fundamental passion for the impossible 
in human experience as “the love of God” —which is religion.121  For Derrida and 
Caputo, “the name of God” is “the name of what we desire and love without question, 
sans voir, sans avoir, sans savoir”—“God” is the impossible (without seeing, 
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possessing or knowing) we passionately desire.122  Thus, the passion of life leads us to 
the love of God. 
From “God” to Love 
The passion of life that is the love of God entails a deep attunement and 
directedness toward “the other.”  God, as “the impossible,” is “the coming 
(l’invention) of the other.”123  For Caputo, post-metaphysical religion is to be (with 
radical hermeneutics and post-metaphysical ethics) heterological.  The heteronomism 
of post-metaphysical religion is evident in that the God of properly religious faith is 
“an absolute heterogeneity that unsettles all the assurances of the same within which 
we comfortably ensconce our selves”—in short, “the God of the other.”124 
At the heart of Caputo’s reflections on “God” and “the other” is the close 
relationship between religion and obligation.  In both obligation and religion, there is 
a bond between the singular individual and the singular other.  Following Levinas and 
Derrida, Caputo recognizes a  structural identity between religion and obligation. 
Religion is obligation to a singularity that is higher than the universal.125  Religion is, 
the re-ligare, which means the one-on-one bond of the existing 
individual with the Absolute, the absolute relation to the Absolute.  
The re-ligare is the ob-ligare, the absolute bond, the obligation, but 
without the shelter afforded by the universal. 126  
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In obligation and religion, one is subject to a call, an unconditional 
solicitation.  As religion reflects obligation, so does obligation reflect religion, in that 
with obligation we experience an other that commands respect and has a mysterious 
depth to it.127  In both, one is structurally “on the receiving end.”128  The “power” in 
both obligation and religion is that of the call, the appeal, not that of the ontological 
(metaphysical) status of the caller.  Thus, in obligation and religion “something 
unconditional happens, without sovereignty and without being, without force and 
without power”—“whose only power is the power of a powerless but unconditional 
appeal.”129  Caputo’s religious project can thus be seen as an effort to conceive of a 
God “without sovereignty” in terms of obligation to the other.130 
At the core of Caputo’s conception of the relation between religion and 
obligation is the Derridean understanding of the tout autre.  “Tout autre,” Derrida 
says, “est tout autre.”131  In other (English) words, every other is wholly other.  The 
relation that is obligation—that we have with every singular, human “other”—is 
identical with the relation that is religion—that we have with a singular, “absolute,” 
wholly “Other.”132  Caputo writes approvingly that for Derrida “it is enough for ‘God’ 
to be the name of the absolutely other, a place holder for the tout autre”—this is “the 
work done by the name of God, the value of religious discourse and religious 
stories.”133  
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Thus, religion—the kind of relation one has with God—is a hyperbolic way of 
speaking of obligation—of one’s “hypersensitivity” to the demands of the other.134  
This is Caputo’s understanding of Levinas’ “unlikely story” of the other and absolute 
alterity.135  The absolutely Other is “a poetic and hyperbolic name for the fact, as it 
were, of obligation, of heteronomy…a way of saying: obligation happens, 
emphatice!”  It is a way of speaking of “an extreme of responsibility, of 
responsiveness and sensibility to the demands of singularity.”136  
God or Love? 
On the more heteromorphic side of this post-metaphysical, heterological 
religion, Caputo sees religious faith as an essentially (even radically) hermeneutical 
enterprise that deals with certain basic undecidable situations.  Religious faith for 
Caupto is a kind of hermeneutics.137  As such, faith operates under the “disconcerting 
conditions” of undecidability—with the reading of ambiguous traces that cannot be 
absolutely tracked down—with making its way in the dark flux of existence.138  
Religious faith has to deal with the tragic sense of life—the persistence of the abyss—
that perpetually throws it into question.  Religion is anxiously “co-constituted” with 
its non-religious other that sees an abysmal, anonymous nothing behind life—that 
sees life and its suffering as an innocent and meaningless becoming.139  The tragic 
view, in which flux rules all, cannot be excluded or silenced.  Faith must own up to 
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it—include it in itself.  Whereas Caputo, in his earlier work—up to Radical 
Hermeneutics—could resolve the tension, in a sense, by conceiving of religious faith 
as a (quasi-Heideggerian) mystical experience of the flux, the abyss itself, in his 
subsequent work he prefers a fundamental and persistent (Derridean) undecidability 
between the religious and the Nietzschean tragic view.140  Thus, the love of and 
obligation to the other that constitute the heart of a post-metaphysical religion are 
themselves construals—seeing compassion as meaningful—on the face of an 
anonymous and loveless force/flux/nothing/abyss.141 
The other and, in his more recent work, more prominent undecidability 
inherent in properly religious faith is that obtaining between “God” and “love.”  We 
ultimately do not, and cannot, know whether “love” is an example of, a way of telling 
us something about, God or if “God” is an example of, a way of telling us something 
about, love.142  This reflects the undecidability intimated above between the other and 
God to whom we are absolutely obligated.143  Properly religious faith exists in the 
“endless substitutability and translatability” between “God” and “love.”144 
“God”/“Love” 
A key point to which Caputo repeatedly returns is that undecidability is not a 
recipe for indecision and inaction, for the abolition of faith and deeds, but the 
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condition for the possibility of faith.145  The “post-metaphysical” non-knowing that 
puts our knowledge of reality in a permanent state of undecidability is what makes 
post-metaphysical religious faith other to (all too metaphysical) knowledge.  For 
Caputo, faith, as a decision in the face of undecidability, is fundamentally tied up with 
action. 
In the end, the basic and inescapable undecidability between God and love 
functions to elicit loving action and deed.  Ultimately, it does not matter what is an 
example of—what exemplifies—what.   It ultimately does not matter which is 
ultimate.146  What does matter—what follows regardless of which is which—is action.  
Either or both call us to become different, actively loving people.147  In fact, Caputo 
goes so far as to say that “God” is a word that is less a name of a “what” than a 
“how,” an invitation to action, “the name of a deed”—whose force is more pragmatic 
than semantic.148  Thus, in the end, it does not matter if a properly religious faith is 
“religious” (talking about God) or not, as long as it is loving.149  Properly religious 
faith is reducible to loving obligation to the other, without remainder.  It is thus that 
one can “be deeply and abidingly ‘religious’ with or without theology, with or without 
the religions.”150  
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In sum, Caputo’s religion without religion is marked by certain strong 
conclusions.  The first strong conclusion is the denial of metaphysical knowledge of 
the absolute or God, in that such is a mask for absolute knowledge.  What is 
emphasized instead is one’s fundamental position of non-knowing.  The second strong 
conclusion is the denial of the significance of metaphysical knowledge for religious 
life.  What is important is the passion.  A genuine religious faith (or love) that is 
dragged down by or hoisted up into a “faithless” metaphysics is thus betrayed. 
 
“Faithless” Metaphysics or Genuine Religious Faith 
 
In Caputo’s work, one is ultimately faced with a choice between a “faithless” 
metaphysics and genuine religious faith—true religion.  This “bad faith” metaphysics 
is not faithful or honest to life (to “who we are”) and, as such, leads to bad faith in 
relating to others and to God.  On the other side, metaphysics without metaphysics, 
ethics without ethics, and religion without religion coincide in a single way of being 
that is faithful to existence in the flux and is faithful in obligation to the singular 
other, which is the same as being faithful to “God.”   
This progression from metaphysics to its/the other is manifest in how Caputo 
presents several positions, or rather, “denials,” regarding metaphysics, ethics, and 
religion.  Regarding metaphysics, Caputo—motivated by concern about metaphysics’ 
elevation of knowledge of reality to a falsely absolute status and supplanting the 
living of life (in the midst of the flux of actuality) with the knowledge of reality (so 
falsely elevated)—denies any robust knowledge of reality (or metaphysics) as well as 
the significance of any such robust knowledge (metaphysics) for life.  Regarding 
ethics, Caputo—motivated by concern about ethics’ elevation of the knowledge of 
ethical guides to a falsely absolute status and supplanting genuine ethical existence in 
all its difficulty with the knowledge of ethical guides (so falsely elevated)—denies 
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any ethics that entails (metaphysical) knowledge of ethical guides and the significance 
of any such ethical knowledge for truly ethical living.  Regarding religion, Caputo—
motivated by concern about metaphysical religion’s elevation the knowledge of God 
to a falsely absolute status and supplanting a properly religious faith—denies any 
metaphysical knowledge of the absolute or God and the significance of metaphysical 
knowledge for genuine religious faith.  
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CHAPTER TWO: METAPHYSICS 
 
This chapter will follow this plan:  In Part One, Desmond’s understanding 
metaphysics (as “metaxological”) is systematically presented.  In Part Two, this 
vision of metaphysics is compared to that of Caputo; in so doing, Desmond’s 
metaxological metaphysics is presented as a viable and indeed preferable alternative 
to LeviNietzschean “radical hermeneutics.” 
PART ONE: A PRESENTATION OF WILLIAM DESMOND’S METAPHYSICS 
Section I: Of Metaphysics in the Present Age 
§1. “Metaphysics” 
Metaphysics asks the question of being.  It inquires into the meaning of 
being—the significance of the “to be.”151  Metaphysics also asks the ultimate “why” 
of being: why being and not nothing?152  William Desmond understands the “meta” of 
metaphysics as double, as referring to how it is to meditate on both the “beyond” 
(implicit in the question of the “why” of being) and the “in the midst” of being as 
intimately related—an “interpretive fidelity” to the emergent happenings in the 
middle that refer one to otherness and transcendence.153  Part of the being “in the 
midst” that Desmond considers to be good meta-physics is its awareness that it always 
starts too late—in media res—in the middle of things.154  In this middle, the 
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metaphysician encounters and struggles with an excess of being—not merely 
indeterminate but plural and “overdeterminate”155—that gives rise to the astonishment 
and perplexity that constitute abiding engine of metaphysical thought.156  This 
excessive or gratuitous surplus of given being calls at once for a metaphysical 
thinking that is an act of gratitude for such gratuity157 and for a mindfulness that is 
itself generous toward its objects, its others.158  Such a generous endeavor to best 
mindfully interpret the plenitude of being must, for Desmond, be itself plural—
plurivocal—it must take up Aristotle’s observation: to on legetai pollachōs (“being is 
said in many ways”).159  As seeking to do justice to this fullness, metaphysics requires 
a finesse that recognizes that being—and our best intelligent understanding of 
being—extends beyond the horizons of determinate intelligibility and so disquiets our 
thinking and strains our language.160  Given his view of the complex and difficult (if 
not daunting) task of being true to the fullness of being, Desmond sees metaphysical 
thinking as entailing an awareness of inevitable failure,161 that it is an uncertain 
venture—a wager and a promise162—and as such calls for humility.163  Metaphysics 
never truly leaves behind the singularity of the thinker for the anonymity of a system, 
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for metaphysics is always undertaken in a particular between (it “starts too late”) and 
bears the singular existential burden of its uncertain wager.164 
Granting his view of metaphysics, it is not difficult to see Desmond’s rejection 
of the post-metaphysical perspective.  Desmond sees such a perspective as unfairly 
totalizing metaphysics in terms of a rigid totalizing univocity—a fascism of 
concepts.165  There is no completion or realization or consummation or end of 
metaphysics that brings it to a close and to an end, for the sources and tasks (ends) of 
metaphysical thinking are perennial and exceed complete determinate 
objectification.166  Metaphysics is not something to be overcome.  Indeed, for 
Desmond, it cannot be; it is inescapable—for all reflection is dependent on and 
complicit in the question of the meaning of the “to be” that moves us to wonder and 
perplexity.167  Metaphysics proceeds from an inherent exigence—from our need to 
think it.168 
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§2. A Heterological Speculum 
This conception of metaphysics lies at the core of Desmond’s vision of a 
different kind of practice of speculative philosophy—“a speculative philosophy of 
non-identity” in which thought thinking itself is not the destination (removed into 
itself in contemplation of its union with the universal) but a way-station on thought’s 
way to thinking what is irreducibly other to thought.169  One need not be a Hegelian to 
be a speculative philosopher.170  Such a suggestion of a speculative philosophy of 
non-identity, however, appears against the backdrop of what Desmond recognizes as a 
certain ambiguity—if not ambivalence—within the western philosophical tradition 
that is at least partially responsible for the contemporary phenomena of philosophy’s 
becoming a problem to itself—for its “unsureness about its own enterprise.”171  The 
philosophical tradition is not simple and unilinear—leading toward some 
consummation, completion and/or exhaustion.172  The tradition is mixed with such a 
speculative philosophy of non-identity as Desmond proposes and a certain reductive 
tendency.  This tendency privileges thought thinking itself over thought thinking its 
other, the abstract over the concrete and elemental, universal philosophy over the 
singular philosopher’s philosophizing, the static over the dynamic.173  Such a 
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tendency yields an excessively narrow view of reason as “determinate cognition of the 
determinate”—falling in the direction of scientism or positivism.174 
Taking speculative philosophy in a different direction from this tendency, 
Desmond suggests philosophy as a mindfulness of what is at work in the middle of 
our existence—of our inescapable being in relation to what is other in terms of 
determinate or indeterminate intelligible mediation (or intermediation).175  This 
speculative mind would be a watching of the play of life that is more akin to ancient 
theoria that  “contemplatively enjoys being as it is” and in which one is open to being 
in its otherness.176  True speculative philosophy for Desmond is a receptive 
contemplation that “introduces a rupture into habitual seeing”—that reawakens 
astonishment before this otherness of being.177 
 As such an other-wise speculation—reflecting with and upon a heterological 
speculum—philosophy has a double exigency (or imperative or requirement or 
desideratum).178  The first exigency stresses thought remaining true to its own form of 
mindfulness with coherence and consistency—the self-mediation of thought thinking 
itself.179  The second exigency stresses thought beyond self-mediation that is open to 
the otherness of being—open to finding “its self-mediations ruptured by forms of 
otherness that its categories cannot completely master”—the intermediation of 
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thought thinking its other.180  In Desmond’s thought, speculative philosophy, having a 
tendency to privilege and fixate upon the first exigency, progresses from the first to 
the second—in that thought thinking itself (itself) leads to (opens beyond itself to) 
thought thinking its other.181 
This progression of speculative thought beyond itself is a process of breaking 
down and breaking through.  Speculative philosophy not only entertains but mindfully 
safeguards irreducible perplexities that constitute a breakdown—a self-debunking—of 
thought’s claims of self-sufficiency and absolute, self-certain knowing.182  It concerns 
itself with the limits, the extremities of thought.183  This kind of speculative 
philosophy, as Desmond presents it, can then come to find a new kind of affirmation 
breaking through its own breakdown—a festivity of mind, a speculative “yes” that 
makes mind “agapeic.”184 
§3. The (First) Ethos — The Between 
The kind of metaphysics that Desmond proposes is a reflective mindfulness of 
the community of being.  This community of being—as a plurivocal community that 
sustains otherness in relation—is called “the ethos” or “the ontological ethos” and 
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“the between” in Desmond’s work.185  “The between”—“the middle”—is our given 
place in being as between being and non-being.186  It is the primal, primordial and 
elemental ethos that is matrix or milieu of all our subsequent (if always already 
present) constructions.187  Our dwelling in this most basic given ontological ethos is 
not neutral; the ethos manifests the worth of being, the value inherent in the given, its 
hospitality to the good.188  The ethos is charged with value.189 
This charged ethos is the ontological context for all our self-mediations and 
intermediations—for all of our participation in and reconfiguration of the ethos in 
terms of our more specific presuppositions.190  It is the overdetermined matrix from 
and within which we make our more determinate judgments and valuations.  It is 
because of a more excessive preexisting goodness or worth in being that we can think 
goodness or value or worth at all.  We think and value determinately from the 
overdeterminate resources of the ontological ethos.191  The ethos/between is a prior 
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happening192 and givenness that is always already given and, as such, contains the 
promise/potentiality/possibility of the fulfillment/realization/actualization of 
beings.193  As so overdetermined, the ethos is equivocal—lacking precisely (and so 
not precisely lacking) in its fullness—not reducible to simple univocal 
determinations.194  The enabling resource then comes to look more ambiguous—a 
chiaroscuro that makes us uneasy about the meagerness of our knowing and valuing 
and demands a more finessed, more artful dwelling.195 
Metaphysics, for Desmond, is to be just such a dwelling.  One of metaphysics’ 
great tasks is mindfulness of this primal ethos—tracing the contours of the between—
the community of being that enables our thinking and being.196  Further, when 
metaphysics tries to reflect upon the ethos it tries to reflect on its own source.  Here 
the between is the ethos of the intimate strangeness of being—as intimately present 
yet overdeterminate, thus enigmatic—that occasions our astonishment and perplexity 
and awakens us to mindfulness as such.197 
§4. The Second Ethos — The Present Age — (Post)Modernity 
Desmond presents a further complication of this picture of the ethos.  Within 
the matrix of the first, primal ethos there is constructed a second, reconfigured ethos.  
This reconfigured ethos is made up of the more determinate judgments and valuations 
that we come up with to get a handle on the fullness of the between.  This process 
(call it hermeneutics?) naturally causes certain aspects of the community of being to 
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come into focus while it throws others into recess.  The problem, as Desmond sees it, 
is that the dominant reconfigured ethos in the last several centuries—the present age, 
modernity—has functioned to cut off mindfulness from some of the deeper, 
overdeterminate resources of the primal ethos, or the between, such that “the 
constructed ethos tries to absorb the giving ethos” without remainder.198 
The modern ethos, as Desmond understands it, is pervasively instrumental and 
pragmatic—seeking to have determinate knowledge and thus control over beings.199 
This impulse comes to manifestation in the two-fold process of the objectification of 
being and the subjectification of value that Desmond describes as the “double face of 
modernity.”200  Being is objectified in that it is neutralized or devalued or evacuated—
emptied of any value or worth or goodness in itself—and made into a “merely 
empirical” mechanism.201  The subjectification of value comes about as there is a 
“revaluation” of value in terms of human self-determination,202 that comes to see the 
supreme value as freedom understood in terms of human autonomy—ultimately 
flowering to reveal its core in the will to power.203  The objectification of being serves 
the purposes of the subjectification of value (for there is no other value but that 
imposed upon the world by human power), while the subjectification of value drives 
the objectification of being (for humans cannot be truly autonomous if there is any 
value or good other than that which they create).  The end result is an 
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instrumentalized ethos in which being has value only insofar as it serves human will 
to power—the autonomia turannos.204 
The result of this two-fold process and its instrumentalization of the ethos is a 
trajectory toward distrust, hostility, and ultimately a kind of nihilism.  The 
objectification of being makes the ethos into a “neutral medium of valueless 
happening” yielding a “devalued soil of otherness.”205  Where the primal ethos does 
not “fit” the purposes of autonomous humanity—when its equivocity resists 
determinate intelligibility—the modern ethos distrusts this equivocal intransigence 
and seeks to secure itself there against.206  With this distrust of the equivocity of the 
ethos comes the modern mind’s methodical doubt and suspicion of being other than 
itself, leading to a hostile, oppositional stance toward the ethos of being.207  This 
hostility of autonomous, value-creating humanity toward the valueless ethos moves 
toward nihilism, in that the same humans who claim to create value participate 
themselves in the valueless whole.208  The end result is that the only value in the 
universe is the product of worthless humanity’s inherently valueless valuations.  In 
this nihilism, there is made manifest the loss of the fullness and the intimate 
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strangeness (or strange intimacy) of the ethos in the modern ethos.209 
From this perspective, Desmond sees so-called “postmodern” thought as (at 
least partially) diagnosing certain problems with modernity—such as its fixation on 
excessively dualistic thinking and on univocal determinate intelligibility.210  
Nonetheless, Desmond sees the postmodern as partaking of the same modern ethos.  
Postmodernism is perhaps more of a kind of “hypermodernism”—a self-
determination become self-laceration.211  Postmodernism, for Desmond, is 
modernism—a denizen of the same modern, reconfigured ethos212—but taken to an 
extreme of deconstructing the sole constructions of value (human constructions) 
allowed by the modern ethos.  One can see how Desmond rejects postmodern talk 
about metaphysics as culminating in nothing more than disguised totalizing 
instrumental reason as itself a totalization operating from within just such an 
instrumental framework.  At the same time, Desmond does recognize a totalizing 
tendency of some (especially modern) metaphysics and criticizes it himself.213 
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ear to the ground to hear the muffled tramplings of the Zeitgeist.  It is because I think there is a matter 
to be thought which all the philosophers have tried to think.” 
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Section II: The Fourfold Sense of Being 
(The Fourfold) 
Desmond begins his metaphysics with the “how” of metaphysics—how it 
proceeds—how to go about talking about being.  This “how” of metaphysics or being 
takes the form of a “logic” reminiscent of—and indeed related to—that of Hegelian 
dialectic but with important differences—regarding the nature and the importance of 
difference.  This “logic” (though Desmond does not call it such) intends to lay out a 
plurality of ways of talking about and relating to being, taking a clue from Aristotle’s 
“to on legetai pollachōs” —“being is said in many ways.”214  Desmond’s name for 
this plurality is “the fourfold sense of being.”215  This fourfold sense of being 
proposes a way to think about metaphysics, and our relation to what is other to 
thought, that is plurivocal and thus appropriate to the plural fullness or 
overdetermination of given being.216  Desmond writes:217  
My claim is that the fourfold sense of being offers a flexible systematic 
framework that allows us complexly and very comprehensively to 
interpret the variety of possible relations, and the very ontological 
richness of what is at stake in each of the perplexities. 
 
Such a plural and flexible framework is necessary in order to deal with the complex 
interplay of many elements—unity and multiplicity, sameness and 
difference/otherness, immediacy and mediation, determinacy and indeterminacy, 
immanence and transcendence—that is entailed in our understanding of being and in 
being itself.218  One moves through the fourfold sense of being, propelled by a 
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The fourfold sense of being is the basis for Desmond’s understanding of selves or ethical selvings (how 
we relate to our selves), of human ethical communities (how we relate to others) and of God and 
religion (how God relates to humans and the world in general and how we relate to God). 
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dunamis, an immanent exigency, an eros whose orientation toward/desire for 
wholeness and otherness drives thought through the breakdown of less whole, less 
true understandings of being until all of the senses are teleologically suspended in the 
open whole of the metaxological community of being, that is the true. 
§1. The Univocal 
The first of the fourfold is the univocal sense of being.  The univocal sense 
stresses immediate unity and simple sameness over multiplicity, mediation and 
difference.219  There is a unity, sometimes an immediate unity, between mind and 
being or between self and other.  In this univocal relation, there is a heavy emphasis 
on determinacy such that all being is seen to be determinately intelligible—“that to be 
is to be intelligible, and that to be intelligible is to be determinate.”220  Thus, mind 
can, in principle, know being fully and without remainder.221  So the univocal sense 
can be understood as a kind of “naïve realist” position that holds forth an ideal of 
“objective mind.”222 
The univocal sense of being is at once true and untrue to being—bearing an 
indispensable role but intimating senses beyond itself.  Desmond sees the univocal 
sense as true to being, indeed as necessary to talk about being, in that we need 
determination to identify and distinguish in the happening of the between.223  Yet it is 
when univocity is made the exclusive sense of being that one encounters problems, 
namely that it cannot account for the complexity either in the external 
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object/other/being or in the internal subject/self/mind or in their relation to each 
other.224  Univocity in trying to fix truth determinately—in seeking to attain 
comprehensive consistency and coherence—runs against limits that undermine its 
claims to absoluteness.225  Univocity, pressed to the extreme of making such absolute 
claims, subverts itself in two principle ways.  First (on the side of the object/other), 
univocity abstracts itself from the chiaroscuro of being and ignores what does not fit 
into its determinate framework—thus equivocally contradicting itself by actually 
ignoring that to which it intends to attend.226  Second (on the side of the subject/self), 
the univocal sense of being cannot univocally account for the will to univocity—the 
desire to account for all of being in terms of determinate intelligibility—itself.227 
§2. The Equivocal 
The second of the fourfold sense of being is the equivocal.  The equivocal 
sense stresses manyness over unity, difference over sameness, ambiguity over 
clarity.228  It calls attention to unmediated (even un-mediat-able) difference—seeing a 
sheer plurality and a fragmented dispersal that cannot be brought into any kind of a 
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 BB 81-82. 
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BDD 762: “the equivocal sense accentuates diversity, the unmediated difference of being and mind, 
sometimes to the point of setting them into oppositional otherness.” 
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unity.229  There is such a stress on immediate difference that there is little if any 
relation between mind and being—there is no mediation between self and other.  
Otherness recedes into unintelligibility.  Thus, the equivocal sense of being stresses 
indeterminacy in our relation to being—a doubling of voices that cannot be brought to 
a unity.230  This reflects a kind of “subjective mind” that sees no community between 
mind and being (and any supposed community being but as a subjective projection) 
that one finds in a strong empiricism or skepticism.231 
The equivocal sense, like the univocal, is at once true and untrue to being—
bearing an indispensable role but intimating senses beyond itself.  The equivocal 
sense of being, for Desmond, is truthful in that it points to the equivocity in being 
itself—in being’s becoming.  The equivocal sense calls attention to being as an 
ongoing process (a “universal impermanence”) in which there is often an 
intermingling of opposites and in which univocal determinate labels thus have limited 
staying power.232  However, the equivocal sense, taken on its own, advocates a sheer 
plurality that is merely fragmenting.  Here being and mind are set in opposition to one 
another such that there is no relation but only unmediated difference.233  Like 
univocity, equivocity is a privative relation in which there is only a negative sense of 
separation.  The univocal and the equivocal senses “are two sides of the same 
orientation to the immediate” that sees all relation in such either/ors as total 
presence/absence, total union/difference, total determinate-clarity/indeterminate-
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ambiguity.234  The equivocal sense, again like the univocal, subverts itself in that 
remaining with sheer equivocity means not only the dispersal of being but the 
dissolution of mindfulness itself.  There is no reason the absolute claim of equivocity 
should stand when all other absolute claims cannot.  The, as Desmond sees it, inherent 
drive of mindfulness cannot stop with equivocity’s mere fragments; it calls for a 
deeper understanding of the differences, othernesses and ambiguities in the flux of 
being.235  This calls for the mediating work of the dialectical sense of being. 
§3. The Dialectical 
The dialectical is the third of the fourfold sense of being.  The dialectical 
sense, unlike the univocal and equivocal, stresses neither simple sameness nor simple 
difference.  Ultimately, the dialectical stresses a unity of the same and the different—
a unity produced from the side of the self to encompass the difference of otherness.236  
The dialectical seeks to recover or return to the promise of the univocal sense beyond 
the difference and dispersal of the equivocal.237  The dialectical sees the contradiction 
of the equivocal not as a dead end for thought, but as a source to drive thinking on to 
seek a better determination of the significance of such contradiction and ultimately of 
the meaning of being.238  The dialectic dwells with otherness by placing it in the 
context of—by subsuming it within—a deeper togetherness, a larger whole, a more 
embracing totality.239  This greater unity is thought itself—thought that thinks itself in 
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subsuming whole, all the way to the whole of all wholes, which is the absolute absorbing totality.” 
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thinking its other.240 
The dialectical sense of being seeks to attain unity through mediation.  The 
mediation of difference is an expression of the self-transcending dynamism of thought 
which is itself internally differentiated and complex—itself a process of finding unity 
in difference.241  Mediation endeavors to think through the immediate equivocity, 
difference and ambiguity of being.242  Dialectical mediation tends to see all mediation 
in terms of self-mediation—difference and otherness is ultimately but an occasion for 
the self to come understand itself—to return to itself—to attain greater self-
consciousness.243  With regards to determinacy, the dialectical sense sees self-
mediation as proceeding  through a process of self-determination.  The dialectical 
sense agrees with the univocal in taking all being to be determinately intelligible, but 
it also sees this as the fruit of a process in which the indeterminate is shown—or 
made—to be determinate by the thinking self.244  This self-mediation and self-
determining dialectical sense of being can be understood in terms of idealism—an 
“erotic mind” that strives to incorporate all otherness into itself.245 
The dialectical sense, like the univocal and the equivocal sense of being, is at 
once true and untrue to being.  The dialectical sense of being, for Desmond, is truthful 
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in that it points to the necessity of thinking through the ambiguity and instability of 
partial truths and of coming to have some intelligible understanding of being in its 
becoming and its otherness.246  The dialectical points to the immanent development—
the inherent exigence—of thought as it develops and comes to further articulation and 
determination.247  However, the dialectical sense taken on its own tends to absolutize 
itself and its self-mediation such that thought thinking itself becomes a univocal 
totality that is deaf to any mediation but its own—a solipsistic circle that closes in on 
itself.248  The problem with self-mediation’s self-absolutizing is that it fails to take 
otherness or genuine plurality—as that which is other to thought thinking itself—
seriously.249  Reference to the other is always a subordinate moment to the self-
mediating whole.250 
The dialectical sense of being, again like the univocal and the equivocal, 
ultimately (in Desmond’s view) subverts itself and intimates the metaxological sense 
beyond it—dialectical thinking is itself aufgehoben, so to speak.  Desmond sees the 
dialectical sense as subverting itself in its failure to adequately pay attention to 
othernesses—transcendences and infinities within, without and above—that resist the 
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dialectical sense’s total reduction to immanent unity and remain sources of persistent 
perplexity.251  By failing to account for these othernesses, the dialectical sense fails in 
its own project of total self-mediation and calls for another—an other-wise—kind of 
mediation or dialectic that is not constrained by the dialectical sense’s univocal 
ambition.  The breakdown of the dialectical sense intimates the metaxological sense 
of being inasmuch as it presents another manner of dialectic, one displaying an 
awareness of other forms of mediation than self-mediation and “a more discriminating 
sense of otherness”—an openness to transcendences or certain irreducible excesses to 
self-mediation.252 
§4. The Metaxological 
The fourth sense of the fourfold sense of being is the metaxological.  This 
neologism of Desmond’s refers to a logos—word, discourse, account—of the 
metaxu—the between, the middle, the intermediate.  It is “a discourse concerning the 
middle, of the middle, and in the middle.”253  The metaxological sense is a discourse 
of and in the middle—a thinking that is between the totalizing closure of rigid 
univocal “objective” thinking and the fragmented discontinuity of equivocal 
“subjective” thinking.254  The metaxological sense is also a discourse concerning the 
middle—striving to be mindful of what is at work in the happening of the ethos, the 
milieu, the between of being as our given place—to be attentive to the community of 
being’s plurality of others in interrelation.255  Thus, the metaxological focuses on 
thought in terms of interest or “inter-esse”—as being moved by wonder and 
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perplexity at the fullness of our being in the between—our interest in esse arising 
from our inter-esse.256 
The metaxological sense of being stresses plurality, “doubleness,” difference 
and otherness over oneness and sameness while seeking a form of unity that is a 
being-with that is not reductive to otherness—namely, a community.  Desmond, in his 
concept of the metaxological, advocates an “affirmative doubleness”—a genuine 
plurality—that takes the dia of dialectic seriously and resists the reduction of the 
double—the plural—to a simulacrum of otherness in the self-division of the one in a 
single, dialectical process.257  Such a view of genuine doubleness or plurality places 
an accent on otherness (emphasizing Desmond’s second requirement or exigency of 
thought) even in the context of togetherness.258  Thus affirming otherness and 
togetherness leads the metaxological sense of being to present the relation between 
mind and being, between self and other, between the diversity of beings as a 
community—as a plurality of singulars in interplay in an “open whole.”259 
The metaxological sense of being also focuses on mediated relations over the 
immediate relations of the univocal and equivocal senses.  The metaxological is like 
the dialectical in its affirmation that the self and the other are neither absolutely same 
nor absolutely different.260  However, unlike the dialectical, the metaxological sees 
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the difference between the self and the other as being mediated from the side of the 
other as well as from the side of the self.  This double mediation entailed in the 
metaxological sense of being consists of both self-mediation (thought thinking itself 
in thinking its other) and intermediation (thought thinking its other)261 such that 
dialectical self-mediation is limited in its trajectory toward the self-enclosure of total 
self-mediation by the irreducible otherness of the other in its own relating to and 
mediating with consciousness.262  Thus, the metaxological sense treats the middle in 
which the self and the other meet as a plurally mediated community in which the self 
is but one mediating center of power and thus should be hospitable to the mediation of 
the other out of its otherness.263  From a hypothetical third person perspective on the 
happening of being in the between, there is a situation of general intermediation in 
which there is an open community of singulars, “a plurality of centers of active being” 
mediating out of themselves with their others—multiple self-mediating wholes 
mediating with one another such that there is an excess to any single self-mediating 
whole.264  From the first-person perspective of the involved (interested, inter-esse, 
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between-being) singular self there is, again, a situation of double mediation, of both 
self-mediation (of coming to intelligent self-articulation and self-understanding in 
relation to one’s others) and intermediation (of seeking to come to terms with the 
other in its otherness as it manifests itself to us), so as to articulate our relations with 
our others intelligently while preventing closure—while obviating the temptation to 
reduce all mediation to self-mediation in the name of total(izing) intelligibility.265  
This intermediation of the metaxological sense stresses surplus otherness—it calls 
attention to and tries to find ways of intelligently talking about the overdeterminacy 
(neither reductive univocal determinacy nor lacking equivocal indeterminacy nor 
totalizing dialectical self-determinacy) that characterizes the community of being—
the “between.”266 
 The metaxological sense of being is a plurivocal way of speaking, in kind, of 
the plural community of being.  This can be seen in two ways: first in the way that the 
metaxological sense includes or takes up the truth of the prior senses of being, and 
second in the way that the metaxological sense views genuine plurality, otherness and 
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transcendence in being.  First, the metaxological sense of being is, for Desmond, the 
truth of the other senses—it takes up their plural perspectives on being, which “is said 
in many ways.”267  The metaxological sense (or “metaxological realism”) is superior 
in that it includes or reiterates or redeems the promise of: the sense of unity and the 
lived immediacy of our community with being, the sense that we really do reach the 
other, intimated by the univocal; the awareness of a certain irreducibility to otherness, 
difference, indeterminacy and rich ambiguity recognized by the equivocal; and the 
rejection of simplistic dualism (between self and other) and the sense of togetherness 
in the midst of difference understood by the dialectical.  It does this without 
including: the fixation on determinacy and blindness to complex otherness inherent in 
the univocal (or naïve realism); the discontinuous plurality of the equivocal (or 
skeptical empiricism); or the totalizing, self-mediating holism of the dialectical (or 
idealism).268  It is thus, in its plurivocity, that the metaxological is the fullest sense of 
being—giving the fullest articulation of the overdetermined middle.269 
The second way in which the metaxological sense is plurivocal is in how it lets 
there be genuine plurality, otherness and transcendence in being.  The plurivocity of 
the metaxological sense reflects the plurality of being in its character as an 
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forms of relation and interplay between self and other, and so on.” 
BB 177: “The metaxological reiterates, first a sense of otherness not to be included in dialectical self-
mediation, second a sense of togetherness not reached by the equivocal, third a sense of rich 
ontological integrity not answered for by the univocal, and fourth a rich sense of ontological ambiguity 
not answered for either by the univocal, the equivocal, the dialectical.” 
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original astonishment.  The other three senses help to articulate the truth of the metaxological, but we 
risk error when they are absolutized and claimed to cover the entire milieu of being.” 
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overdetermined excess made up of unrepeatable singulars.270  Being is a manyness 
that necessitates a finessed many-sided thinking—able to regard simplicity and 
complexity, sameness and difference, clarity and ambiguity, stability and flux, 
immediacy and mediation, determinacy, indeterminacy, self-determination and 
overdetermination—in their relations and in their difference.  In this facet (in its 
preference for the plural) the metaxological is a kind of reinstatement of equivocal 
difference (either/or) after dialectical unity (both/and)—a both-either/or-and-both/and 
that sees genuine difference in the midst of community.271  As such, the metaxological 
sense acknowledges the “being beyond totality” of certain irreducible transcendences 
or infinitudes that cannot be reduced to a single unity: the interior infinitude of the 
self, the exterior infinitude of becoming, the superior infinitude of the absolute.272  In 
its “letting be”—in its affirmation—of these irreducible plural otherness, 
transcendences and othernesses in community, the metaxological sense of being 
intimates a kind of “agapeic mind.”273 
 
Section III: A “Phenomenology” of Being-Between 
In this section, I will lay out Desmond’s—for lack of a better term— 
“phenomenology.”  Like the “logic” of the fourfold sense of being, this 
“phenomenology” speaks of the “how” of metaphysics.  It concerns how being comes 
to manifestation in relation to thought and the progression or development of this 
relation between mind and being—between thought and its other.  As such, this 
“phenomenology of mind” displays a complex correspondence with the fourfold sense 
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of being inasmuch as it relates to the progression of individual consciousness.  In 
relation to the thought of the relation between thought and being, Desmond’s work in 
this area can be understood as a “philosophy of love” that traces the fecund tension 
between eros and agape as framed by his metaphysical (and ultimately religious) 
vision of being as a metaxological community (see Section IV).274  The progression 
here described follows a kind of chiastic structure (ABCBA) comprised of five 
moments: first astonishment, first perplexity, curiosity, second perplexity, and second 
astonishment.  In this progression, the agon between eros and agape can be resolved, 
inasmuch as other views can be seen as possessing restricted scopes that focus on 
different parts of the (restless if ultimately peaceful) whole. 
§1. First Astonishment  
Astonishment arises in response to—is occasioned by—the enigmatic, 
overdetermined excess of given being—of the ethos.275  Thought is struck into 
astonishment by the “that it is at all”: that there is something rather than nothing, the 
asymmetry between being and nothing, “the sheer being there of the world.”276  The 
givenness of being in its otherness and fullness astonishes us.277  This initial 
astonishment at givenness is overdeterminate—an awareness of an original 
unarticulated plentitude prior to and exceeding all determinate facts and definitions.278  
Not merely indeterminate or lacking, this overdetermined givenness of being is 
recognized by astonishment as excessive—being is offered to mindfulness as an 
excess, a surplus, a “too much,” an overfullness, a “pluperfection.”279 
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This excess or fullness of being incites the astonishment or wonder that, for 
Desmond, is the origin of thought, the opening of mindfulness.  Astonishment names 
this original wonder before being that is a joy or delight or trust in being—even a love 
of being.280  This astonishment or wonder is a reverence before being—an as-of-yet 
ambiguous recognition of its value (of being’s goodness) apart from us.281  Such 
wonder, such astonishment is the originating pathos of thought, the opening of 
mindfulness, the advent of metaphysical thinking—the shock or bite of otherness that 
impels the self-transcending of consciousness.282 
This first astonishment is encountered as an elemental immediacy—as an 
intimate strangeness.  In astonishment, mindfulness is intimate with being.  This 
intimacy is a spontaneously lived immediate bond—a “being-with” the other.283  It is 
mind in communication or community with being.284  In astonishment, being appears 
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to us as both intimate and strange—an otherness in which we are participating.285  
This dwelling in the intimate strangeness of being, that is astonishment, is at once 
idiotic—a private or singular existential happening (not a mere abstract category) with 
the individual I286—and elemental—a spontaneous and irreducible, essential and 
perennial immediacy.287  As such, astonishment manifests a kind of univocity—the 
lived, “rapturous” (“perlapsarian”) univocity of the “immediacy to our initial 
immersion in being.”288 
The excessive given being encountered as such an intimate strangeness is the 
giving, agapeic beginning that enables and empowers the self-transcendence of 
mindfulness in desire.  Desire has its roots in and grows from a fullness—an 
affirmative attunement to or rapport with an anterior presence—that is more primal 
than lack.289  In astonishment one finds an overdetermined resource that makes 
possible the promise of further determinate becoming.290  Prior to the active conatus 
essendi—the urge, the striving, the endeavor to be—there is a passio essendi—the 
patience or pathos or passion or undergoing or receptivity of thinking that is its 
agapeic astonishment before the fullness of being.291  This astonishment is called 
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“agapeic” in that it is both the awareness of the givenness from the other and the 
spontaneous transcending of mind toward being—a joyful, celebrating, festive 
mindfulness.292  There is here a dual opening of transcendence: first is the other’s 
transcendence opening to us in the overdeterminate intimate strangeness of givenness 
(passio essendi); second is our opening to transcendence—the “vector of 
transcendence” that is our active transcending toward the other seeking determinacy 
(conatus essendi).293  With this second opening of transcendence—the self-
transcending of thought—the eros over the agape of thought comes to the fore. 
§2. First Perplexity 
The intimate strangeness of being gives rise not only to astonishment, but also 
to perplexity.  In perplexity, the focus of mindfulness is drawn to the strangeness of 
being while the intimacy of being becomes recessed, ambiguous, ambivalent.  
Perplexity testifies to the infinite restlessness of desire within the intimacy of the 
self—that within desire there is not only the exigence to relate to the other as other, 
but also the exigence toward self-development, self-determination and wholeness.294  
This tension between infinitude (regarding relating to the irreducible otherness of the 
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transcendent others) and wholeness reflects that between the passio essendi and the 
conatus essendi in which the conatus essendi can proceed in such a way that it forgets 
or denies or puts-into-recess the dependence on the other implied in the passio essendi 
in order to give a greater emphasis to self-determination, self-will and self-mastery—
while in reality it is the givenness of being felt in the passio that makes the conatus 
possible.295 
There is a powerful equivocity to perplexity corresponding to the equivocal 
sense of being.296  Desire is an equivocal thing insofar as it is driven by both fullness 
and lack—seeing its originating fullness as privation, as wanting—the “more” is seen 
as lack.  Perplexed desire is driven by both the excess and the lack of the other.297  
Desire’s “want” is the will to power that arises from (is dependant upon) the lack over 
which the will is powerless—the search for wholeness is made possible by the 
otherness of being that is beyond the bounds of the self-determining whole.298  Not 
only is there an inner equivocity evident in desire, there is an equivocity in given 
being—in the chiaroscuro of the ethos of being.299  Perplexity recognizes this 
equivocity in the “outer” overdetermination of being as it seeks determination—as 
well as the equivocity in the “inner” conflict of desire at the root of self-determination 
itself. 
Desmond commonly describes perplexity as “erotic”—as a self-transcendence 
arising from an infinitely restless desire to overcome lack.300  Erotic perplexity carries 
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within it the dual exigency of desire—of self-fulfillment or completeness or 
wholeness on one hand and openness to otherness or transcendence on the other.301  
This duality, as Desmond often notes, is reflected in Diotima’s myth of the parentage 
of Eros in Plato’s Symposium.302  Eros is the child of Penia or poverty and drunken, 
sleeping Poros or resource or plenitude.303  Thus, there is an inherent ambiguity in 
perplexity evident in a duality between fullness and lack, poros and penia—between 
the “agape” and the “eros” of perplexity, so to speak.304  Despite this duality, 
perplexity tends to be erotic as it is driven toward the other in order to attain some 
completion, wholeness or security of the self—the other is sought as something to be 
attained or acquired or possessed as an occasion for self-fulfillment.305  However, 
perplexity like desire can be agapeic: driven by prior fullness to transcendence—
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driven to be genuinely self-transcending—to genuine relation to the other as other and 
as worthy in itself.306  The driving lack/penia of eros, driven by the conatus essendi, 
can return/progress to the fullness/poros of eros that is at once the given (passio) prior 
excess (poros) and the ful-fillment of eros’ want. 
Perplexity arises from (is roused by, is born of) astonishment before being’s 
excessive otherness regarding the meaning of given being.307  The excessive given 
encountered in astonishment is viewed in perplexity as indeed too full, such that the 
“too” of the “too full” of givenness is seen as a lacking—the overdetermined is seen 
as indeterminate, lacking determinacy.  Thus perplexity, energized by a prior 
(over)fullness, is driven by the “lack” in the overdetermined-come-indeterminate 
“fullness” toward greater determinacy.308  Indeterminate erotic perplexity—as an 
equivocal and troubled mindfulness seeking peace and resolution—is what makes us 
urgent to determine.309  The trajectory of this drive toward the determinacy of beings 
can be a drive away from the astonishing givenness of being such that perplexity can 
forget its source in such overdetermined otherness and take itself to be its own 
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source—as mere indeterminate erotic lack seeking determinate fulfillment.310  In such 
as case, perplexity that ceases to be in communication with astonishment ceases to be 
perplexity—collapses into mere urge to determinate knowledge…but this brings us 
well into the domain of curiosity.311 
§3. Curiosity 
 Curiosity is Desmond’s name for the state of relations between mind and 
being in which the mystery of being is reduced to a series of determinate questions 
with determinate answers whereby being is domesticated—calculated and cut to fit 
our purposes.  So it can be seen that with the advent of curiosity the intimate 
strangeness of being is in the process of being eclipsed.  Being lacks intimacy in that 
it is seen as but a series of beings or objects.  Being is a mere strangeness to be 
domesticated; beings are mere strangers over against us to be fixed and conquered—
strangers to be made, by us, no longer strange.312  At the heart of curiosity is desire 
that has forgotten any prior enabling givenness or fullness and has become a 
devouring willfulness seeking to incorporate and control and ultimately erase 
otherness.313  This desire is wholly concerned with its own expanding wholeness 
without the second exigency of relation to the other as other—seeing all goodness, 
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value or worth in the other (indeed, in all of being) as nothing more than functions or 
projections of the self’s desire.314 
Curiosity is driven toward definiteness, determination and univocity.315  Here, 
curiosity is seen, in Desmond’s view, to provide a necessary function: to seek out 
further determinacy where it is available.316  But this function can be potentially 
distorting inasmuch as curiosity fixates upon finding definite answers about the 
“what” of particular beings (over the more perplexing “that” of being, for instance) 
such that all being is considered to be determinately intelligible.317  Curiosity thus 
correlates to the univocal sense of being.318  Curiosity’s is an imperialistic, 
“postlapsarian” univocity (in contrast to the more passive spontaneous univocity of 
astonishment) seeking to dominate otherness in a self-projected unity—to impose a 
hegemony of the univocal in which being in all its resistant equivocity is reduced to a 
rational univocity cut to fit human interest.319 
Curiosity’s imperialistic impulse comes to the fore in what Desmond calls 
instrumental mind.  Instrumental mind is a calculative expression of erotic mind—of 
will to power over being’s otherness that is a will to a manipulable univocity over the 
uncertainty of what is not determinately intelligible.320  There is a dualism of fact and 
value that drives instrumental mind: on one side, the “degraded” or “deracinated” 
world as a valueless, inherently worthless thereness constituting a universal 
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mechanism (the objectification of being);321 on the other side, the projection of value 
onto the world so as to make what is “there” valued as useful—an instrument—to the 
self (the subjectification of value).322  This instrumental mind inherent in curiosity is 
“an ungrateful child” in that it shuns or has forgotten its own birth in the 
overdetermined and inherently valuable givenness of being beheld in astonishment 
and contemplated upon in genuine speculative philosophy—the granted (the given) is 
taken for granted (neglected) in that it is not taken for granted (as given).323 
Curiosity with its instrumental mind is, in Desmond’s reckoning, the principal 
understanding of mindfulness as such in the modern ethos.324  This is so both in terms 
of the devaluation of being and in terms of the instrumental construal of value.325  
Such modern curiosity often issues in a scientism that denigrates any understanding 
falling short of the univocal standard of determinate intelligibility and its instrumental 
utilization of being.326  The result of this ascendant curiosity is the reconfigured 
modern ethos described above (I.§4.) with its elevation of autonomy as the sole value 
(and source of value), its devaluation and neutralization of being and its suspicion, 
distrust and, ultimately, hostility toward the other. 
 Ultimately, for Desmond, curiosity can lead to its own self-destruction.  First, 
the end (or purpose) of curiosity, the total determination of being, if achieved would 
spell the end of curiosity—after all is calculated and homogenized there is no room 
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left for curiosity.327  Curiosity, if it is totally cut off from its sources in astonishment 
and perplexity, ceases to be curiosity—it is merely instrumental manipulation of mere 
thereness.328  In addition to the former hypothetical failure (regarding the completion 
of the task of curiosity), Desmond calls attention to the latter reflexive and practical 
failure of curiosity.  Second, the reflexive failure of curiosity is evident in how the 
urge to determinate intelligibility is itself not determinately intelligible—the desire for 
univocity, as with all desire, is itself equivocal.329  Third, the practical failure of 
curiosity is evident in the continual failure of coming to complete determination—
there is always a residuum, a fragment that mocks any present claims to 
completion.330  Finally, curiosity, whether it sees its failures or not, easily spawns 
nihilism, in that the instrumental revaluation of valueless being itself partakes in the 
same ontological, root valuelessness as its objects—the neutralization of being also 
neutralizes the being of the projectors of value, thus emptying out any so projected 
value.331  These breakdowns of curiosity can also be the occasion for the breakthrough 
of a second perplexity.332 
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§4. Second Perplexity 
Second perplexity is the return of perplexity—a disquieted mind before 
overdeterminate, unmastered otherness—after or beyond the determinate knowing of 
curiosity.333  This second indeterminate perplexity arises from a failure, a “coming to 
nothing,” a “being at a loss,” a breakdown in thinking.334  This is the breakdown of 
the pretension of complete and absolute (erotic) self-mediation enclosing all otherness 
within univocal categories in order to be instrumentally utilized—the breakdown of 
totalizing curiosity and instrumental mind.335  The curiosity’s totalizing and 
univocalizing thought breaks upon (as it were) limiting, unmastered otherness that, 
while unrecognized, still intrudes upon thought and through its closure.336  The 
perplexity is induced by such enduring othernesses or transcendences: by the outer 
otherness and overdeterminacy of the givenness and goodness of being at all;337 by 
the inner otherness and excess—the inner abyss—of thinking itself in its 
overdeterminate capacities for freedom and intelligibility;338 by ultimacy—otherness 
as transcendence itself, transcendence “as other”—as the ground and/or horizon of 
being and goodness, as the agapeic origin of being.339 
After the breakdown of curiosity’s univocal and instrumental mind, there are 
three options that present themselves—three directions in which perplexity can be 
developed corresponding to the equivocal, dialectical and metaxological senses of 
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being.340  First, perplexity can move in the direction of a nihilistic equivocity.  This is 
a despairing and truncated perplexity that dwells in and fixates upon the failure, the 
breakdown, the coming to nothing of the search for univocal meaning.  It is a 
skepticism issuing from a self-lacerating dissolution of univocal curiosity that rejects 
the univocal and is left with only the equivocal.341  Second, perplexity can work in a 
dialectical direction.  Here, the breakdown of univocal determinacy is seen to be 
merely a part of the process of self-determination which exceeds univocal 
determinacy.  The dialectical trajectory of perplexity—here truly “erotic” 
perplexity—encounters resistant otherness as but something to be, but yet to be, 
incorporated within a larger dialectical whole.  Erotic perplexity, as envisioning itself 
as part of a process of dialectical self-completion and self-determination, circles or 
spirals towards a greater univocity and thus seeks to return to the full or total 
determinacy sought by curiosity (“this system will be complete…tomorrow”).342  
Third and finally, perplexity can develop in the direction of the metaxological.  
Perplexity can mark a breaking of the circle of self-mediation that is also an opening 
toward otherness that exceeds self-mediation.  This perplexity is a nihilism, a “coming 
to nothing” that is not despairing but is a readiness (a patience, a passio) for the 
coming of something, of a good or a fullness that is beyond the self’s instrumental 
control.  It is a breakdown that is the possibility of a breakthrough of a renewed 
astonishment, a remembering of a prior positive power.343 
With this third trajectory, there is more of a true second perplexity—an 
equivocal place of tension between breakdown and breakthrough that is neither a 
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nihilistic collapse into nor a dialectical eclipse of the breakdown of determinate 
curiosity.  This tension is present in the intimate strangeness of being as the equivocal 
presence of the otherness of being still strange after curiosity—equivocally intimate, 
principally strange in its intimacy.344  The tension of second perplexity is manifest in 
eros and desire not only seeking wholeness and completion so emphasized in the 
dialectical trajectory345 or collapsing into themselves as despairing infinite lack as in 
the equivocal development346 but also opening beyond self-mediation—beyond eros 
and desire—an “ex-centricity” of eros and desire toward relation and participation 
with otherness in its excess.347  Second perplexity’s openness to otherness is 
discernible in a readiness or a preparation or a patience for the coming breakthrough 
of second renewed astonishment and of agapeic mind.348  In this ground-clearing and 
preparatory function, second indeterminate perplexity beyond determinate curiosity is 
not something to be allayed and set aside—it is a metaphysical “insomnia” or 
“migraine” to be deepened and dwelt with as a radical struggle approaching truth 
beyond our measure.349 
 
To take a brief (perhaps critical) step back:  On first glance, this 
phenomenology, in particular in second perplexity and the transition to second 
astonishment, one can notice at this point a kind of break in the consistent unfolding 
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of consciousness.  Before second perplexity, thought (simply?) pregresses/unfolds as 
a kind of Platonic eros (toward the other to thought) or Hegelian Geist (toward 
determinacy).  At the breakdown of curiosity there appears, for the first time, 
options…implying that consciousness has a will, a choice in the manner of its 
progression.  Was choice here before?  If not, where did it come from?  (One may as 
well ask where it goes, if it goes, in the transition to second astonishment.)  By way of 
a possible answer, one should perhaps see the breakdown of curiosity’s self-enclosed 
instrumental mind in the face of intransigent otherness(es) is a unique crisis in this 
particular (and particularly un-Hegelian) metaxological phenomenology of 
consciousness.  For there is no clear way forward, no clear (dialectical?) progress.  
The unfolding desire of thought is brought—not to fulfillment, not yet—but to 
nothing.  There are only so many things one can do with nothing—when one’s 
supposedly sovereign self-mediations come to naught and one is left stunned, 
perplexed, at a loss.  One can despair—see in the breakdown the “appearance” of the 
abysmal wind that makes all things flap emptily.  One can try to paper over the hole 
(just short of the whole, almost there)—pretend that (this) nothing (n)ever 
happened—shake it off and press on dialectically toward consummate, consuming 
curiosity.  Or one can recognize the breakdown and wait.  The last sees this breach as 
the end of self-mediation—of one’s erotic desire—alone.  Desire reaches beyond its 
grasp—beyond itself—desire beyond desire—outside, beside itself.  There are 
perplexities, tensions, paradoxes—living death, still motion—here in the waiting 
room, the antechamber of grace, of resurrection.  (Does one attain it?  Grasp it?  
Receive it?  See it?  Remember it?  Awake one morning the same and yet 
unspeakably different?) 
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§ 5. Second Astonishment 
In Desmond’s thought, there is the possibility of the return of astonishment in 
the midst of second indeterminate perplexity.  Such a second astonishment is a re-turn 
to or re-petition of first agapeic astonishment—an astonishment reborn,350 renewed,351 
reawakened,352 recalled,353 refreshed,354 resurrected,355 restored356 after the failure of 
the quest for fully univocal determinate knowledge.  The wonder before given being 
that awoke thought in the first place can return at the limit of thought—where thought 
seems to have come to nothing.357  This renewed astonishment before being is a kind 
of “posthumous mind”—a mindfulness after the breakdown of erotic mind.358 
This second astonishment is a reversal of mindfulness.  It is a breakthrough of 
the otherness of the energy of being in its goodness (bespeaking something of an 
ultimate origin)359 calling forth our astonishment, our affirmation, our consent, our 
trust, our gratitude and our love of being—the “idiot wisdom” of our agapeic 
festivity.360  This breakthrough is a gift for which one can be prepared, for which one 
can patiently and vigilantly wait in openness in the midst of perplexity, but it cannot 
be willed—one cannot choose to be gifted, to be astonished.361  Such breakthrough in 
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the midst of breakdown is a reversal of mindfulness from lack/absence to 
fullness/presence, from a self-mediating closure to an opening to otherness, from eros 
to agape.362  Desire is reversed from an erotic self-transcending seeking to fill a lack 
with the acquisition of the other and to thus secure the wholeness of the self (“desire 
as lack”) to an agapeic self-transcending that genuinely transcends the self inasmuch 
as it pours forth from a prior fullness and recognizes and affirms the other as good in 
itself (“desire as goodwill”).363  In the former the desiring (self) and the desired 
(other) are the same, forming a circle of self-wholeness in which the other is reduced 
to being a mere function of self-becoming, while in the latter the desiring (self) and 
the desired (other) are genuinely different—providing for the possibility of genuine 
otherness, relation and community.364  This reversed desire-as-goodwill is the “second 
love” of agapeic relativity and openness to otherness that relativizes desire’s “first 
love” of self-insistence.365 
In such a reversal is revealed the central element of second astonishment 
described by Desmond in terms of agapeic being or agapeic mind.  Agapeic 
mind/being is both constitutive of our being, our ontological reality and a regulative 
ideal—our ontological participation in agapeic being (as freely given) bears the 
possibility and the promise (and possible betrayal) of our own active agapeic 
                                                
362
 DDO 19; PO 211; BHD 331, 333; BB 500; PU 214-15. 
BB 261: “Agapeic being is a movement of creative origination that goes forth from itself, from its own 
surplus, but it does not go forth for the sake of itself; it offers the other being, for the sake of the other.  
Its self-transcendence is truly self-transcending, since there is a kind of releasing reversal between self 
and other: the self is othered such that the other is given a freedom of being from the giving self…. The 
self-transcendence that is a reversal of self is a giving of genuine separateness to the other.  Freedom is 
this separation.” 
363
 DDO 19, 164, 166-67. 
DDO 167: Desire as goodwill “reveals that desire may be more than an erotic rush from lack to 
wholeness, that it may be an agapeic pouring forth from a wholeness already real.” 
364
 EB 217: “If erotic sovereignty is tempted to close the circle of desire, and make self both desiring 
and desired, by contrast, agapeic service cannot close any circle, for the desired is not the same as the 
desiring - when I desire I desire the good as other to my desire: the communal reference to the good as 
other is in the dynamism of our self-transcending.” 
365
 PO 188-89, 197, 254, 274, 310, 350; PU 155. 
 81 
participation in being—our own being agapeic.366  Though the terms are largely 
interchangeable in Desmond’s work, agapeic mind can be seen as this second more 
self-conscious participation that entails a transformation of mindfulness that in turn 
entails a transfiguration of being for one—being able to see the ugly and hateful as 
lovely and lovable, valuable, worthy.367  This transformation of mindfulness arises 
from a rebirth of agapeic astonishment, a recalling and recognition of the excessive 
gift of being that is the opening for an ethics of gratitude and generosity—gratitude 
for the agape (the given gift) of being calling one forth to become agapeic (giving) in 
generosity.368 
The agapeic mind emergent in second astonishment is then, first, gratitude—a 
thanking, a seeing the given as given, as a gift—as an agapeic giving to us.369  There 
is here, in the gratitude of agapeic mind, a recognition of and remaining true to one’s 
passio essendi—the pathos, the “suffering,” the coming-upon-one that shows our 
being, first, to be a gift—that we are not our own ground.370  Agapeic mind’s gratitude 
is a reverence for the goodness, the worthiness of being—that being is not only given 
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but is also good.371  Such reverent gratitude is a basic love of being, in that agapeic 
mind appreciates and affirms the intrinsic goodness of being.372 
Agapeic mind is also generosity—a generous excess giving out of the surplus 
of one’s excess givenness.373  This generous giving is a genuine/true self-
transcendence toward the other as other, not a mere function of the self’s self-
mediation and self-determination.374  Generosity gives to the other and not merely for 
a return to self.  Agapeic mind, as such a generous vigilance regarding otherness,375 
finds expression in the love of singular and particular others in their singularity and 
particularity.376  Singularity is the mark of otherness, of resistance to instrumental 
self-mediation which subsumes under a universal and makes useful.  Agapeic mind’s 
self-transcending, this movement of going out of the self to and for the singular 
other,377 is expressed in service—in making oneself available to serve, to give to the 
other.378  The generous giving in agapeic service is a freeing, a releasing,379 an 
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abandon,380—an “idiotic” letting the other be apart from one’s projects of erotic self-
recovery and self-constitution.381  Agapeic mind gives to and affirms (and blesses and 
celebrates) the other in and as its own distinct and singular being. 
The generous “let it be” of agapeic mind is ingredient in a broader, festive 
“amen” to being in second astonishment—an affirmation of being as good.  The 
agapeic being in second astonishment gives rise to a kind of festivity—a festive being 
and mind that greets the fullness and goodness of given being with affirmation and 
celebration—with thought not only thinking but singing its other.382  This festive 
mind bespeaks what Desmond calls “golden being”—a transfigured vision that sees 
the intrinsic worth in and of being.383  In this festive celebration of agapeic mind there 
is a kind of speculative laughter that is the coming together of the failure, the “coming 
to nothing,” of one’s best efforts to understand being (in second perplexity) and of the 
generous affirmation of the excess plenitude of being in its otherness—of an 
elemental “yes” to a plenitude that surpasses our grasp not in its absence and 
emptiness but in its overwhelming (astonishing) fullness and presence.384  Such a 
festive affirmation of the goodness of being in second astonishment entails what 
Desmond calls “posthumous mind”—a looking upon life and being as one dead, as 
one without ulterior instrumental motive, so that one sees the astonishing worth and 
goodness of being beyond its value and good “for me.”385 
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Finally, as such an agapeic and festive mind, Desmond’s second astonishment 
is a metaxological “idiot wisdom”—a singular mindfulness of the overdetermined 
intimate strangeness of being.  Second astonishment is an idiot wisdom in that it, as 
agapeic mind, respects and affirms the enigmatic goodness of being (“idiotic” in the 
sense of affirming something strange, astonishing) in the singularity of being (idios as 
singular as opposed to public), in the excess or strangeness of being (idios as outside 
the sphere of the determinately accountable), and in the intimacy of being (idios as 
private).386  Thus, this idiot wisdom emergent in second astonishment and agapeic 
mind is a self-conscious return to the intimate strangeness of being—seeing the 
excessive “strangeness” of otherness not as a mere indeterminacy to be overcome and 
mediated but as an overdeterminacy that is always already with us, that is at the origin 
of mindfulness, and that is greeted in astonishment’s renewal beyond the breakdown 
determinate thinking.387  Second astonishment greets the overdeterminacy of being—
the excess, the plenitude, the reserve of given being—as something to be affirmed, not 
as merely something to be dealt with, as a sign of the frustration of the attainment of 
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the ideal of total determinacy.388  Perplexing breakdown and astonishing breakthrough 
is the proper functioning of thought—not an aberration—for contra univocal curiosity 
(which sees all being as intelligible and all intelligibility as determinate) 
metaxological second perplexity and astonishment recognizes that overdeterminate 
and other-wise being can exceed intelligibility as intelligibility can exceed 
determinacy.  Second astonishment (before the overdeterminate, intimate strangeness 
of being) as idiot wisdom is thus metaxological in that it is a mindful return to the 
overdeterminacy of the givenness of being389 and an affirmative acceptance and 
maintenance of otherness (being is strange)390 that is yet in community 
(“metaxological community”) with otherness (the strange is intimate)391—a 
community that is plurally mediated and not reducible to a single overarching (erotic, 
dialectical) mediation.392 
 
Section IV: Transcendences 
 
With the conceptual groundwork of the fourfold sense of being and the 
“phenomenology” of mindfulness, Desmond moves from the “how” of metaphysics to 
the “what” of metaphysics.  As thought is opened to otherness it seeks to understand 
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 DDO 152-53; PO 260; BDD 759-63. 
BDD 766: “The excess of overdetermined manifestation proves to be ever drawing thought, ever daring 
to extend to the extremes, ever renewing it when it wearies, redoubling it beyond self-determination 
and all its putative completions.  It strikes us into astonishment again, disturbing the complacency of 
our conceptualizations with a perplexity that may be deepened but never will be totally dissolved.” 
389
 BDD 763; EB 51; HG 70. 
BB 181: “The metaxological seeks to restore mindfulness of the that it is given to be at all.  Moreover, 
this restoration is shaped in a recall of the agapeic astonishment that is prior to all perplexity and 
determinate thinking about being.” 
BDD 763: “The metaxological is the truth of the univocal, the equivocal, and the dialectical.  When we 
try to articulate it, we are trying to find the right words for what is given in the overdeterminacy of the 
original astonishment.  The other three senses help to articulate the truth of the metaxological, but we 
risk error when they are absolutized and claimed to cover the entire milieu of being.” 
HT 28: “We need a metaxological approach to acknowledge the affirmative surplus of the 
overdeterminate, beyond determinacy and self-determination.” 
390
 PO 253, 300; BB 35, 333. 
391
 PO 211, 310. 
392
 BB 8, 205. 
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this otherness—these others.  This section will lay out the “what” of Desmond’s 
metaxological metaphysics in broad outlines. 
Metaphysics, in Desmond’s understanding, tries to be faithful to the emergent 
happenings in the middle (“meta” as in the midst) that refer one to otherness and 
transcendence (“meta” as beyond, transcendent).393  Such a meta-physics that is 
concerned with thinking otherness and transcendence from our situation in the midst 
of plural othernesses and transcendences is metaxological.  A metaxological 
metaphysics is a speculative philosophy of non-identity that investigates the 
intermediation with thought’s others (as opposed to mere self-mediation) and the 
overdetermination involved in trying to make intelligible the happening of being (as 
opposed to mere self-determination).  (This is so for even the self of dialectical self-
mediation and self-determination contains a transcendence that is beyond mediation 
and determination—a transcendence that also makes the self-transcending in 
mediation and determination possible.)  Metaphysical meditation upon the excess, 
overdeterminacy of being (that gives rise to the overdeterminate astonishment, 
indeterminate perplexity and determinate curiosity described in the previous section) 
requires a likewise overdeterminate language that is metaphorical394 and 
hyperbolic395—carrying thought, indeed thought throwing itself, beyond itself in a 
vector of transcendence toward transcendence.  The “objects” to be considered by 
such a metaphysics are then the plural “others” that constitute the metaxological 
                                                
393
 BB 44: “‘Meta’ is being in the midst; ‘meta’ is also reference to what is beyond, what is 
transcendent.  Metaxological metaphysics must think the doubleness of this tension between being in 
the midst and being referred by self-transcendence to the transcendence of what is other, what is over 
and above.” 
394
 BB 101-2, 208. 
BB 45: “Metaphor is a carrier in the between; it ferries (pherein: to carry) us across a gap; or it is the 
carrier of transcendence; it is in the midst as meta, and yet an image of the meta as beyond, as 
transcendent.” 
395
 BB 218-19. 
BB 218: “We are thrown towards transcendence by our being” as  “a metaphysical exigency.” 
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community of being.396  Desmond examines these “others” in terms of three 
transcendences: the exterior transcendence of beings in nature, the interior 
transcendence of the self, and the superior or ultimate transcendence of God. 
§1. Exterior Transcendence (T1) 
The first transcendence, which Desmond refers to as “T1,” is the 
transcendence of beings as other in exteriority.397  The beings in the exterior world or 
nature are transcendent in that they are not the product of our thinking.398  The 
otherness of the world precedes and exceeds our thinking of it.  This “exceeding” is 
the overdetermination of outer being that resists any full reduction to univocal 
determination—there is always a reserve of otherness.399  The transcendence of the 
world to our determinate thinking is due in part to its being self-transcending—its 
being as becoming, a universal impermanence.400  Exterior being as becoming does 
not easily conform to the univocal401 but displays equivocity in its a double coming to 
be and passing away402—a process of differentiation in which things come to 
determinacy in a kind of dialectical process.403  The equivocal flux and becoming of 
the world for Desmond is not merely equivocal, not merely a formless and 
indeterminate dispersal inhospitable to any intelligibility— becoming is 
metaxological, a dynamic and intermediate happening where there is room for both 
the persisting equivocity of being and the possibility of intelligibility, determinate or 
                                                
396
 BB 448. 
397
 DDO 154; BB 206, 231; HG 2. 
 This understanding, of a distance between thought and being entailed in an other-than-
univocal understanding of this relation, distances Desmond from Badiou who sees thought as directly 
engaged with being.  Hallward, Badiou, 55. 
398
 HG 3. 
AOO 268: “The transcendence of such beings consists in their not being the product of our process of 
thinking; their otherness to us resists complete reduction to our categories, especially in to far as they 
simply are, or have being at all.” 
399
 BB 13. 
400
 BB 88, 90, 143, 237, 256, 279-80. 
401
 BB 50, 238. 
402
 BB 88, 90, 291. 
403
 BB 237, 284. 
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indeterminate—a being-between a totally determinate unity and an unintelligible 
mass.404  Desmond describes this first transcendence of the external world of 
becoming as an infinite succession—an open, never completed plurality or series of 
particular beings in time and space.405  This first transcendence (T1) opens onto the 
other transcendences inasmuch as the overdeterminate happening of external being, 
first, gives rise to astonishment and a vector of self-transcendence (T2) toward this 
external other in human mindfulness406 and, second, suggests a more radical sense of 
the infinite as a ground or an origin (T3) which makes possible the possibility and 
actuality of the world of beings.407 
§2. Interior Transcendence (T2) 
                                                
404
 BB 57: Desmond observes that even with Heraclitus “the flux of happening is shot through with 
logos….  Becoming…is intermediate, as the happening of the between: it is between form and 
formlessness, indefiniteness and determination.” 
BB 88: “Equivocity is not always just our failure of univocal logic, but is rooted in the character of 
being itself.  Being is metaxological, hence plurivocal.  The process of becoming provides the dynamic 
ground of univocity.  Thus the ideal of the cut and dried is an abstraction from this becoming, with a 
provisional truth.  Being as becoming, as flux, as temporal, as process, as ongoing—in a word, creation 
in the universal impermanence—undermines every effort completely to stabilize being as an aggregate 
of univocal substances, or units.” 
405
 DDO 149-51; BB 207, 408, 448. 
BB 256: “Finite beings are differentiated in a process of becoming that, as open-ended, does have its 
indefiniteness.  Finite beings partake of the originated infinitude of endless succession and the 
universal impermanence.  But that derivative infinity is not the underived infinite.” 
 In Badiou’s understanding, being as being is infinite—nature is an infinity multiplicity.  
Desmond parts company with Badiou with Badiou’s assertion that one is forced to choose between an 
infinite God and a finite nature, on the one hand, and atheism and an infinite nature, on the other.  In 
Desmond’s understanding, an infinite nature is not inconsistent with the existence of an infinite God.  
God need not be the erotic One that Badiou assumes.  One suspects the difference here is, in part, one 
of theologies—of understandings of God—as much as of philosophies of nature or the infinite.  Again, 
Badiou’s understanding is based on an axiomatic (militant) decision against God (as what Desmond 
would call the erotic origin, the absorbing God) and for the infinity of being.  Desmond makes another 
axiomatic decision that includes an infinite God and an infinite world.   See Badiou, Being and Event, 
pp.142-45, 148.  Hallward, Badiou, 81. 
406
 BB 179. 
BB 11:  Astonishment “comes from transcendence as other…. Yet in opening the self, it initiates the 
vector of transcendence in the self and its going towards being-other with express mindfulness.” 
407
 DDO 152; PO 138; BB 207, 231, 291; HG 3. 
BB 293: “Creation as universal impermanence, as it were, reaches beyond its open wholeness to its 
own transcendent ground.” 
AOO 268: “What makes possible both their possibility, as well as their actuality?… Why beings and 
not nothing?…The possibility of transcendence as other to their transcendence is opened by such 
questions.” 
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The second transcendence, which Desmond refers to as “T2,” is the 
transcendence of the self.408  There are here two interrelated senses to this 
transcendence: first, the transcendence of the self’s inward reserve of otherness;409 
second, self-transcendence or the self’s active transcending as a vector of 
transcendence—as the restless power of human self-surpassing.410  The inward 
otherness of the self is the overdetermined source or fullness that enables self-
transcendence—the agape at the root of the eros.   
First, there is an intimacy411 and an idiocy412 to the self—an inward 
otherness413 that is marked by an irreducible, absolute and idiotic singularity.414  The 
givenness of the singular thisness or “thatness” of the self is overdetermined—it is an 
excess, a “too muchness,” a “more,” a plenitude that cannot be exhausted or fully 
mediated in entirely determinate terms.415  This overdeterminacy of the inward 
                                                
408
 HG 2. 
409
 BB 201: “This being beyond totality refers to the beyond of innerness to totalization, the abyss of 
idiocy in the immanence of self-transcendence.” 
410
 BB 5, 7, 231, 407; HG 3, 203; AOO 268. 
411
 BB 383; PU 161, 202-3. 
BB 374: “There is a certain intimacy of self-relation that is not included in a determinate system, not 
even a self-determining system, since it is the source of such…system.” 
412
 PO 367; BB 187, 397; PU 55. 
BB 384: “The idiocy of the self in this inwardness is an opening to otherness within itself.  Indeed its 
excess suggests the promise of an inexhaustibility.” 
PU 61: “By the idiocy of singularity I intend no privatistic atomism, though I do mean a privacy of the 
intimate.  I intend it also in this sense: there is a certain excess of being characteristic of what it means 
to be a self, which can never be completely objectified in an entirely determinate way.  This is an 
affirmative overdetermination.” 
413
 BB 189, 384, 417; PU 202-3. 
BB 187: “The metaxological sense differs from the dialectical in denying that the innerness of the 
singular is entirely determinable in terms of self-mediation.  This innerness is what I called the 
intimacy of being of the singular.  And while it is self-mediating, it is not a closed self-sufficiency, but 
opens inwardly into its own idiocy.” 
HG 190: “Is there an inward otherness, even in the most intensive self-mediation, without which the 
self-mediation would not be possible, but which itself cannot be fully self-mediated?” 
HG 190: “If we are talking about the infinite inwardness of self, there is this immanent otherness which 
is most intimate to the self and yet is not owned by self, and can never be.  Its most intimate being is 
other to its own self-possession; something exceeds self-mediation, this inward infinity, even in the 
most intensive of self-mediations.” 
414
 BB 532; PU 55, 57; EB 171, 186. 
415
 DDO 151, 154; BB 13, 115, 188; PU 59-61, 73, 144. 
PO 361: “Original selfness cannot be exhausted by any determinate what; as a this, it is a 
singularization of the power of being whose unity is not univocal; it shows a certain indeterminacy, in 
the sense of being overdetermined and hence not exhaustible in terms of univocal predication.” 
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otherness of the self is the transcendent reserve of the singular individual that is the 
funding source of the self’s (self-)transcending. 
The second facet of the self’s transcendence is in its being self-transcending.  
Desmond links self-transcendence with the infinite restlessness of human desire.  The 
self-transcendence of desire is an intentional infinitude which, in its dynamic 
restlessness, is not satisfied with any finite thing.416  This intentional infinitude of 
human desire in the midst of one’s actual finitude417 is a continual going-beyond418 
that is the expression of the excess of the self’s inner infinitude419—the outpouring of 
the reserve of the self’s overdetermined depths, the sprouting forth from an infinite 
root.  This excessive self-transcendence is also a vector of transcendence toward an 
excessive and transcendent other—it is an urgency of ultimacy moving from 
                                                                                                                                        
BB 183-84: “There is something in the singular that is not reducible to univocal predicates nor 
dialectical universals or concepts, that is not a mere equivocation in relation to determination, that is 
not exhausted by being an instance of a universal nor dissoluble into a system of universals.  This is so 
because the singular exhibits a thatness that is the show of excess.” 
BB 187: “The metaxological sense differs from the dialectical in denying that the innerness of the 
singular is entirely determinable in terms of self-mediation.  This innerness is what I called the 
intimacy of being of the singular.  And while it is self-mediating, it is not a closed self-sufficiency, but 
opens inwardly into its own idiocy.” 
HG 190: “There is the overdetermination, the ‘too much’, of the singularity in the recess of the 
intimacy of being.  The soul is too much even for itself, but its too muchness is not only its own.” 
416
 DDO 12, 73, 85, 150-51; EB 212, 215. 
BB 189: Regarding the infinitude in the intimacy of the singular self, it is “only because of this, does 
our characteristic desire exhibit an infinite restlessness.  We transcend ourselves again and again in 
desire; we are satisfied with this determinate thing, only to find dissatisfaction resurrected on 
satisfaction, and another search initiated; and there seems to be no determinate limit to this restless self-
transcendence.” 
417
 DDO 12, 75; BB 185; HG 203. 
BB 230: “We are self-transcendence that will not rest, intentionally infinite even in being actually 
finite, an opening, not just to this being or that, but to being simpliciter, and the community of being.” 
EB 215: “Infinite desire emerges in finite being.” 
418
 BB 156; PU 205. 
419
 BB 206-7, 230, 448, 527; EB 215. 
BB 401: “The excess of the self…is the source of its infinite restlessness.” 
EB 190: “The infinitely restless desire attests to the ‘too muchness’ at the idiotic source.” 
 For Badiou, we are infinite inasmuch as we think infinitely, as we can think mathematically 
about being qua being which is infinite.  This is an “ordinary” infinity that has to do with being as such.  
One becomes extraordinary, Immortal, when one becomes (a) subject to a truth—when one becomes a 
militant for a particular if universalizable truth.  For Desmond, the infinity of the human is not of two 
distinct orders—one necessary, formal and abstract, one particular, accidental.  The distinctive co-
existence of the infinite and the finite in the human for Desmond is intrinsic, metaphysical, constituting 
a genuine philosophical anthropology.  Hallward, Badiou, 67.  Badiou, Ethics, ch 4. 
 91 
transcendent fullness to transcendent fullness.420  Intentional infinitude, as intentional, 
enables articulate mediation with the multitude of beings in the world (T1) so as to 
form a wholeness—however provisional and “open” such a whole may be as existing 
in tension with the self’s whole-exceeding infinity (or however prone to forming an 
instrumental totality).421  This wholeness, the more determinate relating of the self to 
itself and to the world and God, Desmond describes in terms of different ethical 
selvings.422  Finally, this self-transcending is an outreaching and an opening toward 
the metaxological community of excessive others423—toward other intentionally 
infinite but actually finite, inwardly transcendent and outwardly transcending selves 
(T2), toward the infinite succession of the exterior transcendence of the world (T1)424 
and toward the actual infinitude of superior transcendence (T3).425  The more 
                                                
420
 PO 111; BB 155; EB 215. 
DDO 24: The infinitude of desire testifies to the fact that “we are always oriented to something more” 
in “an incessant process of going beyond limited satisfactions.” 
EB 215: “The anomalous being of the human is revealed in this freedom of infinite desire. Infinite 
desire emerges in finite being - excess of being rises up in the human being as selving: transcending as 
more, and towards the more. This "more" means enigmatic otherness in inwardness itself: the very 
interiority of being is the coming to show of infinity, the transcending power of the being, the 
transcendence towards infinity of the human being.” 
421
 DDO 26; BHD 44; BB 446; EB 188. 
DDO 150: Intentional infinitude “helps to rescue the infinite succession of becoming from being solely 
a scattering or equivocal process.  Intentional infinitude specifically refers to the power of and open 
dialectical self-mediation displayed in the articulation of human desire.” 
DDO 151: “Intentional infinitude…refers us to the indeterminate power disclosed in original selfhood, 
which enables us to mediate between unity and multiplicity in our search for wholeness.” 
BB 157:  Intentional infinitude “is intentional to the extent that the restlessness of self-transcendence 
can be directed through the self-mediating powers of thinking itself.” 
 Milbank likewise understands (again from a theological perspective) the desire at the core of 
human nature as wanting to be both at home (toward wholeness) and abroad (toward infinite).  
Milbank, Being Reconciled, 210. 
422
 See below: Chapter 3, Part One, Section III. 
423
 BB 230, 448; PU 205. 
BB 408: “The metaxological space between self and other is a middle between infinitudes.  As well as 
the self’s inward infinitude, there is recognized the infinitude of the other.  This other infinitude can be 
the infinite succession of external becoming, the universal impermanence; it can be the self-mediating 
infinitude of an other self; it can be the actual infinitude of the absolute origin.” 
424
 PO 23; BB 7. 
425
 DDO 152; PO 111; BB 155, 207, 231, 378; PU 11, 250; EB 113-14, 214-18; HG 5, 7; AOO 268-69, 
288, 291. 
BB 182: “The vector of self-transcending is an infinitely restless seeking of unconditional 
transcendence.” 
PU 204: “Our transcending being is unfolded as the quest of ultimacy.  The field of being and our 
being in that field, both point beyond themselves…. [W]ithin the self-transcending urgency of desire, 
we find an opening to the ultimate other.  We are the interior urgency of ultimacy, this other is ultimacy 
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determinate shape of this kind of human dwelling-with is laid out in terms of 
Desmond’s different ethical communities.426  Indeed, this metaphysical understanding 
of human being is, for Desmond, the foundation of ethics—how we are in relation 
(ontologically) to the other of the self is the foundation of how we are to relate 
(regulatively) to the other. 
§3. Superior Transcendence (T3) 
The third transcendence (T3) is that of the divine or God.427  Desmond often 
refers to God as “transcendence itself”—not in the sense of an abstract category of 
“transcendence” but as the original transcendence that is the “possibilizing source” of 
the other transcendences.428  Third transcendence is actual infinitude (in distinction 
from the infinite succession of becoming in T1 and the intentional infinitude and 
actual finitude of the self in T2) in the sense of a qualitative inexhaustibility in excess 
of all finitude.429  This transcendence itself or actual infinitude is transcendence as 
other—it is not reducible to other transcendences (as a projection of our self-
determination, for example) although it is spoken of in metaphors drawn from inner 
and outer transcendence.430  One such metaphor that Desmond sees to be particularly 
apt is that of height, such that third transcendence is a vertical transcendence: a higher 
transcendence, an ultimate431 other “beyond” all finite beings432—a transcendence 
superior to exterior (T1) and interior (T2) transcendence.433  (Other metaphors of 
                                                                                                                                        
as the superior…. The point is not to appropriate the ultimate in its transcendence to human self-
transcendence, nor yet to depreciate the energy of human self-transcending.” 
426
 See below: Chapter 3, Part One, Section IV. 
427
 BB 231; HG 2-4; AOO 269.   
428
 BB 231; EB 219; HG 3; AOO 269. 
429
 DDO 151; BHD 181; BB 408, 448. 
BB 255: “We must think of infinity here as other than an infinite succession or series.  We must think 
of qualitative inexhaustibility rather than quantitative accumulation and summation.  In a sense, such 
qualitative inexhaustibility is more than humans can think.” 
430
 BB 231-32; PU 230; HG 3-4, 200. 
431
 BDD 763-64; EB 219. 
432
 DDO 198; BB 201, 208. 
433
 BB 201, 231; HG 3; AOO 269. 
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Desmond’s that will be introduced presently and expanded upon in chapter four 
include: ground, origin and agapeic giver.)  For Desmond, this “above” of third 
transcendence is the huper toward which human self-transcending thinking is thrown 
in contemplation of itself (T2) and the external world (T1)—thought about God is 
hyperbolic, thrown beyond itself toward a limit.434  However, such a hyperbolic 
thought of divine transcendence is not of a mere indeterminate or empty beyond but 
of an overdeterminate fullness.435 
One of the chief characteristics of third transcendence (like first and second) 
for Desmond is its overdetermination.  As overdeterminate, God is neither an empty 
indeterminate idea nor simply a determinate being.436  The overdetermination of 
divine transcendence is the excessive, surplus plenitude of the origin of being.437  This 
excess/surplus/fullness/too-muchness is a reserve—a persisting otherness, a holding 
back in a mystery beyond conceptual encapsulation and any holistic immanence.438  
The infinite excess of the overdetermined reserve of third transcendence in its 
                                                
434
 BB 231: “T3: The transcendence of the origin—this would be transcendence itself, not as the 
exterior, not as the interior, but as the superior.  This would be the huper, the above.  The way of 
transcendence as hyperbolic throws us towards it.  
BB 256-57: “The way of transcendence is hyperbolic.  Transcending thinking finds itself thrown 
upwards at an ultimate limit.  Any metaphysical arrogance is entirely out of place, for this hyperbolic 
thinking is marked by a paradoxical humility.  It is thrown into the face of the absolutely superior, a 
face of excessive dark, as much as a face of excessive light.” 
435
 HG 7. 
436
 BB 19: “We have to recall the overdetermined excess of original being.  This agape of being is 
manifested in the determinations of beings, but it is not a determinate being simply, not even the 
highest being in the sense with which God is often identified—namely, the ens realissimum.” 
HG 7: “I would speak of divine transcendence as overdeterminate, not indeterminate.  In excess of the 
determinacies of things and our self-determining, this transcendence (T3) could not be defined as a 
merely indefinite beyond to finite being…. Third transcendence is not an empty indefinite but 
overdetermined in a surplus sense: God as hyperbolic…. If this is so, God could not be comprehended 
under any finite category of the possible or real.  It would be above, huper, über them, and yet be the 
original power to be at its most ultimate.” 
437
 BB 182; HT 34; BR 226; HG 7, 136. 
BB 330: “God thought metaxologically would be…the overdetermined excessive plenitude of the free 
original power of being.” 
AOO 269: “Transcendence itself would be in excess of determinate beings, as their original ground; it 
would be beyond self-transcendence as its most ultimate possibilizing source…. In excess of 
determinacy and our self-determining, it would be overdetermined transcendence which, as other, 
would not be a merely indefinite beyond to finite being.” 
438
 DDO 153; BHD 177; BB 495; HG 139, 187-88, 199ff. 
HG 197-98: “The hyperbolic full is always excess, whether in its communication of itself and to what 
is other, or in terms of what remains reserved as absolute surplus even in its self-communication.” 
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otherness is the ground of its transcending—it is out of the fullness of its reserve of 
otherness that the third transcendence creates, communicates and is open to its 
others.439  It is the overdeterminate and excessive transcendence of third 
transcendence that enables its transcending in the sense of its transcending itself in 
creation (originating being as other to it) and in relating to creation. 
The preeminent metaphysical metaphor that Desmond uses for this third 
transcendence is that of the origin—more specifically, the agapeic origin.440  God as 
the original transcendence is the origin of the “coming to be” of being—an answer to 
the question of being-at-all, why there is something instead of nothing.441  As the 
origin, God is the possibilizing source and sustaining ground of being—not only 
bringing into being the other transcendences (T1, T2) but doing so in such a way as to 
enable their own possible self-transcendings.442  The origin for Desmond is an 
                                                
439
 HT 31; HG 200. 
BB 502: “There are two sides to this ontological truth of the origin as other.  The first is its open 
wholeness, the side of its communicative being that is turned towards finite being.  The second is the 
excess of its infinitude, which is really the ground of its unmastered openness, and which remains other 
and in enigma, ‘dwelling in inaccessible light which no one has seen or can see’ (1 Tim. 6:16).  This 
side is the reserve of its otherness, preserved as other, remaining beyond and transcendent.  The side 
turned towards us is in community with finitude, though, as shown, it gives an inkling of what remains 
in reserve.  This hiddenness of the ultimate truth again invokes our need of images and metaphors, 
themselves both true and untrue, double…. This reserve is significant because it unequivocally reverses 
our anticipation that we can reduce the truth of the origin to our truth, be on a par with it in our 
conceptual mediations.” 
440
 BB 208, 231, 330; PU 230; HG 3. 
441
 HT 34: “Coming to be is hyperbolic happening.  What is suggested is an overdetermined source of 
origination out of which coming to be unfolds.  To speak of ‘creator,’ I suggest, is a way of putting us 
in mind of this other source.” 
442
 BB 263; AOO 269. 
BB 231: “T3: The transcendence of the origin—this would be transcendence itself, not as the exterior, 
not as the interior, but as the superior.  This would be the huper, the above.  The way of transcendence 
as hyperbolic throws us towards it.  Since it is in excess of determinate being, as its original ground, it 
would be beyond the doublet of possibility and reality.  It would be what we might call the 
possibilizing source of both possibility and realization; but it could not be just a possibility, nor indeed 
a determinate realization of possibility.  It would have to be real possibilizing power, in a manner more 
original and other than possibility and realization.  It would have to be ‘possibilizing’ beyond 
determinate possibility, and ‘realizing’ beyond all determinate realization.” 
EB 219: “Transcendence itself possibilizes all transcending.” 
HG 3: “T3: Here I refer to original transcendence as still other to the above two senses.  What might 
this be?  Can we speak of transcendence itself?  Rather than the exterior transcendence or the interior, 
can we speak of the superior?  How superior?  Transcendence itself would be in excess of determinate 
beings, as their original ground; it would be in excess of our self-transcendence, as its most ultimate 
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agapeic origin in that it gives being its own being in otherness—whereas an erotic 
origin, such as Hegel’s, is involved in (or just “is”) a process of self-becoming, of 
self-othering and re-incorporation into self, in which the created other has only a 
provisional or illusory otherness.443  Such a metaphysical understanding of God444 is 
the foundation for our proper relating to this God, in religion.445  This God as agapeic 
origin is the ground of the metaxological community of being. 
§4. The Metaxological Community of Being 
These three transcendences—of beings in the external world (T1), of selves 
(T2) and of God (T3)—constitute the metaxological community of being.  This is a 
genuine community in that there are others in relation to one another—transcendences 
transcending themselves toward each other.  Each is an overdeterminate fullness 
funding and impelling it to go out of itself toward its others.  This metaxological 
community is neither a univocal monism (sheer unity) nor an equivocal dispersal of 
unrelated beings (sheer difference) nor a dialectically self-becoming and self-relating 
totality (unity including and absorbing difference within itself—difference as merely a 
vanishing moment toward unity).  Community is relation between others.  Both 
otherness and relation are equiprimordial and irreducible: for without otherness there 
can be no relation (there is only the same, the totality, the one), without relation there 
can be no otherness (the other disappears, “which other?”).446  Desmond’s vision is of 
                                                                                                                                        
possibilizing source.  It would be beyond the ordinary doublet of possibility/reality, as their possibility 
source; it could not be just a possibility, nor indeed a determinate realization of possibility.” 
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 BB 495; AOO 287. 
HG 136: “The agapeic origin does not produce itself in giving creation.  It is always already itself—
superplus power of origination, overdeterminate, not in ‘need’ of finite determination.  Finitude is not 
its own determination, but is a released happening that if given its own promise of being creative.  This 
God gives the being of creation.” 
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 One suspects that the fundamental preference for univocity (in Deleuze and Badiou) will ultimately 
undercut, on one side or the other, any possibility of understanding the nature of community and, 
therefore, of understanding the nature of otherness (difference, plurality) or of relation.  The univocity 
of being flowers into a nihilistic equivocity, in which identity and relation disappear.  In Desmond’s 
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many different unities (transcendent others) in different relations (transcending 
mediations) with each other.  Here genuine singularities are let be within an open 
whole—with (“cum”) one another.  This plurally mediated metaxological 
community—this interweaving matrix of intermediation—is “the between.”447  
Metaphysics is the endeavor to behold and understand (and affirm and celebrate)—to 
mindfully dwell within—this community of others transcendent and transcending. 
                                                                                                                                        
terms, this debilitation of our thinking of the community of the between (indeed of community and 
between-ness as such) is due to the entrenched thinking of the modern ethos that has constricted and 
deracinated the primal and enabling (whence this strange urge to univocity?  To understanding?) ethos 
of the metaxological community of being.  On the roots of this univocal modern (post-modern?…post-
post-modern?) ethos, see Pickstock, After Writing, passim. 
 Desmond’s work, indeed, resonates with some of Deleuze’s concerns.  Both Deleuze and 
Desmond argue for the priority of relation, of an open intermediation that avoids any closed static 
whole or equivocal dualism.  Both also present a fundamental regard for difference, singularity and 
plurality.  One might argue, however, that Desmond’s metaxological community of being better 
provides for relation and singularity (otherness) than Deleuze’s ontological univocity/monism.  
Deleuze maintains the univocity/monism of being in order to provide for difference and becoming such 
that difference operates within a more basic static unity.  Desmond presents a community of 
othernesses/transcendences in dynamic non-reductive inter-relation.  Here unity/identity is not needed 
to found difference.  (Also, while Deleuze sees such relation and singularity as being devalued by the 
idea of a transcendent God, Desmond sees all of this as fully compatible with his understanding of God 
as agapeic origin, see ch. 4.) 
447
 Milbank presents such as community of difference in harmony and ultimate ontological peace again 
from a theological perspective.  Distinctly opposed to this ultimately harmonious vision of community 
is Badiou’s militant subjects in eternal struggle against, “forcing” into (themselves ever creating 
anew?) the totalitarian state(s) of the situation.  See Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 434, 
440.  Badiou, Being and Event, pp. 93ff. 
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PART TWO: METAXOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS AND RADICAL 
HERMENEUTICS 
 
Having summarized William Desmond’s conception of metaphysics, I will 
now turn to examine how this conception provides a viable and preferable alternative 
to that represented in the work of John D. Caputo.  Desmond’s position can be seen as 
a viable alternative in that it two ways.  First, Desmond’s position is able to answer 
Caputo’s critique of metaphysics by showing that the understanding of metaphysics 
represented in Desmond’s work is not guilty of the errors that Caputo levels against 
metaphysics as such.  Second, Desmond’s position is able to genuinely address the 
motivating concerns that can seen to be inspiring Caputo’s treatment of metaphysics.  
Beyond this, Desmond’s position can be seen as preferable inasmuch as it presents a 
broader perspective from which the LeviNietzschean position can be seen to betray its 
motivating concerns and from which these concerns can be better addressed.  Finally, 
this more capacious narration can be used to critique Caputo’s own (de)constructive 
proposals regarding how to think about reality and how to think about thinking about 
reality. 
Section I: Desmond as answering Caputo’s critique of metaphysics 
§1. Abstraction 
Caputo’s first critique of metaphysics regards its abstraction.  “The great 
mistake of metaphysics,” Caputo writes, is “to think that we can come up with a pure, 
interest-free rationality.”448  The grand “intellectual illusion” of the Western 
metaphysical tradition, from its opening gesture to its consummation, is its conception 
of thought as (at least ideally) disinterested or interest-free.449  Metaphysics, for 
Caputo, is an essentially abstract enterprise seeking to achieve understanding through 
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 Radical Hermeneutics 262. 
449
 Radical Hermeneutics 19. 
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disinterested and disengaged speculation—above (meta) the flux that is our actual 
existence.  Taking (Platonic) recollection and (Hegelian) mediation as its basic forms, 
Caputo sees metaphysical thinking as a turn toward abstraction—“to pure thought and 
disengaged speculation.”450 
Desmond’s conception of metaphysics can be seen to answer this critique in 
several ways.  First, part of what Desmond considers to be good meta-physics (here, 
meta as “in the midst”) is its awareness that it is in media res—in the middle of 
things—in the midst of the excess givenness of the overdetermined community of 
being.451  Second, Desmond’s view of metaphysics as such a mindfulness of what is at 
work in the middle of our existence—of our inescapable being in relation to what is 
other452—presents a speculative mind that would be a watching of the play of life akin 
to ancient theoria that  “contemplatively enjoys being as it is” and in which one is 
open and receptive to being in its otherness.453  Third, far from being disengaged and 
passionless, true speculative metaphysics for Desmond is born of our involvement 
with being—with what is happening—with being in its intimate strangeness.  This 
excess or fullness of being incites the astonishment and the perplexity that, for 
Desmond, is the origin of metaphysical mindfulness.  Astonishment is a wonder 
before being that is a joy or delight or trust in being—even a love of being454—while 
perplexity develops out of a perplexity that testifies to an infinite restlessness of 
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desire.455  Fourth, metaphysics concerns a finessed and artful dwelling in the given 
ethos of being—a dwelling whose tasks include mindfulness of the intimately given 
community of being in which we are involved and which enables our thinking and 
being.456  Finally, on Desmond’s accounting, metaphysics as such a dwelling is not 
neutral nor is the ethos in which it dwells.  Metaphysics is trying to make intelligible 
our involvement in and being in the midst of (inter-esse) the given ethos of being 
which is encountered as charged with excessive value (in which the metaphysician is 
interested).457 
§2. Universal System 
Caputo’s second critique of metaphysics concerns its being a system.  For 
Caputo, a philosophical “system” entails a fixed set of universal rules and indeed a 
certain fixation on universality.458  The universals involved in such a metaphysical 
system are to correspond to reality in a necessary way.459  Such a system of necessary 
and universal propositions presents, for Caputo, a violent hierarchy that “flattens out” 
and “levels off” the particularity, singularity and individuality that pervade and 
complicate concrete existence.460  
Desmond sees such a critique as unfairly totalizing metaphysics in terms of a 
totalizing univocal system—a fascism of concepts.461  The kind of thinking that is 
fixated on systems of necessarily obtaining propositions applies not to metaphysics as 
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such, but more to the univocal sense of being in which there is a heavy emphasis on 
determinacy such that all being is seen to be determinately intelligible—“that to be is 
to be intelligible, and that to be intelligible is to be determinate.”462  While Desmond 
sees the univocal sense as useful, even necessary—in that we need determination to 
identify and distinguish in the happening of the between463—it is when univocity is 
made the exclusive sense of being that one encounters the problems that concern 
Caputo, namely its inability to account for the complexity either in the external 
object/other/being or in the internal subject/self/mind or in their relation to each 
other.464  Caputo’s criticism can also be seen to apply to the dialectical sense of being 
inasmuch as it agrees with the univocal in taking all being to be determinately 
intelligible, though as the fruit of a more complex self-determining process 
culminating in a full systematic understanding of the whole of reality (in its more 
ambitious idealist versions).465  However, Caputo’s critique does not apply to 
metaxological metaphysics in that such a way of thinking about reality strives to think 
in terms of an “open wholeness” rather than a closed, totalizing system.  Such an 
“open whole” is a community of a plurality of singulars in interplay466—a plural 
intermediation in excess to any single self-mediating whole.467  The plurivocity of the 
metaxological sense reflects the plurality of being in its character as an 
                                                
462
 BDD 734, 762; PU 12. 
463
 BB 48; PU 12. 
464
 DDO 6; BHD 6; PU 110. 
465
 DDO 142; PU 105; EB 117. 
BB 161: “The dialectical sense, like the univocal, thinks that to be is to be intelligible, and that to be 
intelligible is to be determinable.  But unlike the univocal interpretation, this determinate intelligibility 
is not a static state of affairs but a coming to determinacy in the very happening of becoming itself.” 
466
 DDO 127-28; BHD 129; BB 418, 451; PU 15. 
467
 DDO 115; BHD 129; BB 188, 196, 451; PU 15; NDR 48. 
DDO 8: “The intermediation of the metaxological relation grounds an open community of self and 
other.  Beyond mere unity, beyond sheer manyness, beyond manyness within a single unity, it entails a 
community full of unities, each of which is inexhaustibly manifold within itself.” 
BHD 81: “Metaxological intermediation is simply respect for the richness, complexity and community 
of Ownness and otherness that is going on, always and already.  Ownness and otherness and 
metaxological community escape beyond final encapsulation.” 
 101 
overdetermined excess made up of unrepeatable singulars.468  The metaxological 
emphasis on genuine plurality, rather than leveling or flattening, provides space for 
the singularity, for the “idiocy” of individual beings and selves—these including the 
singularity of the metaphysical thinker, for metaphysics is always undertaken in a 
particular between and bears the singular existential burden of its uncertain wager.469  
Metaxological metaphysics, seeking to do justice to the overdeterminacy (neither 
reductive univocal determinacy nor lacking equivocal indeterminacy nor totalizing 
dialectical self-determinacy) of the surplus otherness of given being, requires a finesse 
that recognizes that the chiaroscuro of being—and our best intelligent understanding 
of being—extends beyond the horizons of univocal determinations and so disquiets 
our thinking and strains our language.470  Desmond himself presents a critique similar 
to that of Caputo’s in his discussion of the instrumental mind (rampant in the modern 
ethos471) which seeks to impose a hegemony of the univocal in which being in all its 
resistant equivocity is reduced to a rational univocity cut to fit human interest472—in 
which being is a mere strangeness to be domesticated and made determinately 
intelligible.473 
§3. Static Unity 
Caputo’s third critique of metaphysics concerns its fixation on static unity.  
Caputo claims that metaphysics seeks intelligibility at the expense of movement and 
difference.474  It does this by suppressing movement and subsuming difference into an 
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absorbing unity.475  With the suppression of movement and difference, metaphysics 
can impose an order that escapes and/or arrests the chaotic flux of existence.476  This 
privilege for static unity culminates in metaphysics’ drive toward an abstract static 
system (previously noted) in which knowledge of reality is elevated to the totalizing 
unity of absolute knowledge. 
Desmond’s conception of metaphysics can be seen to answer this critique in 
several ways.  First, Desmond, again, sees such a fixation on static unity as not being 
indicative of metaphysics as such but as describing the kind of stress on unity evident 
in the univocal and dialectical senses of being—in the univocal sense’s stressing 
immediate unity and simple sameness over multiplicity and difference477 and in the 
dialectical sense’s stressing a mediated unity of the same and different produced from 
the side of the self to encompass the difference of otherness.478  Second, regarding the 
subsuming of difference, Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics advocates an 
“affirmative doubleness” that resists the reduction of the double—the plural—to a 
simulacrum of otherness in the self-division of the one in a single, dialectical process 
so as to envision being as a plurality of singulars in interplay in an “open whole”—a 
community of being whose “being-with” is not reductive of otherness.479  Third, 
Desmond’s own metaphysics sees external being (T1) in terms of a self-transcending 
becoming, a universal impermanence in which there is an equivocal coming to be and 
passing away in a process of differentiation that is nonetheless intelligible, if not in a 
fully determinate manner.480  Finally, the plurality and becoming of being calls for a 
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plurivocal and flexible (finessed) metaphysics in which “being is said in many 
ways.”481  Desmond’s fourfold sense of being is presented as such a plural and 
flexible framework that is able to deal with the complex interplay of many elements—
unity and multiplicity, sameness and difference/otherness, immediacy and mediation, 
determination and indeterminacy, immanence and transcendence—that is entailed in 
our understanding of being.482 
§4. Not Faithful to Life 
Finally, Caputo sees all of these critiques as supporting his fundamental 
critique of metaphysics, namely that it is not faithful to life.  Metaphysics is dishonest 
to our severely finite human situation by making light of the difficulty of existence.  It 
does this as an abstract system privileging static unity with which it gives an 
absolutely stable foundation for life—allaying our fears with the “assurances of the 
same.”483  Metaphysics claims to provide a total knowledge of and privileged access 
to reality— it claims “to be in on The Secret and thereby to have surpassed the limits 
of offering a mere mortal interpretation.”484  Such arrogant philosophical posturing is 
dishonest about the fix in which we find ourselves and thus supplants factual 
existence.485 
Desmond sees such a critique as not justified if aimed at metaphysics as such 
and metaxological metaphysics, in particular.  The meta of metaxological metaphysics 
is never just a “beyond”; it arises “in the midst” as an “interpretive fidelity” to the 
emergent happenings in the middle that refer one to otherness and transcendence.486  
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While seeking to be a mindfulness of what is at work in the middle of our existence—
to be true to and to give the fullest articulation of the happenings in the middle—
human metaphysical thinkers cannot escape the middle to gain a view from nowhere, 
a privileged viewpoint on reality.487  Far from providing the assurances of such a pure 
access to reality, metaphysics as Desmond conceives of it disquiets our thinking and 
strains our language—metaphysics is an insomniac, migraine-courting encounter and 
struggle with the excess of being that gives rise to the astonishment and perplexity 
that constitute the abiding engine of metaphysical thought.488  True speculative 
philosophy “introduces a rupture into habitual seeing” and engages with the 
irreducible perplexities that constitute a breakdown—a self-debunking—of thought’s 
pretentious claims of self-sufficiency and absolute self-certain knowing such as one 
finds in totalizing curiosity and instrumental mind.489  Within the overdetermined 
ethos of being, life is difficult due to the lack of simple univocal determinations490—
due to the meagerness of our knowing and valuing and thus demanding a more 
finessed dwelling in the chiaroscuro of being.491  This metaphysical finesse that the 
metaxological sense tries to articulate is a plurivocal saying arising from and dwelling 
with astonishment and perplexity before the perennially strange, enigmatic, 
overdetermined excess of given being.492 
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Section II: Desmond as Addressing Caputo’s Motivating Concerns 
Behind Caputo’s critique of metaphysics and his more positive alternative to 
metaphysics, there can be seen to be certain motivating concerns.  First, Caputo is 
concerned to avoid elevating the knowledge of reality to a falsely absolute status.  
This is a counsel for humility—for not putting too high a polish on our all too human 
determinations.  Second, Caputo is concerned to avoid supplanting the living of life 
(difficulty, flux) with the knowledge of reality.  This is a counsel for relevance—for 
not getting lost the abstractions of thought and forgetting where one lives.  By 
avoiding these two negatives, Caputo seeks, I think, to address a more basic positive 
concern.  This is a concern to be honest and faithful to life—and to do so by having a 
way of thinking that is involved (interested, in the midst) in life in all its particularity 
and difference toward the end of directing one toward the difficulty of one’s 
existence.  Caputo’s own alternative to metaphysics, his radical hermeneutics, is 
intended to be just a way of thinking that is honest and faithful to life. 
Desmond however addresses these concerns from a metaphysical perspective 
at least as well as Caputo does.  First, Desmond’s vision of metaphysics avoids 
elevating knowledge of reality to a falsely absolute status.  With regard to 
metaphysics’ (univocal and dialectical) claims to absoluteness—its pretension of 
fixing truth determinately so as to attain self-certain and comprehensive consistency 
and coherence, such as is found in totalizing curiosity and instrumental mind—
metaxological metaphysics lives not in its completion, but in its inevitable 
breakdown, in its self-debunking.493  There is no completion or realization or 
consummation or end of metaphysics.494  Metaphysics, for Desmond, is an uncertain 
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venture entailing a certain inevitable failure, and thus calling for humility and finesse 
in the face of the meagerness of our knowing.495  In fact, Caputo can be seen as being 
complicit with a high-handed dismissal of metaphysics—itself a totalizing gesture: 
metaphysics is reduced to the function it fulfills (the tyrannical order—against which 
we are the brave and virtuous transgressors) in the deconstructive system.  One 
suspects there is lurking here an uncannily modern pretence to (“radical”?) newness 
and its concomitant prejudice against that which has gone before. 
Second, metaphysics in Desmond’s view avoids supplanting the difficulty of 
life with the some kind of abstract knowledge.  Metaphysics never truly leaves behind 
the singularity of the thinker for the anonymity of a system, for metaphysics is always 
undertaken in a particular between (“starts too late”) and bears the singular existential 
burden of its uncertain wager.496  Metaphysics is a mindfulness of what is at work in 
the “middle” of our existence, the happenings of our given place in being.497  This 
mindfulness is to enable a more artful dwelling in the given ethos of being—a 
dwelling whose tasks include mindfulness of the intimately given community of being 
in which we are involved and which enables our thinking and being.498 
Finally, Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics seeks to be faithful to the 
emergent happenings in the middle and thus to be honest and faithful to life.  It is 
involved/interested (inter-esse) in the living of life (see §1. above).  It is sensitive to 
and particularly mindful of particularity, singularity and difference (see §3. above).  It 
is honest with regard to life’s difficulty (see §4. above).  Metaphysics is to be an 
“interpretive fidelity” to the plural and overdeterminate happenings emergent in the 
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middle, not an escape from them.499   
In fact, one suspects a certain abstraction and forgetfulness in any perspective 
so reticent to attend to the most recurring human questions and perplexities:  What is 
thinking?  What is being?  What is the relation between them?  For Desmond, the 
speculative arises from existential involvement.  To say it is always (or even 
primarily) an attempted escape from life is to be honest neither to life—to the 
existential fact of wonder and perplexity—nor to speculation. 
 
Section III: Desmond’s Metaphysical Alternative to Caputo’s 
“Metaphysics Without Metaphysics” 
 
In addition to answering Caputo’s critiques of metaphysics and addressing 
Caputo’s motivating concerns, Desmond provides a metaphysical alternative to 
Caputo’s alternative to metaphysics.  Desmond’s metaphysics is preferable to 
Caputo’s radical hermeneutics, his “metaphysics without metaphysics.”  Beyond 
answering Caputo’s central concerns arguably better than Caputo’s own system, 
Desmond’s thought can be used to critique/locate many of Caputo’s main points and 
strong conclusions.   
§1. Radical Hermeneutics: Minimalism 
Caputo’s radical hermeneutics addresses what a way of thinking that is faithful 
to life should be.  Radical hermeneutics stands as a bulwark against the assurances of 
metaphysics, seeing no grounding or foundation for interpretation to guide it and 
ensure its stability and fidelity.500  It affirms flux and becoming against metaphysics’ 
stabilizing of the flux—“the uncircumventable futility involved in trying to nail things 
down.”501  Thus, the post-metaphysical rationality of a radical hermeneutics entails a 
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minimalism that stays with the modest “finite facts” as they appear on the surface of 
experience and neither speculates about depths/beyonds nor overestimates the status 
and scope of its knowledge.502  Instead it seeks a minimally restrictive or constraining 
idiom by favoring such constitutionally inadequate metaphors as flux, fluidity, 
movement, free play, instability, events and happenings.503 
Desmond’s work shows that one can have a grand, maximal vision that still 
has place for irreducible singularity—perhaps has a better place for it.  The 
metaxological “grand narrative” is maximal without the pretence to legitimate or 
found itself by appeal to some neutral, universal reason—without being an incredible 
meta-narrative.  For Desmond, metaphysics is not in the business of providing the 
assurances of a pure access to reality—it entails perplexity, disquiet, struggle, strain 
and failure.504  Metaxological metaphysics is a discourse of and in the middle—it does 
not overestimate its grasp by envisioning an escape from the middle to gain a view 
from nowhere.505  Instead of nailing things down, metaphysics is an attending to 
astonishment and perplexities that rupture and constitute a breakdown—a self-
debunking—of thought’s claims of self-sufficiency and absolute self-certain 
knowing.506  Metaphysics is an “interpretive fidelity” to and a mindfulness of the 
emergent happenings in the middle, the between—to the “finite facts” on the surface 
of life—a being attentive to the community of being’s plurality of others in 
interrelation.507  Thus far, Desmond and Caputo agree on what thinking (called radical 
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hermeneutics or metaxological metaphysics) should be up to and how it should carry 
itself, as it were. 
Desmond’s vision, however, does differ on some significant points.  These 
“finite facts” in the middle are not merely lacking or indeterminate—and thus calling 
for a minimalist description—but overdeterminate.  The metaphysician encounters 
and struggles with an excess of being as plural and “overdeterminate” that gives rise 
to the astonishment and perplexity that constitute the abiding engine of metaphysical 
thought.508  The modesty and humility of finite and all too human metaphysician does 
not demand the abandonment of the deepest questions of philosophy—of being, of the 
self, of the world, of God.  In fact, a fidelity to the surface happenings of the middle is 
what raises these perplexing questions about depths and beyonds in the first place.  
The “beyond” and the “in the midst” of meta-physics are intimately related—such that 
trying to be faithful to the emergent happenings in the middle (“meta” as in the midst) 
refers one to otherness and transcendence (“meta” as beyond, transcendent).509  Such 
a metaphysical meditation upon the excess overdeterminacy of being requires, not a 
metaphorics that is content to ask little of itself, but a likewise overdeterminate 
language that knowingly asks too much of language in the form of metaphor and 
analogy and symbol and hyperbole, for such is the best hope for naming (if always 
imperfectly) the fullness of the transcendences that surround us in the metaxological 
community of being—of the beyonds in our midst.510 
§2. Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition and Inter-esse 
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Over and against metaphysics’ escaping the flux through abstraction and 
fixation on static unity, radical hermeneutics emphasizes being in and forging ahead 
in the midst of the flux in terms of repetition and inter-esse.  Radical hermeneutics 
breaks with metaphysics’ drive toward a static unity insulated from the vagaries of 
life.  Caputo sees the exemplary movement of traditional metaphysics as a 
recollection seeking an original and pure presence uncontaminated by the arbitrariness 
and indeterminacy of our all too fluid human existence.  Instead, radical hermeneutics 
emphasizes repetition which represents how any unity, identity or presence in life is 
one that is produced and not found—every “presence” as an effect of “repetition.”511  
As such, repetition embraces a creative and productive movement into the difficulties 
of life where there is the possibility of novelty and genuine movement—against some 
eternal, preexisting, static unity.512  This is the way of living inter-esse—in the midst 
of the rush of things.  “The existing spirit,” Caputo writes, “exists (esse) in the midst 
(inter) of time…in the midst of the flux.  Its esse is inter-esse; its being is being-
between, being-in-the-midst-of.”513  The repetition at the heart of radical hermeneutics 
embraces this basic locatedness in the midst of temporal becoming (this passive inter, 
being-in-the-midst) and takes up the proper task of forging ahead in this situation (as 
an active being, esse in the context of the between).514  Radical hermeneutics thus 
presents this repetition as interestedness as “the way of the existing individual.”515 
Desmond, again, sees such a fixation on static unity as not being indicative of 
metaphysics as such but as describing the kind of stress on unity evident in the 
univocal and dialectical senses of being.  Regarding metaphysics’ (particularly in the 
form of recollection) fixation on pure presences, Desmond sees there to be 
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(particularly in the phenomenon of astonishment) an overdeterminate presence that is 
not the foundation of a static system, but the awareness of an original unarticulated 
plentitude prior to and exceeding all determinate facts and definitions that gets 
thought moving in the first place.516  This first astonishment is encountered as an 
elemental immediacy—not as an immediate determinate knowledge but as an intimate 
strangeness517—the lived, “rapturous” (“perlapsarian”) univocity of the “immediacy 
to our initial immersion in being.”518 
Regarding the unity or identity or presence that is produced by repetition, 
Desmond would see this as only half of the story.  This kind of unity produced or 
constructed by the self in repetition maps onto what Desmond describes as self-
mediation.  There is for Desmond however, from the perspective of the involved 
(interested, inter-esse, between-being) singular self, a situation of double mediation, 
of both self-mediation and intermediation, so as to articulate our relations with our 
others intelligently while preventing closure—while obviating the temptation to 
reduce all mediation to self-mediation in the name of total(izing) intelligibility.519  
Thus, second astonishment can be seen as a repetition that is not produced by the self.  
Such a second astonishment is a re-turn to or re-petition of first agapeic astonishment.  
This repetition of the prior overdeterminate presence of astonishment is a 
breakthrough—it is a gift for which one can be prepared, for which one can patiently 
and vigilantly wait in openness in the midst of perplexity, but it cannot be willed.520  
(This is actually close to the description Caputo, following Kierkegaard, gives of 
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religious repetition as a movement that is impossible to bring about on one’s own and 
is ultimately a gift—as will be seen in chapter four.) 
Desmond’s metaphysics also gives an alternative discussion of the possibility 
of genuine movement and novelty.  As was recognized before, Desmond’s own 
metaphysics sees external being (T1) in terms of being-as-becoming, as a universal 
impermanence that does not easily conform to the univocal521 but displays equivocity 
in its double coming to be and passing away522—a process of differentiation in which 
things come to determinacy in a kind of dialectical process.523  For Desmond, the 
equivocal flux and becoming of the world is not merely equivocal, not merely a 
formless and indeterminate dispersal inhospitable to any intelligibility—becoming is 
metaxological, a dynamic and intermediate happening where there is room for both 
the persisting equivocity of being and the possibility of intelligibility, determinate or 
indeterminate—a being-between a totally determinate unity and an unintelligible 
dispersal (such as one has a hard time not seeing to be suggested by Caputo’s radical 
hermeneutics).524  Regarding the notion of novelty that repetition is to defend, 
Desmond would hold that it is not a choice of either origin or novelty but it is the 
nature of origin as agapeic that enables, possibilizes novelty.  It is precisely 
Desmond’s metaphysics of agapeic origination that makes genuine novelty (and 
plurality and singularity and uniqueness) possible.525 
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Finally, Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics presents an alternative to 
radical hermeneutics’ vision of human existence as inter-esse.  Metaxological 
metaphysics is “a discourse concerning the middle, of the middle, and in the 
middle.”526  The metaxological sense is a discourse of and in the middle—a thinking 
that is between the totalizing closure of rigid univocal “objective” thinking and the 
fragmented discontinuity of equivocal “subjective” thinking.527  The metaxological 
sense is also a discourse concerning the middle—striving to be mindful of what is at 
work in the happening of the ethos, the milieu, the between of being as our given 
place—to be attentive to the community of being’s plurality of others in 
interrelation.528  Metaphysics attempts to make intelligible our involvement in and 
being in the midst of (inter-esse) the given ethos of being which is encountered as 
charged with excessive value (in which the metaphysician is interested).529  Thus, the 
metaxological focuses on thought in terms of interest or “inter-esse”—as being moved 
by wonder and perplexity at the fullness of our being in the between—our interest in 
esse arising from our inter-esse.530 
§3. Radical Hermeneutics: Heterology 
Radical hermeneutics counters metaphysics’ urge to subsume everything 
within a singular, universal system with the awareness of abiding difference—it is “a 
philosophy of ‘alterity,’” with “a relentless attentiveness and sensitivity to the 
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‘other.’”531  Caputo describes radical hermeneutics as a philosophy of difference in 
terms of its being a “heterology”—both a heteronomism and a heteromorphism.  
Heteronomism views difference in terms of the particular and undigestable singular 
other as “marked by its idiosyncrasy, its idiomaticity, its uniqueness, its anomaly, its 
unclassifiability, its unrepeatability”—as standing against metaphysics’ universal 
system of sameness. 532  The heterenomist sees reality in terms of the singular and 
idiosyncratic without there being any deeper structure.533  Heteromorphism views 
difference in terms of the plural, the multiple, the diverse, the changing and is 
concerned to keep the free-play of diverse and changing reality free of the closure of 
metaphysics’ urge to static unity.534  It keeps things open-ended, celebrates diversity 
and alteration, and happily greets unanticipated pluralities—seeking to “maximize the 
possibilities” and “to keep as many options open as possible.”535 
Desmond likewise considers his way of thinking to be a heterology but in the 
sense of a different kind of practice of speculative philosophy—“a speculative 
philosophy of non-identity” in which thought is ultimately engaged in the task 
thinking what is irreducibly other to thought.536  Metaxological metaphysics is a 
heteronomism considering being in its character as an overdetermined excess made up 
of unrepeatable singularities—as a general intermediation in which there is an open 
community of singulars.537  The ideal that Desmond puts forward in terms of agapeic 
mind in particular is a heternomic vigilance regarding otherness, finding expression in 
the love of singular and particular others in their singularity and particularity—in 
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giving to and affirming the other in its own distinct and singular being.538  
Metaxological metaphysics (as an “idiot wisdom”) respects and affirms the idiocy of 
being in the singularity of being (idios as singular as opposed to public), in the excess 
or strangeness of being (idios as outside the sphere of the determinately accountable), 
and in the intimacy of being (idios as private).539 
Desmond parts with Caputo’s heteronomism inasmuch as the emphasis on 
singularity precludes any kind of deeper being-with or community in being.  Here 
Caputo can be seen as representing Desmond’s equivocal sense of being, which 
subverts itself insofar as remaining with sheer equivocity means not only the dispersal 
of being but the dissolution of mindfulness itself.  The, as Desmond sees it, inherent 
drive of mindfulness cannot stop with equivocity’s mere fragments; it call for a 
deeper understanding of the differences, othernesses and ambiguities in the flux of 
being.540 
Desmond’s metaphysics is also heterological in the more heteromorphic sense.  
Metaxological metaphysics advocates an “affirmative doubleness” that resists the 
reduction of the double (the plural) to a simulacrum of otherness in a single, 
dialectical process.541  This is a kind of reinstatement of equivocal difference 
(either/or) after dialectical unity (both/and)—a both-either/or-and-both/and that 
envisions being as a plurality of singulars in interplay in an “open whole”—a 
community of being whose “being-with” is not reductive of otherness.542  The 
metaxological also takes us the truth of the equivocal sense of being in its recognition 
of the equivocity in being itself—in being’s becoming as an ongoing process (a 
“universal impermanence”) in which there is often an intermingling of opposites and 
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in which univocal determinate labels thus have limited staying power.543  Again, the 
fixation on static unity that makes Caputo justifiably nervous is not, for Desmond, 
indicative of metaphysics as such but as describing the kind of stress on unity evident 
in the univocal and dialectical senses of being.544 
From Desmond’s perspective, Caputo’s notion of heteromorphic heterology 
takes the notions of plurality’s free-play and freedom from closure to the extreme of a 
sheer equivocal diversity.  The equivocal sense of being taken on its own presents a 
sheer plurality that is merely fragmenting.  Here being and mind are set in opposition 
to one another such that there is no relation but only unmediated difference.545  
Desmond, however, envisions a community of plural singulars rather than mere 
equivocal dispersal.  The difference is the difference between equivocal difference 
and metaxological difference where the latter includes the former’s (heterological) 
emphasis on singularity and plurality while also seeing this plurality as an (at least 
potentially) intelligible community of complex relations.  Metaxological metaphysics 
is a way of thinking about reality which strives to think in terms of an “open 
wholeness” rather than the kind of closed, totalizing system that rightfully concerns 
Caputo.  Such an “open whole” is a community of a plurality of singulars in 
interplay546—a plural intermediation in excess to any single self-mediating whole.547  
The plurivocity of the metaxological sense reflects the plurality of being in its 
character as an overdetermined excess made up of unrepeatable singulars.548  The 
metaxological emphasis on genuine (heteromorphic) plurality, rather than leveling or 
                                                
543
 BB 88; EB 123. 
544
 DDO 6; BHD 6; BB xii, 143, 175, 178; PU 12; BDD 762. 
545
 BHD 6; BB xii; PU 12-13. 
546
 DDO 127-28; BHD 129; BB 418, 451; PU 15. 
547
 DDO 8, 115; BHD 129; BB 188, 196, 451; PU 15; NDR 48. 
BHD 81: “Metaxological intermediation is simply respect for the richness, complexity and community 
of Ownness and otherness that is going on, always and already.  Ownness and otherness and 
metaxological community escape beyond final encapsulation.” 
548
 BB 34, 88, 465; BDD 761. 
 117 
flattening, provides space for the singularity, for the (heteronomic) “idiocy” of 
individual beings and selves.  Here Desmond provides a unified and complementary 
picture of the heteronomic singular and the heteromorphic plural whereas in Caputo’s 
work these two (the Levinasian Rabbi and the Nietzschean Dionysius) are in deep, 
perhaps unmediatable tension with one another. 
§4. Critiquing Caputo’s Conclusions 
For Caputo, being faithful to life—being honest about the situation in which 
we find ourselves—brings one hard upon certain conclusions.  First, there is the 
denial of any robust knowledge of reality (or metaphysics)—that the only acceptable 
“metaphysics” is one that recognizes that we do not (and cannot) know who we are or 
what is going on or what is true.  Radical hermeneutics demands the humility to 
recognize the hard (difficult) truth that there are no hard (solid) truths…such as 
metaphysics claims.549  Caputo’s radical hermeneutics is then a basic “non-
knowing”—not a metaphysical knowing but a passion driven by not knowing who we 
are or where we are going.550  Thus our understanding is always in a state of 
undecidability—of flux—in which we can never really say what is going on.551 
Second, there is the denial of the importance of metaphysics for life.  
Metaphysics, as Caputo understands it, stands in a position of fundamental opposition 
to our living of life as it truly is, in all of its ambiguity and difficulty, and we can and 
should (and ultimately cannot but) make our ways without it.  Thus, radical 
hermeneutics as a thinking about reality after metaphysics, a metaphysics without 
metaphysics, moves in the opposite direction to metaphysics—from an abstract 
escape from the vagaries of existence to an interested involvement in the living of life.  
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Factical life—anxious because of its lack of hard truths—is difficult in that we are not 
made safe by a metaphysical canopy and so have to make decisions against the 
backdrop of “undecidability.”552  Finally, radical hermeneutics as an awareness of the 
difficulty of life leads one from metaphysics (as thinking about reality) to ethics (as 
regarding how one is to relate to others)—from “what” to “how.”553 
Desmond’s work stands to critique these strong conclusions of Caputo’s “post-
metaphysical” alternative to metaphysics.  The general critique is that radical 
hermeneutics’ denials are too radical and that they go to unnecessary extremes 
(specifically, the extreme of a false either/or) in order to address its motivating 
concerns.  Desmond questions the rejection of metaphysics as expressed in the 
critique of “onto-theology”—of all metaphysics being considered to be one form or 
another of “onto-theology.”  Regarding Caputo’s denial of any “hard truths” (in the 
first conclusion) Desmond grants the scarcity of true univocal determinations insofar 
as such cannot account for the complexity either in the external object/other/being or 
in the internal subject/self/being or in their relation to each other.554  Moreover, 
Desmond would argue, this scarcity is not a problem for metaphysics as such, nor is it 
a reason to deny that metaphysics ever produces some knowledge of reality.  
Speculative philosophy not only entertains but mindfully safeguards irreducible 
perplexities that constitute a breakdown—a self-debunking—of thought’s claims of 
self-sufficiency and absolute self-certain knowing in terms of univocal 
determinations.555  It concerns itself with the limits, the extremities of thought.556  The 
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lack of “hard truths” is more of the condition for the possibility of metaphysics—the 
perplexity that gets it off the ground—than its frustration.  Or rather: The common 
frustrations of metaphysics are not its utter downfall but a possibly seminal, fecund, 
fruitful going to ground—an undoing, unraveling that allows an other-wise 
reweaving.  In fact, it is the post-metaphysical perspective, such as is found in 
Caputo’s radical hermeneutics, that is too totalizing—itself totalizing metaphysics in 
terms of a rigid totalizing univocity.557 
Regarding the “non-knowing” ingredient in the first conclusion of Caputo’s 
radical hermeneutics, this can be seen, in Desmond’s terms, as a despairing second 
perplexity.  This is a perplexity become nihilistic equivocity—a despairing and 
truncated perplexity that dwells in and fixates upon the failure, the breakdown, the 
coming to nothing of the search for univocal meaning.  It is a skepticism issuing from 
a self-lacerating dissolution of univocal curiosity that rejects the univocal and is left 
with only the equivocal.558  In Desmond’s metaphysics, however, there are other 
possible trajectories after the breakdown of the hope of total determinacy (III. §4.).  
One can recognize the breakdown without giving up hope (despairing) of any other 
understanding of the overdeterminate givenness of being.  Here radical hermeneutics 
unnecessarily closes down possibilities beyond the either/or of full univocal 
determinacy or total equivocal indeterminacy. 
Likewise, radical hermeneutics’ assertion of “undecidability,” is an expression 
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of what Desmond calls the equivocal sense of being.  It calls attention to unmediated 
(even un-mediat-able) difference—seeing a sheer plurality and a fragmented dispersal 
that cannot be brought into any kind of a unity.559  Desmond’s critique here concerns 
the question of how to think otherwise than in terms of univocal determinacy (or of 
dialectical self-determination which has the former as its telos).  Desmond suggests 
that a proper understanding of being should be metaxological, not equivocal—should 
think of being as overdeterminate, not merely indeterminate.  The equivocal 
conclusion of radical hermeneutics points to a false either/or (univocal/equivocal)—
for as the univocal tends to break down into the equivocal, so does the equivocal (as a 
strong conclusion about the un-knowability of the world) tend, if it is honest, to 
breakdown and demand a more complex view of interrelationships in the community 
of being.  The equivocal sense, again like the univocal, subverts itself in that 
remaining with sheer equivocity means—not only the dispersal of being—but the 
dissolution of mindfulness itself.  There is no reason the absolute claim of equivocity 
should stand when all other absolute claims cannot. 
Desmond’s thought can also be used to critique Caputo’s second conclusion 
about the insignificance of metaphysics for existing individuals.  For Desmond, meta-
physics is to take up residence “in the midst” of life and questions about the “beyond” 
are not a function of wanting to escape the between but of being faithful to the 
transcendings and transcendences that intermediate there.560  Desmond suggests 
philosophy as a mindfulness of what is at work in the middle of our existence—of our 
inescapable being in relation to what is other in terms of determinate or indeterminate 
intelligible mediation (or intermediation)—and thus intimately related to the living of 
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life.561  Metaphysics is inescapable as our mindfulness of the happening of life; it 
proceeds from an inherent exigence—from our need to think it—for all reflection is 
dependent on and complicit in the question of the meaning of the “to be” that moves 
us to wonder and perplexity.562  Furthermore, metaphysics as Desmond understands it 
does not skirt the difficulty—the irreducible and intrusive perplexity—of life but 
deepens it.  
From the perspective of Desmond’s metaxological hermeneutics the 
conclusions of Caputo’s radical hermeneutics can be seen, not as a (postmodern) 
break with modernity, but as in basic continuity with modernity—particularly in terms 
of what Desmond calls the objectification of being and the subjectification of value.  
Desmond describes this as the “double face of modernity.”563  Being is objectified in 
that it is neutralized or devalued or evacuated—emptied of any value or worth or 
goodness in itself—and made into a “merely empirical” mechanism.564  The 
subjectification of value comes about as there is a “revaluation” of value in terms of 
human self-determination.565  This disjunction of being (knowledge of which is 
metaphysics) and value (the stuff of life and ethics) runs through radical hermeneutics 
like a great fissure: we poor, existing individuals on the side of (valueless) valuing—
on the side of factical, equivocal existence—and metaphysics on the far unreachable 
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side of being—on the side of abstract and universal totalizing systems. 
Along these lines, Caputo can be seen as rightly identifying the problem with 
the totalization of instrumental mind but wrongly identifying instrumental mind with 
metaphysics as such—as the objectifying metaphysics on the far, inaccessible side of 
the fissure.  This instrumental mind—as a will to a manipulable univocity over the 
uncertainty of what is not determinately intelligible566—easily spawns nihilism, in 
that the instrumental revaluation of valueless being itself partakes in the same 
ontological, root valuelessness as its objects—the neutralization of being also 
neutralizes the being of the projectors of value, thus emptying out any so projected 
value.567  Caputo’s critique of the modern ethos ultimately does not escape modernity 
but retains its nihilistic conclusion regarding humanity’s inherently worthless 
valuations as the sole source of value (the Nietzschean metaphysics without 
metaphysics of his Levi-Nietzscheanism).  Radical hermeneutics does not go far 
enough—its postmodernism is modern, all too modern.  Desmond here sees the 
postmodern as partaking of the same modern ethos—postmodernism as more of a 
kind of “hypermodernism,” a self-determination become self-laceration.568  
Postmodernism, for Desmond, is modernism—a denizen of the same modern, 
reconfigured ethos—but taken to an extreme of deconstructing the sole constructions 
of value (human constructions) allowed by the modern ethos.  Thus Caputo, in 
divorcing life and values from any thought of what is real, can be seen as perpetuating 
a hypermodern and ultimately nihilistic dualism between being and goodness, while 
                                                
566
 PO 26, 121, 137, 158, 226, 306; PU 116, 195; EB 46. 
567
 BB 71, 83, 508; PU 5, 39, 169, 171, 222-23, 227; AT 236; EB 46; BR 227; MC 14. 
BB 509: “If the creation is valueless in itself, then the human being as a participant in creation is also 
ontologically valueless, so likewise his human construction is ultimately valueless….  Only subtle self-
deception can avoid the collapse of our constructions into the ontological nihilism that is said to affect 
the whole of being in itself.” 
568
 NDR 41; EB 169-70; AOO 276. 
NDR 45: “To what extent is deconstruction a victim of the devaluation of being in modernity?  Are 
deconstructive thinkers still in the same ethos which breeds the quasi-deconstruction of modern self-
determination?” 
 123 
Desmond wants to reexamine more deeply the relation between being and goodness—
the charge of and hospitality to the good in given being.  But this has already taken us 
well into the realm of ethics… 
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CHAPTER THREE: ETHICS 
This chapter will follow this plan:  In Part One, Desmond’s understanding of 
metaxological ethics—of his understandings of ethical “selvings” and communities in 
particular—is systematically presented.  In Part Two, this vision of ethics is compared 
to that of Caputo; in so doing, Desmond’s metaxological ethics is presented as a 
viable and indeed preferable alternative to LeviNietzschean ethics without/against 
ethics. 
PART ONE: A PRESENTATION OF WILLIAM DESMOND’S ETHICS 
Section I: Being and Goodness, Ethics and Metaphysics 
The modern ethos provides the background for modern understandings of 
ethics in that it molds not only our values but our conception of value itself.1  
Desmond sees a dualism or estrangement between being and goodness flowering into 
the fact/value distinction and into the absence of intrinsic worth that is one of the 
chief characteristics of the modern ethos.2  This dualism in the reconfigured ethos 
produces a neutralization of the ethos and an evacuation of worth from being that 
leaves the human to dwell as in a valueless whole.3  The modern “good” or value is 
good or valuable because it is valued for a human project—the good is good because 
human desiring makes it so.4  Thus being is instrumentalized—made the raw matter 
                                                
1
 AT 235; EB 19. 
2
 PO 160, 353; EB 194. 
3
 AT 235-36, 250; NDR 46. 
4
 MC 9; EB 31. 
BB 517-18: “When the ancients said that desire seeks the good because it is the good, they were 
superior to the moderns who said that the good is good because desire seeks it.” 
EB 168: “Is not late modernity anomalous in this regard? We have set ourselves up over against the 
surplus of otherness; stripping it of the charge of the good, we have also stripped it of the signs that 
point towards the ground of the good. As we saw, being there becomes worthless. In tandem, we set 
ourselves up as ground of value who impose on this valueless thereness values of our construction.” 
 This estrangement between being and the good—of the objectification of being and the 
subjectification of value—is very much present in Badiou’s understanding of human’s as inherently 
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for human manipulation—totally.5  Yet, Desmond argues, if being is valueless then 
humans are ontologically valueless as well, as are their valuations—there is no bank 
to cash the check of their bestowal of value upon being.6  This total collapse of value 
(when the check bounces, as it were) issues in nihilism, be it hidden or overt.7 
This modern ethos provides, for Desmond, the background for modern 
conceptions of ethics particularly as it influences the meaning of the central concept 
of freedom.  Freedom, in western modernity, is understood in terms of—if not simply 
as—autonomy or autonomous self-determination.8  This freedom-as-autonomy is 
grounded in the “devalued soil” of the modern ethos,9 in that its relation to being in its 
otherness is ambivalent, equivocal—or rather it comes to see otherness itself as 
equivocal: valueless in itself but useful in our autonomous value-constructing 
projects.10  Because of the lack of any inherent goodness or value in being or 
otherness, the autonomous subject is the seen as the only possible source of value.  
And once autonomy is installed as the ideal it works to maintain its autonomy as 
freedom from otherness.11  For the self-determining self to secure itself as truly 
autonomous it alone must be the source of value—it is the source of what value there 
is in being in its otherness.  Otherness is valuable because it is valued by an 
                                                                                                                                        
worthless and of ethics (his “ethics of truths”) as not arising from what is, for what is is nothing more 
than neutral pure multiplicity.  Badiou, Ethics, pp. 28, 59.  On the problem of the estrangement of 
being and goodness, see Milbank, Being Reconciled, 17. 
5
 PU 227. 
6
 EB 138; BR 228; PU 248.  
BB 509: “If the creation is valueless in itself, then the human being as a participant in creation is also 
ontologically valueless, so likewise his human construction is ultimately valueless.  Every effort to 
construct values out of himself will be subject to the same deeper, primitive, ultimate valuelessness.  
Human values collapse ultimately into nothing, if there is not a ground of value in the integrity of being 
itself.” 
7
 PU 227; EB 31, 149, 154, 167. 
BB 509: “The human being is a living nihilism masquerading as ethical, if there is no ontology of the 
good, if the good is not grounded in being itself, or if being is not primally good.”  
8
 PO 185; EB 160, 270; AT 233; BR 218. 
9
 EB 133; AT 237. 
10
 PU 121; AT 233; EB 169; AOO 271. 
11
 PO 173-74; PU 191. 
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autonomous self.  This reinforces the dualism between being and goodness.12  
Desmond contends that there is, however, a way of thinking of the relation between 
being and goodness other than the modern dualism and a way of thinking of freedom 
(and thus ethics) other than modern, absolutized autonomy.13 
Desmond’s conception provides an alternative that affirms the inherent value 
of being in its otherness—a close interrelating of being and goodness.  Desmond sees 
the “modern” view of the relation between being and value as being based on a 
contraction (or an “evacuation” or a “neutering”) of the given ethos of being—on the 
modern ethos’ overly determinate and univocal constriction of the overdetermined 
“between.”14  Whereas the “modern” view sees the good as existing only as projected 
and defined by human desire, Desmond sides more with the “ancients” who saw 
desire as seeking the good because it is good—that there is good in being that is not 
fully reducible to our desiring.15  Being and goodness, for Desmond, are related to 
each other—not in terms of any simple univocal identification or equivocal 
separation—but in terms of such metaxological relations or intermediations as the 
promise of goodness in being (especially regarding human being),16 being’s intimacy 
                                                
12
 EB 137. 
NDR 43-44: This is related to what Desmond calls, “the antinomy of autonomy and transcendence”: 
“Absolutize autonomy and you must relativize transcendence; but if transcendence cannot be so 
relativized, autonomy must itself be relativized.” 
13
 EB 138, 158; HG 22. 
14
 NDR 46; EB 99; AT 235. 
AT 236: “Suppose such an ethos of ‘neutralization’ is itself an ontological contraction of the given 
milieu of being as saturated with value.” 
(N.b.) The “phenomenological” experience of this ethos was addressed more specifically in the first 
and third sections of the first part of the previous chapter. 
15
 AT 235. 
BB 517-18: “When the ancients said that desire seeks the good because it is the good, they were  
superior to the moderns who said that the good is good because desire seeks it.  The vector of 
transcendence of desire is ethical love of the good.” 
EB 248: “[S]ome say: the good is the desirable; it is what is desired; desire defines the good, not the 
good desire. This is a widespread modern view, from Hobbes onward. The ancients took the other side 
of the ambiguity: the good is the desirable, it is desired as desirable, but it is desirable because it is 
good; the good is desired because it is good, not good because it is desired. I take the second view to be 
the truer, but the first has its partial truth.” 
16
 PU 192; EB 17, 162. 
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with the good17 and being’s hospitality to the good.18  Such an understanding of the 
interrelatedness of being and goodness issues in a different view of freedom: an 
ontological freedom that one has in being given to be—the prior “coming to be” that 
makes our free becoming possible, that possibilizes our possibility19—a freedom not 
just “from” foreign or external domination but “to” become a more excellent self and 
then giving beyond the self “toward” the other.20 
This bringing together of being and goodness in an understanding of the value 
or worth of being likewise brings metaphysics and ethics into a closer, more intimate, 
relation.21  Ethics and metaphysics, for Desmond, are inseparable and should not, and 
indeed cannot be, divorced from one another.22  Metaphysics cannot be divorced from 
the ethical in that metaphysics entails an ethical valuing of being and desire for, even 
love of, truth.23  Neither can ethics be divorced from the metaphysical.  Ethics, for 
Desmond, is metaphysical—is dependent on metaphysics—in that it entails an 
understanding of the relation between being and goodness, of what it means to be 
                                                                                                                                        
PO 160: “The ethical is an articulation of being as good, the charge of being in us that we become, 
actualize, the given promise of the good.” 
AT 235: “Ethos is indeterminate in an overdetermined sense: not merely neutral, but an equivocal 
medium of possibility or an in-between of promise.” 
EB 51: “The ethos is one of promise, and so open to different shapings in terms of the plurality of the 
potencies of the ethical.”  See Section II below. 
17
 NDR 44; EB 21. 
BB 535: “The immanence of the good concerns its working in the intimacy of being itself.  This 
intimacy refers both to the idiocy of the self, and to the community between ethical selves that sustain 
each other with respect for their inherent worth.” 
18
 AT 235. 
NDR 44: “One of the richest ways of speaking of [being] would be to say: it is hospitable to the gift of 
the good.  It is enveloped by a light of worth.  The metaphysical milieu, the ontological ethos of our 
philosophizing, requires reflection in terms of this, reflection on this hospitality of being to the good.” 
19
 BHD 80, 182. 
20
 EB 317. 
See Section III below. 
21
 PO 161. 
PU 39: “The question of the worth of what is, the very worthiness of being…[t]his question points to a 
convergence of metaphysics (as asking about the meaning and truth of being) and ethics (as asking 
about the goodness of being).” 
22
 PU 87, 223, 227; AT 235. 
23
 PU 87, 108, 149, 177. 
PO 163: “All being mindful is ethical.” 
PU 109: “There is an existential ethical side to objective knowing as participatory in a community of 
mind and being.  Objective knowing counsels detachment, disinterest.  But these are ambiguous 
counsel, since they seem to deny the value of objective inquiry itself.” 
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good.24  Ethics entails articulating what is good or valuable or of worth in being25—
particularly when it comes to that of human beings.26 
Finally, Desmond’s conception of the deeper interrelation of being and 
goodness, of metaphysics and ethics, suggests meditation on the ground of the 
enigmatic value and goodness in being and thus the ground of ethics.27  The error of 
more modern conceptions, for Desmond, is the endeavor to ground goodness and 
ethics solely in the autonomous self’s groundless valuing.28  In opposition to this, 
Desmond sees the more proximate ground of ethics to be metaphysics as it presents a 
conception of the ethos as a metaxological community of being—particularly when it 
comes to the understanding of the being of human selves in community (see the 
sections below).29  The more ultimate ground, however, is the ground of this 
grounding community of being.  The agapeic origin is the ground of being and 
goodness as the one that gives forth being to be as good in itself.30 
                                                
24
 PU 39; EB 18. 
PO 344: “Being ethical is a way of being of desire: desire is an articulation of being that is always 
already charged with value…. Ethics is the hermeneutics of this charge.” 
BB 509: “The human being is a living nihilism masquerading as ethical, if there is no ontology of the 
good, if the good is not grounded in being itself, or if being is not primally good.”  
PU 223: “Again metaphysics and ethics are inseparable.  Without proper metaphysical ground, ethics is 
groundless.” 
25
 PO 160-61, 183, 189. 
PO 160: “The ethical is an articulation of being as good, the charge of being in us that we become, 
actualize, the given promise of the good.” 
PO 161: “We value according to an ontological sense of being, the self-knowledge of which we often 
lack.” 
26
 PU 227. 
PO 160: “The ethical, as care for the good, is a way of being, articulating what we are in a manner that 
from the outset shows a configuration of being always already charged with the good.  The ethical is an 
articulation of being as good, the charge of being in us that we become, actualize, the given promise of 
the good.”  
more specifically, the value of the other human being 
PO 187: Respect for the other “follows from what we might term the metaphysical worth of 
personhood.” 
27
 EB 18-20. 
28
 EB 45: “This is nonsense, of course, since the ground, even while giving growth, must always 
remain other; the flower is only relatively self-growing and never self-grounding. The self-grounding 
flower is folly. But we will ourselves to be thus blooming.” 
29
 EB 199-200: “There is a transcendental/ontological meaning of metaxological community which is 
the ground that makes possible determinate formations of ethical community such as we find in definite 
forms of ethical selving and communal intermediation.” 
30
 EB 17, 20, 201. 
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Section II: The Plurivocal Promise of the Singular Self 
Key to Desmond’s understanding of ethics’ relation to metaphysics is his 
philosophical anthropology—the way in which a metaphysical understanding of the 
self serves as a basis for a more concrete understanding of ethics in terms of different 
“ethical selvings” and ethical communities.  Toward this end, I will summarize (in 
§1.) Desmond’s conceptions of: the idiocy or singularity of selfhood, the infinitude 
and inward otherness of selfhood, the promise of original selfhood, and the freedom 
and development of the becoming self.  I will then outline (in §2.) what Desmond 
identifies as the ethical potencies of the human self. 
§1. The Metaxological Self 
The human self, for Desmond, is characterized by an idiotic singularity31—by 
a felt irreplaceable uniqueness or originality—a singular integrity.32  This singularity 
is a “rich ‘univocity.’”33  The idiot self is an “elemental self”34 that has a non- or pre-
objective35 mindfulness of its being for-itself.36  The self senses, feels, is aware of this 
                                                                                                                                        
PU 225: “How can we speak of such value as intrinsic to being?  The language of ‘creation’ points in a 
direction which cannot stop short of metaphysics, indeed a certain theology.  Creation is good because 
to be is to be a value; to be a value is to be so because one is valued; but who is the one that values the 
creation?  The most radical answer is that the origin does.” 
31
 PO 361; BB 397; EB 170-71. 
BB 383: “This elemental self is idiotic, again in the Greek sense of the idiōtēs: the private, the 
intimate—what is on the edge of, or outside, or other than—more publicly available generalities or 
neutral universals.” 
32
 BB 380, 397; EB 186. 
BB 380: “This elemental self is itself and nothing but itself.  Perhaps we may speak of its simplicity 
and indivisibility, though this will have to be further qualified.  We might say that to be a self is to be 
an original unto oneself.” 
BB 381: “The human self—and this is felt singularly by each singular self—has an ineluctable sense of 
itself as itself and itself alone.” 
33
 BB 383. 
BB 380: “The univocal sense offers us a first approach to this singularity of self.  A self is itself and 
nothing but itself.” 
34
 BB 381-84, 397. 
35
 BB 381: “This nonobjective selfhood is a singular mindfulness of the original power of being that 
senses and feels itself as a unique becoming that is for itself in the vast enigma of the universal 
impermanence.” 
EB 171: “Idiocy" also names an indeterminate pre-objective and pre-subjective "awareness" that is not 
any definite awareness, and that floats with a pre-determinate sense of "self" that is no definite self, and 
that yet precedes any definite formation of self, and out of which crystalize different formations of 
selving.” 
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idiotic singularity intimately and elementally.37  Such mindfulness of the singular self 
entails a concrete awareness of the self’s integrity38 and worth as a singular being.39  
But this singular, idiotic self is also communal—always already in relation to 
otherness whether in the self’s own inward otherness (its transcendence) or its 
intimate relation with others (its transcending).40 
The human self, in Desmond’s understanding, is also characterized by its 
infinitude.  Selfhood is the emergence in finite being of an infinitely restless 
desire41—of an intentional infinitude.42  The source of this infinite restlessness and 
intentional infinitude is the excess of the self—the inward otherness of the self as an 
inner infinitude and as source of transcending.43  This transcendence of the human self 
(T2)—as both an inward otherness/excess/infinitude that is its transcendent source 
                                                                                                                                        
36
 BB 377, 379-80. 
37
 BB 381-83. 
BB 381: “The human self—and this is felt singularly by each singular self—has an ineluctable sense of 
itself as itself and itself alone.” 
BB 397: “It is this sense of idiotic integrity, incomparable singularity, that is felt by the primal, 
elemental I.” 
38
 EB 186. 
BB 397: “It is this sense of idiotic integrity, incomparable singularity, that is felt by the primal, 
elemental I.” 
39
 EB 188. 
EB 200: “The idiot self concretizes the infinite value in the ontological roots of human being as given 
to itself by the origin.” 
40
 EB 170-71. 
BB 384: The elemental self is “as idiotically my own, and as never possessed even while my own, it is 
never owned by me.  It is an inward otherness, more intimate to inwardness [than] all its own self-
possessions.  The idiocy of the self in this inwardness is an opening to otherness within itself.” 
EB 170: “The intimacy of the idiocy is both a self-intimacy and also an unthematic mindfulness that 
self is with others always and from the start. The ontological definition of the intimate "solo" is always 
to be with the other, even when not knowing this, and indeed when not knowing itself.” 
41
 DDO 75; BB 401.  
EB 215: “The anomalous being of the human is revealed in this freedom of infinite desire. Infinite 
desire emerges in finite being - excess of being rises up in the human being as selving: transcending as 
more, and towards the more. This "more" means enigmatic otherness in inwardness itself: the very 
interiority of being is the coming to show of infinity, the transcending power of the being, the 
transcendence towards infinity of the human being.” 
42
 DDO 75. 
43
 EB 215. 
BB 384: “The idiocy of the self in this inwardness is an opening to otherness within itself.  Indeed its 
excess suggests the promise of an inexhaustibility.” 
BB 401: “The excess of the self…is the source of its infinite restlessness.  A pure whole is never 
restless with itself; it is perfect and needs nothing; or it is perfectly at home with itself.  Not so the 
human self as original.” 
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and a self-transcendence that is its transcending activity—has to do with the self’s 
freedom and possibility.44  The possibility of the self is the possibility of development 
both in its relation to itself—becoming a more articulated and determinate whole—
and in its openness and relation to otherness.45 
Desmond brings these elements of the being of the self—of singularity and 
self-transcendence—together in his concept of the original self.46  The self is original 
in two senses.  First, the self is original in the sense of being unique, singular, original 
unto itself.47  Second, the self is original in the sense of being a source of 
origination.48  In this second sense, there is an original power or energy of being in the 
self—an overdetermined ontological excess or plenitude or unmastered depth to the 
self’s inward otherness.49  As such, the original self (as constitutive of the being of the 
self) is the “indeterminate locus of selving” (of the self as becoming and 
developing).50  Thus Desmond writes of the promise of the singular self51—the way in 
                                                
44
 BB 231; EB 215. 
HG 3: “T2: Here I refer to the transcendence of self-being such as we meet especially in the self-
surpassing power of the human being.  The meaning of possibility can here be defined immanently 
rather than just determined externally.  There is possibility as freedom, perhaps even as the promise of 
free finite creativity.” 
45
 DDO 75; BB 384. 
DDO 189: “As an intermediate original, the self revealed itself as double—that is, both as a desire for 
immanent self-relation and as infinitely open in terms of its exodus into what is beyond.  It desires to 
be whole; yet, as infinitely open, it may become actively originative in relation to otherness.  
Wholeness and infinitude in this sense can be seen as two ultimates defining man’s deepest relation to 
himself and otherness.” 
46
 See regarding original selfhood: DDO 35-67. 
47
 PO 361; BB 380-81. 
BB 380: “This elemental self is itself and nothing but itself.  Perhaps we may speak of its simplicity 
and indivisibility, though this will have to be further qualified.  We might say that to be a self is to be 
an original unto oneself.” 
48
 BB 380. 
PU 78: “If there is an indeterminacy to the idiot I that is original, ‘original’ does not imply atomic 
substance but source of origination.  The original indeterminate I is free as an originative source of 
being.” 
49
 PO 51, 361; BB 401; PU 60. 
BB 380: “To be a self is to be a distinctive center of original power of being.” 
PU 60: “…an indeterminate power that is prior to any determination and that exceeds every 
determination, whether effected by the self itself, or by the social networks of relations which 
consolidates its communal identity.  This is the ontological power of original selfness.” 
50
 BB 381. 
51
 BB 377: “In sum: the promise of singularity, concretized in the being for-itself of creation, selves 
through things and intelligibilities, and begins to be mindfully realized in the human self.” 
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which the self both is itself and becomes itself52—such that its being can be described 
as inexhaustible excess (its transcendence) and possibility (its transcending).53  The 
promise of the self is the possibility of its self-transcending,54 be it in the direction of 
its self-becoming/realization (erotic) or of its relating to others (agapeic).55 
The self’s (self-)transcendence as freedom develops through a process of self-
determination and self-mediation that is the becoming of the ethical self.  The 
transcending power of human being comes to expression in its being as possibility—
its perplexing and indeterminate freedom.56  This transcending of the self is a self-
surpassing in which the self is self-determining and self-originating.57  As such, the 
self’s transcending/surpassing/originating/determining is a process through which the 
self becomes ethical in coming to relate to itself (understand itself) and shape itself 
(form itself in practice) in different ways—in different “selvings.”58  In this process of 
                                                
52
 PU 57: “We become ourselves, but we are already ourselves; and we become the selves we already 
are, because we are not the self we might be, given the promise of being that is given to us as being this 
person.” 
53
 BB 384. 
PU 192: “Possibility as creative is ontological.  It refers to the promise of being as concretely offered in 
the between, a promise that is given, but that is not completely actualized in its givenness.  Promise 
may be a gift that has to be actualized, or actualize itself in freedom.  Ontological promise is especially 
evident with the human being as free.  Creative possibility reveals the transcending energy of being 
itself; in the promise of human freedom, the original power of being becomes freely self-transcending.” 
54
 BB 378. 
BB 397: “The dynamism of self-transcendence specifies the promise of this original self.” 
55
 PU 78. 
BB 390: “[T]his self is…an affirmative openness to what is other to itself, and to the to-be-realized 
realization of its own promise of being.” 
PU 70: “There is both erotic and agapeic promise in the intimacy of being, in the idiocy of selfhood.” 
56
 BB 231; PU 191; EB 215; AOO 268. 
HG 3: “T2: Here I refer to the transcendence of self-being such as we meet especially in the self-
surpassing power of the human being.  The meaning of possibility can here be defined immanently 
rather than just determined externally.  There is possibility as freedom, perhaps even as the promise of 
free finite creativity.” 
57
 PO 361; HG 3. 
BB 380: “The indeterminacy of the original self is to be understood affirmatively as a source of 
origination.  As a power of determining, we can also call it a source of spontaneity and freedom.” 
BB 392: The self is “original of itself to the extent that its doing of itself also makes it to be the kind of 
being that it is.” 
58
 BB 378, 397, 525; EB 52. 
PO 164: “Ethical mind in its fullness…[is] an achievement, the product of a process of 
development…we must become ethical.  Here we have the risk of soul-making: being ethical involves a 
poie¯ sis of selfhood, the self-becoming of the human being in praxis with respect to its ideal 
perfection.” 
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selving (of the self’s indeterminate ontological freedom/possibility forming itself in 
various ways), the self comes to understand itself in the light of different 
understandings of freedom.59  But this selving is also (and, as Desmond argues, more 
basically) an intermediation with otherness beyond this self-mediation—seen in the 
way the higher forms of selving consist of coming to live in the midst of community 
with the other.60 
 
The indeterminate original self then comes to and undergoes plural mediations 
and determinations.  Within and out of the singularity of the self there is a plurality.  
Desmond describes this plurivocal promise of the singular self in two ways in Ethics 
and the Between: in terms of the more abstract account of the ethical potencies and in 
terms of the more concrete account of the ethical selvings.  Desmond then goes on to 
describe the different kinds of ethical communities in which selves come to dwell.  
First, I will deal briefly with the ethical potencies before moving on the ethical 
selvings in the following section (III) and the ethical communities in the section after 
that (IV). 
§2. Ethical Potencies 
Within the singular self there is a plurality of ethical potencies—a plurivocity 
of the good—for the good too is “said” in many ways.  These potencies refer to the 
plurivocal ontological promise of being in the human self—the dynamic endowment 
                                                                                                                                        
BB 379: “Selving, like being, is plurivocal.” 
EB 223: Ethical selvings (which are dealt with in Part III of Ethics and the Between) have to do with 
“the self-mediation of the good from rudimentary desire to agapeic freedom beyond autonomy.” 
59
 The different selvings and concomitant freedoms will be expanded upon in Section III below. 
EB 269: “If the freedom that ferments in ethical selving is not univocal but plurivocal, it follows that 
there are different freedoms, corresponding to different formations of self-transcending.” 
60
 EB 223: “Of course, we cannot separate the self-mediation of being good from intermediation with 
the other. But for purposes of clarification, self-mediation can be correlated with a more dialectical 
slant, intermediation with a more metaxological. In truth, ethical selving is intermediated through and 
through, and hence metaxological. The intermediate sustains the self-mediation.”  
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out of which the self develops.61  These potencies are the basic sources out of which 
the self comes to reflect more determinately on the indeterminate show of value—out 
of which ethics comes to dwell with the both the equivocities and the constancies in 
the ethos.62  The potencies are: the idiotic, the aesthetic, the dianoetic, the 
transcendental, the eudaimonistic, and the transcending. 
The first two potencies are the idiotic and the aesthetic.  The idiotic potency 
has to do with the self’s elemental and yet indeterminate (or overdeterminate) 
intimacy with the good of being.63  This potency names the simple and (as mentioned 
above) singular pre-objective and pre-subjective awareness of the community of being 
as good on a primal and elemental level within oneself.64  The aesthetic potency, 
however, has to do with the showing of the worth of being in the body and to the 
senses—often expressed in terms of beauty.65  There is an indeterminate excess in the 
aesthetic display of value that issues in an equivocity that calls for constancies in our 
understanding of the good.66 
The dianoetic potency seeks intelligible regularities or constancies in the midst 
of the ambiguities of polyvalent showings of the good.67  This potency names the 
                                                
61
 EB 10: “The ontological promise of the power of the ‘to be’ receives such plurivocal articulation in 
terms of what I will call the potencies of the ethical.” 
EB 10: “We are plurally endowed with the ethical promise of diverse potencies of the original power to 
be.” 
62
 EB 79, 191. 
63
 EB 10-11. 
EB 170:  “‘Idiocy’ names the initially unarticulated intimacy with the good.” 
64
 EB 170-71. 
EB 171: “The community of being as good comes to indeterminate mindfulness in the innerness of 
selving that is the mysterious coming to self in primal self-awakening to the ‘to be.’” 
EB 171: “I connect this with the elemental, non-determinate mindfulness of simply being. This 
indeterminate awareness/non-awareness of simply being is saturated with the value of being, but we 
cannot uninterruptedly endure this value.” 
65
 EB 11. 
EB 177: “The worth of being is shown aesthetically in the ethos—given to our senses and our bodies.” 
EB 179: “The more standard contrast of aesthetics and ethics cannot be finally upheld. We think of 
beauty as an aesthetic category, but it is also ethical. Beauty is the singular formation of harmonious 
integrity of being within the ambience of value pervading the ethos.” 
66
 EB 189-91. 
67
 EB 11, 191. 
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drive to identify patterns of integrity and commonality—intrinsic values that 
command moral respect.68  Such patterns or constancies would include perennial and 
elemental human concerns—that the gift of being or of life, in oneself and in the 
other, is something to be valued (for it is has inherent worth), honored, protected—not 
taken for granted but taken as granted, as a gift.69  This potency retains a necessary 
place in being ethical even if there can be no complete univocal determination of the 
constancies (and such is to be guarded against).70 
The next two potencies, the transcendental and the eudaimonistic, mirror on a 
more sophisticated and abstract level the dianoetic and aesthetic potencies.  The 
transcendental potency names the power to name certain constancies that occupy a 
special position in that they are necessary for the possibility of ethical life.71  
Desmond identifies two such conditions for the possibility of ethical being in the 
between: first, the metaxological relation or community between self and other72 and, 
second, the metaxological relation between the agapeic origin and the community of 
                                                
68
 EB 192: “Ethical mindfulness is intensive attunement to the play of sameness and difference in the 
ethos, where insistent and subtle constancies emerge in the flux of impermanence.” 
EB 192: “The constancies reflect dynamic patterns of integrity and commonality in the changing flux 
of the ethos. They are forms of ‘being together’ that, already at work, make a call on humans to realize 
more fully their given promise.” 
69
 EB 196: “What do we find is the constant? We approach very close to the elementals: worship and 
thanks, reverence and honor, love, birth, marriage, death, covetousness and liberality, possession and 
hospitality” 
EB 196: “I think the ten commandments offer a succinct codification of the constancies as passing from 
God's absolute constancy, and the gift of the "to be," through the other more qualified constancies 
related to self and other: mortal life, family, marriage, birth, death, one's place in the sun, what one may 
possess and what one should not usurp; the elementals above named.  The point is not mindless 
submission to dead law. The constancies formulate deep and elemental exigencies of human being, 
formulate them often as tasks, but tasks based on what we are, for what we are is an openness to 
become what we are and answer the exigencies immanent in our being.” 
70
 EB 11, 196. 
71
 EB 11. 
EB 199: “What I mean by transcendental here is not any logical or epistemological possibility; it is 
ontological as pertaining to the constitution of what it means to be, and what it means to be good.” 
72
 EB 11, 199-200. 
EB 199: “But do we find constancies so insistent as to be called transcendental in the general sense that 
without them determinate ethical living would not be possible? I think the agapeic relation between 
origin and the ethos is transcendental in that sense, as well as the metaxological relation between self 
and other within the ethos. Both relations condition the possibility of more determinate possibilities of 
selving and being together.” 
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being.  The eudaimonistic73 potency, however, names value in terms of the fullness of 
human flourishing and resumes the idiotic and aesthetic potencies inasmuch it seeks 
to come to terms with the more indeterminate manifestations and embodiments of 
value in human being.74  This potency has to do with an ethical dwelling that is less 
science than finesse—with more attentiveness to nuance and ambiguity—seeing 
excellence in terms of a feel for the whole of life.75 
Finally, the transcending potency has to do with how the indeterminate or 
overdeterminate excess within the human exceeds and surpasses itself toward 
otherness.76  This restlessness points to an infinite dimension of the human being—a 
desire that is not satisfied by any finite good.  It transcends us toward something 
transcendent of any finite good.77  This transcending takes various formations: be it 
equivocal transcending driven by unchecked desire as lack toward mania and 
boredom,78 or erotic transcending seeking to affirm oneself and be one’s own 
master,79 or agapeic transcending consenting to the gift of being (gratitude) and letting 
go of what is one’s own for the other (generosity)—a desire as openness to the other 
that is a true self-transcending.80 
 
 
 
                                                
73
 Sometimes Desmond has the eudaimonistic follow the dianoetic in sequence to accentuate the 
dialectical to and fro between the more stable/constant/univocal and the more fluid/variable/equivocal. 
74
 EB 12. 
75
 EB 203: “The needful discernment is neither a fixation on rigid principles nor a lax yielding to every 
passing impulse. It is principled and yet ever vigilant to the nuance of situation. It is a living constancy 
in the midst of the passing.” 
76
 EB 12. 
77
 EB 209. 
EB 212: “A restlessness emerges that testifies to an infinite dimension to human desire. We cannot 
force all desire into the mould of finite appetite. To live in terms of that forcing is to deform ourselves. 
The infinite restlessness must be given allowance to be itself. Allowing it so, however, risks futility on 
one side, our coming into something more transcendent, on the other.” 
78
 EB 215. 
79
 EB 216. 
80
 EB 217. 
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Section III: Ethical Selvings and Agapeic Selving 
The human being, in Desmond’s understanding, becomes ethical through a 
poiesis of selfhood—through the process of the progressive unfolding of the self.81  
This process of self-becoming broadly follows the lines of human development: from 
infancy and childhood through adolescence to adulthood and maturity.82  The 
development of these different “ethical selvings” describes the development of will 
and desire from root indeterminate urge/willing through various self-mediations and 
transformations toward a (perhaps paradoxical) willing and desiring beyond willing 
and desiring.83  As such, the ethical selvings are the plural enactment of freedom—
different kinds of freedom, different kinds of self-transcendence.84  These plural 
ethical selvings are the self-mediations of the good as the dialectical development of 
the self and its understanding of the good—as the coming to greater self-
consciousness and a greater level of self-determination (regarding its will, desire, 
freedom, etc.).85  But this self-determination is also intimately connected to, 
dependent upon and relating to the intermediation with the other in the broader 
community of being (as will be explored in the next section: on ethical 
communities).86  In this section, I will present Desmond’s understanding of these 
plural ethical selvings, giving particular attention to the differences with regard to will 
                                                
81
 PO 164; BB 415. 
82
 EB 223-24. 
83
 PU 70; EB 223-24. 
84
 EB 269. 
EB 269: “If the freedom that ferments in ethical selving is not univocal but plurivocal, it follows that 
there are different freedoms, corresponding to different formations of self-transcending.” 
85
 BB 525-26; EB 223. 
EB 223: “In Part III, I consider the self-mediation of the good from rudimentary desire to agapeic 
freedom beyond autonomy.” 
86
 EB 120: “Ethics entails a process of selving in community, and a process of communication between 
selves. Ethical self-mediation occurs within the intermediation of the ethos.” 
EB 223: “Of course, we cannot separate the self-mediation of being good from intermediation with the 
other. But for purposes of clarification, self-mediation can be correlated with a more dialectical slant, 
intermediation with a more metaxological. In truth, ethical selving is intermediated through and 
through, and hence metaxological. The intermediate sustains the self-mediation.” 
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and desire, freedom and relation to otherness (or love).  For the sake of simplicity, I 
will organize the seven selvings (from Ethics and the Between) into the four more 
general categories of selving used in Desmond’s other works and paralleling (more or 
less) the different forms of ethical community (as well as the fourfold sense of being). 
§1. Idiotic Selving (first ethical selving) 
The first of Desmond’s ethical selvings is idiot selving.  Idiot selving names 
the private and intimate elemental or original self (as discussed above).87  This selving 
is a richly “univocal” self—the self that is intimately aware of itself as itself, its 
mineness—the singular and unique becoming of the self.88  Idiot selving is a prior 
selving—prereflective, preobjective, pre-explicitly known—a “Self Before Self” that 
is the “root” self presupposed by all subsequent selvings.89  This prior, root, idiot self 
is also the indeterminate and excessive source of origination of further selvings.90 
This particular, idiotic selving can be understood as distinctive in terms of its 
relations to desire, will, freedom and otherness.  The idiotic self is the immediate and 
spontaneous eruption of desire as the self’s elemental, urgent and emergent power to 
be.91  Desmond describes the energy of this desire as a root will from which the self 
                                                
87
 BB 380-83. 
88
 BB 379-83. 
BB 382: “This nonobjective sense of self suggests the nonreducibility of the inner feeling of 
mineness.” 
BB 383: “This elemental self is idiotic, again in the Greek sense of the idiōtēs: the private, the 
intimate—what is on the edge of, or outside, or other than—more publicly available generalities or 
neutral universals.  This idiotic singularity points to a rich ‘univocity’ that is not subsumable in any 
system of categories.” 
89
 BB 381, 384; PU 63, 65. 
90
 BB 381-84; PU 65. 
BB 380: “The indeterminacy of the original self is to be understood affirmatively as a source of 
origination.  As a power of determining, we can also call it a source of spontaneity and freedom.” 
BB 397: “The dynamism of self-transcendence specifies the promise of this original self.  The risk run 
here is always that of self-distraction, or self-loss, or self-betrayal, or self-deformation; though again 
the self that loses itself is still the primal integrity for itself; it has, however, betrayed the promise of its 
own originality.” 
PU 60: “This inexhaustibility of selfhood, exceeding determination, conceptual or social, is the idiocy 
of its being.” 
91
 PO 159; EB 223-24, 227. 
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unfolds92—a double willingness that includes both self-insistence (the self’s 
spontaneous affirmation of its own being)93 and an intimate relation to otherness.94  
This first selving is characterized by an idiotic freedom as elementally given to 
itself95—a freedom to be itself—that is indeterminate in that it cannot be determined 
for it is a source of determination but not totally autonomous in its determination for it 
does not give itself to be.  It is indeterminate in its both being (relatively) and not 
(absolutely) being its own source/origin.96  Finally, idiotic selving is characterized by 
a certain intimacy both with itself97 and with otherness—an elemental being-with the 
other, the always already being-present of the other to the self.98 
                                                                                                                                        
PU 70: “Desire erupts in the idiotic self, it surges up in the flesh, elementally and unbidden.  It comes 
to be shaped in a process of selving.  Instead of the dissolution of determinacy, there is the fuller 
unfolding of this power to be into a distinctive self with a plurality of determinate self-manifestations.” 
EB 223: “First selving: the idiocy of root will surges up as spontaneous desire/need—elemental self-
insistence.” 
92
 EB 227-27; BB 415. 
93
 EB 227. 
EB 228: “The root will is always at work, even when self-determination mediates it. There is goodness 
to this root will: the self-insistence is the very energy in which the unique self-being of this being gives 
expression to itself. Every being is thus, simply as a being of dynamic energy; this is the spontaneous 
affirmation of its own being, of this being as good, and of the good of this being.” 
94
 PU 80; EB 227-28. 
EB 228: “The root will is in the idiot self: sheer idiosyncrasy in one sense, but in another sense it is the 
intimacy of being, and hence the happening of deep presence both to self and to others. The truth of 
community, of communicative being with a uniquely personal intonation, is already there in the root 
will.” 
95
 PU 78-80. 
EB 270: “First freedom is given to us as the release into being for ourselves.” 
96
 PU 78: “Freedom cannot be reduced to a determinate power…. To be free in itself, the source of 
freedom must be beyond univocal determination; for it cannot be fixed.  And it cannot be fixed because 
it is a fixing or source of fixing, a shaping and not at first a shaped product.” 
PU 78: “Freedom is not ultimately erotic, nor simply for the self.  Put otherwise, the indeterminate 
freedom of the idiot I is not autonomy.  For the intimacy of being is double, hence its being for itself is 
also heteronomous.” 
97
 BB 383; EB 228. 
PU 161: “There is a truth to the cogito argument—the self in being denied or deceived cannot be 
denied to be.  I see this as the ineradicable intimacy of being, the idiocy of self-being.” 
98
 PU 63-76. 
PU 66: “Elemental self-transcendence and community are inseparable, so much so that an elemental 
‘being-with’ is constitutive of the idiotic I itself.  The nature of the intimate self is ‘being with’: being 
with self, and being with what is other to self.”  
PU 76: “Is the idiotic I just thought thinking itself?  No, for its intimacy with the other is always 
already there from the outset.” 
EB 171: “This idiocy is an awakening. The community of being as good comes to indeterminate 
mindfulness in the innerness of selving that is the mysterious coming to self in primal self-awakening 
to the "to be" -  a coming that is of the essence to singular selfhood and yet irreducibly communal, at 
once a relation to itself and a relation to what is other.” 
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§2. Aesthetic, Equivocal Selving 
After idiotic selving is aesthetic or equivocal selving.  Aesthetic selving—as 
having to do with the body and the relation between inner and outer, subject and 
objects—is a more determinate, more manifest expression of the idiotic self as 
fleshed, located and positioned in a world of others.99  The aesthetic self is a 
between—the fleshed site of passage between the inner and the outer—an elemental 
community with otherness inasmuch as the self undergoes, suffers in its inwardness 
the “press” of being in its otherness.100  However, this community, as arising from a 
kind of vulnerability, is equivocal, for we need what is in the world and what we need 
can either be acquired or not, the latter condition constituting a threat to us.101  It is in 
relation to this ambivalence about the “outer” that desire asserts itself—transcends 
itself—seeking to maintain itself by acquiring what it needs from what is other to 
itself.  Thus desire as lack seeking to overcome itself becomes will as self-will—
becomes a self-affirming and self-insistent willfulness.102  It is an equivocal, 
“devouring” love—loving the self and consuming the other—loving/hating the other 
as necessary/threatening.103  Under this more general category of aesthetic or 
equivocal selving, Desmond describes two more specific ethical selvings (in Ethics 
and the Between): the second ethical selving of “the redoubling of will” and the third 
                                                
99
 BB 384: “In certain respects, the idiot self is prior to aesthetic selving, because the latter is already 
‘objectified’ in the body, positioned, ‘posited,’ there,’ hence more determinate than the idiotic I.” 
PU 66: “This idiotic self comes to more manifest expression with the aesthetic I—aesthetic in its 
ancient and widest connotation concerning sensible and sensitive being.  Being-there as other is given 
as aesthetic presencing; so also the sense of self is emergent as aesthetically intimated.  By the aesthetic 
self I mean the self in the prereflective and preobjective feeling of itself as fleshed.” 
100
 BB 385-87. 
BB 386: “The aesthetic self is a site of flow and passage, in and out.  In the element of the flesh it is 
already a between.” 
101
 BB 388, 390. 
The other as t(h)reat? 
102
 DDO 165; BB 385, 415. 
103
 BB 389; En 136; HG 39. 
DDO 166: Self-will’s “devouring willfulness…cannot endure the pathos, the suffering, of difference.  
Indeed, in that it hates what it cannot control, there is really a despair, both of itself and of otherness, in 
its defiance of finitude.” 
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ethical selving of “the becoming of freedom.”104 
second ethical selving 
Desmond’s second ethical selving of the redoubling of the will has to with the 
way that will comes to direct desire more determinately—a transformation of desire 
into a more decisive, directed self-mediation and self-becoming.105  Desire values 
what fills lack and thus fulfills it.106  Desire becomes more determinate as it seeks and 
focuses on a particular outcome or object—but desire finds it cannot find univocal, 
definite satisfaction, for desire is excessive.107  It is from this equivocal situation (the 
dis/satisfaction of desire) that desire is elevated and broadened, seeking not merely 
after this or that particular object, but after a certain state of being—a kind of 
wholeness to the self—willing to be a certain kind of person.108  This happens with a 
redoubling of will—the will comes to stand above itself to judge itself, to be 
answerable for itself to itself.109  With this redoubling of the will, there comes into 
being the consciousness of failure in terms of judgment—of one will (the judge, as it 
                                                
104
 EB 245, 269. 
105
 EB 126, 245. 
106
 EB 248. 
107
 PO 159; BB 392-93. 
EB 249: “Desire is indeterminate as simply desire, but determinate as oriented to this particular 
outcome. It is always both: indeterminate/determinate, and yet again more than any determinate desire. 
There is a univocity to the process: I desire this, this, this - and the "this" can often be determined with 
strong univocity: food, drink, shelter... Yet this univocity leads to this good, this good and so on, ad 
infinitum. It is this multiplication that introduces the more in equivocal form. The excess of desire 
meets the excess of things, always more than desire, and at the same time desire is more than they. 
They are more than it can possess; it wills to possess more than they can give. There is a double 
"more," on both sides. The ad infinitum of desire suggests futility: ad nauseam. It is the same damn 
thing again and again, in every different object.  And as the same, it is now not anymore the more that 
desire seeks. An orgy of satisfaction comes to sing the dirges of dissatisfaction.” 
108
 EB 245: “Hence desire is not just for this and that but also for its own fulfillment. This appears with 
will: not just the will to this or that; but the will to be such and such a person. Not only do I will to 
have, or do, or be, such and such. I will myself to be such and such, in having or doing or being such 
and such. This is a more decisive self-mediation than any immediate happening of desire.” 
109
 EB 245: “Will thus is always implicitly an answerability for self. To will is to be answerable: to be 
open to acknowledge that what has been willed has been willed by this self, as the original of this 
willing. This answerability means the root will that merely insists on itself here decisively steps in the 
direction of ethical responsibility. The will that is answerable for itself is more than the will that insists 
on itself. Answerability lays itself open to judgment, while self-insistence calls for attention to itself, 
announcing its being there as a claim on the other.” 
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were)  judging the other will (the judged).110  In this situation of failure and judgment, 
there can be a “refusal” in which the self refuses to identify with the judged and 
exclusively identifies with the judge, the higher—thus identifying with only one part 
of the redoubled will.111  This ends up canceling the doubling, leaving only the will 
willing itself, affirming itself.112 
third ethical selving 
Desmond’s third ethical selving, described as “the becoming of freedom,” 
takes up where the last one left off—with an “adolescent upsurge.”113  This self-
affirming of the will and desire comes to think of its relation to the other in terms of 
its freedom—in particular, in terms of its freedom from the objects of its desire.  The 
desiring and willing self is free from what it desires in that it is beyond them—it 
always exceeds its objects.114  It exceeds them while also needing them—the self is 
independent and free for itself and yet also dependent upon the others than one would 
be free from.  Thus, this freedom from is an equivocal liberty.115  Yet, in this third 
                                                
110
 EB 247. 
111
 EB 248: “So the intrepid self-doubling, redoubling of the will, risks being the refusal whereby the 
self falls into evil, even as it elevates itself in the reiteration of its own self-infinitizing. Will willing to 
be itself absolute, to be itself the absolute: this is, in one sense, a natural development of the root will; 
in other sense, it is the result of a perversion of the doubleness that necessarily emerges in the self-
unfolding of the root will.”  
112
 EB 249: “What of the will willing to be itself absolute? This is a self-doubling that expresses the 
root energy of our being as self-transcending. But this is a self-transcending that does not transcend 
self. The self-doubling is no doubling at all; it is the insistent reiteration of the I as alone to be affirmed, 
and as I alone. This is a will to self-reiteration: self-insistent solitude in the absolitude of will willing 
itself.” 
113
 EB 223-24 
114
 EB 280 “In its upsurge, desire discovers freedom both in its power to possess this thing and that, 
and in its dissatisfaction in excess of all these possessions. Its knowing of this ‘more’ about itself 
means it is ‘free from’ these things: it is beyond them, even though it needs them. Its dissatisfaction 
paradoxically is inseparable from its superiority: it tastes the unlimited range of its self-transcending, 
and sees this lack of limit as revealing its power. Its unhappiness shows its power, even though as it 
ages more it will know more from this the meaning of its impotence. Now here the virgin freshness of 
desire, new to its own restlessness, is intoxicating. Desire is desire affirming itself as desire. Its 
drunkenness consists in its own self-intoxication, even as ‘freedom from’ takes form out of the will 
willing itself, or self-affirming affirming itself.” 
115
 PO 167. 
EB 271: “This first freedom opens equivocity: equivocity between our dependence on the other origin, 
our relativity to other things and persons in creation, and our own integrity of being for self. I said that 
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selving, freedom from the other is held to as an end—as establishing a kind of 
wholeness or integrity to the self—such that desire/will affirms itself over anything 
desired.  The self-affirming will’s dissatisfaction with the possessed other is seen as 
indicative of its superiority—I am more than this…and this…and this.116  Desiring 
self becomes self-enjoying, self-seeking, self-circling, self-intoxicated —and would 
be self-generating.117  Yet, in this self-circling, desire cannot “fill” itself, cannot “feed 
on” itself.  Desire as “freedom from” becomes a craving, a would-be self-
consummation (as self-completing) that is a self-consuming, a self-devouring that is 
ultimately despairing—an emptiness instead of sought fullness, an enslavement 
instead of sought freedom (from the other).118  So faced with the self-willing will’s 
desire becoming nihilistic craving, it can become apparent that some kind of purpose 
is needed to constrain or tame desire if the self is not to dissipate itself.  This entails 
another kind of freedom and another kind of selving.119 
                                                                                                                                        
my being is an affirmation of the ‘to be’ in the self-affirming of my being for self. This affirmation is a 
freeing of the original power of the ‘to be.’ It is a primordial ontological freedom.” 
116
 EB 280: “Its knowing of this ‘more’ about itself means it is ‘free from’ these things: it is beyond 
them, even though it needs them. Its dissatisfaction paradoxically is inseparable from its superiority: it 
tastes the unlimited range of its self-transcending, and sees this lack of limit as revealing its power. Its 
unhappiness shows its power, even though as it ages more it will know more from this the meaning of 
its impotence. Now here the virgin freshness of desire, new to its own restlessness, is intoxicating.” 
117
 EB 289, 291. 
EB 280: “Desire is desire affirming itself as desire. Its drunkenness consists in its own self-
intoxication, even as ‘freedom from’ takes form out of the will willing itself, or self-affirming 
affirming itself.” 
EB 297: “Desire would be self-generating; self would generate self. Any releasing of desire into 
freedom as itself given to it, will be redefined in terms of the circle of the self-generating, self-seeking 
self-enjoying self. There is no gift.” 
118
 EB 289: “Despite appearances, this self-circling excitation of desire desiring itself is not fulfilled 
desire. Desire fills itself with itself. One is ‘full of oneself,’ we say. Is this fulfillment: ‘being full of 
oneself’? Is it the plenitude of agapeic generosity that would give beyond itself? Is it the power to 
bestow itself on the other? No. It is the self-consummation that consumes itself and only itself, and in 
its own self-consumption finds the bitter taste of its own nothingness….  Despair here is an empty self 
full of itself, circling on empty in its own lacking fullness with self.” 
EB 299: “What is craving? A hunger that gnaws at itself as an emptiness that is never replete, that must 
be infinitely fed, even as it ceaselessly devours everything. Craving: desire that is mine and that is not 
mine anymore, for I am not free in my craving. Craving: my desire is freed but so freed that it is the 
prisoner of necessitation, hence not free at all.” 
119
 EB 289: “Without some purpose desire dissipates itself. But to have some purpose is to be more 
than ‘free from’;  it is to be ‘free towards...’ If we have made our settled abode in ‘freedom from,’ we 
are in trouble. Why? Because purpose constrains desire. If I have a purpose I am not ‘free from’ 
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§3. Erotic, Dialectical Selving  
Erotic selving (overlapping with what Desmond calls “erotic mind”) has a less 
overtly antagonistic relation with the other as the prior “equivocal” selvings.  Erotic 
selving is dialectical in the sense that it is focused on becoming something for itself 
through the other—it mediates with itself through the possession or appropriation of 
the other.120  The dynamic of erotic mind moves toward mediated self-possession and 
self-completion121—a self-relativity served by its other-relativity.122  Here desire has 
become a directed self-becoming oriented toward the self’s self-mediated wholeness 
or integrity.123  The erotic self intends to be a master, a sovereign—of both the other 
and the self—this is both its glory and its hubristic peril as there is the temptation to 
close the circle of desire making the self both desiring and desired without an 
openness to the other as anything other than an occasion for self-becoming.124  The 
erotic sense of freedom is thus closely related to the autonomy celebrated in 
                                                                                                                                        
anymore, and have to direct, discipline desire towards that objective. This means placing restraint on 
desire.” 
EB 290: “Purposes may serve to arouse desire initially; but since freedom is ‘freedom from,’ purposes 
must now serve to deflect the energy of desire back to desire itself. The particular purpose arouses 
desire, desire energizes itself towards it, but the ‘freedom towards’ is again overtaken by ‘freedom 
from.’” 
120
 BB 402: “The self-transcending restlessness of desire here seeks wholeness but it subordinates the 
other to the goal of its immanent self-satisfaction.  The erotic self finally tries to appropriate the other 
to itself and make it serve the riches of its own immanent self-satisfaction” 
EB 358: “Eros returns the self to itself through the other.” 
HG 40: Erotic love is “a kind of self-mediation in and through the other.  I come to myself more fully 
in and through the other, the other gives me to myself in the fuller form beyond initial lack.” 
121
 BB 402; En 136. 
PU 70: “The self of erotic transcendence surpasses itself towards the other, but mediates with the other 
to mediate its own self-completion; the other is finally for the self; hence erotic  self-transcendence is 
never entirely released from the self-insistence of existence.” 
PU 113: “The dynamic of erotic minding follows this structure: from the experience of lack, through 
the quest for an appropriate object to requite the lack, to possession or appropriation of that object, and 
thence to fulfillment and the overcoming of lack; in this appropriating of the object, there is a return of 
mind to itself, both as completing itself and as being completed, through possession of the object.  
Hence, erotic possession is mediated self-possession, self-possession mediated through the other.” 
122
 PU 105: “By erotic mind I will mean a relativity of mind to what is other to self, but a relativity that 
subsumes what is other into the self-relativity of the mind seeking its own self-satisfaction and self-
certainty.  Erotic mind goes to the other beyond itself, but its self-transcendence is impelled by its own 
lack which it would fill by appropriating the other.  Its relativity to the other serves this fulfillment of 
its own initial lack.  The truth of the other affords the truth of self-fulfillment.” 
123
 PO 159; EB 126. 
124
 BB 402; EB 217. 
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modernity125—to a more mature, adult, self-actualized autonomy126 that bears within 
it the seed or the promise or the possibility of a freedom beyond autonomy.127 
fourth ethical selving 
Desmond’s fourth ethical selving is a dialectical autonomy in which the self 
comes to further self-determination128 seeking to appropriate the equivocities within 
itself and between itself and others.129  Here the more adolescent “freedom from” is 
disciplined, tempered, and directed through the work of making something of 
oneself—which involves a calculating and a self-disciplined negation or denial that is 
foreign to base self-assertion.130  Dialectical autonomy’s work is that of the adulthood 
of the will—of willing to be a certain self and thus transcending itself toward from 
what is other (upon which one is dependent) in order to become such a self.131  Thus, 
this autonomy involves not only the negative freedom of “freedom from” the other 
but the more positive freedom of a “freedom to” become a certain kind of self.132  
There is, however, in dialectical autonomy the holdover from “freedom from” of the 
equivocal position of the other—that the other is needed, but needed as the object for 
                                                
125
 AT 233; EB 160, 169, 326. 
126
 PU 191: “Erotic freedom is ‘for-self’; it is autonomy, auto-nomos, law of the same.” 
EB 224: “Fourth selving: beyond an equivocal liberty ethical selving works for an adult autonomy, not 
least by dialectically seeking to appropriate its own powers of negation. Fifth selving: adult eros seeks 
its sovereignty (there is ‘autonomy’ and mature autonomy).” 
127
 PU 118, 191; CWSC 40; EB 160, 165. 
EB 161: “Dialectical freedom as erotic sovereignty is already in seed beyond autonomy, because its 
community with the allowing other is already immanent in its self-determining.” 
128
 EB 309, 320. 
129
 EB 309: “The root self-insistence is to be further transformed in a willing of self that seeks to 
appropriate the multiple ambiguities of its own internal equivocity, and the recalcitrances of resisting 
others.” 
130
 EB 310, 316. 
EB 309: “Autonomous self-determination is indeed self-insistent, but now the naivete of my own self-
affirmation has been tempered: I have tasted the despair in an undirected intoxication of desire; I have 
known the dubious fidelity of others who stand more against me than with me; coming to myself, I 
must calculate for myself and not be prodigal; I must work and not spend, and work for myself; and 
work for myself as one works to make oneself be something. I must climb out of the sty of the hired 
hand and be my own master, owning not only my own property, but my own life. I see my further 
freedom is closely connected with negation and work, beckoning me to autonomy as a dialectical 
freedom, and perhaps the further selving of erotic sovereignty.” 
131
 EB 316, 320. 
132
 EB 309-10, 316-17, 320. 
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the self’s imposition.133  With this equivocity at the heart of dialectical autonomy—
the equivocity that autonomy (for the self) requires heteronomy (for the other)—there 
is the possibility within this selving of the tyrannous and the monstrous.134 
fifth ethical selving 
Erotic sovereignty, Desmond’s fifth ethical selving, claims to deal with these 
equivocities in a higher form of “freedom to.”135  The “sovereignty” of erotic 
sovereignty entails the higher autonomy gained in the confirmation and affirmation of 
one’s powers of self-transcending136 in relation to one’s being with others (the 
“erotic” of erotic sovereignty).137  The erotic sovereign transcends itself toward the 
other, impelled by lack, and finds in this experience that the transcending desire is a 
power  (a transcending potency) that is more than mere lack—it returns to itself in 
                                                
133
 EB 318: “If its own self-determination is the meaning of freedom, the other cannot be completely 
fitted into the seamless circle of its own self-mediation. Something is here inherited from the ambiguity 
of ‘freedom from.’ For the latter, to be free for self is to be free from the other as a restraining curb; 
hence the latency of hostile relations: the ‘from’ is shaped by the negation that springs up with the ‘no’ 
to the other standing in the way of my freedom. But since there is no escaping the other, the other must 
be ‘put in its place.’ Autonomy continues ‘freedom from’ into ‘freedom to,’ and in terms of the will 
willing itself. And it is this continuity of the will willing itself that inevitably places the other in an 
equivocal position.” 
EB 320: “Dialectical self-mediation, as autonomy, subjects the other to its own becoming subject.” 
134
 EB 319-21. 
EB 317: “Autonomy risks always the return of its own ‘freedom from’ in the shape of the self as a unit 
of power, indeed as negative power turned to predatory power, that is, as implicitly tyrannical in the 
idiocy of the heart, there where the monstrous slumbers.” 
EB 319: “Within the freedom of autonomy, the absolute willing of itself by the tyrannical will comes to 
arise. This tyranny is not the opposite of autonomy; it is the monster that has always slept in the cellar 
of will willing itself and that now crawls out triumphant under the mask of self-legislation to proclaim 
itself finally as the absolute work.” 
EB 321: “What is tyranny but the most powerful will willing itself in relation to the other? This means 
that autonomy, as this tyranny, is exactly heteronomy. The logic of the one willing itself is that there 
but be one absolute autonomous self-determination. Short of that there will always be others to 
relativize the absolute autonomy. This logic of autonomy must become totalitarian, and hence produce 
the most tyrannical heteronomy, relative to all others except the all-devouring one. Some of this we 
have seen in modernity.” 
135
 EB 321. 
136
 CWSC 38, 40; EB 323, 338. 
137
 EB 323. 
BB 439: “The coming of the self to itself, in its outgoing towards the other, is erotic sovereignty.  It is 
erotic, because the self proceeds through its transcending from its own lack to self-fulfillment; it is a 
sovereign because its togetherness with others gives the self back to itself, with a confirmation of itself 
and its powers.  The community of erotic sovereignty gives selves to themselves as autonomous.” 
 One can see a similarity between Badiou’s subject’s participation in a truth procedure that 
incorporate and expands the domain of a “truth” Desmond’s erotic sovereign. 
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affirmation of its free power as, at once, finite/dependent (in its lack and need of the 
other) and absolute/independent (in the excess of its self-transcending power to any 
lack).138  Erotic sovereignty is a “freedom to” become a certain kind of self, not in 
terms of a simple selfishness, but in terms of pursuing a great purpose—a purpose 
greater than itself.139  Thus sovereigns can be heroes, exemplars of human excellence 
and purpose.140  Yet, there is still in erotic sovereignty the peril, danger and 
temptation of fixating upon oneself and one’s glory—of thinking that one has 
achieved the highest freedom—such that one can become to the other a tyrant and a 
monster.141  There can be in erotic sovereignty, as willing to be absolutely 
autonomous, an ingratitude toward the other that makes one’s own being possible.142  
                                                
138
 EB 324, 328. 
EB 323: “Finite beings mix the exigence to be and lack. The elemental self-insistence of a being is 
inseparable from its lack of its full self. It insists on itself in face of its own lack, and to overcome its 
threat. The becoming of desire shows the urge to be free, and to be free as self-affirming, in such a wise 
that the lack internal to finitude is met and mastered.” 
EB 329: “Erotic self-transcendence goes out of itself towards the other. It goes out needing the other to 
fulfill its lack, and finds its own desire to be more than lack, for how else could it surpass itself, were it 
not already an affirmative center of transcending being.” 
139
 EB 323-34, 316, 338-39. 
EB 324: “What does it mean to ‘come to itself’ (again that phrase)? It is not any simple selfishness. 
Sovereignty is pursued in view of a purpose greater than the particular self. Recall the fanaticism of 
purpose mentioned before: it takes over the whole self, seems to be greater than one. So with 
sovereignty: the search is to overcome the shabby condition of one's present limits.” 
140
 EB 339: “It seems to be your passion to demonize erotic sovereignty. But No. Erotic sovereignty, 
qualified by openness to transcendence as higher than itself, can show us the glory of the world. In the 
upbuilding of communities of justice, sovereigns who have come into a maturity of self-possessed 
freedom, are essential. They are essential to show us something of the realized promise of immanent 
excellence: such are heros and exemplars - originals to imitate, paragons to emulate.” 
141
 EB 217, 330, 332, 339-40. 
EB 329: “Is there a fatal flaw risked by this erotic sovereignty? This. Just in its glory it risks losing self 
in its affirming of itself, as glory turns to self-glorification, turning the circle of eros into a ‘higher’ 
autonomy that hiddenly is an autism of spirit, a solitude curved back into itself: freedom thankless,  
even though counting itself king of infinite possibility.” 
EB 339: “The tyrant is what one is, as willing all being to be for one, as willing the good as my good, 
as will willing itself as the absolute will, for which everything other serves. There is no service of the 
other in all this, and no true release of self.” 
142
 EB 327, 330. 
EB 206: “Erotic sovereignty hides gratitude for the generosity of the gift. And the hiding can be 
double, either a denial or pushing aside, or something that, more shyly, will not coarsely claim as 
owned the gift of great powers.” 
EB 344: “The matter was not only a lack of nuanced mindfulness about the temptations of erotic 
sovereignty, but a clear minded choice for a sovereignty that refused or willed to exclude the divine 
gift, for every gift makes one other than absolutely autonomous.” 
EB 335: “The erotic sovereign…alone is unable to utter the prayer of consent that follows on the lips of 
Job: Blessed be the Lord forever. God gives, God takes: the gift is lifted into being over nothingness; it 
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Likewise, erotic sovereignty also contains within itself the possibility of remembering 
the other in thanksgiving143—the possibility of abdication of its sovereignty that can 
lead to a freedom beyond autonomy such as is found in agapeic selving.144 
§4. Agapeic Selving  
Erotic sovereignty has within it hints of a further selving that transcends it and 
yet realizes its promise—a self-transcendence beyond autonomous sovereignty.145  In 
agapeic selving, the closure tempting the erotic self is perforated and opened up.146  
The agapeic self is a self that has been decentered, has undergone an “unselving,” and 
has been re-centered within community—it is a self that is “being-at-home in its not 
being-at-home with itself.”147  This decentering of the self is due to the double excess 
or otherness to which agapeic selving is opened and attends—to the inward 
excess/otherness of the original self in which the self is given to be by another (as not 
self-generating)148 and to its willingness to be for the other, to be subject to the needs 
                                                                                                                                        
is taken out of finite being. The sovereign is tempted to refuse this taking, and hence the coming to 
nothing that is the mortal pathos of the gift.” 
143
 CWSC 40.  
EB 330: “Erotic self-transcending that comes to selve with a measure of sovereignty can retain its 
memory of the way the other has given one back to oneself.” 
144
 EB 344: “It is only when our unease about the other as other has taken on conviction, that we 
seriously think about the abdication of erotic sovereignty. Abdication does not here mean an abject 
giving up, though there is a giving up; does not mean a lifeless surrender, though there is a surrender; 
does not mean a submission to impotence, though there is a consent to powerlessness. Abdication has 
to do with the reticence of power, and the reserve of the power of freedom beyond autonomy.” 
145
 BB 411, 413-14; PU 191. 
EB 347: “Erotic sovereignty seeks a freedom beyond autonomy, but it is still not released beyond its 
own self-mediation, and the will that wills its own glory. How might it be given over, give itself over 
more fully to this freeing beyond autonomy?” 
EB 353: “Autonomy is not the sovereign it takes itself to be, but itself the issue of an origin or source, 
enigmatic just in its intimacy. Autonomy as self-transcendence opens into, or up to transcendence 
beyond autonomy.” 
EB 365: “Suppose one touches a measure of erotic sovereignty; there can be a fulfilling, but also a new 
unrest. Our infinite restlessness can only come to peace in a good itself infinite; we cannot be that 
good, though we have an infinite promise; and this our restlessness hearkens back to our first selving. It 
is impossible to rest with one's own fulfillment.” 
146
 BB 407. 
147
 BB 409. 
BB 453: “The agapeic self is centered beyond itself.” 
CWSC 41: “Agapeic selving is a being beyond self as willful and as willing itself; hence it implies a 
kind of unselving, if you like, but…with a willing beyond willfulness and beyond will to power, and 
indeed beyond good and evil, in so far as these are defined by a determinate human measure.” 
148
 BB 406, 410. 
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of the other, even to the point of sacrifice.149  This agapeic willingness is a giving out 
of surplus to the other for the other—exceeding or transcending the self (from the 
excessive surplus of the self) toward the other.150  Its desire for the other is an 
openness to the other in terms that are beyond self-desiring.151  In the midst of this 
openness to double otherness, the agapeic self is a “between” as its love is an 
“interest”—an inter-esse—an affirmative being-between the excess of what is given 
to one and the other to whom one gives.152  Thus, agapeic self is both an ontological 
reality—in the sense of being freely given to be for itself and for others—and a 
regulative ideal—in the sense of an ethical call to fulfill the promise of our being in 
giving to the other.153  Agapeic selving also realizes the promise of other selvings: the 
recognition of the worth of the singular (self and other) intimated with the idiotic self, 
the affirmation of the goodness of being in its otherness intimated with the aesthetic 
self, and the more complex interrelationship with the other in the midst of one’s self-
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 BB 414; PU 70. 
BB 408: The agapeic self is “doubly stressed in the between: between the excess of its own original 
power, and the willingness to suspend that power in the interests of the other….a middle between 
infinitudes” 
PU 144: “The overdetermined power to be of selfhood is agapeic in these two ways: as given to itself to 
be out of an origin other to itself; and as the power to give itself over to being beyond itself in its own 
self-transcendence.” 
150
 PU 70; En 144; EB 358. 
En 136: “Agape [is] a love out of surplus that gives to the other but not with the intent to secure a 
return to itself, but simply gives goodly for the good of the other as other.” 
HG 40: “A going towards the other but not from a lack in the lover but from an excess or surplus of 
good that gives from itself, gives beyond itself to the other….It is beyond self-mediating love, 
affirming beyond proportionality, a disproportionate relation of being good for the other.” 
151
 EB 217: “If erotic sovereignty is tempted to close the circle of desire, and make self both desiring 
and desired, by contrast, agapeic service cannot close any circle, for the desired is not the same as the 
desiring - when I desire I desire the good as other to my desire: the communal reference to the good as 
other is in the dynamism of our self-transcending. Desire itself is a primal openness to the other and the 
beyond.” 
152
 BB 413: The agapeic self “is not lacking in interest; rather its interest is in the other for the other…. 
In fact, its very being is simply interest.  Its esse is interest, inter-esse, where the stress is on the inter.  
In other words, interesse puts the self into the inter, puts it outside itself, beyond self-interest, makes it 
disinterested in that regard.” 
153
 PU 157-58, 195. 
PU 119: “Agapeic mind expresses something that is both a regulative ideal and an ontological reality, 
somehow constitutive of our most intimate being.” 
EB 197: “Finite being is given for itself and given as good; it is given for nothing; but as being, it is the 
promise of agapeic self-becoming and self-transcendence, hence being in metaxological community. 
This promise reflects what we are and what we are to become. Relative to what we are to become, we 
come to understand promise as command relative to inner exigence.” 
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becoming intimated with the erotic self.154 
This agapeic selving entails a conception and enactment of freedom that is 
different from that of prior selvings.  Agapeic freedom is a freedom beyond or higher 
than autonomy—a freedom that both recognizes it is given from the other and uses its 
powers to give to others.155  Agapeic freedom is not a freedom from or to but toward, 
toward the other in a true self-transcendence.  This “freedom toward” is an agapeic 
release156 in which the self is released toward the other—being able to affirm and 
consent to the other as having value and worth in excess of the other’s usefulness for 
the self157—and the other is released from the self.158  Here, the will becomes 
goodwill, a willingness beyond willfulness to be put in the relative position and to be 
vulnerable in service to the other.159 
sixth ethical selving 
Desmond’s sixth ethical selving is that of agapeic service and friendship.  This 
service entails a difficult laying of the self open to the other and to the reality of the 
metaxological between—as saturated with giving without (immediate) return.160  This 
                                                
154
 BB 410-11. 
155
 EB 34, 161. 
BB 199: “The freedom beyond self-determination is a gift, first of the other, then for the other.” 
CWSC 40: “There is an agapeic freedom that is released beyond the higher autonomy of erotic 
sovereignty.  It is released in a being for the other that is for the other and not for any return to self.” 
156
 BB 410; PU 191, 196; CWSC 40. 
157
 PO 202; PU 193; EB 137, 201. 
158
 BB 261: Agapeic being’s “self-transcendence is truly self-transcending, since there is a kind of 
releasing reversal between self and other: the self is othered such that the other is given a freedom of 
being from the giving self…. The self-transcendence that is a reversal of self is a giving of genuine 
separateness to the other.  Freedom is this separation.” 
PU 147: “Agapeic mind makes a welcome in the manner it prepares the way for the other to come to 
self-manifestation.  Preparing a way is making a space in the middle, a space for the freedom of the 
other.” 
159
 DDO 164, 167, 190; CWSC 41, 51; EB 169, 192, 217-18. 
DDO 164: “Goodwill may reveal a nonobjectifying recognition of otherness, which responds to the 
appeal of the other with a nonpossessive solicitude.” 
160
 EB 217-18. 
 In a sense, the “return” of the other’s giving to one precedes and enables one’s giving.  This 
complex interplay and enabling is more fully explicated in the section on community. 
EB 161: “We are returned to the ethos in terms of its being criss-crossed by the agapeic relation, by its 
being from the origin the promise of the agapeic community which, given the internal complexity of its 
participants, is quickly stressed this way, that way, and indeed stressed into a distress where the agapeic 
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opening to the other includes both gratitude and generosity.  The agapeic self has 
gratitude ultimately to God for its being as a good and original power in itself.161  This 
gratitude, for the agapeic self, in turn generates within one, charges one with, a 
generosity toward the other162—recognizing our giftedness, our givenness from the 
generous other, we in turn give to the other as we have been given to—with a self-
transcending creativity giving to the other and not asking for a return.163  With this 
generosity, the will in the selving of agapeic service becomes a willingness—a 
willingness to help, to be available to the other.164 
Desmond sees friendship as involving this kind of willingness.165  In 
friendship, there occurs a mutual giving, a reciprocity or symmetry in which the self 
gives to or serves the other and the other gives to or serves the self.166  One could say 
                                                                                                                                        
relation becomes incredible. We need metaxological ethics to make sense of the service of the other in 
the agapeic relation.” 
161
 EB 220. 
EB 115: “There is an ethics of gratitude: a living out of the heed of deepest gratitude for the good of 
being. Gratitude to whom? The blue of the sky, the master of the ocean deeps, the voice of quiet and 
silence, thanks to God.” 
162
 EB 177, 220. 
EB 168-69: “We are grateful for the generosity of the ground, and we respond to this with thanks, and 
with thanks lived as a form of existence. For it is not only the generosity of the giver that is important 
but the generosity of the receiver. We are the receivers, and, strangely, it is the generosity of the other 
that possibilizes our comportment of generosity towards the other. Generosity entails no servile 
reception or abjection before the other. In fact, the other's generosity does more than occasion our 
gratitude; it charges us with the living of generosity.” 
EB 217: “Affirming is consent to gift. Generosity is born of a primal gratitude. Ethics springs from 
gratitude. This is lived in ethical and religious service beyond autonomy. What is this service? It is a 
willingness beyond will, beyond will to power, beyond my will to power.” 
163
 BB 407; EB 355-56. 
EB 354: “Agapeic self-transcendence arises from an overdetermined source of origination, and not 
from a deficient condition or a merely indefinite possibility. Its power is the very definite power of 
generosity, an excess of original being which is also the expression of the primal freedom of the self. 
Rather than being our assertion of power over against the valueless absurd, real creativity reveals the 
generosity of being, the free power to give itself to what is other to itself. Agapeic self-transcending is a 
giving of being to the other, and for the other. There is no insistence on a return to self.” 
164
 EB 347-48, 358, 506. 
EB 348: “I can say: ‘I am at your service,’ and mean by that my willingness to be there for the aid of 
the other, beyond any external imposition, but just because I have been freed beyond myself into 
another relation of generosity for the other.” 
EB 363-64: “There is asked a willingness beyond will; a willingness that is a new will in us, but a will 
that cannot be described as self-willing, or any kind of self-determining willing; it is a willingness 
beyond self-determining.” 
165
 EB 364. 
166
 EB 356, 358; HG 40. 
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that one’s service (one’s giving to the other) is necessary but not sufficient for 
friendship—there needs to be a mutual “serving” as it were.  (A service without 
symmetry, reciprocity or mutuality would be suffering, as will be seen below.) 
Finally, agapeic service entails a transformation of freedom.  While service is 
often thought of as below autonomy in terms of subordination or servility, agapeic 
service sees that it is in fact autonomy that entails an enslavement of other and self to 
self.167  Agapeic service, however, is a freedom—a “freedom towards” the other as 
good in itself and for itself—it is a creative freedom that gives freedom.168  In this 
freedom toward the other in generous agapeic service there is a true self-
transcendence that is not exhausted by autonomous self-determination.169 
seventh ethical selving 
Desmond’s seventh and highest ethical selving is that of suffering.  This 
suffering is the pathos of accepting and affirming the other, of letting the other be, 
that expresses the passio essendi of human being in its primal receptivity—its 
suffering the given.170  This suffering is a return to the first idiotic, elemental self171—
                                                
167
 EB 347; HG 181. 
EB 351: “One would rather not be in any debt to another. This is the autonomy that finds it hard to say 
thanks. And what about self-mastery? Does this make sense beyond a certain point? Is one servant on 
one level, and master on another? What is one mastering when one masters oneself? Is it just one's base 
side, say one's body? But then just the so-called autonomy that is won is not at all free from the self 
that has been mastered. The autonomy of self-mastery is enslavement to oneself. Is there a freedom 
beyond self-mastery? What about the coherence of the notion of self-service?” 
168
 EB 347, 510. 
EB 362: “It is another ‘freedom towards’: there is a direction in its transcending not only to itself in its 
own self-becoming; its self-becoming moves it towards what it is not, and not what it will become, but 
what it would love, as a good that is itself and for itself, and not at all product of our self-becoming, 
and without which no self-becoming on our part would at all be possible. It is a freedom beyond self-
determination, in which proximately we are released to being with others differently.”  
EB 508: “As there is an autonomy beyond servility, there is a service beyond autonomy and servility, 
and this service is releasing of freedom beyond autonomy and subjection, beyond the instrumental 
domination and subjection of serviceable disposability, beyond the self-affirming dominion of erotic 
sovereignty. This service is release into community in which we live from the good of the absolute 
other, and towards the good of ourselves and finite others as others, and again through them live 
towards the good of the absolute other.” 
169
 EB 353-54. 
170
 PO 286; BB 6; PU 20, 255; En 131; EB 219, 367-68. 
171
 EB 367-68. 
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a return to an intimacy with the other as good.172  Here, suffering is a kind of 
askesis—a breakdown that strips the masks of false selvings, that would be self-
originating in their self-determination, to the first original self that is a self given from 
an origin beyond the self.173  With the awareness of this origin comes a communion 
with the ultimate in the suffering, in the passio essendi, of the self that opens beyond 
the merely ethical and into the religious.174 
As with agapeic service, this suffering of the given (in gratitude) is the seed of 
giving (generosity) to the other—our suffering the other helps us give to the other and 
understand those who suffer.175  One’s new awareness of one’s “freedom from” (here 
given from another, from the origin) spurs one in the direction of a more radical 
“freedom towards.”176  This “freedom towards” the other to the point of the suffering 
of giving (suffering the giving) is a new willingness177 that is intimate with the 
                                                                                                                                        
BB 414: “[T]here is a kind of return to the first, because agapeic acting, willing, creating, doing are 
germinated in passion, suffering, imitation, patience.  The passion of being that is always already 
spread out in the elemental I, returns in the end.” 
172
 EB 367-68, 370. 
EB 367: It is “suffering that returns willing to an intimacy with the good deeper than its intimacy with 
itself.” 
173
 EB 110. 
EB 367: “It may well be the case that the new willing cannot become itself without some kind of 
askesis: not the askesis which simply denies or negates; more the suffering that wears away, strips the 
masks of false selving; the suffering that mediates self in its most elemental love, as well as loosing it 
to its being free beyond itself; suffering that returns willing to an intimacy with the good deeper than its 
intimacy with itself; embarking it on a voyage of love in which its harbor lies in the transcendent good 
beyond finite measure. Infinite depths, infinite restlessness: desire turned to the abyss of inwardness, 
desire turned to the height of transcendence.” 
174
 PO 370; EB 367-68. 
EB 370: “If the idiocy of suffering brings us back to the origin, this means it is bound up with the 
sacred. Because suffering is thus idiotic as well as universal, philosophy does not always deal with it 
well, since philosophy's universals are often such as to shun the idiotic.” 
175
 PU 255; EB 111-12, 365. 
176
 EB 365: “We must join the meaning of ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom towards.’ The ‘from’ is from 
the origin as giver, but as freeing us, and into gratitude for the gift, even in suffering. This is not 
‘freedom from’ the other which wants to be outside of community, but freedom given from the agapeic 
origin, and hence a ‘from’ that founds elemental community. And here too ‘freedom towards’ is 
beyond ‘freedom to’ be oneself, since in certain sufferings there is an excess to self-transcending that is 
freed beyond itself and towards the good as other. This ‘freedom towards’ has a vector that is 
ontologically intimate: both selfless and the deepest selving. One goes towards the good, sometimes 
sightlessly, in agapeic selving.” 
177
 EB 365: “Can suffering be at the origin of a new willingness, breaking one open, asking one to 
understand the others who suffer (even tormented sovereigns)?” 
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other178 and is willing to suffer with and for the other even in the absence of 
reciprocity.  The suffering of the highest selving is compassion—a suffering with and 
for the other.179  Here, the highest selving is shown to be opened beyond itself—a 
post-self, a “self-less” selving—toward the other and the communal.180  At the same 
time (as mentioned above), this highest selving comes to the limit of ethics as 
regarding selving and moves toward the religious—the self is opened horizontally 
toward others in community as it is opened vertically toward the agapeic origin.181 
 
Section IV: Ethical Communities and the Community of Agapeic Service 
Ethics, for Desmond, is a process of selving in the broader context of and 
toward the forming of different kinds of communities.182  Community has to do with 
different modes of togetherness, of being-with, and different social embodiments of 
value.183  The different kinds of ethical communities constitute different determinate 
                                                                                                                                        
EB 367: “The new willingness can be called will-less, if by will we mean the will that wills itself; but 
in truth it is a transformation of willing that is here at issue.” 
178
 EB 365, 498, 500. 
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 BB 450, 454. 
PU 151: “What is this compassion?  It is a pluralized passion, or patience, or pathos.  It is an 
undergoing, and a going out of self, and an inwardizing of the other’s suffering.  It is a community of 
passion, a community of suffering.” 
180
 EB 365-67. 
 Desmond’s understanding of suffering as the highest selving, as a selving that opens beyond 
selving toward community, such that suffering is neither the primordial enabling gift nor the 
consummate communal end of our selving, reflects Milbank’s recognition (for all of his uneasiness 
regarding agape’s apparent lack of reciprocity and participation) of the presence of agapeic suffering, 
of an always apparently unredeemed sacrifice in our present fallen world—a suffering that is enabled 
by a prior fullness.   Marion (like Desmond here regarding the agapeic self but missing the broader 
enabling and teleological reciprocal community emphasized by Milbank and Desmond…in the next 
section), in seeing that the true lover “decides to love in advance,” proposes in a manner parallel to 
Desmond that the willing giving of the agapeic self is a precondition to a kind of reciprocal gift-
exchange.  See Milbank, Being Reconciled, pp. 155-57.  Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, passim. 
181
 DDO 174; EB 367, 377-78. 
BB 415: The process of ethical selving is “the unfolding of self from the elemental I of idiotic 
inwardness is thus from the aesthetic passion of immediacy, into the self-insistent I of self-will, through 
the self-mediation of ethical will, to the religious passion in which the I radically gives itself back to 
the between and its origin.” 
EB 377: “Ethics brings us to the limit of the ethical, as determined by autonomy and erotic sovereignty. 
At this limit a witness to something more is solicited.” 
182
 BB 409; EB 120. 
183
 PO 162; BB 417; PU 81. 
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formations, diverse articulations of ethical community.184  These different determinate 
kinds of community derive, for Desmond, from the given metaxological community 
or ethos that is prior in the sense of a transcendental, metaphysical ground that makes 
possible these different formations of ethical community.185  As the highest selvings 
are those that best understand and live out the reality of the self (as given and self-
transcending), so do the higher ethical communities dwell in a closer relation to the 
primal ethos, the metaxological community of being. 
§1. The Community of Intimacy, Idiocy, Family 
The first of Desmond’s ethical communities is that of the intimate and idiotic 
community of the family.  The community of the family is an idiotic, elemental, prior 
being-with that forms and nurtures (or fails to nurture) the young self’s potencies.  
The family mediates the intimate sense of the good of the idiot self and shapes its 
impression of aesthetic good—of beauty and pleasure.  The family provides a context 
in which one comes to understand and accept certain dianoetic norms—be they tacit 
or explicit—along with a transcendental sense of the unconditional in one parents’ 
love.  In this first, intimate community, there is instilled respect for the self’s seeking 
after excellence, one’s eudaimonia, in the special attention and reverence for the 
singularity of the child.  Finally, it is within the family that one is oriented toward the 
infinitudes of human transcending—in the encouragement to press on and seek the 
highest—and divine transcendence—imaging one’s relations of reverence toward, 
                                                
184
 EB 196-97, 199-200. 
185
 DDO 127. 
EB 197: “Community with the good is not a subsequent construction; there is a primal community with 
the good that emerges into diverse articulation and more explicit formation of ethical community in the 
between.” 
EB 200: “There is a given community of self and other that grounds the doing of the good in the ethos. 
We do not first create metaxological community. It is given. What we are given in its given 
betweenness is the freedom to realize more fully the promise of agapeic transcending, in self-integrity 
and forms of community that concretize its truth in the world.” 
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dependence upon and intimacy with the divine.186 
§2. The Community of Distracted Desire and Serviceable Disposability 
The second of Desmond’s ethical communities is the community of distracted 
desire and serviceable disposability.  This community is driven, at least initially, by a 
desire for self-preservation and self-perpetuation.187  The world is seen as a web of 
utility, of serviceable disposability, in which one works to acquire and exploit other 
beings as “goods.”  This results in the dominion of instrumental use-values, in that the 
community of the between has value or worth only in relation to its use for human 
desire—in itself, it is useless and thus worthless.188  The desire that drives this 
community of serviceable disposability is deeply equivocal—it gives communal 
expression to the equivocity of human desire.  The other is the valued object, but it is 
not valuable for itself.  The other is desired for the satisfaction of desire, which is 
never satisfied and continually desiring.189  The other is only thought of as for the self, 
for the self’s consumption and exploitation.190  There is, in this kind of ethical 
community, no point or purpose save the multiplication of satisfactions of desire—
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 EB 385-86.  See EB Chapter 13. 
187
 BB 435. 
188
 BB 437. 
EB 416-17: “The commons I most want to consider now concerns the web of utility in the world of 
work. This web, delicate and entangling, is yet an interconnecting, driven by the exchange of 
instrumental goods and services. A dominion of use-values pervades the ethical milieu, and infiltrates 
all the levels of ethical intermediation. This dominion is unavoidable; but it is not finally sufficient, 
indeed it is pernicious when totalized relative to the ethos.” 
EB 443: “Intermediation in the web of serviceable disposability is dominated by the dianoetic 
exploitation of the aesthetic, through an instrumental univocalism. This use-full intermediation cannot 
attain a fully ethical comportment vis a vis the good of the other, or indeed of self, despite the surface 
pervasiveness of self-interest. Its necessity vis a vis pragmatic affairs is governed by useful expedience 
rather than excellence beyond expedience. Its relativization of the good to use values is dissembling, 
since a complete occlusion of inherent ends would precipitate an inexorable slide towards nihilism.” 
189
 BB 435; EB 416-17, 444.  
BB 434: “The community of distracted desire emerges from the frustration of any univocal formation 
of human self-transcendence.” 
BB 434: “Desire excites itself beyond univocal satisfaction, but perplexes itself in this self-activation.” 
190
 EB 416-17. 
BB 435: “What if we pluralize such restless beings?…All things serve desire’s satisfaction, but since 
there is no real satisfaction, they really do not serve satisfaction but the endless arousal of 
dissatisfaction.  Each member of this community is for-itself, but for itself in a manner that does not 
really take the other as other into account, except insofar as the other is for the self.” 
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while there is no satisfaction.191  In the end, the empty and craving self in the context 
of such a community—seeking but not finding satisfaction in the otherwise worthless 
and purposeless others in the community—can only seek diversion or distraction from 
itself.192  Thus, the community of serviceable disposability is, in the end, a community 
of distracted desire. 
§3. The Community of Erotic Sovereignty 
With the community of erotic sovereignty comes a community that values 
excellence beyond utility—there are self-justifying excellences to be sought that are at 
once supreme and useless.193  This seeking after higher (“sovereignty”) excellence is 
also a seeking for self-fulfillment (“erotic”).194  In the community of erotic 
sovereignty, such a seeking results in a community of selves seeking to achieve 
wholeness through an ascent to self-mastery195—a community that gives selves back 
to themselves as autonomous.196  In this kind of community, there is a respect for the 
other—a companionship with other sovereigns (or would be sovereigns)197—such that 
one comes to oneself through the other's recognition.198  Thus, the community of 
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 BB 437; EB 443. 
192
 EB 443. 
BB 436: “The selves of distracted desire are the most bored beings, for our diversions reach an empty 
satiation where we know ourselves simply as disgust with self.” 
193
 EB 444: “To be sovereign is to approach the supreme and useless - beyond serviceable 
disposability. It is useless but as such more supremely useful: it gives use the self-justifying 
excellences the network of serviceable disposability lacks, and without which the whole seems finally 
pointless…. This worth beyond serviceable disposability can take different forms. Examples: the worth 
of a work of art, beyond the instrumental work ruled by a schema of means: there is something 
sovereign about the great artist or work.” 
194
 BB 439. 
195
 BB 440, 544. 
BB 441: “Our self-relating sociability must win through to an achieved integrity of self in the between.  
There it is together with other selves, also engaged in the adventure of integrity.  The community of 
erotic sovereignty is the community of such achieving wholes.” 
196
 BB 439, 448-49. 
197
 BB 440:  The sovereign self “breathes freedom in the companionship of other such sovereigns.  
Self-assertion is not the point, nor is domination.  A sovereign self is at home with itself and at home 
with other sovereign selves.” 
198
 BB 439: “Self-transcending comes to rest on the others, and here comes to look at itself from the 
point of view of the other.  Put differently, the other turns the self mindfully back to itself, offers it a 
way to be at home with itself…. Through the other I come to recognize myself; through the other’s 
recognition I come to self-recognition.” 
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erotic sovereignty is, at its best, a community of justice that celebrates immanent 
excellences—often in the person of the hero.199  The gains of the community of erotic 
sovereignty over the community of serviceable disposability and distracted desire 
include the recognition, first, of the infinite reserve of worth in the human self and, 
second, of the co-implication of the self with the other—of self-relation as being 
dependent on other-relation.200  However, there is danger implicit in the community of 
erotic sovereignty—namely the danger of a dialectical totalism, a larger wholeness as 
absorbing, subsuming, and thus forgetting otherness, singularity, infinitude, excess.201  
Ultimately, erotic sovereignty in itself cannot fully incorporate the religious extremes 
of the idiot self (in its intimacy with the divine other) and the religious community of 
agapeic service.202  The community of erotic sovereignty does, however, have the 
potential (in recognizing singularity, otherness, infinitude and religious ultimacy) to 
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 BB 453. 
EB 339: “Erotic sovereignty, qualified by openness to transcendence as higher than itself, can show us 
the glory of the world. In the upbuilding of communities of justice, sovereigns who have come into a 
maturity of self-possessed freedom, are essential. They are essential to show us something of the 
realized promise of immanent excellence: such are heros and exemplars - originals to imitate, paragons 
to emulate.” 
200
 BB 443-45. 
201
 BB 445-49. 
BB 446: “In the most inclusive of communities, there will be no real other at all, only the absolute 
whole mediating with itself in its other, which is only itself again in its otherness.” 
BB 447: “The essential danger of dialectical totalism, we might say, is in giving a wrong priority to the 
notion of the whole over the excess of the infinite.” 
EB 479: “Sovereignty is inseparable from the bewitchment of idols. Social power casts its spell of self-
mediation in the other: the sovereign as ‘other’ is invested with social power's own self-fascinating 
infinity, the implicit infinite self-love of social will willing itself, rival to God in its general eros to be 
causa sui.” 
EB 481: “The metaxological view demands a plurality of mediating centers of power to prevent the 
social intermediation of erotic sovereignty from the project of seeking to become the one absolute 
center that seeks to ingest all others, subjecting them to itself as mirrors of itself.” 
202
 EB 481: “What cannot be absolutely incorporated into the power of the ascendent sovereign? At one 
extreme, there is the idiot self - the void, you might say sometimes, the indeterminate source of 
innerness that is never exhausted by any determination, though its determinate existence be in bondage 
to them. The idiot is not absolute solitude, but is intermediated prior to determinate mediation: God is 
in the immanence of the soul….This idiot extreme points to the other religious extreme, namely, the 
community that tries to live in the between in light of its acknowledged metaxological relation to the 
divine: in light of the generous finitude of its being, given the goodness of the "to be," out of nothing 
and for nothing but the good of being. This is the religious community of agapeic service that enacts 
the intermediation of the good beyond erotic sovereignty and in ethically likening itself to the 
generosity of the agapeic origin. If at the first extreme, erotic sovereignty gives way to mystical 
consent, at the second extreme the festival of a community becomes a sacramental drama.” 
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open onto a different, agapeic kind of community—as the dialectical to the 
metaxological.203 
§4. The Community of Agapeic Service 
For Desmond, the ethos as the intermediating community of self-mediating 
wholes, is full of, “criss-crossed by,” agapeic relation—given to be and giving to 
others.204  The ethos as the community of being (metaphysically considered) holds 
within it the promise of the human community of agapeic service (ethically 
considered).205  In this highest of ethical communities, there is a generous serving—a 
giving of oneself beyond self-interest, even to the point of sacrifice (here service 
includes the possibility of suffering) to the other as worthy or good in itself206—in 
which the self is centered beyond itself, decentered or ex-centered, so as to result in a 
fundamentally other- or community-oriented self.207   
In his understanding of agapeic community Desmond presents an 
understanding of community as metaxological (as at once exceeding and preserving—
teleologically suspending, transfiguring—the erotics of a closed dialectic) that 
includes both disinterest and interest, agape and eros, sacrifice and reciprocity.  The 
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 BB 443, 448-49; EB 161, 506. 
BB 490: “When sovereignty does not close on itself, its power can become releasing rather than 
domineering….This is the fulfillment of the original power of being that reaches its richest truth to 
itself in the service of agapeic being.” 
204
 BB 451; EB 476. 
EB 161: “We are returned to the ethos in terms of its being criss-crossed by the agapeic relation, by its 
being from the origin the promise of the agapeic community which, given the internal complexity of its 
participants, is quickly stressed this way, that way, and indeed stressed into a distress where the agapeic 
relation becomes incredible. We need metaxological ethics to make sense of the service of the other in 
the agapeic relation.” 
205
 EB 161. 
EB 162: “The agapeic relation suggests a promise already be at work in order for community, in a more 
overt, determinate sense, to be constituted. The ethos is the promise of the agape of being.” 
HG 181: “The spirit of agapeic community seeks to be true to the promise of the given goodness of 
being in creation and history.” 
206
 BB 450-53; HG 39. 
207
 BB 453: “Agapeic self-transcendence into the between is not a decentering so much as an 
excentering of self.  For the self is still a center, even when it makes its original energy of being 
available for the other; it is centered eccentrically.  Even within its own inward centering, it is 
eccentric, since the inward otherness points beyond the for-self towards the other origin.  The agapeic 
self is centered beyond itself.” 
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community is thus more fundamental than the individual (though in a way that 
specifically preserves the singularity, otherness, idiocy of the individual) both 
ontologically and ethically.  The genuine agapeic selving is a selving beyond selving, 
a potentially sacrificial giving from and unto community.  Thus the unilateral moment 
of the gift is to be but a moment.208 
This community of agapeic service is a community of freedom, of agapeic 
release—a community in which freedom is beyond being merely hoarded as 
autonomous freedom for-self but is given to the other as (divine and human) others 
have given one freedom.209  This kind of community also entails in its agapeic service 
and release of the other a twofold idiocy—first, an intimate and elemental community 
with otherness even in idiotic inwardness210 and, second, a love of the other as 
irreplaceable in its idiotic singularity.211 
The community of agapeic service, for Desmond, has significant religious 
resonances—such that such a community is seen largely in terms of religious 
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 In this broader vision of agapeic community, Desmond provides resources to answer Badiou’s 
critique of agape and ethical consideration of the “other” that he (Badiou) levels against a Levinasian 
position.  Desmond provides an alternative account of singularity, difference and relation in terms of a 
metaxological community of being as the promise of agapeic human community.  See Badiou, Ethics, 
passim. 
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 BB 199, 448-90; PU 191. 
 Milbank likewise sees charity as giving forth and letting be freedom and singularity—but also 
a sharing and blending in the midst of otherness—a relation in the midst of otherness.  See Milbank, 
Theology and Social Theory, p. 422; Milbank, Being Reconciled, pp. 121, 168. 
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 BB 385, 456, 535. 
EB 171: “This idiocy is an awakening. The community of being as good comes to indeterminate 
mindfulness in the innerness of selving that is the mysterious coming to self in primal self-awakening 
to the "to be" -  a coming that is of the essence to singular selfhood and yet irreducibly communal, at 
once a relation to itself and a relation to what is other. It includes a relation to self given to itself, not by 
itself, but by the agape of the origin; and given to itself, not solely for itself, but in relation to all that is 
other. The idiocy awakens to the agapeic relation. This is the relation of community in which self-
relation and other-relatedness are always in togetherness and yet irreducible to each. The idiocy of 
being good shows the agapeic relation coming to mindfulness of itself in the irreducible singularity of 
human innerness as itself, always from the origin, in intimacy with what is other to itself.” 
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 BB 542. 
BB 456: “Agapeic service is a certain love of singularity.  We do not see singularity as the opposite of 
community.  Instead love of the singular is the concrete enactment of agapeic community, which is a 
being together with the goodness of the this, this being as being, this being in its being for itself.  Put 
otherwise, the community of agapeic service alone can do justice to the idiocy of selfhood.  The latter 
signals the radical intimacy to singularity that is the infinite worth of the human self.” 
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community.  As agape, as the divine gift of creation, enables ontological community, 
so does agape enable our agapeic service, our participation in the broader agapeic 
community.  The agapeic generosity of the community of agapeic service is born of 
gratitude to the origin for its generosity,212 such that there is in agape a double service, 
both ethical and religious.213  Religious community consists in how the togetherness 
of the divine and human transforms human community214—instilling it with a 
generous trust and patience (as one gratefully recognizes the origin’s trust and 
patience in its creative release) that is not giving up on the promise of the good in the 
other.215  The love of the other in the community of agapeic service—the giving (and 
trusting and waiting on) even to the point of suffering—is, in Desmond’s reckoning, 
so difficult as to be not sustainable on our own, such, first, that it feels called forth by 
superior transcendence,216 and, second, that we need help from beyond ourselves to be 
equal to its call.217  The end result of this kind of community is its being as a witness 
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 EB 171, 220, 365, 507. 
EB 217: “Generosity is born of a primal gratitude. Ethics springs from gratitude. This is lived in ethical 
and religious service beyond autonomy. What is this service? It is a willingness beyond will, beyond 
will to power, beyond my will to power.” 
EB 489: “A fundamental gratitude is resurrected, expressing itself in an ethics of generosity towards 
the frailty of beings in the between, human and nonhuman.” 
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 EB 509: “Double service: God service, religious service; neighbor service, ethical service. Service is 
the word for the enactment of this love. The word too quickly withers into sentimentality, or into 
cynicism under the leer of those grown old with jaded enlightenment. This is loss. Only love lives the 
agape of being.” 
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EB 486: “Religious community binds together (re-ligare - Augustine) the human and divine, and out of 
this transforms the bonds holding humans together. The sources of social power undergo a 
transformation which carries human power to the edge of its humanness. We understand power as 
given all along, a gift from motiveless generosity, motiveless goodness beyond the goodness of the gift, 
rousing in community the vision of humans together living an ethics of generosity in finite image of the 
ultimate generosity.” 
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 BB 455; EB 510. 
216
 EB 197, 218. 
EB 220: “The agape of being is first given to us, but we are called to an agapeic being which is the 
doing of living, in an ethics of gratitude to the origin, and of generosity to self and other. The agape of 
being intimates a fullness, but it is not being full of oneself. One does nothing to merit it, and no 
payment is exacted, for it offers itself simply as the life of the good, a life we are to live. It has no 
reason, beyond itself, which is to be beyond itself, in being itself.” 
217
 EB 217-19. 
EB 217: “Is it possible for humans to sustain an ethics of agapeic service? Extremely hard. We are 
always drawn back into the being of selving as for-itself.” 
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to and as a finite image of its agapeic origin, of God’s agapeic generosity218—this 
divine service as lived out in ethical service toward the other and as enacted in divine 
festivity, in religious celebration, in the agape(ic) feast.219 
 
Desmond’s understanding of the metaxological nature of agapeic community 
as embracing eros as well as agape sheds light on recent discussions of the nature of 
the gift, of love and of reciprocity.  Marion, following a broadly Levinasian trajectory 
(in a manner similar to Derrida and Caputo), rejects reciprocity inasmuch as its 
“economy” cancels out the agapeic gift as an expenditure without return.220  Milbank 
(and Pickstock) advocate a kind of erotic reciprocity—a gift-exchange that is more 
true to the nature of the gift and of love.  Agape is ultimately fulfilled in a community, 
a polis.221   
 The highest ethical selving for Desmond is that of agapeic service and 
suffering—here Marion (and Levinas and Derrida and Caputo) would agree.  
                                                                                                                                        
EB 219: “The life of agapeic service is impossible if we are alone, and without the sustaining power of 
the good as other. As I suggested before, the familiar word (and I think best word) for transcendence 
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a concretion of agapeic community, and witness to the ultimate agapeic source. This end is 
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EB 486: “We understand power as given all along, a gift from motiveless generosity, motiveless 
goodness beyond the goodness of the gift, rousing in community the vision of humans together living 
an ethics of generosity in finite image of the ultimate generosity.” 
On religious community as imaging the agapeic origin, see Milbank, Theology and Social 
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However, this is not the end of the story for Desmond…not is it the beginning of the 
story.  For, first, the enabling “beginning” or condition for the possibility of such 
agapeic selving is the given matrix of the metaxological community of being in 
general and the original self in particular, and, second, the end of agapeic giving, 
service, suffering is beyond itself—it is the agapeic community of (mutual) service.  
Love or charity is ultimately gratuitously received exchange.  The enabling 
reciprocity of the intersubjective (ontological) community (the metaxological 
community of being) is a precondition for the gift as the gift (from the individual 
perspective) is for reciprocity.  Desmond’s work echoes Milbank’s observation that 
one must think in terms of ontology, of metaphysics, to see this—thus Marion’s more 
restricted, though correct as far as it goes (which is not far enough), vision of 
individual gift-giving as enabled by a prior agape.222  The unity of agape and eros that 
appears in Marion’s work involves not as much the broader (“erotic”) reciprocities of 
the community but the fulfillment and pleasure that is part of the “one love”—the 
latter, however, if one thinks metaphysically, opens onto the former as its whence.223   
In seeing the unilateral moment of the agapeic gift as not the telos of ethical 
being (or being as such) but a moment within the broader and more fundamental 
reality of the agapeic community, Desmond recognizes, as does Milbank, that the 
internal, individual psyche must be properly oriented within the external polis—agape 
must be oriented beyond egotism and self-sacrifice toward the communal (agapeic) 
“feast.”  Thus, genuine agape (viewed from the broader perspective of the 
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 See Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 416.  Milbank, “Can the Gift be Given?” p. 137.  See 
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 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, pp. 220-21. 
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metaxological community) is not a pure gift but a purified gift-exchange.  Here, 
human community is realizing the promise of the primal community of being.224   
Milbank describes this broader, genuine agapeic community in terms of an 
asymmetrical reciprocity or an “aneconomic economy” in which gifts are given and 
returned non-identically (asymmetrically).  Marion gives a qualified affirmation of 
this kind of non-identical reciprocity, “a reciprocity that is out of phase.”225   
Speaking theologically, between Fall and Consummation—in our fallen 
state—the present human embodiment of true community will, as not yet perfected, 
be saturated with giving without returning, with service that is a suffering (in the 
present), yet it is precisely this willingness to give, to serve, to suffer that is necessary 
for (is a condition for the possibility of) true community.  In this between-time, alas, 
the ecclesia is born (cannot be born but) through a cross. 
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PART TWO: ETHICS WITH/OUT METAPHYSICS 
Having summarized William Desmond’s conception of ethics, I will now turn 
to examine how this conception provides a viable alternative to that represented in the 
work of John D. Caputo.  Desmond’s position can be seen as a viable alternative 
based on three points.  First, Desmond’s position is able to answer Caputo’s critique 
of ethics by showing that the understanding of ethics represented in Desmond’s work 
is not guilty of the errors that Caputo levels against ethics as such.  Second, 
Desmond’s position is able to genuinely address the motivating concerns that can 
seen to be animating Caputo’s treatment of ethics.  Third, Desmond’s position is able 
to be used to critique the conclusions of Caputo’s own (de)constructive proposals 
regarding how to think about ethics. 
Section I: Desmond as Answering Caputo’s Critique of Ethics 
§1. Dependence on Metaphysics 
Caputo’s first critique of ethics regards its dependence upon metaphysics.226  
The basic problem with ethics for Caputo is that it is based upon metaphysics and 
functions toward the same end—to give (false) stability to life.  Ethics seeks to 
elevate its knowledge of its subject matter through metaphysics—it is “a (certain) 
metaphysics (of morals), a metaphysics charged with making obligation safe.”227  
Caputo thus sees ethics, as dependant on failed (in his view) metaphysics for its 
ground, to end up being groundless.228 
Desmond’s conception of ethics can be seen to answer this critique.  Whereas 
Caputo sees (true) ethics and metaphysics as ultimately distinct and thus sees their 
intermingling in terms of ethics being infected by a necessarily suspicion-arousing 
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foreign (onto-theological) agent, Desmond sees that ethics and metaphysics are 
inseparable and should not, and indeed cannot, be divorced from one another.229  As 
metaphysics cannot be divorced from the ethical—as metaphysics entails an ethical 
valuing of being and desire for, even love of, truth230—so ethics cannot be divorced 
from the metaphysical as ethics is dependent on metaphysics, in that it entails an 
understanding of the relation between being and goodness, of what it means to be 
good231 and of what is good or valuable or of worth in being232—particularly when it 
comes to that of human beings.233  Being and goodness, for Desmond, are related to 
each other—not in terms of any simple univocal identification (the elevation of ethical 
knowledge that Caputo wants to avoid) or equivocal separation (that Caputo 
advocates)—but in terms of such metaxological relations or intermediations as the 
promise of goodness in being (especially regarding human being),234 being’s intimacy 
with the good235 and being’s hospitality to the good.236 
§2. A System of Universal Rules 
Caputo’s second critique of ethics concerns its seeking to be a system of 
universal rules.  Ethical systems, like and as metaphysics, privilege a kind of static 
unity—finding a fixed point of reference to absolve ethical reflection from the 
arbitrariness of existence so as to provide a stable foundation for ethical relations.  
Such ethical system-making thinks that ethical existence permits formulations in hard 
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irrevocable rules—in “universal, rational, or natural laws.”237  The problem with such 
ethical laws and principles is that they, in Caputo’s estimation, cannot speak to 
individuals making particular choices in particular situations,238 for ethical existence 
is entangled in such a situation of  groundlessness, singularity, particularity, novelty, 
transcendence and incomprehensibility that resists any kind of universal ethical 
rule.239   
Desmond’s conception of ethics can be seen to answer this critique in several 
ways.  First, Desmond’s conception of ethics does not advocate a simple, static unity 
but a dynamic plurality—a plurivocal ethics.  There is a plurality of ethical potencies 
referring to the plurivocal ontological promise of being in the human self—the 
dynamic endowment out of which the self develops.240  Desmond’s conceptions of 
ethical selvings and ethical communities are plural enactments of freedom—different 
kinds of freedom, different kinds of self-transcendence.241  Second, ethics for 
Desmond is not about formulating hard irrevocable rules as much as it is about 
naming the constancies and the fluidities that are operative in ethical existence.  
Certain ethical potencies focus on the intelligible regularities or constancies (such as 
the dianoetic and the transcendental) while others focus on the more equivocal 
fluidities (such as the aesthetic and the eudaemonistic) of life such that there is a 
plurivocity describing the complexities of our ethical situation.242  Even within this 
plurivocity, there can be no complete univocal determination of the constancies (and 
such is to be guarded against).243  Third, Desmond’s ethics gives special attention to 
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the singularity—to the idiocy—inherent in ethics.  The human self, for Desmond, is 
characterized by an idiotic singularity, a singular integrity, an original unto itself.244  It 
is out of this singularity that the plural promise of the self—in terms of potencies, 
selvings and communities245—unfolds toward the highest (agapeic) selvings and 
communities in which the singular other is valued and loved in its unique and 
irreplaceable singularity.246 
§3. Faithful Neither to Life Nor to the Other 
Caputo’s third critique of metaphysics concerns its failure to be faithful to life 
or to the other.  First, (metaphysical) ethics is not faithful to life in that it gives a false 
stability or safety to life and thus ends up making light of life’s difficulty.247  Second, 
ethics, as building upon and complicit in faithless metaphysics, is not faithful to the 
other.  Within metaphysical ethics, ethical existence with and toward the other—in all 
of its risk and difficulty—is supplanted with a kind of abstract knowledge. Life (and 
obligation) is more difficult and risky than ethics would allow.248 
Desmond’s conception of ethics can be seen to answer this critique in several 
ways.  First, regarding the charge of not being faithful to life, Desmond presents the 
descriptive goal of his ethics not as making for stability and “safety” in our ethical 
decisions as much as intelligently dwelling in the ethos as it is—with all of its 
ambiguities and equivocities—with the aid of metaxological metaphysics.  Second, 
regarding the same charge, the more prescriptive side of Desmond’s ethics (in his 
understanding of the “higher” selvings and communities) sees the better ethical 
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dwelling as precisely that which is the most difficult and least safe—agapeic service 
to the other even to the point of suffering that is so difficult as to be unsustainable on 
one’s own.249  Third, regarding the charge of infidelity to the other, Desmond’s ethics 
is shot through with precisely the ideal of relating to the other as a good in itself.  The 
process of selving is ultimately oriented toward an intermediation with otherness 
beyond self-mediation—seen in the way the higher forms of selving consist of being 
opened beyond oneself toward the other and the communal in a compassionate 
willingness to suffering with and for the other.250  In the highest of ethical 
communities, there is a generous serving—a giving of oneself beyond self-interest to 
the other as worthy or good in itself251—in which the self is centered beyond itself so 
as to result in a fundamentally other- or community-oriented self.252  Fourth, 
Desmond recognizes the abiding difficulty of relating to the other in the way in which 
the other keeps getting co-opted in human selving and community.  Desmond’s 
metaphysical ethics gives some explanation of how and why this is difficult in terms 
of kinds of willing, freedom and desire dominant in different selvings and their 
concomitant communities. 
 
Section II: Desmond as Addressing Caputo’s Motivating Concerns 
Behind Caputo’s critique of ethics and his more positive alternative to 
(metaphysical) ethics, there can be seen to be certain motivating concerns.  First, 
Caputo is concerned to avoid elevating the knowledge of ethical guides, norms or 
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laws to a falsely absolute status.  Second, Caputo is concerned to avoid supplanting 
genuine, difficult ethical existence with such ethical guides, norms or laws (falsely 
elevated).  By avoiding these two negatives, Caputo seeks, I think, to address a more 
basic positive concern.  This is a concern to be honest and faithful to life and to the 
other—and to do so by having a way of thinking that is involved in the relation to the 
other in its particularity and difference toward the end of directing one toward the 
difficulty of such a relation.  Caputo’s own alternative to ethics, his post-metaphysical 
ethics “against ethics,” is intended to be just such a way of thinking that is faithful to 
the other. 
Desmond, however, addresses these concerns from a metaphysical 
perspective.  First, Desmond’s view of ethics avoids elevating knowledge of ethical 
guides to a falsely absolute status.  Desmond is largely concerned with seeking to be 
true to the given situation in its complexity and plurality.  There are, again, both 
constancies and equivocities/fluidity in our ethical existence.253  Beyond any simple 
gesture of flux über alles, Desmond suggests more of a true plurivocity in which 
different potencies focus on the constancies and others on the fluidities.  Even when it 
comes to his more prescriptive agapeic ideal, Desmond is not focused on ethical rules 
as much as a more holistic vision of better/higher selvings and communities.  One 
wonders how to envision a LeviNietzschean community of impossible 
responsibility—of groundless, nihilist pure giving.  Can one even think of it as a 
community? 
Second, Desmond’s view of ethics avoids supplanting genuine, difficult 
ethical existence with such ethical guides/laws/rules.  Desmond likewise wants a 
vision of ethics that tries to deal with life in its ethical fullness.  He wants, and 
                                                
253
 EB 79, 191. 
 171 
presents, not a set of laws but a more holistic vision of multiple potencies, selvings 
and communities that describes our ethical reality and gives us some direction toward 
a better way of being and relating to those around us.  Desmond’s ethics has a similar 
view of the degree of difficulty involved in genuine ethical existence as that of Caputo 
inasmuch as it has the same high ideal of agapeic service and even suffering for the 
other.  One wonders if, within Caputo’s framework, ethical existence so bereft of any 
funding source or community is so difficult as to be impossible.  How can one think 
of one’s ethical existence as impossible without (perhaps through a strange, subtle 
deconstructive yet abstractly speculative Aufhebung) abandoning it, or at least 
abandoning any thought of it? 
Third, Desmond’s view of ethics is a way of thinking about ethical existence 
that is faithful to the other.  In Desmond’s vision, agapeic love of and giving to the 
other as good and valuable in itself is the highest, is the ideal. Agapeic selving 
realizes the promise of the other selvings.254  However, this agapeic service and 
freedom toward the other in its singularity as worthy and good is, for Desmond, based 
on a certain metaphysical understanding of the human self and of the metaxological 
community of being.  Our agapeic being is both an ontological reality—in the sense 
that one is freely given to be for oneself and for others—and a regulative ideal—in the 
sense that there is an ethical call to fulfill the promise of our being in giving to the 
other.255  Agapeic being toward the other is an ethical dwelling that is in harmony 
with the metaphysical understanding of the community of being as metaxological.  
There is a “why” for Desmond’s ethics rooted in the nature of the “others” around 
(within, above) us.  In comparison, it seems that Caputo’s “why” is emptied, is as 
empty as the “other” about whom/which we can say (metaphysics) only enough to 
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demand our utter obligation.  One can reasonably wonder if this saying is truly 
enough to make (reasonably) such demands. 
 
Section III: Desmond’s Metaphysically Informed Alternative to Caputo’s 
“Ethics Without (Metaphysical) Ethics” 
 
In addition to answering Caputo’s critiques of ethics and addressing Caputo’s 
motivating concerns, Desmond provides a metaphysical alternative to Caputo’s 
alternative to metaphysical ethics.  In other words, Desmond’s ethics can be presented 
as a viable and indeed preferable alternative to Caputo’s post-metaphysical “ethics 
without ethics.”  Beyond answering Caputo’s motivating concerns arguably better 
than Caputo’s own system, Desmond’s thought can be used to critique/locate many of 
Caputo’s main points and strong conclusions. 
§1. Heterology 
Post-metaphysical ethics—as an ethics (a way of thinking about relating to the 
other) without ethics (ethical systems)—seeks to be faithful to the other.  Caputo 
describes such a faithful ethics in terms of a heterology.  Caputo summarizes such a 
heterological ethics using Augustine’s: “Dilige, et quod vis fac”—“Love, and do what 
you will.”256  This follows the dual trajectory of the heterology of the project of 
radical hermeneutics, that of heteronomism (dilige) and heteromorphism (et quod vis 
fac).257  Heteronomism is the sober, self-effacing posture of being responsive to the 
call of the other and the call to love (dilige) the other—of placing one in the position 
of a “non-coercive heteronomy.”258  Ethical heteronomism takes the form of 
obligation, such that a post-metaphysical ethics is an ethics of obligation.  
“Obligation,” Caputo argues, “is what is important about ethics, what ethics contains 
                                                
256
 Against Ethics 41, 121-22.  Caputo cites the Augustine quote from Augustine’s Commentary on the 
First Epistle of John, in Migne, Patrologia Latina, v. 35, p. 2033. 
257
 Against Ethics 41, 121. 
258
 Against Ethics 42-43, 55, 61; More Radical Hermeneutics 186. 
 173 
without being able to contain.”259  Such heteronomic obligation finds expression in an 
“hyperbolic” sensitivity to the other260—a radical partiality to the singular, individual 
other that is before one.261  This privileging of radical, ineffable, unanticipated 
singularity in obligation entails a deeper awareness of difference—of the other as 
other.262  Heteromorphism is the more Dionysiac posture of celebrating difference (et 
quod vis fac) as multiplicity and diversity263—a nonexclusionary egalitarianism that 
seeks “to let many flowers bloom.”264  Caputo describes ethical heteromorphism as a 
letting be, a “generalized Gelassenheit” which lets “all things be what and how they 
are”265 and seeks to be maximally nonconstraining—proceeding “in such a way as to 
keep as many options open as possible.”266  Ultimately, a properly heterological, post-
metaphysical ethics must come around to include both the heteronomic Rabbi and the 
heteromorphic Dionysiac.267 
Desmond’s ethics is likewise a kind of heterology, including both heteronomic 
and hetermorphic elements.  Desmond’s ethics displays a (metaphysical) ethical 
heteronomism in several ways.  First, Desmond likewise sees love in terms of an 
agapeic service that is something beyond autonomy—a freedom that both recognizes 
it is given from (dependent upon) the other and uses its powers to give to others.268  
Second, Desmond likewise sees an agapeic, heteronomic passion for the other as the 
core of ethics, but this is based on his metaphysics.  The agapeic decentering of the 
self is due to the double excess or otherness to which agapeic selving is opened and 
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attends—to the inward excess/otherness of the original self in which the self is given 
to be by another (not self-generating)269 and to its willingness to be for the other,270 its 
willingness to be put in the relative position and to be vulnerable in service to the 
other.271  Third, Desmond’s conception of agapeic selving and community entails a 
love and a recognition of the worth of the other as irreplaceable in its idiotic 
singularity.272  This valuing of the singular is based on Desmond’s metaphysical 
conception of the genuine plurality and the unique singularity and inherent worth of 
selves as beings within the community of being.273 
Desmond’s ethics displays an ethical heteromorphism in several ways as well.  
First, agapeic selving and agapeic community entail a certain freedom and release.  
Agapeic “freedom toward” is a creative freedom that gives freedom—a true self-
transcendence that is not exhausted by autonomous self-determination.274  It is an 
agapeic release275 in which the self is released toward the other—being able to affirm 
and consent to the other as having value and worth in excess of the other’s usefulness 
for the self276—and the other is released from the self.277  Second, this agapeic release 
is a “letting be”—a kind of “Gelassenheit.”278  This letting the other be expresses the 
passio essendi of human being in its primal receptivity—its suffering the given.279  
Third, there is, again, a plurality entailed in Desmond’s conception of the ethical 
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potencies, selvings, and communities.  This is, however, not sheer plurality—at least 
with the selvings and communities there is a kind of hierarchy such that the 
heteronomic (the agapeic) guides and structures the heteromorphic (the plural selvings 
and communities).  The higher, heteronomic agapeic selvings realize the promise of 
the plural other selvings.280  Such an hierarchy is necessary if one wants to have any 
(agapeic or heteronomic) ideal.  This sort of hierarchy (of the heteronomic over and 
maintaining the heteromorphic) is supported by Desmond’s metaphysics in that the 
highest selvings and communities are those that best understand, live out and dwell in 
the reality of the self (as given and self-transcending) and the metaxological 
community of being. 
§2. Post-Metaphysical Ethics: Minimalism 
Caputo’s post-metaphysical ethics is also a minimalist ethics.  A post-
metaphysical ethics proceeds from the foundationless foundation of radical 
hermeneutics—it takes place in the withdrawal of any deeper grounding or 
metaphysical certification.281  Such an ethics is, as following the project of radical 
hermeneutics, a minimalism—seeking a maximally “open and undetermined” and 
“weak and nonconstraining” notion of the Good.282  The one regulative principle, that 
of obligation, is simply an “event” or “happening” of obligation.  “Obligation,” 
Caputo writes, “happens”—and this happening is groundless, in a void, without any 
evident further “why.”283 
Desmond parts with this kind of minimalism insofar he sees metaphysics as 
being valuable, if not necessary, for ethics.  Instead of seeing ethics and/or obligation 
to the other as being foundationless, Desmond suggests the foundation of a 
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metaphysical conception of the self and of community as providing a guide for seeing 
which selvings and communities dwell in a closer relation to the primal ethos, the 
metaxological community of being.  The agapeic self is an ontological reality, in the 
sense of being freely given to be for itself and for others, and because of this reality it 
is also a regulative ideal, in the sense of ethical call to fulfill the promise of our being 
in serving or giving to the other.284  This service entails a difficult laying of the self 
open to the other and to the reality of the metaxological between—as itself saturated 
with giving without return.285  One’s generous agapeic regard for and obligation to the 
other does not happen without a why,  but because of gratitude.  Gratitude generates 
within one, charges one with, a generosity toward the other286—recognizing our 
giftedness, our givenness from the generous other (and metaphysics for Desmond 
endeavors to map this communal and ontological reality), we in turn give to the other 
as we have been given to—with a self-transcending creativity giving to the other and 
not asking for return.287 
§3. Post-Metaphysical Ethics: Ethical Repetition 
Central to Caputo’s post-metaphysical ethics is the idea of ethical repetition.  
This ethical repetition is the task of becoming oneself as an ethical self in the midst of 
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the flux of existence without the knowledge of any prior guide or foundation.288  In 
ethical repetition the individual seeks to constitute, to produce the self in relation to 
the other.289  Ethical repetition also presses toward a privilege for the other that is at 
once a de-centering the self.  Ethical repetition is in need of the other.290  Thus, ethical 
repetition deconstructs its own project, in that in order to achieve itself it has to 
become something else.  This “something else” is a “hyperbolic” ethics—a religious 
ethics—that is even further purified of metaphysics. It is thus that an awareness of the 
difficulty of ethical life leads one to the use of religious language. 
Desmond likewise sees ethics as entailing a similar becoming of a self as 
Caputo describes in his ethical repetition but within the context of a metaphysical 
understanding of the self.  First, Desmond describes the self in terms of selving—of 
processes and projects of becoming.  The self metaphysically understood in 
Desmond’s terms of “original selfhood” is an originating or becoming self.  The 
original self (as constitutive of the being of the self) is the “indeterminate locus of 
selving” (the self as becoming and developing).291  Thus, for Desmond, the 
metaphysical conception of the self is not in opposition to the thought of a self that is 
in a process of becoming.  Second, the agapeic self is a self that has been decentered, 
has undergone an “unselving,” and re-centered within community.292  This 
decentering or “unselving” that is at the summit of ethical selving comes about 
through an agapeic release293 in which the self is released toward the other—being 
able to affirm and consent to the other as having value and worth in excess of the 
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other’s usefulness for the self294—and the other is released from the self.295  Third, 
this decentering involved in the process of ethical becoming suggests the advent of a 
religious ethics in Desmond’s work as well.  The love of the other in the community 
of agapeic service is, in Desmond’s reckoning, so difficult such, first, that it is 
manifest as needing to be called forth by superior transcendence,296 and, second, that 
we need help from beyond ourselves to be equal to its call.297  Here, agapeic suffering 
can be a kind of askesis—a breakdown that strips the masks of false selvings, that 
would be self-originating in their self-determination, to the first original self that is a 
self given from an origin beyond the self.298  This highest selving comes to the limit 
of ethics as regarding selving and moves toward the religious—the self is opened 
horizontally toward others in community as it is opened vertically toward the agapeic 
origin.299 
§4. Strong Conclusions 
For Caputo, being faithful to the other—being honest about the situation in 
which we find ourselves when it comes to our ethical relations—brings one hard upon 
certain conclusions.  The first conclusion is the denial of (the possibility of) 
metaphysical knowledge of ethical guides.  This is the denial of ethics inasmuch as it 
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entails a metaphysical knowledge of ethical guides—the only acceptable ethics is one 
that operates without metaphysics—that is, without the aforementioned “ethics.”  
Post-metaphysical ethics sees that we act lacking unshakable metaphysical 
foundations and thus with a heightened awareness of our insecurity—of our “fear and 
trembling.”300  We are, again, in a situation of undecidability, in which we have to 
make ethical decisions and judgments without any sure guidelines that would answer 
our questions ahead of time.301  The second conclusion is the denial of the possible 
significance of metaphysics for ethical knowledge.  Even if one could have 
metaphysical knowledge, it would be of no value for truly ethical living.  Obligation 
(true ethics) and metaphysical (not true) ethics are incompatible.  Obligation is the 
core of ethics that metaphysical ethics is based upon and betrays, that scandalizes 
metaphysical ethics, and to which post-metaphysical ethics seeks to be faithful.302 
Desmond’s work stands to critique these strong conclusions of Caputo’s “post-
metaphysical” alternative to ethics.  The general critique is that the denials of 
Caputo’s post-metaphysical ethics of obligation are too radical and that they go to 
unnecessary extremes (specifically, the extreme of a false either/or) in order to 
address its motivating concerns. First, regarding the denial of the possibility of 
metaphysical knowledge of ethical guides—regarding the impossibility of ethics, for 
Caputo, as following from the failure or impossibility of metaphysics—Desmond 
provides a powerful challenge.303  Regarding the descriptive side of ethics denied in 
this first conclusion: when it comes to the difficulty and complexity of thinking of the 
metaphysical foundations of ethics, Desmond sees pluralities of elements to be dealt 
with, but this is complexity, not impossibility.  Desmond’s “metaphysical guides” are 
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 Radical Hermeneutics 239; Against Ethics 191. 
301
 Against Ethics 3, 63. 
302
 Against Ethics 5, 18. 
303
 See Chapter Two, Part Two, Section III, §4. 
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not determinate, univocal, metaphysical principles but are metaxological—a 
description of ethical life in terms of the plural potencies (some necessarily 
indeterminate and some more determinate) and the plural concrete descriptions of 
projects of selving and being in community in their interrelation.  Metaphysics is 
involved, for instance, in seeing how there is within the singular self a plurality of 
ethical potencies which refer to the plurivocal ontological promise of being in the 
human self.304  These potencies are the basic sources out of which the self comes to 
reflect more determinately on the indeterminate show of value—out of which ethics 
comes to dwell with the both the equivocities and the constancies in the ethos.305   
Regarding the prescriptive (the more properly ethical?) side of ethics in this 
first conclusion: It can be seen that, for Caputo, metaphysical guides are supposed to 
make the ethical life easier to navigate.  But for Desmond, his explicitly metaphysical 
ethics entails as high a demand and difficulty as the ideals in Caputo’s own vision 
inasmuch as it has the same high ideal of agapeic service and even suffering for the 
other.  Desmond’s ethical ideal of agapeic being is a high and difficult one, and 
Desmond’s metaphysical ethics gives some explanation of how and why this is 
difficult (regarding the various tensions and imbalanced tendencies in the doubleness 
of human desire and will coming to expression in different conceptions of freedom in 
relation to the other).  The love of the other in the community of agapeic service—the 
difficult laying of the self open to the other306 and the giving (and trusting and waiting 
on) even to the point of suffering—is, in Desmond’s reckoning, so difficult as to be 
not sustainable on our own resources, such that it feels called forth by superior 
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 EB 10. 
305
 EB 79, 191. 
306
 EB 217-18. 
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transcendence,307 and that we need help from beyond ourselves to be equal to its 
call.308 
Second, Desmond likewise challenges Caputo’s denial of the significance of 
metaphysical knowledge for ethical life.  Again, this judgment about the uselessness 
of metaphysics for genuine ethical existence is based on how Caputo sees the two as 
being fundamentally at odds.  Caputo denies the significance of metaphysics because 
he has defined metaphysics in such a way that obligation, or any serious engagement 
with lived existence, would be allergic to it.309  Ethics and metaphysics, for Desmond, 
however, are inseparable.310  A metaphysical understanding of the self serves as a 
basis for Desmond’s more concrete understanding of ethics in terms of different 
“ethical selvings” and ethical communities.  These different determinate kinds of 
selving and community derive, for Desmond, from the given metaxological 
community or ethos that is prior in the sense of a transcendental, metaphysical ground 
that makes possible these different formations of ethical community.311  These 
metaphysical foundations are significant for the ethical life in that Desmond’s 
metaphysical understanding of community and of the self coheres with and supports 
precisely the kind of high regard for the other that Caputo wants (extracted) from 
ethics.  For Desmond, a metaphysical understanding of reality and the high and 
difficult demand of the agapeic ideal are of a piece—they cohere harmoniously.  
While for Caputo these two stand in stark contrast to each other, such that he and his 
view of ethical obligation is “against ethics” inasmuch as ethics partakes of the 
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 EB 197, 218, 220. 
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 EB 217-19, 494. 
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 See Chapter Two, Part Two, Section III, §4. 
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 PU 87, 223, 227; AT 235. 
311
 DDO 127; EB 197. 
EB 200: “There is a given community of self and other that grounds the doing of the good in the ethos. 
We do not first create metaxological community. It is given. What we are given in its given 
betweenness is the freedom to realize more fully the promise of agapeic transcending, in self-integrity 
and forms of community that concretize its truth in the world.” 
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poisoned well of metaphysics.  But, in the end, if Caputo’s critique of metaphysics as 
such, and any ethics tainted thereby, does not stand—as it does not in relation to 
Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics and ethics—then there is no good reason to 
accept Caputo’s extreme, either/or, severance of thinking (about being, about reality) 
and doing (good unto the other, as one ought). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: GOD AND RELIGION 
This chapter will follow this plan:  In Part One, Desmond’s understanding of 
God (and of the nature of our understanding of God) and religion is systematically 
presented.1  In Part Two, this vision of God and religion is compared to that of 
Caputo; in so doing, Desmond’s conception is presented as a viable and indeed 
preferable alternative to LeviNietzschean religion without religion. 
 
PART ONE: A PRESENTATION OF WILLIAM DESMOND’S PHILOSOPHY OF 
GOD AND RELIGION 
 
Section I: God and the Modern Ethos 
§1. The Modern Ethos 
Modernity has made religion and thought about God problematic.  Clues to 
this difficulty can be gleaned from an understanding of the modern ethos.  The 
modern ethos, for Desmond, is a reconfiguration of the primal ethos.2  This 
reconfiguration has resulted in a “contraction”/“evacuation”/“neutering”/“degrading” 
of the given ethos of being—an overly determinate and univocal constriction of the 
overdetermined “between” that has lost a feel for the fullness of the ethos3 —that has 
come to cut off mindfulness from the deeper, overdeterminate resources of the primal 
ethos, or the between.4  This modern deracination of the ethos finds expression in a 
                                                
1
 It should be noted that at time of the writing of this chapter, Desmond’s definitive statement on God 
and religion, his God and the Between, has yet to be completed and published.  What is here presented 
is, to the best of my understanding having read drafts of God and the Between, consistent with this 
forthcoming work.   
2
 AT 250. 
3
 BB 71; NDR 46; EB 99, 167; AT 235. 
AT 236: “Suppose such an ethos of ‘neutralization’ is itself an ontological contraction of the given 
milieu of being as saturated with value.” 
4
 EB 44-45; GEW 23; MC 9. 
PO 228: “The order we make is grafted onto another order that we ourselves do not produce.” 
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dualistic opposition between fact and value—a divorcing of being and goodness.5  
The modern instrumental mind—a will to a manipulable univocity over the 
uncertainty of what is not determinately intelligible, seeking to have determinate 
knowledge and control over beings—is driven by this dualism.6  The dualism of fact 
and value that drives instrumental mind comes to manifestation in the two-fold 
process of the objectification of being and the subjectification of value that Desmond 
describes as the “double face of modernity.”7  On one face, being is objectified—the 
“degraded” or “deracinated” world is a valueless, inherently worthless, “merely 
empirical,” thereness constituting a universal mechanism;8 on the other face is the 
subjectification of value that comes about as there is a “revaluation” of value in terms 
of human self-determination and a projection of value onto the world so as to make 
what is “there” valued as useful—an instrument—to the self.9  Thus, the instrumental 
mind of the modern ethos is, for Desmond, “an ungrateful child” that shuns or has 
forgotten its own birth in the overdetermined and inherently valuable givenness of 
being beheld in astonishment and contemplated upon in genuine speculative 
philosophy—and has also, as a not at all unrelated parallel, shunned and forgotten 
God.10 
                                                
5
 PO 158; BB 72, 103; AT 236, 248; BR 227; EB 24. 
6
 PO 26, 121, 137, 158, 226, 306; PU 116, 195; EB 46. 
BDD 760: “The general spiritual ethos is pervasively pragmatic and oriented to instrumental problem-
solving.  We give our concern to things about which we can do something, where we seem able to will 
it and bring them under some control.” 
7
 HG 21-22; AOO 292; MC 3. 
EB 41: “Modernity's shaping of the ethos grows out of distrust of equivocity, expressed in the 
univocalizing mentality of dualistic opposition that produces a devaluing objectification of being on 
one side, and a subjectification of value on the other.” 
8
 PO 158, 366; BB 71; AT 235-37; NDR 46; BR 227; EB 46, 99; HG 21-22. 
9
 AT 235-37; PO 333. 
PO 353: “What is there, what ‘is,’ has no intrinsic worth; worth is merely an instrument of the 
projecting self, already set in opposition to being.  The fact/value distinction is an expression of this 
ethical/ontological estrangement.” 
BR 224: “If the world is worthless, we cannot stand a worthless world, we must make it worthy, 
worthy of us, and that means we must make it our instrument.” 
10
 PO 242; BHD 20; BB 14, 202, 204-5; BDD 738; BR 224; MC 11-12. 
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§2. God and modernity 
Modernity’s instrumental mind, with its dualistic objectification of being and 
subjectification of value, leads to the problematic status of God in modernity.  Divine 
transcendence has become problematic and devalued in modernity—such that there is 
a modern “allergy to transcendence.”11  In the wake of modern fact/value dualism—of 
its lost attunement to the richness of the between—the world is stripped of signs and 
traces of the divine.12  Desmond writes of the problem of God in modernity in terms 
of an antinomy of autonomy and transcendence.  The relation between the two is an 
antinomy such that in absolutizing one, one would relativize the other.13  Modernity 
has largely opted for absolutizing of human autonomy leaving the strange animal of a 
relativized transcendence.14  Thus taking upon itself the mantle of absoluteness, the 
modern self is made to be a double—as Desmond would say, a false double—of 
God.15  What God remains is a relativized transcendence that survives as but a 
projection of our own power—yet another inherently worthless instrument to be 
wielded by us strangely diminishing sovereigns (are we losing our clothes? our mantle 
borrowed from our fiction?) in our little war with being.16  How then to speak of God 
                                                                                                                                        
 See Milbank’s understanding of the secular a modern invention, as an invention of pure power 
with humanity functioning as a false double of God.  Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, ch1 
passim, pp. 13, 18. 
11
 HG 4; AOO 271-72. 
12
 PR 108; GEW 16. 
EB 167: “The loss of the ethos takes the form of the so-called death of God. And this is correct in that 
this is the loss of the elemental good of being in the between. It is not primarily a matter of finding the 
arguments for God unconvincing, or finding oneself living fine without God, or indeed even of turning 
against God. It is a loss of the mindful attunement between the indeterminate openness of elemental 
expectation in us and the goodness of the source.” 
13
 EB 32-33, 353; HG 22; AOO 275. 
NDR 43-44: “Absolutize autonomy and you must relativize transcendence; but if transcendence cannot 
be so relativized, autonomy must itself be relativized.” 
EB 33: “Can one serve two masters as god? Is there not a certain antinomy of autonomy and 
transcendence? For both cannot be absolute together, in the terms proposed by the priority of 
autonomy. Absolutize the first, you relativize the second; absolutize the second, you relativize the first, 
and hence put a strain on the proposed priority of autonomy.” 
14
 EB 353; HG 4; AOO 269, 283. 
15
 AT 250. 
16
 PR 109: “Can God be thus used?  Have we taken a fateful or fatal step outside fitting reverence, 
when God is thus used?  And is not the self-projection of our own power not then the superiority we 
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again upon this disenchanted earth of modernity?  
 
Section II: Ways to God 
§ 1. Religion and Philosophy (and Religion) 
The task of thinking about God in the wake of modernity is, for Desmond, one 
to be shared by religion and philosophy.  Desmond sees philosophy and religion as 
independent (at least to a certain extent) and interrelated integrities such that 
philosophy can be regarded as a separate discipline that can think about religion and 
that to which religion refers.17  Philosophy and religion are interrelated in that each 
can change as a result of dialogue with the other—philosophy (as metaphysics) and 
religion display a certain porosity between each other and thus should not be divorced 
from one another.18 
However, within this relationship, religion is for Desmond closer to “the 
ontological roots of things”19—it is the deeper and more intimate matrix (the mother 
tongue) of our thinking, especially our thinking of God.20  Desmond’s primary 
configuration of the relation between philosophy and religion is not as much 
                                                                                                                                        
project?  Not God as the superior, but our selves as creating ourselves at a higher level as superior 
being.” 
17
 BHD 84-85: “Philosophy and religion are not necessarily and essentially instrumentalities….  Both 
are what I would call finalities or integrities: finalities, not in any sense of bringing the dunamis of 
mind or being to a dead closure, but modes of mindfulness that engage what is ultimate, ways of being 
mindful that themselves try to approximate ultimacy; integrities, as embodying something of the 
realized, yet open promise of human wholeness.” 
18
 HG 8. 
HT 24: “Surely, philosophy can think about anything; in principle, everything can be the occasion of 
thought, especially our most basic notions.  This also entail[s] philosophy’s willingness to reformulate 
its own characteristic ways of reflection under the impact of those dissident others, like religion and art, 
that contest and challenge it.” 
AOO 294: “Religion reflected in its truth is (metaxological) philosophy which understands that to be is 
to be religious, namely, to have one’s being in the happening of the between by virtue of the ultimate 
giving of the agapeic origin.” 
19
 BR 213-14, 226. 
20
 HG 17. 
AOO 290: “After long consideration, I see that religion has power that neither art or philosophy has: it 
is most intimate with the primal porosity, the passio essendi, and the urgency of ultimacy.” 
HG 187: “We need to reconsider the religious matrix in which philosophical thought is grown, and a 
new mindfulness of what that matrix communicates.”  
BR 211: “Religion is closer to the mother that makes us who we are.” 
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(indeterminate, religious) faith seeking (determinate, philosophical) understanding as 
it is philosophy’s coming to show an opening to divine transcendence21 and religion 
after itself coming to a standstill, to nothing, to a breakdown (all of sorts) in 
perplexity before the astonishing excesses in being.22  (One can see even at the outset 
how this follows Desmond’s “phenomenology” from a primal, enabling religious 
astonishment (as intimate matrix) to philosophical perplexity and curiosity to 
philosophy’s second perplexity opening toward a second, reborn, religious 
astonishment.)  This going-beyond-itself of philosophy, Desmond describes as a 
different poverty of philosophy—its fulfillment in being called, from within itself, 
beyond itself.23 
Desmond’s work on religion and God is then an endeavor to think 
philosophically in a religious register.  It involves contemplation and meditation upon 
worthy otherness, upon the ultimate and transcendent.24  The philosophical perplexity 
induced by enduring otherness breaks the circle of self-mediation and leads to the 
thought of ultimacy.  Speculative philosophy, in this mode, not only entertains but 
mindfully safeguards irreducible perplexities and concerns itself with the limits and 
                                                
21
 BDD 766-67. 
22
 HG 191. 
HG 70: “Intellectus does not speculatively surpass fides, but rather finds that, in dialogue with religion, 
or perhaps in the secret communication between thinking and the divine source, it has to seek beyond 
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speculatively surpasses religion; but that philosophy must surpass its speculative idealistic form, just in 
its being true to the excess of religion.”  
HG 97-98: “It is not faith seeking understanding; it is faith after the effort to understand that does not 
now dispel the mystery but finds itself more wrapped in it than ever, more deeply struck into perplexity 
and praise and love at the being greater than the greatest of our thoughts.” 
23
 HG 191. 
HG 76: “What if there is a different poverty of philosophy: one where philosophy comes closer to a 
fulfillment, not at the point where knowing no longer goes beyond itself, but just the opposite—where 
knowing is called upon to an exodus beyond itself, above itself, into the darkness of the divine?” 
24
 GEW 21; BR 223. 
PO 235: “The contemplative attitude epitomizes our highest freedom, the freedom to mind what is of 
ultimate worth.” 
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extremities of thought.25  This kind of philosophizing is a speculative watch—a 
wakeful watching for signs of absolute otherness in finitude and a guarding watch 
against ascribing the absolute to the finite.26  It is in this watchful tension that one 
must find ways to speak of God (whose ways are not our own). 
 
By way of brief excursus, one would be remiss to pass by at this point without 
mentioning a certain tension or ambiguity between reason and faith or philosophy and 
theology in Desmond’s thought.  To be more specific, it could be observed that 
Christian theology informs his philosophy points where thinly veiled Christian 
concepts, such as creation, agapeic suffering service (imitatio Christi), needing divine 
aid (grace) for higher selvings and community, and the consummate agapeic 
community of religious service (church).  To do this without an explicit theology 
could leave one with an overly effective “apologetics” that may threaten to make 
theology redundant—if philosophy alone can yield these theological concepts.  There 
is a possible logic of dualism here, where philosophy on its own can perform such that 
theology is redundant, unnecessary, rejected.  Perhaps Desmond would benefit from a 
more positive account of revealed, confessional theology.  Indeed, Desmond might 
need to “come out of the closet” as a theologian as well—to be able to give a more 
robust accounting (and so remedy a kind of incompleteness in his present accounting) 
of the indeed necessary relation between, not only philosophy and religion, but 
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 PO 242; BHD 42-43, 243; AOO 4. 
BHD 81-82: “But one does not, one cannot cease, one will not cease to think speculatively.  
Philosophy’s reasonable dream of the ultimate otherness renounces all totalizing hubris.  In this 
renunciation, speculative philosophy is renewed as thought’s restless exigency to still think otherwise 
what is other to thought, to think what we can hardly think: the absolute original as the absolute other.” 
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 BHD 81-82. 
BHD 136: “Philosophical mind negates our ascription of absoluteness to the relative yet it is on 
speculative watch for the appearances of the absolute in the relative.  It detaches and distances the self, 
but in the distance it may involve mind deeper with the other.  Its speculative watch is vigilant towards 
the togetherness of the self and the ultimate other.  The speculative watch is the openness of mind to 
this togetherness.” 
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philosophy and theology.  Such would only benefit philosophy and theology and the 
metaxological community between them.  Though it must be said that Desmond’s 
reticence about confessional theology is understandable—especially insofar as he has 
made his career speaking to a philosophical field that tends to be (especially earlier in 
Desmond’s career) suspicious of, if not hostile to, confessional theology. 
 
§2. How to Speak of God 
How then speak of God?  Desmond’s answer is that we should speak of God 
metaxologically.  This needs to be unpacked before going on to look at the various 
signs of and “ways” to God in the between.  Laying out how to speak of God (in 
Desmond’s thought) we will follow a course that gets progressively more concrete: 
from speaking in terms of the middle generally to those of indirection to metaphor to 
hyperbole. 
From the Middle 
In speaking metaxologically, we should speak of God from the middle—
speaking as from the middle.  Speculative philosophy is, for Desmond, a mindfulness 
of—an attending to—what is at work in the middle, the midst of our existence.27  We 
cannot name God (or anything for that matter) but from the middle.28  Thus, there can 
be—for our eyes that cannot clearly or fully see the beginning or ending or depths or 
heights of being from our often ambiguous location—no immediate, direct access to 
God, who is to us more an enigma.29  From our intermediate position God cannot be 
determined directly or (in Desmond’s terms) univocally, because humans cannot be 
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 PO 11, 18; PU 22; AOO 4. 
HT 25: “Philosophy is just the thoughtful engagement of the sources of intelligibility immediately at 
work in the between.” 
28
 DDO 181. 
29
 DDO 206. 
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on a par with God (as the transcendent other) conceptually.30  Because of the middle 
position of humanity with its attendant ambiguity, there is need for us to speak of 
God, if we so speak, by means of indirection. 
Indirectly 
Speaking of God metaxologically entails speaking with images and 
representations that involve a certain doubleness.  For Desmond, to speak indirectly is 
to speak imaginatively—in terms of representations that are intended to do the work 
of imag(in)ing an original.31  In the case of God, no finite determinate (univocal, 
intending to be direct) category will do, for the original that is to be imaged is at the 
boundary of human understanding.32  Thus, if one is to talk of transcendence one must 
live with the risk of equivocity,33 for such talk is necessarily representational and 
indirect—able to conceal in its revealing.34   
This indirect speech entails a certain doubleness.  God is the ultimate 
transcendence that is beyond all images/names which no image can exhaust, and 
because of this the naming of God risks a fundamental violence of objectifying God—
of turning the infinite into a finite object35—and of producing an idolatrous 
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 PO 136; EB 79; HG 8. 
31
 HG 9-10. 
32
 PU 207: “Metaphysical metaphors are responsive to what Jaspers calls ‘boundary questions.’  Within 
the boundary, we make intelligible sense of things by means of determinate finite categories.  But at the 
boundary, and relative to the boundary, no such finite determinate category will do.  Here we ask about 
the ground of determinate categories that exceeds complete categorical determination.” 
33
 GEW 22. 
BB 218-19: “Equivocal language may have to be risked if we want to affirm the absolute difference of 
the transcendent.  Here the equivocity is that to speak the transcendent, equivocally or otherwise, is 
already to bring it out of its absolute difference, and so either not to name it, or to imply that there is no 
absolute difference.  I think this equivocity has to be lived with dynamically; it cannot be resolved into 
a univocal or dialectical determination.”  
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 PO 111, 136. 
35
 PO 157. 
PO 134: “Do we not rob God of mystery, power, and transcendence?  The name seems then to be the 
fundamental violence on otherness.”  
PO 135: “By directly naming the divine we objectify it, turn it into a finite object, turn it into 
something it is not.” 
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counterfeit double of God.36  However, this risk is inevitable, for we need—“cannot 
but need”—images and names to speak of God at all.37  We are thus in the tension of 
a double situation where naming and imag(in)ing God is both necessary (otherwise 
God is to us a nameless nothing) and impossible (in the sense that all names/images 
fall short of univocally determining the transcendent other to which they refer).38  The 
best names then, for Desmond, are those that name their failure to be The Name39—
that exhibit iconic speech in naming metaxologically.40  In this manner of speaking 
about God—in its caution, reticence, diffidence about making claims about God41—
God can remain other in our thinking about (naming/imaging) God.  There is in 
indirect speaking a space of difference—a degree of equivocity—that can be 
maintained between the name/image and God and can function to guard the threshold 
of the enigma of transcendence.42 
Metaphorically 
For Desmond, such indirect speech about God is, more specifically, 
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 BHD 103, 174; HG 8-9. 
PO 140: “No religion is free from the risk of idolatry, because none can continue without the sacred 
image.” 
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 PO 113; HG 8. 
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 PO 133-35. 
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 PO 135. 
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 PU 189; HG 8. 
42
 BB 219: “The equivocal is the threshold of enigma, a subverter of every claim to have encompassed 
the enigma of transcendence.  It has, so to say, the guardianship of this threshold.  It is a suitor in love 
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and to be true to itself, it must always keep open the space of difference between itself and God.” 
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metaphorical.43  Metaphysical metaphors are speculative categories (or “imageless 
images”)44—such as original selfhood,45 agapeic and erotic being,46 creation,47 the 
absolute original,48 and the agapeic origin,49 to name a few.  Such metaphysical 
metaphors are intermediating names that entail a “carrying between” (metapherein)—
a carrying across a gap—a speaking of the “beyond” or transcendences “in the midst” 
(meta) of our actual finitude.50  A metaphor is a way to articulate what is beyond 
univocal determination51—an “as” (or metaphorical “is”) that identifies an excessive 
(ontological) “is”52 but resists (the seduction of) reducing (or elevating) the likeness 
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 PU 207: “One needs to speak also…of analogies, symbols, and hyperboles.  My use of ‘metaphor,’ 
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determinacy, yet at the same time always reserves the right to call itself into question and to dissolve 
any pretension to unsurpassable absoluteness regarding the name that it has uttered in the middle.  This 
subversion of claims to mastery in the very act of articulation opens the space of irreducible difference 
once again.” 
PU 208: “The metaphor carries us beyond univocity and equivocity, fixed determinacy, and inarticulate 
indefiniteness.  The sense of determinacy is opened to what is other than rigid univocity; the sense of 
indeterminacy is guarded from a merely privative indefiniteness.” 
52
 BB 310. 
BB 210: “The metaphorical ‘is,’ as I understand it, keeps itself open as an identification of otherness, 
hence is never the encapsulation of transcendence, but instead a vector towards and beyond the circle 
of self-thinking thought….  [M]etaphor is metaphysical and metaxological.  It defines a complex 
mindful intermediation between us and what is ultimately other.  It offers no direct possession of the 
ultimate.  Rather its indirection is respect for the enigma of the ultimate, expressed in the openness on 
the metaphorical ‘is’ itself.” 
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(the “as”) to a univocal identity (an “is”) such that the result is a complex identity, “a 
certain identification.”53  A metaphysical metaphor, when used of God, is a concrete 
saying of perplexity that preserves reference to a beyond, to an otherness, and respects 
the enigma of the ultimate.54 
Hyperbolically 
Desmond further focuses the indirect saying involved in metaphor in his 
concept of the hyperbole.  A hyperbole is a thought (image, name, etc.) that, in its 
attending to certain phenomena, has an immanent exigency that propels one to the 
thought of the transcendent.  With the hyperbolic, one is “thrown,” propelled “by our 
being” beyond (huperballein) ourselves and beyond the hyperbole toward the ultimate 
and transcendent—from our being between toward the “being above” of 
transcendence.55  Hyperbolic thought has to do with how something in experience 
(immanence) suggests something beyond experience (transcendence)—with 
something disproportionate or asymmetrical to finitude in the midst of finitude.56  The 
hyperbolic is, for Desmond, a via eminentiae—a way of excess57 that brings one to 
the thought of that which exceeds determinate categorization.58  This overdetermined 
                                                
53
 BB 209: “In living metaphor there is a certain identification of otherness.” 
PU 210: “Metaphysical metaphor must dissolve the pretension finally to have uttered the final word, 
for every word of our is in the middle, and hence carries the trace of inevitable untruth…. Metaphor, 
under the skeptical shadow of this speculative suspicion, rejects the seduction whereby a likeness is 
turned into an identity.  Thus, it rejects the consolation of univocity, without losing all articulacy in 
nameless equivocity.” 
54
 BB 209; PU 209. 
55
 BB 218, 222. 
BB 218: “We are thrown towards transcendence by our being.”   Hyperbole “throws mindfulness into 
the huper, the beyond.” 
BB 256: “The way of transcendence is hyperbolic.  Transcending thinking finds itself thrown upwards 
at an ultimate limit.” 
56
 HT 30; BR 227. 
 This should be contrasted with Deleuze’s vision of a rejection of transcendence in order to 
affirm immanence.  Desmond sees transcendence and immanence as interrelated such that immanence 
is not devalued by transcendence but is indeed valued in itself—this value bespeaks a broader 
community of the transcendent and the immanent.  Ontologically speaking, the immanent is suspended 
in the transcendent.  Phenomenologically speaking, the immanent hyperbolically refers in itself beyond 
itself to the transcendent.  See Radical Orthodoxy on “Suspending the Material.” 
57
 BB 219, 221. 
58
 HT 23; NDR 48. 
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talking about overdetermined reality involves an affirmative equivocity—a 
constitutive ambiguity, a persistence of paradox (signifying such a saying’s ultimate 
failure to univocally identify, “pin down,” ultimate transcendence) that obtains when 
one comes to think transcendence, to think that which is beyond thought.59  As such 
as a way of excess, the hyperbolic is connected with a reborn, second astonishment 
and agapeic mind (a breakthrough after breakdown)—a thinking akin to praise (if not 
simply that) that names the worthy other in a manner that affirms its otherness and 
worthiness.60  Here there is for Desmond a reversal involved in the hyperbolic, in that 
there is a coming to see the finite measures (metrics) that we employ to refer to the 
ultimate as lesser reflections of the more fundamental and prior reality of the ultimate 
as an infinite measure that is beyond our measure, asymmetrical to us and ours.61  
Whereas a common conception (perhaps not foreign to Caputo’s) sees talk of the 
ultimate as but “hyperbolic” (as exaggerated, figurative, “unreal”) talk about the finite 
(reality), Desmond’s idea of the hyperbolic is a reversal of this—it is how our 
                                                
59
 BB 217-19; HG 69. 
BB 218: “Excess is the way to huperousia, beyond being, above being, being above being.  Being 
beyond being is a double saying: paradoxical language is unavoidable.” 
BB 219: “The equivocal is the threshold of enigma, a subverter of every claim to have encompassed 
the enigma of transcendence.  It has, so to say, the guardianship of this threshold.  It is a suitor in love 
with the ultimate beloved that it does not know.”  
HG 127: “Iconic speech is needed which incarnates in itself just this confession of its own finitude, and 
its witness to what exceeds finiteness.  Its doubleness is just its being on the boundary between finitude 
and infinity.”  In this way, “the asymmetrical difference is kept open.” 
60
 BB 219. 
BB 221: “Hyperbole offers a via eminentiae, in a metaxologically reformulated sense.  The hyperbolic 
is a way of excess that throws beyond finitude.  But this via is by way of agapeic mind; hence the point 
is not to proceed from lack to perfection, but from perfection and plenitude, indeed from perfection in 
the between to pluperfection in transcendence.  Agapeic astonishment intimates the pluperfection that 
is always already more, always is and will be more, eternally more.  The hyperbolic way will pile up 
perfection on perfection, knowing it will always not be enough to do justice to transcendence.  This via 
eminentiae would be the hyperbole of praise.” 
61
 BB 221: There is “a reversal, relative to ultimacy itself.  We do not have its measure; the measure is 
beyond measure.  The hyperbolic measure beyond our measure instead measures us.  We are not going 
from perfection here to ultimacy there; but there is perfection here, because there is ultimacy.  
Perfection here is an image of an ultimacy whose perfection always exceeds immanence. There is a 
reversal into an asymmetry; finite perfection is a created image of ultimacy.  There is no ‘It is good’ in 
the between, but for the ultimate ‘It is good’ that cannot be encompassed or mastered.” 
 See here Milbank on the infinite shining through the finite and drawing the finite to itself, to 
the infinite.  Milbank, Being Reconciled, p. 77. 
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understanding of finite realities impels or propels (“gives rise to”) our thinking toward 
something more than the finite which is not sufficient unto itself.  Such suggestive, 
impelling finite happenings (to which we will turn below) are what Desmond calls the 
“hyperboles of being”—these excessive happenings are signs pointing beyond 
themselves (in various ways) toward ultimacy.62 
 
 We now turn to the various hyperboles of being.  For Desmond, these are 
sundry ways to God—signs of God in the othernesses of the between.63  We will 
consider these ways under the broad categories of the overdeterminate transcendences 
in the between—the exterior transcendence of being in nature (T1) and the interior 
transcendence of the self (T2)—that point to a superior transcendence beyond the 
between (T3).  These signs in these othernesses bring one to a perplexity—that God 
does not quell as a univocal answer to a determinate question—but that points to God 
as an intimate stranger, who utterly transcends us and whose indeterminate signs and 
traces utterly surround and indwell us.64 
 
                                                
62
 PR 113-15; HG 7. 
BR 227: “It is in the hyperbolic dimensions of disproportion that finesse is needed to read our place in 
being for signs of the ultimate excess, the unsurpassable beyond, beyond which nothing can be 
thought—God.” 
HG 138: The hyperboles of being “point beyond themselves, not to a whole that includes them all, but 
to an ultimate power that is hyperbolic again to the creation as a happening of contingency.” 
HG 187-88: “When we return to the ontological matrix or ethos wherein being religious and 
philosophical come to articulation, we come on certain happenings that are ‘too much’, certain 
hyperboles of being that occasion, on our part, deep reservations about claims made for holistic 
immanence as the last word or the ultimate horizon.” 
63
 PO 343; GEW 24. 
EB 219: “We do not understand the mystery of God. Metaxological mindfulness mulls over the signs 
of God in the between, alert to what comes to it from beyond itself. Traces of transcendence are 
communicated in many ways to the twilight or dawn of the middle.” 
64
 PU 188: “I do not think we need to take God as an ‘explanation,’ if we mean some determinate 
univocal reason why things are thus and thus.  God as a merely univocal explanation would be a ruse 
by which reason uses the idea of God to shirk the deeper ontological perplexity about God.  Reason 
then uses God to allow itself to go back to sleep again.  If God is an ‘explanation,’ there is a sense in 
which this answer is darker than the question it answers, because the answer involves a certain 
extraordinary complex acknowledgement of the mystery of the ultimate.  This mystery is the answer, 
but this answer is no answer in the more normal sense of a relatively self-transparent, rational 
demonstration.  God deepens our perplexity about being, makes mind sleepless” 
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§3. Ways to God from Exterior Transcendence 
The hyperboles of being are happenings experienced in finite being that point 
beyond themselves.65  In this section, we will look at the hyperboles of being that are 
encountered in Desmond’s first transcendence (T1), in the infinite succession of 
beings in the external world of becoming.66  Generally, these hyperboles consist of the 
encounter with external transcendence as suggesting or intimating a transcendent 
ground or origin—the world’s ultimate ground in an origin.67  This is the hyperbolic 
thought of creation.68  It is in the following ways that finite being images, in its 
intermediate being, an ultimate ground or origin.69 
The givenness of being 
The first hyperbole of external being is the hyperbole of the givenness of 
being.  The phenomenon from which this hyperbole arises is the finitude of creation 
                                                
65
 HG 138: “Hyperboles of being…point beyond themselves, not to a whole that includes them all, but 
to an ultimate power that is hyperbolic again to the creation as a happening of contingency.” 
66
 DDO 149-51, 154; BB 206-7, 231, 408, 448; HG 2. 
BB 256: “Finite beings are differentiated in a process of becoming that, as open-ended, does have its 
indefiniteness.  Finite beings partake of the originated infinitude of endless succession and the 
universal impermanence.  But that derivative infinity is not the underived infinite.” 
AOO 268: “The transcendence of beings as other in exteriority.  The transcendence of such beings 
consists in their not being the product of our process of thinking; their otherness to us resists complete 
reduction to our categories, especially in to far as they simply are, or have being at all.” 
67
 PU 205; HG 7. 
BB 207: The infinities of outward infinite succession (becoming) and inward intentional infinitude 
“suggest a more radical sense of the infinite that is in excess of either, and reducible to none, even as it 
gives them their being for themselves.  The astonishing middle rouses the thinking of radical 
transcendence as itself an agapeic origin.” 
BB 506: “Finite transcending points beyond itself to the absolute origin as the primal giver of the 
promise of creation, and as the sustaining ground of its metaxological milieu.  As giver and sustaining, 
the origin is immanent in the metaxological milieu.” 
DDO 152: “These two forms [intentional infinitude and infinite succession] point to a more that is 
more absolutely original, relative to which they are to be seen as images, as ontologically derivative, 
despite the originative powers of being that they exhibit in their own right.” 
68
 BB 267; AOO 5-6; HG 131. 
HG 127: “Suppose creation…is what one might call a hyperbolic thought.  Suppose creation were more 
like a metaphysical hyperbole, the thought of something hyperbolic, and in excess of finite, univocal 
determination, or our self-determination.” 
AOO 5: “The idea of God as creator suggests, by contrast, a more recalcitrant notion of origination.  I 
call creation a hyperbolic thought, in that it exceeds all determinate intelligibilities.” 
69
 PO 138: “Finite things have being but are not ultimate or absolute; they image in their intermediate 
being the ultimate ground.  They shimmer in their lack of fixed self-subsistence and make a dance of 
symbols that tells of something other or more.  In the finite we divine the infinite—the religious cipher 
is the middle agency spanning their divide.” 
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in its being given to be at all.70  Thought is struck into astonishment by the “that it is 
at all”: that there is something rather than nothing, “the sheer being there of the 
world.”71  The perplexity that arises from the givenness of being has to do with the 
more basic “coming to be” of being—the question of why there is being rather than 
nothing.72  There seems to be an ontological dependency of finite being as a 
whole73—a sense of the whole as a universal impermanence, an open whole, that 
points beyond itself74—and thus “presents itself as something originated.”75  This 
hyperbole of the givenness of being suggests or intimates an origin that makes 
                                                
70
 DDO 184-85; BB 8, 9; NDR 39; PR 112; EB 51; HG 203. 
BB 473: “That they are at all—this is the metaphysical splendor of simply being.  This is excessive and 
occurs in a reference to the origin of being as creation.” 
HT 30: “We are naturally struck into astonishment before this being there at all, and wonder about its 
source….  Indeed, there is something astonishing in the fact that we have such hyperbolic thoughts at 
all, thoughts such as concern creation and nothing.  They are clearly disproportionate to our finitude as 
things in nature.” 
HT 34: “In every finite being that becomes, which is all beings, there is intimated this prior coming to 
be which is not a finite becoming: ‘that it is at all’ is here in question, and that it has come to be this at 
all.” 
HG 3: “I would say that there is something hyperbolic about the being given to be of beings: not what 
they are, but that they are at all.  Hyperbolic in that the astonishment aroused by this givenness of being 
is not a determinate question seeking a determinate answer, but something exceeding determinate 
thinking.” 
71
 PO 33, 229, 236; BB 192; HT 25, 30; PR 112; BR 229; NDR 39; HG 3, 203. 
HG 3: “What makes possible the possibility of their being at all?  This is the metaphysical question: 
Why beings and not nothing?  The possibility of a transcendence as other to their transcendence is 
raised by such a question.  This is a major source of perplexity about God as the origin of being.” 
72
 HT 28, 34; EB 192-93; HG 131. 
GEW 26: “The ontological perplexity concerning primal givenness concerns our appreciation of 
finitude not first as becoming, but as coming to be: not becoming this or that, but its coming to be at all.  
This is extremely difficult to approach, for it lies at the boundary of determinate knowing” 
HT 34: “Coming to be is not identical with becoming.  For in becoming, one becomes a determinate 
something…. Coming to be, by contrast, is prior to becoming this or that; for one must be, and have 
come to be, before one can become such and such….  In every finite being that becomes, which is all 
beings, there is intimated this prior coming to be which is not a finite becoming: ‘that it is at all’ is here 
in question, and that it has come to be this at all.” 
73
 HT 39: “The notion of God as creator gives some articulation to this ontological dependency of finite 
being as a whole, even as it also tries to name something of the originative being of God, originative in 
a radical unique way.” 
74
 BB 293; PU 225; HT 39; GEW 28. 
BB 291: “Creation as universal impermanence is an immanent process of ontological transcendence 
that points beyond itself to its metaphysical ground in the origin itself, but the gap between the two, 
even in their community, is always kept open.” 
HT 38: “Our sense of the whole seems to point beyond the whole.  For the coming to be and the passing 
out of being are not events within the whole, but the originary issuing of the between as the finite 
whole.” 
75
 DDO 184: “The world, in the thereness of things, presents itself as something originated.  As 
originated, it is not identical with its origin, even if it does image it.” 
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possible (possibilizes) the possibility and actuality of being at all.76  The coming to be 
of being—that it is at all—suggests the metaphysical hyperboles of creation77 and of 
an absolute original that gives the given.78 
The plural community of being 
The community of being, not only in its sheer givenness, but in its plurality is 
another hyperbole of being that intimates a particular kind of ground and origin.  The 
community of being is experienced as a plenitude,79 as a genuine plurality80 in which 
there is true, irreducible otherness and singularity in interrelation and 
intermediation.81  Such a community as plural plenitude of finite being suggests a 
                                                
76
 DDO 152; PO 138; BB 207, 231, 291; HT 36; HG 3; AOO 268. 
HG 3: “What makes possible the possibility of their being at all?  This is the metaphysical question: 
Why beings and not nothing?  The possibility of a transcendence as other to their transcendence is 
raised by such a question.  This is a major source of perplexity about God as the origin of being….  I 
would say that there is something hyperbolic about the being given to be of beings: not what they are, 
but that they are at all.  Hyperbolic in that the astonishment aroused by this givenness of being is not a 
determinate question seeking a determinate answer, but something exceeding determinate thinking.  An 
approach to God via this hyperbole of being suggests a source not reducible to being in the sense of the 
whole of finite being.” 
HG 203: “One might argue that the finitude of creation, in its being given to be at all, points…to the 
reserved difference of divine infinitude as exceeding the terms of holistic immanence.” 
77
 HT 23-25. 
HT 23: Creation is “a metaphysical hyperbole, the thought of something hyperbolic, and in excess of 
finite, univocal determination.” 
HT 34: “Coming to be is hyperbolic happening.  What is suggested is an overdetermined source of 
origination out of which coming to be unfolds.  To speak of ‘creator,’ I suggest, is a way of putting us 
in mind of this other source.” 
78
 DDO 181, 188; HT 39-40. 
DDO 184: “The question is what gives the given, what the giver might be like in terms of what appears 
as and in the given.” 
 In resonance with this understanding of the givenness of being as hyperbolic, Milbank sees 
faith as possible because (against Heidegger) the givenness of being can be read “as the trace of a real 
donation”—thus with wonder and gratitude.  See Milbank, “Can a Gift Be Given?” p. 152. 
79
 BB 264, 514. 
80
 PU 238. 
BB 338: “Only with the agapeic origin as ground of possibility do we try to make sense of the other as 
other, and hence genuine plurality, and not just self-pluralization.” → ground of plurality 
PU 212: “Without this overfull, freely originating ground there would be no community of plurality.  
As originated from agapeic excess, the community of plurality does not collapse into the ground as into 
an absorbing god.” 
DDO 180: “Ground of plurality in the ultimate origin of real difference, a ground that supports and 
preserves plurality.” 
81
 BB 330; HT 39-40. 
BB 263: “This metaxological community is not the ultimate, but rather is grounded in the ultimate 
origin that makes relations of true otherness possible in the middle, communities that absolve and 
release their members to their own freedom and relativity to others.  In this real plurality there is both a 
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particular kind of “giving” that originates such a “given.”82  In Desmond’s terms, such 
an origin would be an agapeic origin—an origin that gives finite otherness to be, lets 
otherness be other and sustains it in its otherness.83 
The intelligibility of the world 
Another external hyperbole of being is that of the intelligibility of the world.  
The external world is experienced as orderly, as ordered, as exhibiting an integrity 
and a harmony that makes it intelligible.84  This intelligibility of the world, as 
structured and orderly, exhibits design as a sign that suggests an origin that is the 
ground of our epistemological trust.85  This epistemological grounding is in 
astonishment and perplexity before the manifest  order of the world, not a univocal 
determinate grounding that (onto-theologically) functions to stabilize the world for 
our instrumental manipulation—for we are not equal to the enigmatic ground 
(intelligibility exceeding our determinate understanding bespeaking an origin also 
                                                                                                                                        
community that allows a release of singularity, and a releasing of singularity into the promise of 
solidarity.” 
BB 338: “Only with the agapeic origin as ground of possibility do we try to make sense of the other as 
other, and hence genuine plurality, and not just self-pluralization.” 
PU 238: “The plurality of finite entities comprise a metaxological community of being.  The ground of 
that community as agapeic gives the other its irreducible otherness, but the metaxological interplay of 
self and other is ultimately grounded in the agapeic origin.” 
82
 PO 8, 39, 113; BB 511; EB 195. 
83
 PU 137, 220, 238. 
PU 238: “The ground of that community as agapeic gives the other its irreducible otherness, but the 
metaxological interplay of self and other is ultimately grounded in the agapeic origin.” 
BB 263: The agapeic origin “is the ground that sustains the metaxological community of the self and 
other, as being given in finitude.  This metaxological community is not the ultimate, but rather is 
grounded in the ultimate origin that makes relations of true otherness possible in the middle, 
communities that absolve and release their members to their own freedom and relativity to others.  In 
this real plurality there is both a community that allows a release of singularity, and a releasing of 
singularity into the promise of solidarity.” 
84
 BB 339, 510; PU 227. 
85
 BB 359, 514; PU 225 
PO 228-29: “There is manifest a community of mind and its essential other, being.  The ground of this 
community of logos and being is the metaxological community of being.”   
BB 345: “Creation intimates an origin prior to the drawing of the line that makes it possible for us to 
think of the emergence of intelligibility” 
BB 356: “The notion of the agapeic origin suggests a ground of founding trust….  The agapeic origin 
incites thought to conceive the basis of ontological and epistemological trust in intelligibility as going 
all the way down and up in being.”  
PU 246: “Determinate reason cannot be completely self-mediating but points beyond itself to a ground 
of reason that is not determinate.  This ground is what I am calling the agapeic origin.” 
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thus excessive, if not beyond our intelligible grasping).86  Intelligibility itself begs an 
explanation—whence intelligibility?  The question hyperbolically suggests the idea of 
a trustworthy and ordering origin of the world.87 
The goodness of being 
The final hyperbole of external being is that of the goodness of being.  We 
experience the ethos of being as charged (if indeterminately) with value—as bearing 
an inherent or intrinsic worth.88  It is because of this more excessive preexisting 
goodness or worth in being that we can think goodness or value or worth at all.89  We 
encounter this overdeterminate and indeterminately-given goodness of being with 
astonishment and perplexity.90  Such astonishment is a general reverence before 
being—a recognition of being as being worthy in itself, beyond any instrumental 
valuation.91  This general reverence for being is a sign of a source—of a more primal 
giving and affirmation as good from an origin toward which a deeper (or higher) 
reverence is due.92  Desmond understands this source that is intimated in our 
                                                
86
 PU 170: “The ultimate might be other than the grounded, it may in a certain sense unground the 
grounded.  It may be an enigmatic abyss, relative to the mind in thrall to restricted categories of 
finitude.  It may unsettle all self-satisfied finitude.  But this would be an agapeic incommensurability, 
one that does not induce the slumber of mind, but energizes it into renewed restlessness.” 
87
 HT 28-29: “What grounds determinate intelligibility?  The answer cannot be another determinate 
intelligibility; for that too would be in question.  If there is such a ground of determination, it must be a 
determining in excess of determinate intelligibiles.  I suggest we link creation to such an 
overdeterminate grounding.  If, then, we call creation a hyperintelligible, this would be to say that it 
concerns the beyond of intelligibility that sources the possible intelligibility of the determinately 
intelligible.” 
88
 PU 5, 225, 228; EB 23, 75-76, 177, 219-20; AOO 292. 
BB 277: “In the elemental the trace of the agapeic origin is revealed in matter as good for itself.  
Sensuous being is charged with value.  Its very being there is an ontological good.” 
BB 510: “The harmony of the community of nature points to the integrity of creation, which manifests 
an inherent worth that is to be respected.”  
BB 513: “I want to say that the prior ‘It is good’ means a different understanding of aesthetic value.  
Aesthetic value means the worth of the thereness, as given in its sensuous manifestness.  In this 
ontological meaning, aesthetic value is the show of the worth of being.” 
89
 PU 228; GEW 23, 25; En 130; EB 17. 
90
 BB 36; BDD 735; GEW 26. 
91
 BR 215, 225-26, 229; EB 40. 
EB 195: “Reverence: it is worthy in itself.” 
BR 226: “Reverence is a happening in which the worth and the being-there of the other are conjoined.” 
92
 BR 222-26. 
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encounter of the goodness of being in terms of an agapeic origin that, in creating the 
world as good in itself, is the ground of the unity of being and goodness.93  The 
agapeic origin is the ground of being and goodness as the one that gives forth being to 
be as good in itself.94  With this final hyperbole of external being—regarding 
goodness and the ground of the good—we are already crossing a threshold into the 
hyperboles of internal being that are the ways to God from human being. 
§4. Ways to God from Interior Transcendence  
In this section, we will examine the hyperboles of inner being.  The 
phenomena here under consideration are those that cluster around Desmond’s second 
transcendence as the transcendence of the self’s inward reserve of otherness95 and as 
self-transcendence or the self’s active transcending as a vector of transcendence—as 
                                                                                                                                        
BR 221: “Reverence, properly understood, can give signs about the source…. These signs suggest that 
this source cannot be contained within the circle of thought that thinks itself; for again the release to a 
superior otherness of reverence is a granting that is not self-produced by us; it is a happening, in which 
we are as much gifted, as we are carried by a transcending beyond ourselves.  Reverence for the 
superior other is always a being given of release from the other towards which we are released.” 
BR 227: “It is in the hyperbolic dimensions of disproportion that finesse is needed to read our place in 
being for signs of the ultimate excess, the unsurpassable beyond, beyond which nothing can be 
thought—God.  Reverence already places us in this hyperbolic dimension of being: it is not the abject 
degrading that reduces us to the ‘below.’  It has everything to do with elevation and the dimension of 
height.  When we revere truly we are carried by our love of the superior to a higher level…. reverence 
is a release, a being freed to the superior” 
BR 229: “The wonder that is closer to reverence is inseparable from the good of being, and not only its 
intelligible order.  This reverence is closer to the deeming of the goodness of being, which puts us in 
mind of God in Genesis, who consents to creation: It is good, it is very good.” 
93
 BB 208; PU 226, 230; EB 200. 
BB 511: “But who prizes the creation for itself?  It is not the human being.  The answer already 
suggested is the agapeic origin.  And this view does not dispel metaphysical astonishment.  It deepens 
it.”  
PU 225: “How can we speak of such value as intrinsic to being?  The language of ‘creation’ points in a 
direction which cannot stop short of metaphysics, indeed a certain theology.  Creation is good because 
to be is to be a value; to be a value is to be so because one is valued; but who is the one that values the 
creation?  The most radical answer is that the origin does.” 
PU 227: “The value of being, and indirectly the value of the human being, has to be thought in relation 
to an other origin of value.” 
EB 493: “What gives the goodness of being? What originates it? It is not self-grounding by the 
between itself. For the between as double is not absolutely self-originating. It too is involved in an 
intermediation with what is other to it. This is the source beyond it. This other is the origin. The ground 
of the goodness of the between is the origin that gives the between. This original ground must itself be 
good to give the goodness of the between.” 
94
 EB 17, 20, 201. 
95
 BB 201. 
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the restless power of human self-surpassing.96  Generally, these hyperboles consist of 
the encounter with internal transcendence as suggesting or intimating a transcendent 
ground—a transcendent other that is at the origin and telos of the self’s idiotic 
transcendence and of human self-transcending.  The inward, intentional infinitude and 
actual finitude of the self suggests a more radical sense of the infinite.97 
The infinite worth of the idiotic self 
The first hyperbole of interior transcendence is that of the idiocy of the self.  
With the idiot self there is an infinite value revealed in the ontological roots of the 
human being.98  We experience as a givenness the phenomenon of the intrinsic, 
infinite value of the person—both within ourselves and in relation to other singular 
individuals.99  With this singular infinite worth there is no finite measure—there must 
be another infinitude, an infinite measure other than the human, to be on a par with it 
and to make sense of the infinite worth of the human.100  This suggests that there is a 
relativity to the ultimate that grounds the worth of the singular self—as singular and 
free, as an original self.101  There is then, in the intimacy of the idiotic self—in its 
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 BB 5, 7, 231, 407; HG 3, 203; AOO 268. 
97
 BB 207; HG 190. 
98
 PO 143. 
EB 200: “The idiot self concretizes the infinite value in the ontological roots of human being as given 
to itself by the origin.” 
99
 BB 527; EB 138. 
100
 EB 138: “We sometimes speak of the infinite value of the person. But what could ground such an 
immeasurable value, an infinite worth? It exceeds every calculation, and there could be no way to 
objectify it. Were we to have a bank cheque of infinite value, there is no way we could cash it; for there 
is no bank with the resources to deal out what is needed to be on a par with it. What is this strange 
value? And what source could be on a par with making sense of its given reality? For it is a given 
reality; we do not produce or create this end; it is what we are, constitutive of our being.” 
EB 188: “How do we measure this worth? It seems there is no finite measure, since each is a singular 
infinite, and there is no common whole which would place each in its status relative to the others. The 
measure of the infinite must itself be infinite. The measure of the infinite value of self must itself be 
infinite, more than the infinite restlessness but actually infinite. This is not a human measure.” 
EB 190: “Without relation to a source of infinite worth other than the human, the infinite worth of the 
human hardly makes sense.” 
101
 PO 186; PU 241; EB 496. 
EB 201: “In the metaxological ethos, relativity to the origin as the ultimate other grounds the infinite 
value of self, but beyond the inadequacy of more usual dualistic categories. Original good is being 
agapeic, as giving the self its infinite value, out of which it becomes itself, with a freedom first given to 
the person, before directed and appropriated by that person.” 
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singular “thisness”—a being in relation to the ultimate—a sense of God as the 
(exceeding and transcendent) origin of the excessive worth of the singular self.102 
The following hyperboles of internal being concern desire.  Desire’s self-
transcending is an outreaching and an opening toward the metaxological community 
of excessive others103 and toward the actual infinitude of superior transcendence 
(T3).104  There are here two sides to desire: in its urgent outreaching toward and 
transcending and in its porous opening to the ultimate other. 
Self-transcending desire: the urgency of ultimacy, the conatus essendi 
The anomalous being of the human is that of infinite desire in finite being.105  
This desire is a self-surpassing toward transcendence in general and more radical 
“transcendence as other” in particular.106  Such a self-transcending has a hyperbolic 
vector of transcendence107—an excessive drive toward an excessive, “Unequal,” 
                                                
102
 HG 5, 188-89. 
HG 93: “It is there in the deepest intimacy of the soul (T2) that the more radical sense of transcendence 
(T3) and excess of the divine is communicated.”  
PU 100: “The intimacy of being, we might say, is the memory of God’s creative breath that sustains 
every being as a singular ‘this.’” 
PU 101: “Augustine said that God was intimior intimo meo.  This is the intimacy of being beyond the 
ego, and beyond the intimacy of self.  It is the idiocy of God.  Of God we are made mindful in an idiot 
wisdom.” 
En 138: “In the original idiot the seed of being in relation to God is there” 
HG 190: “There is the overdetermination, the ‘too much’, of the singularity in the recess of the 
intimacy of being.  The soul is too much even for itself, but its too muchness is not only its own.” 
103
 BB 230, 448; PU 205. 
BB 408: “The metaxological space between self and other is a middle between infinitudes.  As well as 
the self’s inward infinitude, there is recognized the infinitude of the other.  This other infinitude can be 
the infinite succession of external becoming, the universal impermanence; it can be the self-mediating 
infinitude of an other self; it can be the actual infinitude of the absolute origin.” 
104
 DDO 152; PO 111, 204; BB 155, 182, 207, 231, 378; PU 11, 250; EB 113-14, 214-18; HG 5, 7; 
AOO 268-69, 288, 291. 
105
 EB 215: “The anomalous being of the human is revealed in this freedom of infinite desire. Infinite 
desire emerges in finite being - excess of being rises up in the human being as selving: transcending as 
more, and towards the more. This "more" means enigmatic otherness in inwardness itself: the very 
interiority of being is the coming to show of infinity, the transcending power of the being, the 
transcendence towards infinity of the human being.” 
106
 BB 155; AOO 268. 
BB 208: “Are we not driven to think about the origin whence, and the ground wherefrom, and the 
matrix wherein, and the goal whither of the passage of self-transcendence.” 
BB 231: “Is this self-transcendence merely an anomalous overreaching into emptiness, or a genuine 
self-surpassing towards transcendence as other?” 
107
 PU 182. 
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other.108  Desmond describes this desire or eros as the “urgency of ultimacy”—as an 
absolute, infinite restlessness for the absolute or the ultimate109 that is not satisfied by 
any finite good.110  Such a restlessness is an infinite neediness, an infinite lack, not 
needing or lacking itself but another good beyond itself.111  Desire’s urgent, self-
transcending restlessness for an ultimate good/end112 suggests a more radical, 
disproportionate sense of the infinite, an “actual infinitude” in excess of its own 
infinity—an infinity which coexists with the desiring human’s actual finitude and is 
thus not what it seeks.113  Desire’s intentional infinitude as something that is absolute 
                                                                                                                                        
BB 378: “The vector of self-transcendence in the human being opens universally, at least in promise, to 
all the community of being in its otherness, as the self-mediation of this being deepens beyond measure 
towards infinity.  Put otherwise, infinite inwardness goes hand in hand with a certain promise of 
inexhaustible transcendence.” 
108
 EB 213. 
BB 540-41: “This hyperbole of the Unequal is echoed in the hyperbole of our self-transcending, the 
excess of our infinite desire that will not reach and end.  For no end will ever match its reaching, except 
an infinite end; but an infinite end is beyond all determinate ends; precisely as infinite, it is beyond all 
determination, and hence, in another sense, it is something that we finite middles can never completely 
reach.  We live in the light, or the shadow, of this never-to-be-dispelled enigma.” 
HG 93: “This immanent otherness to thought thinking itself is strikingly communicated in the measure 
that the infinitude of selving strikes home: its excess to finite determinability and its own complete 
self-determination.  This excess, or excess in immanence is hyperbolic, and perhaps also says 
something about the hyperbolic being of God beyond the whole.” 
109
 BHD 44; BB 155, 182; EB 74, 324. 
PU 204: “Our transcending being is unfolded as the quest of ultimacy.  The field of being and our 
being in that field, both point beyond themselves….  Within the self-transcending urgency of desire, 
we find an opening to the ultimate other.  We are the interior urgency of ultimacy, this other is ultimacy 
as the superior.” 
110
 PU 11; EB 209. 
EB 212: “A restlessness emerges that testifies to an infinite dimension to human desire. We cannot 
force all desire into the mould of finite appetite. To live in terms of that forcing is to deform ourselves. 
The infinite restlessness must be given allowance to be itself. Allowing it so, however, risks futility on 
one side, our coming into something more transcendent, on the other.” 
111
 EB 367; AOO 287. 
EB 214: “An abyss breaks open within, bringing terror as well as excitement. What is this abyss? An 
infinite neediness gapes in our desire…. The abyss is beyond finite determination; the neediness is 
beyond finite alleviation. It is not an infinite lacking that stands in need of itself. For what would its 
neediness do to itself except close a circle of insufficiency, even though it presents the face of absolute 
self-sufficiency to the world? It stands in need of what is other, the good that is other: not this good or 
that good, but the good as other. The infinite need of the good as other seeks another good that, to meet 
the lack, must itself be infinite. Short of this our desire is a futile passion. Transcending would be our 
absurd overreaching into the void. Without an infinite good that comes into relation with our 
transcending, desire is an emptiness that must end in emptiness, a void that calls and must call to void.” 
112
 DDO 197; BB 229. 
BB 208: “Are we not driven to think about the origin whence, and the ground wherefrom, and the 
matrix wherein, and the goal whither of the passage of self-transcendence.” 
113
 BB 207; PU 204; HG 3. 
PO 111: “The urgency of ultimacy reveals the self-transcending of human desire, as a restless 
intentional infinitude in search of actual infinitude in otherness itself”  
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about the self images and refers beyond itself to a more original source (as the 
absolute original of our original selfhood).114  It is thus that thought thinking itself 
becomes thought thinking its other, thinking the unthinkable, that which is 
transcendent to thought.115  This self-transcendence in the urgency of desire is also an 
opening to ultimacy, and this opening shows a being-with transcendence (a passio 
essendi) that is prior to and enabling the self-transcending urgency of ultimacy.116 
Self-transcending desire: porosity, the passio essendi 
Another hyperbole of internal being, another happening that brings to the 
thought of God, is a primal porosity—an intimate commun(icat)ion with God in the 
interior depths of the self.117  In human self-transcendence, there is a passio essendi—
a passive suffering and givenness, a gift from the other—that is prior to the conatus 
essendi—to our striving endeavor to be.118  There is a prior agape, a prior fullness, a 
                                                                                                                                        
EB 215: “Our doubleness comes back: finite and infinite; but infinite restlessness emerging in and 
beyond our finitude, and thrusting for something more; and infinite restlessness teaches us our finitude 
in a deeper sense, since we come to despair if we get no further than finite goods. The infinite 
restlessness throws us back upon finitude in a way that opens up the possibility of another sense of the 
infinite, an infinite not at all defined by the mediation of finitude and infinity in our self-mediation: an 
appearance of the infinite into the middle and in a relation of superiority relative to our infinite 
restlessness.” 
EB 365: “Our infinite restlessness can only come to peace in a good itself infinite; we cannot be that 
good, though we have an infinite promise; and this our restlessness hearkens back to our first selving. It 
is impossible to rest with one's own fulfillment.” 
114
 HG 3, 7; AOO 6, 269, 288. 
DDO 152:  Intentional infinitude and infinite succession “point to a more that is more absolutely 
original, relative to which they are to be seen as images, as ontologically derivative, despite the 
originative powers of being that they exhibit in their own right.” 
115
 BHD 255: “Does thought thinking itself open to the strange thought of the unthinkable, the thought 
of the unthinkable, the thought of the ultimate other?  Does singular mediation of dialectical mind open 
to the double mediation of metaxological mind, and philosophy become, not just thought thinking itself 
but thought trying to think the ultimate other that exceeds thought?” 
HG 93: “In self-knowing, knowing knows an excess in its own immanence: something other to thought 
thinking itself that enables thought to think at all but is not completely determinable through itself, nor 
a matter of thought’s own self-determination.  This immanent otherness to thought thinking itself is 
strikingly communicated in the measure that the infinitude of selving strikes home: its excess to finite 
determinability and its own complete self-determination.  This excess, or excess in immanence is 
hyperbolic, and perhaps also says something about the hyperbolic being of God beyond the whole.” 
116
 PU 11; EB 74. 
117
 AOO 292. 
HG 97: “In the primal porosity of the intimate communication between God and humans, there is no 
absolute self-elevation we determine; there is gift that elevates the self: a passio that lifts the soul, not a 
conatus in which it lifts itself.” 
118
 HG 97, 203-4; AOO 288. 
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prior being-in-relation to transcendence that is the ground of self-transcendence119—a 
divine festivity (poros) that is in the idiotic roots of self-transcending eros.120  Here, 
more basic to desire is an openness, an opening or patience to the other—here, to the 
ultimate other.121  In this passio/opening/patience self-transcendence is ruptured by, 
called forth by and released toward transcendence as other.122  A sense of divine 
transcendence is communicated in intimacy of the self.123  Desmond describes this 
intimate commun(icat)ion between God and the self in the self as a porosity—an 
                                                                                                                                        
HG 130: “‘Being given to be’ here is gift: not self-determination.  This ‘being given to be’ is a passio 
essendi before it is a conatus essendi.  And this is not necessary, either with reference to its originating 
source, or in itself: it is but in might not be.  To be as [sic?] this gift—this is contingency as created 
good.  It is the good of the ultimate ‘to be’ that is at the source of this givenness as gift.” 
AOO 291: “We are passio essendi before we are conatus essendi, passion of being before striving to 
be.  We are first created, before we create.  If so, what is the more ultimate source of originality?  The 
issue at bottom is the interpretation of originality and ultimacy in terms of human self-transcendence or 
in terms of transcendence as other, or the communication between these two.” 
119
 BB 208, 221; PU 250. 
BB 5: “The vector of transcendence, I want to suggest, is already a relation to transcendence, and in a 
sense not reducible to human self-transcendence.  Transcendence as other to us works along with 
human self-transcendence.” 
HG 203-4: “This passio essendi signifies our disproportion to ourselves, hence source of our infinite 
restlessness and inadequacy to complete self-possession.  But that disproportion and inadequacy points 
us beyond ourselves, above ourselves to an other infinitude.  Our infinite restlessness points above 
itself to this other infinitude whose difference cannot be abrogated speculatively.” 
120
 PU 135; EB 157. 
121
 BB 5; EB 217. 
BB 160: “In the abyss of its own inward otherness, it comes before itself and opens to a sense of the 
infinite that exceeds its own self-mediation.  Yet in the tension between its own excess as 
transcendence and the transcendence of the other, it is being perfected, made whole, never closed even 
in the radical innerness.” 
PU 11: “The pursuit of the ultimate itself testifies to a positive power of being in the self; it cannot be 
mere lack that drives desire beyond lack; it is the original power of being that constitutes the self as 
openness to what is other to itself; the dunamis of eros reveals a self-transcending openness to 
transcendence as other to desire itself.” 
PU 204: “Within the self-transcending urgency of desire, we find an opening to the ultimate other.  We 
are the interior urgency of ultimacy, this other is ultimacy as the superior.” 
122
 EB 113-14. 
EB 113: “There is a release of self-transcending toward transcendence itself, because something of the 
possibilizing power of transcendence itself has been released to human self-transcendence, making 
possible what is impossible in human terms alone.”  
EB 218: “Transcending desire discovers that, in being fully itself, it is more than itself and called forth 
by transcendence as more than itself, transcendence as superior to it.” 
123
 PU 83; EB 481; PR 108; HG 97. 
BB 414: “The name ‘God’ arises in the inward otherness of the deepest intimacy of our being.” 
PU 101: “Augustine said that God was intimior intimo meo.  This is the intimacy of being beyond the 
ego, and beyond the intimacy of self.  It is the idiocy of God.  Of God we are made mindful in an idiot 
wisdom.” 
HG 93: “The sense of the superior other appears in the immanences of interiority; but it is there in the 
deepest intimacy of the soul (T2) that the more radical sense of transcendence (T3) and excess of the 
divine is communicated.” 
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experience of being-with or dwelling with that suggests a transcendence beyond or 
superior to self-transcendence.124 
The call of the good: agapeic selving and community 
The final hyperbole of internal being is, broadly, that of the call of the good.  
The call of the good that is experienced in being ethical refers one to a ground of the 
good—a good beyond finite goods—a huperagathos that must be so disproportionate 
in order to be proportionate to the exorbitant good we experience in the between—in 
the experience of the goodness of being and in being called to agapeic being.125  The 
human good refers to more ultimate good as a condition for the possibility of ethical 
being.126  This experience of the call of the good is a being commissioned, being 
constrained by ultimacy in relation to the other.127  As such, the call of the good 
                                                
124
 EB 362-63; PR 108; AOO 290, 292. 
BB 447: “Man is not God, man is never identical with God; man and God may be together, but the 
space of transcendence is never obliterated, even in the most intimate communion of the two.  God is 
more inward to inwardness than inwardness is to itself; and yet this more intimate inwardness, this 
radical immanence of God, is God’s absolute transcendence, since it is immeasurably more 
unmeasured that the unmeasured infinitude of inwardness itself.” 
PU 83: “In the beginning and in the end, the intimacy of ‘being with’ inseperable bring being religious.  
The word religio itself communicates this in its naming of a bond of relatedness and a tie of trust.  The 
intimacy of sacred communion is in the depth of the idiocy of being.  Were this depth entirely 
desecrated, the distinctive personal ‘being with’ of human community would wither at the roots.” 
HG 97: “In the primal porosity of the intimate communication between God and humans, there is no 
absolute self-elevation we determine; there is gift that elevates the self: a passio that lifts the soul, not a 
conatus in which it lifts itself.” 
125
 EB 20, 93, 200, 493 
EB 502-3: “What grounds the good? It is not nature simply: there is goodness to nature, and yet this is 
disproportionate to the good as we come to know it, both in human life, and in our response to all 
being….Is the ground human freedom? It seems not. Our freedom is already in communion with the 
good, and is given to be as a good from a source other than itself…. If the human is a source of good, 
there is a more primordial source of good not human….Since humans are endowed with the promise of 
freedom, this other source must be adequate to the pluralism of singulars without determinate number 
that constitutes the many humans that have come and passed away, and will yet come and pass away in 
lines of succeeding generations that are beyond all human ken. The ground of the good must be 
proportionate to, indeed in excess of this. The prospect staggers the mind, beggars the imagination. We 
either say there is no ground; there is nothing; and the between is the ultimately void space where 
humans come and go, brief flares of inexplicable life that inexplicably bind themselves to a sense of the 
good, as if it were absolute, and yet the flare is snuffed out, and the singular proven to be a nothing in 
the cosmic void. Or we say, there is a ground but it must be proportionate to the sense of the good we 
experience in the between. If so, this ground must be disproportionate just to be proportionate…. A 
ground less than the living God does not ground the exorbitant good that comes to manifestation in the 
between, does not do justice to what is communicated to being ethical in the between, does not itself 
enable communication between itself and that very between.” 
126
 EB 170. 
127
 BB 414. 
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beyond the self is the ground of agapeic selving and community—a good beyond the 
self to which one is called even to the point of suffering, of service without 
reciprocity.128  Thus, when this call is answered and embodied in a community of 
agapeic service, such a community can be a witness to the agapeic source—likening 
itself to the generosity of the agapeic origin.129 
 
Section III: The Metaxological God 
§1. Counterfeit (univocal/equivocal and dialectical) doubles of God 
Thinking about God, for Desmond, entails a vigilance in discriminating false 
doubles of God130—a guarding against counterfeit doubles presenting a God that is 
not God.131  Such counterfeit doubles mimic the original they purport to image—
reflecting only a part of the original but so focusing on that part as to distort its 
imaging of the original.132  Avoiding such counterfeits also involves guarding against 
                                                                                                                                        
PO 159: “In being ethical we are constrained by ultimacy in relation to the other as a self of inviolable 
worth.  Aesthetic and religious respect for otherness are wider than this, not so directly focused on the 
other self as moral.” 
128
 EB 495: “What is the ground on which we are willing to enter in agapeic service with the earth and 
fellow humans? If this service, as a kind of piety of the between, lives in light of the good of the other, 
that goodness is not from us.” 
129
 EB 165, 502. 
EB 481: “This is the religious community of agapeic service that enacts the intermediation of the good 
beyond erotic sovereignty and in ethically likening itself to the generosity of the agapeic origin.”  
EB 486: “Religious community binds together (re-ligare - Augustine) the human and divine, and out of 
this transforms the bonds holding humans together. The sources of social power undergo a 
transformation which carries human power to the edge of its humanness. We understand power as 
given all along, a gift from motiveless generosity, motiveless goodness beyond the goodness of the gift, 
rousing in community the vision of humans together living an ethics of generosity in finite image of the 
ultimate generosity.” 
130
 HG 10. 
HG 7: “In truth, there is nothing but deep water when we come to God.  The question of God, for the 
philosopher as well as for the religious person, concerns our discrimination of the false doubles of God, 
that is, idols.  No one escapes the need for finesse to tell the difference here.” 
131
 HG 2. 
HG 9: “Much hangs on whether there is any original to which reference can be made to sustain the 
claim to be true, or false.  If there is no original, there is no counterfeit; there is not even an image, 
since any image, without an original, images nothing, hence is no image.” 
132
 HG 8: “The problem of the counterfeit double is that the image will mimic as well as show the 
original, and mimic by presenting itself as the original.” 
HG 9: “A counterfeit double is an image that is almost exactly like the original, but something has been 
altered that vitiates its claim to be true.” 
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the idolatry that “stalks thought.”133  Such idolatry often involves an instrumentalising 
of God—a reducing of the overdeterminate, transcendent metaxological God to a 
manipulable univocity.134  These counterfeit doubles, these idolatrous gods are dead 
gods amounting to little other than the human will to power that projects them135—a 
God that is not God.  In Desmond’s work, the counterfeit doubles of the 
metaxological reality of God are presentations of God as contracted into the univocal, 
equivocal, dialectical senses of being. 
The univocal God 
The univocalization of God entails an objectifying of God that is also an 
absolutization of univocity.136  The univocal God is the static, univocal eternity—
absolute in its immutability and stasis beyond time and becoming—that has been, as 
Desmond recognizes, pervasive in the western philosophical tradition.137  This 
univocal God is exemplified in the Ens Realissimum—a static eternity that is a self-
thinking thought fixed outside of time.138  The univocal God can be seen as an 
                                                
133
 PU 229. 
134
 BHD 102: “Idolatry is an ontological inversion that reduces the doubleness of the sacred middle to 
manipulable univocity.  It cannot the constitutive ambiguity of sacred presence/absence, but substitutes 
a domineering univocity for what it sees as an intolerable equivocity.” 
BHD 103: “Instead of the festivity of participation in the excess of the sacred, idolatry reveals the will 
to totalitarian ascendancy over the infinite.” 
135
 BHD 104: “The god of idolatry, whether the archaic fetishism of premodernity or the instrumentally 
enlightened fetishism of modernity, is a dead god…. Idolatry and sheer profanity thus come to the 
same thing.  Both are related outcomes of the same collusion between an anthropocentric will to power 
over being’s otherness and the will to univocalize being entirely.  Both are indifferently different 
avenues to the same dead god, a god dead equally in time and in eternity, and dead whether we call this 
god, god or man.” 
136
 BB 96; PU 110. 
137
 DDO 89-90; PU 171. 
DDO 90: “Absoluteness, in fact, tends to be identified with immutability….Time, because always 
becoming, amounts almost to a defective condition of being, an unreal succession of shadows, all 
without abiding substance.  The philosopher, however seeks an abiding reality beyond time, a realm 
not cursed by change.” 
138
 PU 202. 
PU 200: “God as the ultimate is the univocal Ens Realissimum outside the openness of the dynamic 
middle.  Here we find the idea of an eternal God who stands aloof from time, absolutely fixed, outside 
time, never in the midst of what is in process here and now…. The ultimate becomes the circular self-
mediating absolute.” 
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expression of onto-theology—as an idealized projection of objective mind139 that can 
become an instrumentalization of God, a mere univocal explanation.140  Such a use of 
God as a foundation—as a means of securing ourselves in the world, as a self-
projection of our power141—is, in the end, a use of God makes God useless.  It makes 
God redundant, dispensable when the order of the world and the self (to which God is 
utterly transcendent) is taken as self-sufficient.142  Thus, the univocal conception of 
God can be seen as generating an oppositional dualism—equivocal difference 
between God and the world, the between.143 
                                                
139
 PU 111: “The idealized projection of an absolutized objective mind.  ‘God’ is the absolute voyeur, 
though a strange voyeur, since he does not seem to take any pleasure in watching….  This is the ‘God’ 
of a kind of dead mind, a mind that really minds nothing.” 
PU 202: “the idea of God as self-thinking thought, an idea in some respects the metaphysical and 
theological apotheosis of univocal logic.  In God as self-thinking thought there would be no 
contradiction, only the absolutely pure self-consistency of mind at one with itself.” 
140
 PU 188: “I do not think we need to take God as an ‘explanation,’ if we mean some determinate 
univocal reason why things are thus and thus.  God as a merely univocal explanation would be a ruse 
by which reason uses the idea of God to shirk the deeper ontological perplexity about God.  Reason 
then uses God to allow itself to go back to sleep again.  If God is an ‘explanation,’ there is a sense in 
which this answer is darker than the question it answers, because the answer involves a certain 
extraordinary complex acknowledgement of the mystery of the ultimate.” 
141
 PR 109. 
EB 44: “We turn around the God who would be for us into a God that we make to be for us, according 
to terms we dictate, terms not true to the fullness of the ethos. This instrumentalization means that God 
is not for us as an agapeic origin, but as a means by which we again secure ourselves in the world. This 
is an idolatrous use of God. Nor is God to be used to "secure" ethics.” 
PU 171: “The dualistic opposition of time and eternity might seem to suggest a univocal eternity as a 
complete determinate answer for the equivocations of time.” 
142
 BB 96: “The absolutization of this mathematical univocity leads eventually to the dissolution of 
God as the universal geometrical maker: the clock-making divinity of the clock-work world is made 
redundant with respect to the working of the made clock.  The original dispenser of intelligibility is 
made dispensable with respect to determinate intelligibility, now taken as self-sufficient.” 
EB 42: “I think Descartes has use for God, but his use for God eventually made God useless. The use 
he had for God was as a necessary means to further his new project. He needed God to guarantee the 
ontological import of his cognitive powers.”  
EB 44: “God as useful becomes God as useless, once the circle of our self-generating power gets under 
way and works up enough steam. God as a means will be dispensed with for other means more useful. 
The self using God will now use itself, where before it used God.” 
143
 BB 58. 
PU 217: “The danger with any defense of eternity as time’s other, which wants to preserve the real 
pluralism of the ultimate and finitude, is that it becomes entrenched in a dualistic opposition.  This, in 
turn, tends to produce and equivocal difference between time and eternity without the possibility of 
mediation.  This equivocity itself springs from thinking eternity in univocal terms.  Eternity is the 
unsurpassable stasis of univocal being, beyond the equivocal mutability of time.” 
 On the manner in which the univocal generates the equivocal (and undoes itself) see 
Pickstock’s discussion of how Soctus’s univocity of being in fact produces an unsurmountable 
quantitative difference between humans and God (God is brought onto our plane, but a billion miles 
away from us).  See also Conor Cunningham’s understanding of the logic of nihilism in which 
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The equivocal God 
The univocal understanding of God begets a dualistic understanding of God 
and the world.  This dualism—this fixation of God as eternal outside of the world of 
becoming—leaves the world devalued and degraded, for if there is a dualistic 
opposition between God and the world, God cannot be the ground of goodness or 
value in the world—there can be no relation between the two.144  The God intended as 
a ground, in the end, cannot function as a ground—God’s relation to the world 
becomes equivocal.  What this theological dualism does ground is the fact/value 
dualism so pervasive in the modern ethos—such that what the dualistic conception of 
God has torn asunder (being and goodness), no human will be able to put together. 
This equivocal dualism between God as and the world of beings in the 
between is problematic in several ways.145  The conception of God as a static eternity 
is equivocal inasmuch as it is self-frustrating: one cannot seek to have any relation to 
it; it cannot act in relation in relation to the world; it cannot have originated the world; 
and it cannot be the ground of that to which it is antithetical.146  On one hand, God as 
a static eternity is a nugatory transcendence—unavailable for any relationship with 
the world or humans—for God is defined only negatively, in opposition to the 
world.147  On the other hand, the only kind of relationship is often left in a dualistic 
                                                                                                                                        
(alienating) dualism and (ultimately empty) monism are dialectically intertwined.  Pickstock, After 
Writing, 122-23; Conor Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism (London: Routledge, 2002), passim. 
144
 EB 20; GEW 16. 
EB 24: Dualistic opposition “opens an abyss between creation and the good as ground. But if this abyss 
can only be defined by dualistic opposition, no immanent mediation of the presence of inherent good is 
communicated to creation. It is in this last line that the dualistic opposition of creation and God (as 
ground of good) is reborn in the human being, as itself in opposition to equivocal creation.”  
EB 25: “Simply put: if the dualistic transcendent God is  ground of good, as opposing other it cannot 
be the ground of the good in creation.” 
145
 DDO 108. 
146
 DDO 96-99; EB 25. 
147
 DDO 99. 
BB 240:  Dualistic thinking of transcendence “has the paradoxical result of making the transcendent 
unavailable for divination in the world of given being.  The dualism sunders time and eternity, 
becoming and the origin.  But the whole matter concerns the interplay of these two, not their mutual 
repulsion.  This interplay requires a notion of each that goes beyond a reductive sense of their 
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conception of God—that of the eternal origin and ground of the world of becoming—
that ultimately serves to make God redundant.148  God as static eternity does not serve 
the intended use of securing the world, for such an entity, by definition, cannot 
originate or ground the entities in the world becoming to which it stands in 
opposition. 
The dialectical God 
Finally, this equivocal dualism can lead to a dialectical conception of God.  In 
the long run, the oppositional relation of dualistic opposition and equivocal difference 
in dualism tends to undercut itself and issue in a kind of dialectical monism.149  
Desmond describes this dialectical god as an absorbing god—a closed whole which 
subsumes all parts, all otherness within itself, within its oneness.150  Desmond (with 
Hegel in particular in mind) also describes such a dialectical god as an erotic origin, a 
god that originates the world with the goal of reconstituted self-relativity—in order to 
achieve absolute self-mediation.151  This idea of an erotic origin can come to 
expression in the conceiving of God in terms of human divine sovereignty—of a 
                                                                                                                                        
togetherness and an antagonistic sense of their difference.  One must say that eternity as origin is here 
asserted purely in the mode of negation: eternity is what time is not; the ‘not’ speaks the gulf of 
difference and transcendence….The negation produces, in fact, the nonrelatedness of origin and 
creation.  For if the eternal origin is purely in and for itself, then its power to originate what is other, 
and its relativity to what is so originated as other, is undermined.” 
148
 DDO 99; PU 170; EB 24. 
149
 DDO 204. 
BHD 80: “Dualism begets an essentially oppositional relation between two terms or realities, and in the 
long run an oppositional relation generally tends to undercut itself.” 
PU 14: “Dualistic opposition and equivocal difference subvert themselves, as does mere univocity, if 
we think the matter through.  The possible togetherness of the opposites, indeed the passing of one side 
into the other, is opened up by the dialectical sense.” 
150
 DDO 202-4; BHD 128. 
DDO 28: The absorbing god entails “a principle of completion which, purporting to be absolute 
wholeness, subsumes all parts within itself and in this engulfment absorbs their distinctiveness.” 
151
 BB 242, 245. 
BB 246: “The exitus of the origin into otherness will be seen rather as the middle term by which the 
initial origin, as indefinite, mediates its own indefiniteness, and hence mediates with itself.  In this, and 
finally, the origin will be seen to return to itself in properly articulated self-relation….The reditus of 
the production to the source is the self-mediation of the source, in which the source, in its reconstituted 
self-relativity, produces itself as absolute self-mediation, or as the self-mediation of the absolute.” 
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social will willing itself.152 
Desmond sees several problems in this dialectical conception of God.  The 
dialectical (absorbing, erotic) God subsumes and so dissolves the difference between 
God and humans.153  This again makes divine transcendence redundant, for there is 
ultimately no divine (ultimate) other to the world.154  In fact, with the dialectical God, 
all otherness is ultimately temporary, provisional—there is no true plurality or 
irreducible otherness.155  The originating and the originated entailed in the erotic 
origin is ultimately illusory—there is only self-origination.156  Finally, the dialectical 
God as an erotic origin is an empty, indeterminate origin.  Its originating is driven by 
a lack—needing to become determinate—and not proceeding out of a fullness.157 
§2. The Metaxological God 
The metaxological sense of being is a vision of being that entails genuine 
otherness, transcendence and difference in the midst of community.  Central to this 
vision is the way in which divine otherness or God relates to this metaxological 
community.  If being is an overdetermined excess made up of unrepeatable singulars 
that constitute genuine difference in the midst of community, does this have a bearing 
on how we are to talk about God?  Toward this end—that is, thinking God 
metaxologically—Desmond uses two principle terms to encapsulate his conception of 
God: those of superior transcendence and the agapeic origin. 
Superior Transcendence 
One of the key elements in understanding God metaxologically for Desmond 
is that of seeing God in terms of a superior transcendence.  In Desmond’s 
                                                
152
 EB 25, 474. 
153
 PO 135, 310. 
154
 HG 6. 
155
 BB 247: The erotic origin “denies plurality to be ultimately ‘outside’ the origin.  If there is plurality 
‘outside’ the origin, this ‘outside’ is only provisional….Finally, there is no irreducible otherness.” 
156
 DDO 202-4. 
157
 BB 247-48. 
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metaphysics, there is, in addition to the transcendence of the being of nature (T1) and 
the self-transcending transcendence of human being (T2), a third transcendence (T3) 
which is identified with the divine or God.158  Desmond, following in the tradition of 
the great monotheistic religions, is concerned with defending God’s genuine 
transcendence—over against the potent(ial) counterfeits—as a non-negotiable.159  
Desmond often refers to God as “transcendence itself” as the ultimate and 
foundational  transcendence.160  This divine transcendence is spoken of in terms of 
metaphorics of height and depth, of “the extremes of space.”161  God is the depth of 
the world as its immanent (though different), intimate (though reserved), originating 
and supporting ground.162  Of more significance in the present context, the 
metaxological God is described in terms of height as a “vertical transcendence”—an 
infinitude that is huper, “beyond” or “above” all finite being.163  This “vertical” divine 
transcendence is a superior transcendence (beyond interior and exterior 
transcendence)—an absolutely superior otherness164 that has an essentially 
asymmetrical relationship with humans and the world.165  There is a “divine 
disproportion.”166  Desmond describes this superiority of God in terms of the 
ultimate167—God is “the Unequal Itself.”168 
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 BB 231; HG 2-4, 7; AOO 269. 
159
 PU 189; HG 9. 
160
 BB 231; PU 230; EB 219; HG 3; AOO 269.  This transcendence is “foundational” in the sense of a 
prior possibilizing origin.  See below. 
161
 DDO 198-99. 
162
 DDO 199. 
163
 DDO 198; BB 201, 208; HG 7. 
DDO 198: “The sublimity of the originative source of what is, the infinitude sensuously suggested by 
the overwhelming majesty of being, which towers above us by its transcendence of finitude.” 
164
 BB 201, 256-57; HG 3, 59. 
165
 HG 49. 
HG 59: “If God is the superior (than which none greater can be conceived), the relation has an 
asymmetry built into it: the higher as above the lower relates to the lower differently from the way the 
lower relates to the higher.” 
166
 BHD 182. 
167
 BDD 763-64. 
168
 BHD 182; PU 235. 
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Desmond characterizes this superior and ultimate transcendence, not as an 
empty “beyond,” but as an otherness characterized as plenitude—as actual infinitude 
and as overdetermined, excessive reserve.  Third transcendence is other to the other 
others, the other transcendences—not reducible to a mere projection of the 
transcendence of the becoming of the world or of human self-determination.169  God, 
in the metaxological conception, is not a product of projection but of hyperbole.170  
That is to say that the metaxological God is not mere “hyperbole”—an exalted way of 
speaking about something else (say, ethics)—but an hyperbole in the sense of a 
thinking that finds itself beyond itself, on a trajectory toward an infinite other, an 
actual infinitude that cannot be fully subsumed under or comprehended in terms of 
finitude (or of lesser infinitudes like the infinite succession of external becoming (T1) 
or the intentional infinitude of original selfhood(T2)).171  Desmond describes the 
otherness of God as a “reserve”—as in something that is held back, that retreats, that 
withdraws.172  Superior transcendence, in itself and for itself, remains for us an 
enigma, a mystery that retreats beyond the veil that is the limits of human 
comprehension and mediation.173  The reserve of divine transcendence is a persisting 
otherness that remains beyond, exceeds the bounds of any holistic immanence.174  
Concomitant with this reserve is the necessity that our speech about God be indirect, 
metaphorical.175  Desmond describes this “reserve” not as an indefinite or 
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 BB 231-32; PU 230; HG 3-4, 200; AOO 6. 
170
 BB 256-57; HG 4. 
171
 DDO 151; BB 408, 448. 
172
 BB 495; HT 31. 
173
 BB 258. 
BHD 177: “the reserve of the sacred other, its mystery beyond all conceptual encapsulation.” 
HG 200: “Transcendence is shown and reserved, and so it appears on, and forbears beyond, the unfixed 
boundary between mediation and mystery.” 
174
 BB 495, 502; HG 187-88, 199ff. 
175
 BB 502: “This hiddenness of the ultimate truth again invokes our need of images and metaphors, 
themselves both true and untrue, double…. This reserve is significant because it unequivocally reverses 
our anticipation that we can reduce the truth of the origin to our truth, be on a par with it in our 
conceptual mediations.” 
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indeterminate or empty otherness,176 but as an overdetermined plenitude.177  Divine 
transcendence is a qualitatively inexhaustible excess178— it is the “reserve of the 
full.”179 
Desmond’s metaxological presentation of divine transcendence is not merely 
utter transcendence, transcendence without relation to the world and to humans—thus 
collapsing into an equivocal dualism between God and the world that ultimately 
erases first the “between” and then God altogether.  Metaxological divine 
transcendence is an original transcendence—not merely “beyond” but also “before.”  
It is “original” as first and as originating.  Its overdetermined 
excess/fullness/plenitude is the reserve that grounds its power of origination180 out of 
which transcendence originates genuine others.181  As such, it is the “possibilizing 
source” of the other transcendences—a transcendence (T3) that begets, that is the 
original source of transcendence (T1, T3).182  The overdeterminate and excessive 
transcendence of third transcendence enables its transcending in the sense of its 
transcending itself in creation (originating being as other to it) and in relating to 
creation. 
                                                
176
 HG 7. 
177
 BHD 181; BB 19, 182; PU 230; HT 34. 
BB 330: “God thought metaxologically would be…the overdetermined excessive plenitude of the free 
original power of being.”  
178
 BB 19, 182, 255. 
BB 208: The between’s “original ground is the transcendence that is too much, always more, always 
beyond, and always giving beyond itself as an agapeic origin.” 
179
 HG 198. 
180
 DDO 188; HG 3, 136. 
181
 HT 34: “What is suggested is an overdetermined source of origination out of which coming to be 
unfolds.  To speak of ‘creator,’ I suggest, is a way of putting us in mind of this other source.” 
182
 BB 231; EB 219; HG 3; AOO 269. 
BB 231: “T3: The transcendence of the origin—this would be transcendence itself, not as the exterior, 
not as the interior, but as the superior…. Since it is in excess of determinate being, as its original 
ground, it would be beyond the doublet of possibility and reality.  It would be what we might call the 
possibilizing source of both possibility and realization; but it could not be just a possibility, nor indeed 
a determinate realization of possibility.  It would have to be real possibilizing power, in a manner more 
original and other than possibility and realization.  It would have to be ‘possibilizing’ beyond 
determinate possibility, and ‘realizing’ beyond all determinate realization.” 
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One metaphysical metaphor that Desmond has used in his presentation of this 
“original” aspect of divine transcendence (and here we are already moving into the 
next section) is that of the absolute original.  Desmond describes the absolute original 
in terms of wholeness and infinitude.183  The absolute original is absolute in that it is 
whole—an ultimate unity in itself, neither lacking for fulfillment and needing nor 
dependent upon the world for self-completion (as with the erotic origin, the dialectical 
God).  It is its own (self-originating) whole.184  The absolute original is original in 
that it is infinite, for it is its infinity (its transcendent reserved otherness to the finite) 
that grounds its power of origination.185  Inasmuch as wholeness alone yields an 
univocal God186 and infinitude alone yields an equivocal God,187 both of these 
incomplete options leave one with a God that can have no possible relation to the 
world as other.  Within the absolute original, however, wholeness and infinitude open 
onto each other so as to yield an “open wholeness.”188  Its “absoluteness” is not its 
absence of relation but its giving in relation (or, rather, the manner of its giving, as we 
will see below).189  Its infinitude is not an escape from finitude but is the ground of its 
openness to finitude as a power to originate.190 
                                                
183
 DDO 188-96; HG 8. 
184
 DDO 189, 192. 
DDO 192: “As an originating whole, the absolute original is self-originating; as creative infinity, it is 
the ageless origin of the finite world.” 
DDO 196: “Between the absolute original and the originated world lies a discontinuity between  
the absolute original as its own whole and the world as freely created and other.” 
185
 DDO 192; BB 502. 
DDO 189: “The idea of infinity may help us make sense of its difference and its power of creation in 
relation to otherness.” 
DDO 195-96: “Even though we speak of the absolute original as whole and infinite, there is a sense in 
which the metaxological view means that a sense of the openness of infinity is more primordial than 
any form of wholeness.”  
186
 DDO 192: Such would “falsely fix the boundary of the whole.” 
187
 DDO 192: Such would “let being dissolve into a bad indefiniteness.”  
188
 BB 502.   
No other being possesses the characteristics of wholeness/absoluteness and 
infinitude/originality in this way.  However, all being (T1, T2) possesses lesser, dependent analogues 
of these characteristics. 
189
 BB 263: “The agapeic origin is absolute by absolving the finite creation it gives.  It absolved in 
freeing from itself.  It never functions as an absorbing god, but as a God who releases finite otherness 
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The Agapeic Origin 
“Origin” 
The central metaphor for God in Desmond’s work to date is that of agapeic 
origin.191  Before examining the agapeic dimension, I will first explicate the 
original/originating dimension.  God, for Desmond, is centrally the original 
transcendence192—the origin and creator of the world that is other, transcendent to the 
creation, to the becoming of the world.193  There is, in the metaxological conception 
of God, a clear (and distinctly monotheistic) alternative to the “holistic self-creation” 
of the dialectical God.194  The transcendence of the origin—of God as the unique, 
singular, “first” and “primal” giver195—entails a radical sense of origination, a 
“genuine” origination that is absolute and unconditional.196  Such creation is a 
hyperbolic thought, a metaphysical metaphor for something that exceeds determinate 
intelligibility.197  God’s origination is creation ex nihilo198—bringing being into being 
                                                                                                                                        
for itself, and as other to its own absolute otherness.  So it retains its own otherness, even while in 
relation to the otherness of the finite creation.” 
190
 DDO 189; BB 502. 
191
 EB 495: “We name that source in many ways, "God" being one of the names, and in many ways the 
best. I call that source the agapeic origin.” 
192
 HG 3. 
193
 BB 447; PU 187. 
AOO 6: “I am interested in the metaphysics of origination and the relations implied therein.  Most 
basically, there is the transcendence of the divine: an otherness to the origin that cannot be assimilated 
to any worldly process of becoming…. There is the difference of origin as (one might say) creating as 
creating and the world as creation created, and the difference of origin and world not only names the 
otherness of the former, but releases the latter into its own being for itself.” 
194
 HG 8. 
HT 32: “If there is one absolute source, our major choice seems to be between holistic self-creation and 
creation from nothing, that is, if we are intent on affirming the One as absolute source.” 
195
 BB 506; EB 202, 505; HG 136; AOO 6. 
196
 DDO 197; AOO 6, 288. 
HT 39: “The notion of God as creator…tries to name something of the originative being of God, 
originative in a radical unique way….  Creating is a name for that absolutely unique originating.” 
HG 129: “Creation as the act by which this God brings being to be points in this direction of 
unconditional origination.” 
197
 BB 269; HT 23; HG 131. 
HG 127: “Suppose creation…is what one might call a hyperbolic thought.  Suppose creation were more 
like a metaphysical hyperbole, the thought of something hyperbolic, and in excess of finite, univocal 
determination, or our self-determination.” 
AOO 5: “The idea of God as creator suggests, by contrast, a more recalcitrant notion of origination.  I 
call creation a hyperbolic thought, in that it exceeds all determinate intelligibilities.” 
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from nothing.  The nothing so names the “qualitative difference” between the radical 
origin and the radically originated and the “hyperbolic asymmetry” between the 
creator and the creation such that the latter’s being is utterly dependant on the 
former.199  Thus, as created from nothing, as coming to be in an unconditional 
origination that is bound by nothing, the created universe is “shadowed” by the 
nothingness (nihilo) from which (ex) it was made (creatio)—nothingness is 
ontologically constitutive of finite creation.200 
The agapeic origin is the possibilizing source of being-at-all.  The origin’s 
originating of finite being (creation of creation), as a radical creation out of nothing, 
has to do with the primal “coming to be” of finite being.201  God here is an answer to 
the question of why there is something rather than nothing, the question of being-at-
all, and as such is presented as the ground of “the fact itself”—the fact of given finite 
                                                                                                                                        
 On the hyperbolic thought of creation, see Milbank’s understanding of creation in terms of an 
ontology of the impossible—of the excessive thought of creation (that anything exists outside of God), 
of its outcome exceeding its occasion.  Milbank, Being Reconciled, pp. 62-63, 70. 
198
 DDO 242; BB 262. 
199
 BB 262: “This ‘not-being’ God also means that the meaning of nothingness is not that of 
determinate negation.  The nothingness between God and creation would not be a negation that would 
negate itself and so prove dialectically affirmative.” 
HG 136: “The nothing again names the qualitative difference of origin and creation, since this absolute 
absolving act is not creating itself in creating creation.  The nothing names the hyperbolic asymmetry 
of the God who creates.” 
See Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, passim. 
200
 BB 269; HG 129-30. 
BB 269: “Creation comes out of an origin, but that coming out suggests a doubleness: at once a giving 
of the plentitude of being, for creation is there; and yet a coming out shadowed by nothingness.  For 
creation would be nothing, were it not for the giving of the origin.”  
HG 130:  “The originating is by God from nothing, in that the finite being is brought to be, and it 
would be nothing at all were it not brought to be.  The nothing is constitutive of its finite being, not by 
constituting it, but by qualifying the mode of its ontological constitution, such that, by its very being, it 
is not God and cannot be God.  The ‘not’ is not only between it and God, but is in it as its nothingness 
without the most radically intimate ontological origination that always now sustains it in being.” 
 On this constitutive nothingness, see the vision presented by Milbank (et al) of a participatory 
ontology—in which the finite exists inasmuch as it participates in the infinite—of the natural/immanent 
suspended in the supernatural/transcendent—suspended over the nothing everything (save God) would 
be without God.  Milbank, Being Reconciled, p. 179. 
201
 HG 128-31. 
HT 24: “A creator as origin is not a first being whence other beings become: the ultimate source of 
coming to be cannot be a being in that derive determinate sense.” 
HG 128: “Creation has to do with the coming to be of finite being.  How think, how can we think, the 
ultimate origin of coming to be?  We cannot think it absolutely: as creations of the origin, we ourselves 
are derivative, hence not on a par with the origin.” 
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being at all.202  The agapeic origin is the “possibilizing source,” “the primal and 
ultimate power of creative possibilizing,” the ground of possibility that makes being 
able to be at all.203  It is the original power of being204 that is the sustaining (and thus 
relatively or rather relationally immanent) ground of being and thus human 
origination and creativity.205 
The origin of the world is not an empty transcendent beyond or an erotic lack 
or defect seeking fulfillment,206 but an always-already-full-ness.  The agapeic origin’s 
origination issues from a “superplus”207 surplus—a plenitude that is “an excess of 
completion and wholeness.”208  Creation does not come from a compulsion, from a 
desire to remedy a defect, but from an already present completion, a perfection or 
“pluperfection.”209  The origin’s wholeness beyond lack, far from being the basis of 
God’s merely (univocal/equivocal) insular, static self-enjoyment, is a surplus out of 
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 DDO 180-81, 188. 
HG 129: “Creation is not self-determination, but the giving to be of what is not the origin in itself: 
creation is the origination of the happening of being as the finite between; the happening of finitude is, 
but it might not be, were it not that is were given to be by the absolute original.” 
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 BB 231, 335, 338. 
BB 336: “We might think of this primordial power as the first possibilizing, in contrast to the second 
possibilizing, which refers to the determinate realization of a particular possibility.  This first power of 
the possible is a creative possibilizing.”  
HG 3: “Transcendence itself would be in excess of determinate beings, as their original ground; it 
would be in excess of our self-transcendence, as its most ultimate possibilizing source.  It would be 
beyond the ordinary doublet of possibility/reality, as their possibility source; it could not be just a 
possibility, nor indeed a determinate realization of possibility.” 
204
 BB 330, 335. 
205
 AOO 288. 
BB 506: “Finite transcending points beyond itself to the absolute origin as the primal giver of the 
promise of creation, and as the sustaining ground of its metaxological milieu.  As giver and sustaining, 
the origin is immanent in the metaxological milieu.” 
206
 DDO 193; HG 139. 
207
 HG 139. 
208
 DDO 193; BB 166, 255, 330. 
209
 DDO 193; BB 215. 
BB 255: The origin’s “‘perfection’ would be, so to say, a ‘pluperfection.’  It would be pluperfection, 
not just in the sense of always having been perfected, but pluperfect as now being, and as always being.  
Such pluperfection would not be reducible to any or all of the tenses of time.  It would be the beyond of 
time as always already more than any process of becoming.  it would be the surplus of eternity.” 
 See Milbank on God’s being more than God, on God’s fullness, on God’s goodness as prior to 
any evil as lack.  Milbank, Being Reconciled, p. xii, passim. 
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which it transcends itself in asymmetrical creation—creation of the other that is not 
merely a function of self-relation (as with the dialectical, erotic origin).210 
Finally, the agapeic origin is the source of the community of created being as 
plural, singular and good.  The agapeic origin is the originating and sustaining ground 
of the metaxological community of being.211  As such, it is the ground (the source and 
sustainer) of the genuine, nonreductive plurality of creation212—a true community of 
plurality made up of unique (idiotic) singularities in communicative relation to one 
another.213  This created plural yet singular community of being bears a certain 
doubleness—at once independent of and dependent upon God as agapeic origin.  It is 
independent of the agapeic origin in that the origin originates the other as truly other 
and thus as given to itself, freely released into being for itself.214  In giving being to 
the other, God gives the gift of free otherness to the other.  Finite being is 
ontologically dependent upon the origin in that there is yet an asymmetrical 
relationship between them as finite being has been radically originated from nothing 
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 BB 215, 255. 
BB 215: “There is an asymmetry in agapeic creation, but it is not the asymmetry of nonrelatedness.  
Agapeic asymmetry is asymmetry per se, in that the relation is for the other as other, and not for a 
return to self-relation.” 
211
 PO 113; BB 263. 
212
 DDO 180; BB 264; AOO 293. 
BB 338: “Only with the agapeic origin as ground of possibility do we try to make sense of the other as 
other, and hence genuine plurality, and not just self-pluralization.” 
PU 221: “Plurality itself becomes the generosity of creation, the irreducible gift of the agapeic 
origin….  The agapeic origin is thus the ground of a between that is genuinely nonreductive of 
plurality, even while it allows the intermediation between the one and the other.” 
213
 PU 48. 
BB 330: “The community of creation is the ontological bond of irreplaceable singulars, freed into their 
singularity by the excess of the agapeic origin.” 
HT 40: “Creation need not generate oppositional dualism, but a different sense of plurality, a 
communicative enabling of others as others.  That the world is not God need not mean the ‘not’ yields 
destructive negation.” 
214
 PU 187; AOO 6. 
BB 270: “The doubleness of creation then would seem to imply a tense coexistence of independence 
and dependence.  Independence, in that the outcome of origination is not the self-origination of the 
origin: the creation is other.” 
PU 218: “Agapeic creation would be the giving of being to the other that lets that other-being be as 
other.  Finite being is let be as irreducibly other.” 
EB 202: “The primal giving of the beginning, as creation, is the giving of freedom as the release of the 
finite being into its own being. Its own being is its being given to itself, and hence is gift.” 
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by the origin—its being as finite, as having come-to-be, points back its origination 
and to its origin.215  Finally, finite beings are given to be themselves as good in 
themselves—as bearing inherent value from but not for the sake of the origin (so as to 
make the value of finite being extrinsic, instrumental for divine self-fulfillment).216  
Here we are already moving into the “agape” of Desmond’s agapeic origin. 
“Agapeic” Origin 
The agapeic origin, as Desmond's preeminent metaphysical metaphor217 or 
“hyperbole”218 for God, designates the particular character of God’s/the origin’s 
creation/origination as agapeic.  As intimated above, agapeic origination is creation 
not from lack but from surplus or plenitude.219  Here, the agapeic origin is to be 
understood in contradistinction from the erotic origin which, because of some lacking 
in itself (some indeterminacy or lack of wholeness or completion), seeks to 
produce/fulfill/complete itself in the production of creation—a creation always 
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 BB 270: “The doubleness of creation then would seem to imply a tense coexistence of independence 
and dependence….  Dependence, in that the creation is not absolutely self-supporting; it hovers over 
the nothingness out of which it was called into being, and to which again many of its forms of being, 
perhaps all of it, will eventually return.” 
HT 39: “The notion of God as creator gives some articulation to this ontological dependency of finite 
being as a whole.” 
HG 164: “Between God and creation” there is “an asymmetry between eternal, unoriginated 
overfulness and finite, originated fullness.” 
216
 BB 186, 511-12; PU 196; EB 44; BR 229; HG 140 
BB 448: “The origin as agapeic gives creation its other-being for itself, for the goodness of creation, 
and not just mediately for itself as origin.  This goodness of being-other for itself reaches its richest 
ontological expression in creation with the human being as an end of infinite worth.” 
BB 512: “God’s astonishing saying on beholding creation: it is good, it is very good.  God does not 
say: I am good.  God does not say: It is good for this purpose or that purpose.  Nor again does God say: 
It is good for this being or that being—say, the human being—who indeed is offered dominion by God.  
There is a prior original yes: It is good.  It is not good for human beings; It is good, good for itself.  The 
giving of being is itself the gift of being as good.  There is no other reason for it, beyond the fact that 
creation as being is good.” 
PU 226: “It is as if the Creator, in giving being to the creation also gave it its value for itself.  Anything 
we humans do subsequently follows in the train of this first absolute amen to the goodness of being.  
To comprehend the meaning of this amen is almost impossible for us.” 
217
 BB 208, 231, 330; PU 137, 207, 230; HG 3. 
218
 HT 39-40. 
219
 PU 131: “An origin that from the beginning is articulated in terms of plenitude rather than lack 
simply, I call an agapeic origin.  Such origination does not proceed simply from lack to plenitude, but 
from plenitude to plenitude, or from plenitude/lack to plenitude.” 
HG 135: “Agapeic origination is a way of speaking of this: ‘bringing to be’ from surplus good rather 
than from initial lack.” 
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provisionally other.  The agapeic origin does not need to produce itself in its 
origination—it is “always already itself.”220  The agapeic origin is instead a plenitude 
that freely originates out of a fullness and not lack or internal necessity221—a 
“creative excess” out of which genuine creation happens.222 
Agapeic origination generously gives forth genuine otherness.223  It lets the 
other of creation be as other (as other to the agapeic origin)224—as an irreducible 
otherness225 “in itself”226 and for itself.227  The being of the world is “released”—
given as free from the origin—into being for itself.228  Thus, agapeic creation cannot 
be reduced to self-mediation.229 
In giving otherness, the “agapeic One” gives rise to more than one, to a 
genuine plurality.230  Desmond describes this in terms of an affirmative doubling or 
redoubling that is not the self-division of the One but a “real Secondness.”231  Thus, 
agapeic creation is the source of difference and plurality232—the excessive generosity 
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 HG 136: “The agapeic origin does not produce itself in giving creation.  It is always already itself—
superplus power of origination, overdeterminate, not in ‘need’ of finite determination.  Finitude is not 
its own determination, but is a released happening that if given its own promise of being creative.  This 
God gives the being of creation.” 
221
 BHD 79-80; BB 166; PU 188, 207, 231; HG 135. 
222
 BB 256, 261. 
 On this excess, see Milbank’s understanding of God’s goodness as genuine and non-
reactive—as an original plenitude.  Milbank, Being Reconciled, p. 149. 
223
 PU 196. 
HG 136: “God gives the being of creation.” 
224
 BHD 80; PU 216-18, 231; HG 70; AOO 288.  
PU 218: “Agapeic creation would be the giving of being to the other that lets that other-being be as 
other.  Finite being is let be as irreducibly other.” 
225
 BHD 90; BB 261-62. 
226
 BHD 80, 116. 
227
 BB 262, 448; EB 164. 
PU 100: “The ultimate origin is an agapeic source that gives the finite other its being, not for the origin 
itself, but for the finite being as other in its own right.  The finite entity is let be in its thisness as other 
and its own.” 
228
 BB 257, 263-64; EB 164, 200; HG 136; AOO 6. 
229
 BHD 80; PU 218-19; AOO 287. 
230
 HG 138. 
231
 BHD 120; BHD 80-81, 116; PU 220. 
HG 138: “The agapeic One redoubles its giving, but it does not redouble itself here to give itself to 
itself, but frees the finite into its being for itself.” 
232
 DDO 242; PU 238; EB 502; HG 70. 
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that gives rise to plurality.233  The plurality of the created world is composed of 
singulars—finite beings that are not only other to God but other to each other.234  The 
agapeic origin is thus the ground of singularity and genuine (“idiotic”) selfhood as 
well.  As creator of this plurality of singulars, the agapeic origin is the giver of “the 
between,” “the middle” as the “space of open being.”235  God is the original 
(originating) ground of metaxological commmunity of being.236 
In all of this, the “agapeic” character of the agapeic origin’s 
creation/origination is best described in terms of the “gift.”  God’s creation, the giving 
                                                                                                                                        
PU 221: “Plurality itself becomes the generosity of creation, the irreducible gift of the agapeic 
origin….  The agapeic origin is thus the ground of a between that is genuinely nonreductive of 
plurality, even whole it allows the intermediation between the one and the other.” 
AOO 293: “The agapeic origin sources the pluralism of creation.” 
233
 BHD 81. 
BHD 116: “Agapeic creating is not a fall into self-division of the erotic One, but the overfull generosity 
of the original power of being that grants plurality.” 
PU 221: “Plurality itself becomes the generosity of creation, the irreducible gift of the agapeic 
origin….  The agapeic origin is thus the ground of a between that is genuinely nonreductive of 
plurality, even whole it allows the intermediation between the one and the other.” 
234
 BB 184-87, 193, 263, 330, 496; PU 48, 100, 239-41; EB 164, 502; HG 136. 
BB 184: “The singularity of the thing in its unique that it is is its nonequivalence to anything other….  
There are no univocal or dialectical equivalences for the singular sense of the that it is that exceeds 
every equivalence.” 
BB 187: “Only God is on the level of this absolute enigma of singularity: singularity as being at all by 
virtue of its being valued for itself in its singularity….  The singular being is the great art of God.” 
BB 294-95: “The fecundity of creation gives rises [sic] to the newness of the ‘once’ that is infinitely 
pluralized in the marvel of singularity.  Such a pluralization is a repetition that never repeats itself, that 
never reiterates the univocal same.  Creation is an ever-fresh, never-diminished origination of 
singularity.” 
235
 BB 262. 
PU 234: The agapeic origin is the “giver of the middle in its being; giver of the middle as the space of 
open being, keeping its openness open, and keeping its openness for good; keeping it open for the good 
of the other, as it dissolves its own ‘dominance’ of the beings within the relativity.  This self-dissolving 
keeping is the agapeic renunciation of the origin’s ‘for-itself,’ in order to let the ‘for-itself’ of the finite 
creation come into its own.” 
236
 DDO 242; PO 8; PU 137, 234, 238. 
PO 113: The absolute original is “the unstated ground of the metaxological community of being.” 
BB 263: “This metaxological community is not the ultimate, but rather is grounded in the ultimate 
origin that makes relations of true otherness possible in the middle, communities that absolve and 
release their members to their own freedom and relativity to others.  In this real plurality there is both a 
community that allows a release of singularity, and a releasing of singularity into the promise of 
solidarity.” 
PU 212: “The agapeic ground as overfull grounds the community of finite others, in the sense of letting 
the community of others be as free.  Without this overfull, freely originating ground there would be no 
community of plurality.  As originated from agapeic excess, the community of plurality does not 
collapse into the ground as into an absorbing god.” 
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of being to be as other and for itself, is a gift237—a true gift of love.238  It is a giving 
that gives the given as a gift.  Agapeic creation is a gratuitous origination, a “non-
possessive dispensation,”239 an act of pure generosity exceeding itself for the sake of 
the other—not merely giving something to the other but giving the other to be as such, 
giving the other itself.240  There is a disproportion and asymmetry in the directionality 
of giving—God’s creative gift is something that could not ever be returned; it would 
ever exceed any attempt.241  It is difficult for us to think this excessive gift, to think 
agape—it is foreign, other, transcendent to our (all too erotic) conceptual 
economies.242 
Creation as agapeic gift implies a certain freedom in created being.  Beings 
and human beings in particular are given, are “released” into,243 an ontological 
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 PU 133, 144, 196, 216-17; EB 505. 
 See here Pickstock’s understanding of God as ecstatically preoccupied, as displaced in His 
concern for the other—in creation situating sites.  Pickstock, After Writing, p. 229. 
238
 PU 221: “The agapeic origin casts its bread but asks for nothing in return, constrains nothing, but 
lets it be, lets it be in its promise, loves it to be in its real otherness.  Its cast of being is from its joy, 
flows forth from its agape.” 
PU 231: “God does nothing for Himself; everything is done for the other.  There is a sense in which 
nothing is for God.  God lets be, since everything given by God is for that thing, given for that thing 
itself.” 
PU 232: “A giving without the expectancy of return is beyond our measuring.  This is pure gift.  God 
demands nothing.” 
239
 DDO 191. 
HT 41: “There is nothing jealous about agapeic origination.  The image of non-possessive dispensation 
is more appropriate…. Like creation as hyperbolic generosity, agapeic dispensation transcends 
possession.  Its richness is its own willing poverty, in willing to be nothing, that the genuine other may 
be endowed as something as good.” 
240
 BB 418, 501; HT 41; BR 224; EB 207. 
BHD 80: “Doubling, redoubling would be the creative generosity of the ultimate origin as an agapeic 
absolute.” 
PU 230: “This is the original meaning of the givenness of being: a generosity of being that gives for no 
reason beyond the goodness of giving being.” 
241
 BHD 182: “The directionality of its giving of being out of excess or plenitude is all important.”  
HG 137: “If the first absolute relation we call creation is asymmetrical in radically giving being to be, it 
exceeds the economy of the interplay of beings in the finite between.” 
242
 BB 410, 542; PU 195. 
PU 221: “The metaphysical difficulty of thinking the agapeic origin stems from our disability of being, 
our own being as the living lack of agapeic generosity.  We fail to understand an unconstrained gift.  
For  us its excess is too much, something for nothing, purposive in its purposelessness beyond all our 
finite purposes.”  
PU 231: “Since our minds and being are so insistently erotic, such absolute agapeic being seems hardly 
conceivable, much less believable.” 
243
 BB 257, 264; AT 250. 
BB 264: “The releasing of creation is with the view to the unconditional gift of free being.” 
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freedom, a freedom to be for themselves as other244—a freedom “given from,” a being 
given free(ly) from, the agapeic origin.245  In creating, the agapeic absolute “absolves” 
itself from its creation—makes it other and free.246  In so doing, the agapeic origin 
allows creation the freedom to absolve itself from the origin such that there is a 
permitting, a “letting be” of evil—a patience to evil247—that can be horrifying to 
us.248  Yet there is a conceptual consistency between the existence of the agapeic 
origin and the existence of evil, for a creation without the possibility of evil is not the 
result of agapeic creation, not truly other to the creator, not released, free.249 
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 BHD 182; BB 79; EB 138. 
BHD 80: “Agapeic creation gives an irreducible otherness to the being of finite creatures.  This is an 
ontological freedom that may always shatter the dialectical claims of a singular, totalized self-
mediation.” 
AT 250: “The promise of freedom is a being free, but before that it is being freed.  Being freed, we are 
free.  The agapeic generosity of the origin frees us into the freedom of being for ourselves.  But being 
free(d) is not originally the product of freedom but the gift of freedom…. This giving is not our own.  
This giving gives us to be ourselves.” 
245
 EB 365: “This is not ‘freedom from’ the other which wants to be outside of community, but 
freedom given from the agapeic origin, and hence a ‘from’ that founds elemental community.” 
246
 BB 263: “The agapeic origin absolves itself from its relativity to the creation in the sense that, while 
remaining in relation, it allows the creation for itself to absolve itself from the relation, even to the 
point of turning against the origin, such as we find in human evil.  The agapeic origin is absolute by 
absolving the finite creation it gives.  It absolves in freeing from itself.” 
247
 BB 263; AT 250; En 150. 
BR 224: “We are in the gift of the agapeic origin that lets us be to be free in our own difference, even 
to the oblivion of mindfulness of the generosity of the source: loss of reverence goes with this 
oblivion.” 
En 150: “There can be no necessary redemption of the evil, this enemy.  The letting be of evil, as free, 
is entailed by the agapeic love.” 
PU 249: “This patience is perplexing and horrifying.  That is, the freedom of finitude given by the 
agapeic origin lets be even demonic possibility.  The extremity of spiritual nihilism as a free possibility 
is allowed by the agapeic origin.” 
248
 PU 249. 
PU 221: “God’s generosity is horrifying to our rational prudence; relative to our prudence it seems 
purposeless; there is no determinate purpose to being…. Ultimate generosity is ‘purposeful’ beyond 
every finite purpose.” 
BB 545: “It is because God exists, that everything is permitted, even radical evil.  This does not mean 
that evil is loved.  Freedom is loved, freedom to be the good, freedom as the good.  Absolutely nothing 
is asked of us, yet absolutely everything is being asked of us.  The hyperbolic asking in the face of the 
terror of divine permission resides in the fact that freedom of spirit alone can restore the freedom of 
being.” 
249
 PO 348:  The “defense of perversity as a defense of freedom might be turned into a ‘proof’ of God 
from evil.” 
 One can see a difference of emphasis here between Desmond and Milbank.  Desmond focuses 
on how God lets the world be, is patient with evil, and thus lets be something like a “secular” realm—
of that which has quit God.  This though is not the deepest reality, for even evil is thoroughly 
dependent on the agapeic origin for is being.  Agapeic creation is such that one given to be can turn to 
evil. 
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As agapeic, the origin for Desmond, is good or rather, the Good.250  The 
agapeic good is not extrinsic to God; God is “agapeic transcendence,” the “free 
identity of being and the good.”251  And, as the agapeic origin gives forth being, so 
does it give goodness to being.252  God creates being as good for itself, as valuable in 
itself.  God creates the world and says “It is good.”253  As such, the agapeic origin is 
the original ground of goodness in being.254  And, as such, it can provide both a way 
out of the nihilism of instrumental mind and a ground for our trust in being and 
knowledge.255 
Agapeic Sustaining 
For Desmond, God as the agapeic origin is not merely the source of being, but 
has a continuing relationship with created being.  This relationship, with regard to 
humans at least, is an intermediation, a double mediation between creation and 
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 BB 71; EB 281. 
PU 135: “I call the Good the ‘agapeic origin.’” 
251
 PU 195. 
252
 BB 71; PU 195, 216-17; EB 495, 503. 
BB 71: “The good of creation for itself is given by this origin.  We greet it in the primal agapeic 
astonishment, which is an echo of the primal ‘It is good.’” 
BB 448: “The origin as agapeic gives creation its other-being for itself, for the goodness of creation, 
and not just mediately for itself as origin.  This goodness of being-other for itself reaches its richest 
ontological expression in creation with the human being as an end of infinite worth.” 
253
 BR 224. 
BB 512: “God’s astonishing saying on beholding creation: it is good, it is very good.  God does not 
say: I am good.  God does not say: It is good for this purpose or that purpose.  Nor again does God say: 
It is good for this being or that being—say, the human being—who indeed is offered dominion by God.  
There is a prior original yes: It is good.  It is not good for human beings; It is good, good for itself.  The 
giving of being is itself the gift of being as good.  There is no other reason for it, beyond the fact that 
creation as being is good.” 
PU 242: “God’s ‘It is very good’ names the superlative worth of being, the issue of perfection from the 
pluperfect.” 
254
 EB 200, 496. 
 This can be compared to Badiou’s understanding of being and value.  True value, for Badiou, 
arises in relation to an event, not being-as-being.  Desmond, however, sees value as indeed related to an 
event—but to the event of the origin of being, to creation.  Thus, for Desmond, being is valuable, and 
there are not two orders: one of the subjective, of the Event, and one of the objective, of Being.  See 
Badiou, Being and Event, passim; Hallward, Badiou, p. 78. 
255
 BB 71, 359. 
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Creator.256  Here we will briefly set out God’s side of this continuing relationship; we 
will look at the human side in the next section: on “religion.” 
God’s continuing relationship with being, with the creation, arises out of 
God’s continuing agapeic regard for being.  God loves being, loves it for itself, 
continues to see it as good in itself.257  God “lets the sun shine equally” on all—loving 
even the evil, the hateful, as yet possessing inherent goodness—with what is to us a 
“reckless,” “terrifying,” “monstrous” generosity.258  This loving God is “absolutely 
interested” in being—loving being all the way “down to” the unique and irreducible 
singularity of created being.259  God’s agape, as the creative source of difference, 
otherness and singularity in being, persists—God unconditionally loves the singular 
as something of infinite worth.260  Out of this abiding love, God calls and re-creates 
and sustains the metaxological community of being to be an agapeic community.  
Creation is given as good, yet is given with the promise (not the necessity) of freely 
entering into agapeic community with God and others.  We humans are called forth 
                                                
256
 PU 204. 
257
 EB 491.  
PO 285: “God simply loves being, but we do so on and off.” 
HG 140: “God’s seeing [being as good] is sabbatical.  God is looking with love on the creation as itself 
good, and good in itself, and for itself.” 
258
 BB 544. 
PU 241: “God lets the sun shine equally on the wicked and the righteous….  God does not hate the 
hateful; God loves the evil, the hateful, the enemy.  From our moralistic standpoint the idea of God as 
agapeic is monstrous.” 
PU 242: “God’s agape seems to be an insult to our justice, a reckless generosity exceeding the measure 
of our rational self-mediating morality.” 
259
 BB 452: “True interest suggests a limitless expanse of metaxological mindfulness.  In that regard, 
only God is truly interested in being, in community with being.  Only God loves all being down to the 
ontological intimacy of singularity.  We humans are not capable of that absolute pitch of interest, of 
being between.” 
260
 BB 193, 200, 259, 277, 542; PU 239; EB 188. 
BB 200: “The singular ‘I’ is loved as a singular absolute in a community before God, the absolute 
original.” 
BB 330: The agapeic origin is “reflected in the creation of unique singularity; the being of the thing is 
loved unrepeatably for itself, and hence has its being in this ontological generosity that is absolute—
unconditionally for the singular thing itself, in the ontological worth of being.” 
PU 84: “God who is not an absorbing Moloch, but an agapeic absolute who does not dissolve the 
differences of creatures, but loves them in the singularity of their singularity.” 
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into this community, called to realized the promise of agapeic community.261  We 
freely fail, however, to answer this call, to realize this promise.  
God’s love, however, persists.  God, in Desmond’s understanding, is less an 
erotic sovereign compelling obeisance than an agapeic servant262 who is 
compassionate, involved with our sufferings263—who suggests a com-passio essendi, 
vulnerable, open, patient, in communication with our weakness.264  This agapeic God 
acts with a “condescending” love, entering into the midst of the community of the 
beloved.265  Seeking to save us—to redeem defection from the good, to renew, to re-
create “in place of de-creation”266—God, for only God can do it, acts to bear the 
burden of evil.267  In the bearing of this burden, God offers yet another agapeic 
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 EB 218. 
BB 414: The agapeic self is “not quite a demand of the agapeic origin, for this origin makes no 
demands; not demand but promise, hospitality, welcome, and solicitude.” 
EB 195: “The origin is the ultimate giver of the gift of the good of being in the between. Self and 
others are recipients of the gift in the between, and both in community by their being and called to 
realize the promise of community.” 
EB 220: “The agape of being is first given to us, but we are called to an agapeic being which is the 
doing of living, in an ethics of gratitude to the origin, and of generosity to self and other.” 
262
 EB 476-77: What if the power of God is not to be imaged on this sovereignty, this imperial power to 
command without controversion? What if there is a power higher than such sovereignty? God as the 
agapeic servant who does not determine but frees? I take Jesus as suggesting this, in his life and death, 
in parables like the prodigal son. The tension of the higher good and sovereignty can lead to a struggle 
between the ‘prince of the world’ and God. The prince of the world is the erotic sovereign thinking 
itself the last absolute, and hence having to stand over against God in spiritual agon.” 
263
 PU 235-36; EB 371. 
EB 207: “But the divine, like the human, is not the good as self-sufficient perfection, but as generosity 
that exceeds itself… [This] is the God that enters into the midst of suffering and that comes to suffer 
with the despised others; that communicates the truth of the agapeic relation in the willingness to suffer 
with and for the other.” 
264
 HG 137; En 150. 
265
 BB 544; EB 207. 
266
 BB 531; En 150.  
HG 194: “Re-creation involves the absolving offer, opening again a new beginning.  And because of 
the rupture between the old and new creation, this ‘being re-made’ cannot be fully worked out in terms 
of self-creation, self-making.”  
267
 BB 531: “As we cannot give the primal goodness, so we cannot give this renewal of ontological 
goodness; only a God can save us.” 
PU 245: “Who can bear the unbearable burden of evil?  What power of good would not be crushed by 
evil?  Not a human power; no human being can bear it without being crushed.  Only a God.  The 
agapeic origin means: bearing the infinitely crushing burden of evil, and yet not being crushed.  How 
could we think this?  How dare we think this?” 
EB 115: “The crushing weight of evil is carried, and we cannot carry it. Who carries it, if not God? … 
We cannot completely answers extreme evil; the answer is other to us.  The answer is the goodness of 
the good, a power of living good that exceeds us.  If God does not somehow bear evil, the whole thing 
comes to nothing. Do we perish at the thought? (Why do you squirm?) If only God can redeem evil, 
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asymmetrical relation to human beings, that of forgiveness.268  Thus a continuity is 
joined between agapeic creation and agapeic re-creation.269  We cannot but be brought 
to think here of the incarnation, the suffering servant, the cross, resurrection, 
reconciliation. 
God also works to sustain agapeic community.  The agapeic service and 
community to which God calls us is not sustainable by our will alone but requires 
God’s gracious, forgiving, re-creating, sustaining power.270  Our agapeic service 
needs a willingness, a goodwill, a new will beyond self-will—it needs gracious 
help—a release to reverse the gravity its fall.271  Giving this help, God is our secret 
                                                                                                                                        
then God too must die. The good must embrace its own most extreme opposite, and recreate its 
perverted power.” This is the kenotic power of the good: as passing over, and  passing away, it is a 
passing into finitude. God is passage of that good.” 
268
 HG 64-65. 
269
 En 150. 
HG 194: “If there are continuities between creation and re-creation, it is the promise of the good of the 
‘to be’ in the first instance that finds its promise renewed.  This promise we do not first produce, 
though we do participate in its redemption or betrayal.” 
270
 EB 218-19: “Hence our laying of ourselves as open seems like a constant striving, or like a pathway 
through a wilderness that often vanishes, making us think we had been fooling ourselves, only then to 
reappear suddenly further along, and hearten us that our faith in the good, faith without certitude, is not 
without unexpected fruit. The life of agapeic service is impossible if we are alone, and without the 
sustaining power of the good as other. As I suggested before, the familiar word (and I think best word) 
for transcendence itself is God.” 
271
 DDO 174: “To gain goodwill, self-will would have to reverse its fall and leap upward; but this, 
ensnared as it is, it cannot do by itself.  It requires the ingression of something from above, rain to 
water its droughted roots.  We would never return home, be restored, unless we were called home, 
loved.” 
EB 218: “Acting on the call of agapeic service is not sustainable by our will alone. It is not enacted by 
autonomous will deliberately setting out to be beyond itself in service for the other. Transcending 
desire discovers that, in being fully itself, it is more than itself and called forth by transcendence as 
more than itself, transcendence as superior to it. The call is a sustaining that is prior to the hearing of 
the call. The hearing is sustained by the call that, in being sounded, opens up the middle of 
communication, even before the middle serves as the medium of its transmission and reception.” 
EB 363-64: “This release comes to one, it is given to one. One can await it, one can purify oneself in 
advance in hope. One can pray. One can struggle with one's demons, and the struggle is somehow the 
gift itself, as well as the preparation. One can will to enter the struggle, but the willing cannot make the 
gift be given. One can knock and knock on the door but the knock does not open the door, for the door 
is opened from the other side, and hence the opening comes to one, even though one has roused the 
night into noise that the gods themselves seem unable to ignore. The opening is a simple elemental gift 
that cannot be commanded. There is asked a willingness beyond will; a willingness that is a new will in 
us, but a will that cannot be described as self-willing, or any kind of self-determining willing; it is a 
willingness beyond self-determining.” 
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partner272 who provides needed help in sustaining agapeic community.273  Religious 
community exists partially as recognizing its dependence upon God for the fulfillment 
of agapeic community and appealing to God for help.274  Thus, with the sustaining 
power (grace) of the agapeic God, human community can become an agapeic 
community that is the finite image of, that hyperbolically points toward, God as 
agapeic origin and sustainer, creator and re-creator.275 
 
Section IV: Metaxological Religion 
§1. Religion 
In the context of Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics that sees the world as 
a community of being given by the agapeic origin, “to be” he says “is to be 
religious.”276  For Desmond, “religion” (against the common modern usage) is not a 
dimension, a discrete part, of life, but has to do with our dwelling in being as such—
our being (T2) in relation to the origin and sustainer (T3) of the community of created 
being (T1, T2).  The between, ethos of being, is a “secret commons” between creation 
and God.277  The self that has (re)awakened to second astonishment is a 
“metaxologically open self” that has become initiated into “being religious”—to a 
celebration, a reverence, a sense of the sacred, the inherently good, in the between that 
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 EB 75: “God is the most secret partner, the most anonymous helper, the most intimate prompter, the 
good that asks nothing for itself, for its nature as the good is simply to broadcast the good to the other, 
broadcast itself to the other as other, sustaining that otherness.” 
273
 EB 217-19, 486. 
274
 EB 494: “Religious community is itself the appeal to the good for that help to be good. We cannot 
do it on our own, as we cannot free ourselves from bewitchment on our own. To ask to be free from the 
idols is to ask for the spiritual strength of a divine service.” 
275
 EB 486: “We understand power as given all along, a gift from motiveless generosity, motiveless 
goodness beyond the goodness of the gift, rousing in community the vision of humans together living 
an ethics of generosity in finite image of the ultimate generosity.” 
 On God as agapeic sustainer, see Milbank’s discussion of creation’s participation in God.  
Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, pp. 429-31. 
276
 AOO 294: “Religion lived is our being in the porous happening of communication between ultimate 
transcendence (T3) and finite transcendences (T1, T2).  Religion reflected in its truth is (metaxological) 
philosophy which understands that to be is to be religious, namely, to have one’s being in the 
happening of the between by virtue of the ultimate giving of the agapeic origin.” 
277
 EB 506. 
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hyperbolically refers beyond the between to its agapeic origin.278  There is, in the 
singular intimacy of the religiously awakened self279 a “porosity”280 to, an intimate 
communion with, the divine.  This intimacy, this porosity is connected with our 
passio essendi—our “being given to be” that “signifies our disproportion to 
ourselves” by pointing us beyond ourselves to that which gave us to be.281  In the 
depths of the singular idiotic self, there is a radical intimacy,282 an “absolute” or 
religious community or “being-with” the ultimate.283  Being religious has to do with 
this intermediation, this ultimate relationship between ourselves and God.284  
In Desmond’s work, being religious comes to expression in two principal 
ways: gratitude and generosity.  Recognition of the gifts of the agapeic origin 
“solicits” in us the “hyperbolic life” of agapeic being.285  This agapeic religious being 
                                                
278
 BB 41-42. 
PO 158: “Being religious, as recollected in the inwardness of the metaxologically open self, may help 
midwife the reemergence of sacramental earth.  Out of that inwardness, it will issue its charge: renew 
reverence for being; recall a sense of the sacredness of life; reactivate a proper piety of being there.” 
279
 HG 188: “Being religious has to do with a community of humans with the divine, but also with a 
certain singularity that is reserved to, in the sense of being more intimate than, any merely general 
relation to God…. This is an ontological intimacy to singularity that is, in truth, fulfilled in 
participation in community, and most of all community with God, but that community and singularity 
cannot be described in the standard dialectical languages of a more total inclusivity.” 
280
 HG 10, 97. 
AOO 294: “Religion lived is our being in the porous happening of communication between ultimate 
transcendence (T3) and finite transcendences (T1, T2).” 
281
 BB 415. 
HG 130: “‘Being given to be’ here is gift: not self-determination.  This ‘being given to be’ is a passio 
essendi before it is a conatus essendi.  And this is not necessary, either with reference to its originating 
source, or in itself: it is but in might not be.  To be as this gift—this is contingency as created good.  It 
is the good of the ultimate ‘to be’ that is at the source of this givenness as gift.” 
HG 204: “This passio essendi signifies our disproportion to ourselves, hence source of our infinite 
restlessness and inadequacy to complete self-possession.  But that disproportion and inadequacy points 
us beyond ourselves, above ourselves to an other infinitude.  Our infinite restlessness points above 
itself to this other infinitude whose difference cannot be abrogated speculatively.” 
282
 HG 188-89. 
283
 EB 500; HG 188. 
PU 83: “In the beginning and in the end, the intimacy of ‘being with’ is inseparable from being 
religious.  The word religio itself communicates this in its naming of a bond of relatedness and a tie of 
trust.  The intimacy of sacred communion is in the depth of the idiocy of being.  Were this depth 
entirely desecrated, the distinctive personal ‘being with’ of human community would wither at the 
roots.” 
284
 EB 486; HG 9, 188. 
285
 PU 232. 
HG 140: “We humans are to live the ‘It is good’ also, relative to the finite, and also a hyperbolic life 
beyond holistic immanence, relative to God.” 
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is “sabbatical”—seeing and celebrating the goodness of creation as the gift of the 
Creator.286  This gratitude for the gratuitous and generous creation of the agapeic 
origin also inspires “a different ‘return’” of the gift of creation in the co-creation of 
agapeic community with God and with others.287  Being religious is being in 
community with God—responding to  God’s agapeic gift with gratitude (recognizing, 
celebrating and thanking for the gift) and generosity (becoming agapeic ourselves in 
giving to others in community). 
§2. Gratitude  
Religion as our being in relation to God, as our response to the gift of God, 
entails our recognition and appreciation of God’s gift and our becoming gift-giving 
ourselves.  Religion involves the agapeic mind emergent in second astonishment—
agapeic mind as gratitude—a thanking, a seeing the given as given, as a gift—as an 
agapeic giving to us.288  It is closely connected with becoming an agapeic self—a self 
attending to otherness in two areas.  First, the agapeic self attends in gratitude to the 
excess/otherness in which the self (and the world around it) is given to be by another, 
by a superior divine otherness.289  Second, the agapeic self attends in generosity to the 
human other in its willingness to be for the other, to give to the other.290  In this 
                                                
286
 HG 140: “God’s seeing [being as good] is sabbatical.  God is looking with love on the creation as 
itself good, and good in itself, and for itself….  We are called to being as sabbatical, and to be as 
sabbactical.” 
287
 PU 230: “The metaphor of the agapeic absolute would run: origin as excess plenitude, 
transcendence itself as other; creation as finite concreteness, but not for the return of the origin to itself; 
the ‘exitus,’ if we call it such at all, is for what is given as other in the middle; and while there may a 
different ‘return’ in the metaxological middle, this is not dictated by the logic of a circular erotic self-
becoming; it is gratuitously emergent in the created order as itself trying to be agapeic being; ‘return’ is 
the cocreation of community by the finite other.” 
288
 BB 193-94, 202, 506. 
289
 BB 406, 410. 
290
 BB 414; PU 70. 
BB 408: The agapeic self is “doubly stressed in the between: between the excess of its own original 
power, and the willingness to suspend that power in the interests of the other….a middle between 
infinitudes” 
PU 144: “The overdetermined power to be of selfhood is agapeic in these two ways: as given to itself to 
be out of an origin other to itself; and as the power to give itself over to being beyond itself in its own 
self-transcendence.” 
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section, we will attend to the first attending.  Further, in Desmond’s understanding of 
religion—under what I am here describing with the more general category of 
“gratitude”—there seems to be a progressive (from indirect to direct) unfolding: from 
a breakdown of erotic mindfulness and a breakthrough to an awareness of genuine 
otherness, to a recognition of the goodness of being, to an affirming celebration of the 
goodness of being, to thanksgiving to God for the good gift of being, to worshipping 
and praising God as the Good, the origin, the superior. 
Religion, for Desmond, as operating within second astonishment involves a 
breakdown and a breakthrough—one might call it: a conversion—within the self.  
This breakthrough is described as a gift, as a visitation for which we can prepare, as 
something that cannot be willed.291  This religious breakthrough comes beyond the 
breakdown or failure of self-will292—its precondition is a reversal of self (such as in 
Desmond’s second perplexity).293  It comes to us as an expression of our passio 
essendi—our primal receptivity and intimacy with other.  It is an exalting blessedness 
(in that one has been blessed, given a good gift, raised up)294 that sustains and is 
sustained by a radical humility before the gift-giving Other (for the good I have, I am, 
I have received).295  The religious opening in the self is a breakthrough to appreciating 
(and so affirming, celebrating and trusting in) the gift of the origin—in short, to 
gratitude.296  Opening beyond oneself, one may see the goodness of being in itself. 
                                                
291
 BDD 760; CWSC 51. 
292
 PO 254, 257-58, 296; EB 181. 
293
 PO 211; BB 500-3. 
294
 EB 126. 
EB 110: “Being blessed is an exalting gift; one is lifted up to the superior; but the exalting is often, 
perhaps always, matched by suffering. It is cursed by sorrow. The gift is too much, and to be up to it, 
we have to undergo breakdown, to let its breakthrough or inbreaking come. No breaking in, without 
breaking down.” 
295
 BB 221-22; CWSC 51. 
BB 222: “This is the movement of agapeic mindfulness into radical humility before transcendence 
itself.  It is also a movement of exaltation into the superior.” 
296
 BB 543; PU 252; CWSC 51. 
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Being religious progresses in recognizing the goodness of creation beyond 
one's merely instrumental good.  We meet being not as something neutral, neutered, 
but with reawakened (second) astonishment297—with a sense of reverence before the 
inherent or ontological worthiness or goodness of being “beyond 
instrumentalizing.”298  This reverence is connected with a reborn agapeic mind—a 
transformation of mindfulness, of vision299 in which being is transfigured as saturated 
with goodness—the world comes to be seen as the “sacramental earth.”300  In this one 
comes to see creation more as God sees it, through sabbatical lenses as it were—one 
says, imitatio dei, “It is good.”301 
Beyond simply recognizing the goodness of being, the reverence of being 
opens onto a religious festivity—a “festive being” that celebrates of goodness of 
being.302  This celebration of being is agapeic, the agapeic festivity of agapeic 
mind303—whose idiot wisdom affirms, consents to the goodness of being.304  This 
affirmation/consent entails a kind of trust in being,305 a metaphysical faith “in a 
goodness not of one’s making.”306  Being religious in celebration laughs307 before and 
                                                
297
 PO 158; BR 225-26. 
298
 BR 215. 
BR 225: “Reverence grants the worthiness of being.”  
BR 226: “Reverence is a happening in which the worth and the being-there of the other are conjoined.”  
EB 195: “Reverence: it is worthy in itself.” 
299
 PU 162, 221; EB 492. 
PU 163: “The question of the transfigurative power of agapeic mind concerns the transformation of self 
such that it can love the hateful.” 
300
 PO 158: “Being religious, as recollected in the inwardness of the metaxologically open self, may 
help midwife the reemergence of sacramental earth.  Out of that inwardness, it will issue its charge: 
renew reverence for being; recall a sense of the sacredness of life; reactivate a proper piety of being 
there.” 
301
 BB 545; HG 140. 
302
 PO 260, 300. 
303
 BHD 302; PO 300; PU 252, 258. 
304
 PO 297, 303; BB 193; EB 479. 
305
 PO 127-28; BB 473, 455. 
306
 EB 377-78; BB 545. 
307
 BHD 302, 342; PO 257-58. 
BHD 17: “There is a speculative laughter that issues from the festive celebration of being by agapeic 
mindfulness.  This speculative yes to the community of being in now way subordinates the otherness of 
being to any conceptual whole constructed by the philosopher’s mind.  The yes of this laughter is a 
festive gesture towards the metaxological openness of agapeic being.” 
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speaks to being, as good and as gift, and says “Let it be,”—yielding to the goodness in 
unmastered otherness308—“yes,”—affirming and welcoming and consenting to being 
in its plenitude as good309—“amen.”310 
The celebration of the gift naturally opens toward gratitude to the Giver.  
Being religious is, more deeply, gratitude to God as the generous origin of being, as 
the ground of good, for the goodness of being.311  It seeks to “return goodness in the 
‘yes’ to its origin”312—to be a largess, a generous giving in the face of the gift,313 a 
“being agapeic” toward the agapeic origin.314  Seeing the goodness of being as a gift, 
we seek to thank the giver.  Gratitude for the goodness of being ultimately makes no 
sense without God.315  At the least, our ontological gratitude is a thanks that doesn't 
know who to thank.316  Gratitude shows that true festivity, true celebration of the 
goodness of being, is impossible without the sacred,317 for to thank is to grant an 
excessive asymmetry to the giver, to divine generosity.318 
The festive gratitude for the goodness of being in being religious finds its 
fullest expression in worship.319  Reverence, seeing the good in being as good, is first 
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 PO 253. 
309
 BHD 17, 302, 342; PO 253, 303; BB 194; PU 258. 
310
 BB 42, 206. 
311
 BHD 95; PU 258; CWSC 51; EB 479. 
312
 EB 195. 
313
 BB 193. 
314
 BB 194: “We make thanks (gratias agimus).  Thanking is a doing of being, a being agapeic, a 
saying yes to the other for its otherness.” 
315
 CWSC 51. 
316
 EB 510-11: “Alternatively, we can live with this beyond of time with a thanks that does not always 
know whom it thanks, yet it knows it is under the need to give thanks. There is a thanks in excess of 
singulars who can be thanked, and the excess spills over into a life whose seedbed is thanks. One gives 
thanks to and for a giver one cannot name always, and yet an indeterminate thanks is asked by the 
goodness of what is come to us. Such thanks is like a religious trust which wakes to itself as entrusted 
with the gift of coming to be, entrusted by a giver it does not determinately know.” 
317
 EB 479. 
318
 HG 55: “Thanksgiving which grants the excess generosity of divine transcendence, and the very 
asymmetry calls forth the ultimate gratitude.” 
319
 One thinks here of Josef Pieper’s book: Leisure, The Basis of Culture, tr. Gerald Malsbary (South 
Bend, IN: St. Autustine’s Press, 1998).  “Leisure,” in Pieper’s sense, is a receptive/passive stance of 
appreciation, of affirming, the non-instrumental goodness of being.  Leisure thus understood is closely 
linked with gratitude, festivity, worship, and generosity. 
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due to the origin of the good and being.320  Worship is this reverence as a hyperbolic 
and liberating release321—freeing us from ourselves and being propelled beyond 
ourselves—toward the superior other.322  In worship, one transcends oneself and 
places oneself before the transcendent, the ultimate—such that one's pretense fades to 
praise of the other without demand, to communication without temptation to 
dominion.323  In worship, one confesses that God alone is good, is supremely good, is 
the Good that is the source of the good.324  This doxological height of being religious 
joins together the absolute otherness of God with the absolute intimacy of the singular 
self.325  This joining, this porosity, this community is nothing less than the intimate 
and hyperbolic communication of prayer—as the idiotic and elemental being-with 
God, an agapeic proximity with the transcendent yet con-descending agapeic origin of 
the world and of the self so intimately bared.326 
                                                
320
 EB 195. 
321
 BR 216, 221. 
BR 216: “Reverence is beyond autonomy, but is not a form of affirmed integrity.  Reverence is beyond 
autonomy, but is not a form of servitude: it is a freeing, a being free in relation to the superior other.  It 
always has some relation to the superior in it” 
BR 227: “Reverence already places us in this hyperbolic dimension of being: it is not the abject 
degrading that reduces us to the ‘below.’  It has everything to do with elevation and the dimension of 
height.  When we revere truly we are carried by our love of the superior to a higher level…. reverence 
is a release, a being freed to the superior.” 
322
 HG 59. 
323
 BB 41: “The transcendence of self involved in religious worship or adoration is a placing of oneself 
before the ultimate, a praise of the other without demand, a joy in the glory of the divine.  Again the 
closed circle of immanent selfhood and thinking dies; one is reborn to a different mindfulness in the 
space beyond self, the space of the middle between humanity and the divine.” 
PU 183: “The thought of God may cause to fade the pretense of all human thought.  It fades, not always 
into nothing, but sometimes into praise.” 
HG 58-59: “Worship in a purer register might be said to free us of finite desire that seeks and grasps 
something from the other; to purify our sense of the divine as not needing anything from us, being a 
freer being; to purify the difference of its latent hostilities; to purify the communication of the sly 
temptation to dominion.” 
324
 EB 197, 217. 
325
 HG 138: Worship “is love in the dimension of the hyperbolic, where the God loved is absolutely 
other in absolute intimacy.  Only in worship are absolute otherness and absolute intimacy at one.” 
 Likewise, Pickstock sees liturgical space as being just this kind of metaxu—opening up a 
place of relation between ourselves and God that transfigures the worshiping community.  (See below 
on worshiping community as image of the agapeic origin.)  Pickstock, After Writing, p. 232. 
326
 BB 460; EB 177; BR 213-14. 
PU 101: “Prayer may be the deepest enactment of the intimacy of being; for the praying self is the most 
idiotic.  It is senseless and yet divines sense beyond sense.  It is given over, yet it is the audacity of 
trust.” 
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Grateful worship joins together reverent appreciation, festivity, and 
thanksgiving in a celebration of “the ground of the world” in gratitude for the gift of 
being.327  This holistic doxological being religious enacts and instantiates a solidarity, 
a participation between the human and the divine, between the profane and the 
sacred.328  Worship is an agapeic feast—a festive celebration of and in the midst of 
community of being, of and in intimate communion with God—that looks around to 
the gift of being and looks up to the Giver, celebrating the former, thanking the latter 
for the former, praising the latter as the latter.329  In genuine gratitude, one freely 
gives praise in “return” to God.  Here we see the complex interweaving of gifts and 
gift-giving in religion: gratitude (as recognizing and celebrating God’s gift) is itself a 
gift—God’s gift begets a non-identical reciprocity of gratitude to God and generosity 
to others, building an agapeic gift-giving community in the midst of the agapeically 
given metaxological community of being, as we are sustained by the same 
community, by God’s gift of and through the community.  In being thus gratuitously 
giving, the worshiping community becomes a witness to and a finite image of its 
agapeic origin, of God’s agapeic generosity.330  
                                                                                                                                        
HG 198: “If praying is a love that knows God, or is known by God, then it lives a communicative 
porosity between God and us that could not be exhausted by a knowledge either fully determinate, or 
claiming to be fully self-determining.  Such claims would falsify this religious knowing, this porosity, 
this loving, this praying.  Prayer is the friend of a paradoxical poverty of philosophy that loves the 
reserve of the full.” 
327
 BHD 95: “To worship is to celebrate the ground of the world: the festivity of cultus may be 
gratitude for the gift of being this ground gives.” 
328
 BHD 101. 
BHD 96: “Worship … claims to return the human being to participation in the divine order of the 
cosmos.” 
EB 512: “The consummate community is one of celebration, of our solidarity with the ultimate power, 
despite evil, in our own good in its many forms, in our struggle to be released from evils into which we 
fall, celebration of the sweet gift of life, as well as the peace we seek facing the terrors of death. 
Rebirth to the good of the elemental things is now celebrated.” 
329
 BHD 98, 101; EB 512. 
 Milbank and Pickstock see in the Eucharist the paradigm of this agapeic feast, indeed of the 
gift as such, as gift-exchange.  For in the Eucharist, we meet God’s gift with surrender and reception—
we offer, give ourselves as gift in return.  See Milbank, Being Reconciled, pp. 149, 161; Pickstock, 
After Writing, Part II. 
330
 EB 452, 481, 491, 495. 
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§3. From Gratitude to Generosity 
In Desmond’s understanding of religousness, gratitude to the divine Other 
gives rise to generosity toward the human other—to an agapeic community.  
Gratitude for the (agapeic) gift of being calls forth, commissions, (agapeic) 
generosity—“the gift of agapeic being solicits in us the gift of agapeic being.”331  
Gratitude—recognizing and celebrating that one has received the gifts of being and 
goodness within and without, thanking and praising the Giver, the agapeic origin—as 
if it cannot do justice to, cannot contain, the excessive gifts it receives, itself 
generates, gives forth, charges one with332 an ethics of generosity born of, springing 
from, incarnating gratitude.333  The gift calls for repetition—for a different return.334  
                                                                                                                                        
EB 165: “What is intimated in the archē here becomes community in humanity, itself now called to be 
a concretion of agapeic community, and witness to the ultimate agapeic source. This end is 
participation in community with the arche, and hence itself a finite form of the community of agapeic 
service. This is the good we must seek to be, failing again and again, and beginning again and again, as 
we must.” 
 This tracks with Pickstock’s Eucharistic theology in which we in worship, in offering to God, 
enter into the perpetual offering within the Trinitarian God—participating “in the self-giving flow of 
life between the persons of the Trinity.”  Pickstock, After Writing, pp. 242-43. 
EB 486: “We understand power as given all along, a gift from motiveless generosity, motiveless 
goodness beyond the goodness of the gift, rousing in community the vision of humans together living 
an ethics of generosity in finite image of the ultimate generosity.” 
331
 PU 232; BB 414. 
EB 220: “The agape of being is first given to us, but we are called to an agapeic being which is the 
doing of living, in an ethics of gratitude to the origin, and of generosity to self and other. The agape of 
being intimates a fullness, but it is not being full of oneself. One does nothing to merit it, and no 
payment is exacted, for it offers itself simply as the life of the good, a life we are to live. It has no 
reason, beyond itself, which is to be beyond itself, in being itself.” 
332
 EB 177, 220. 
EB 168-69: “We are grateful for the generosity of the ground, and we respond to this with thanks, and 
with thanks lived as a form of existence. For it is not only the generosity of the giver that is important 
but the generosity of the receiver. We are the receivers, and, strangely, it is the generosity of the other 
that possibilizes our comportment of generosity towards the other. Generosity entails no servile 
reception or abjection before the other. In fact, the other's generosity does more than occasion our 
gratitude; it charges us with the living of generosity.” 
EB 217: “Affirming is consent to gift. Generosity is born of a primal gratitude. Ethics springs from 
gratitude. This is lived in ethical and religious service beyond autonomy. What is this service? It is a 
willingness beyond will, beyond will to power, beyond my will to power.” 
333
 EB 217: “We affirm the good as the source of this good: God. Affirming is consent to gift. 
Generosity is born of a primal gratitude. Ethics springs from gratitude.” 
CWSC 51: “An ethics of gratitude can be called forth, lived as a life of generous offering.  Thanks is 
incarnated as a form of life.” 
 Milbank likewise observes that the giving of oneself arises from a fullness, a “plenitude of 
vision” such that doxology and charity, the gift thankfully received and given, become inseparable.  
Yet it is the enabling gift of God and our grateful recognition of this gift that comes first—as Milbank 
writes: “Festival, first of all.”  The mirror image of this is the way in which suspicion disables the 
 240 
It is as if the first commandment, to love (thank, praise) God (as the agapeic origin)—
to enter into agapeic community with God—gives forth from its (gratuitous) excess 
and sustains the second commandment, to love the neighbor, to become an agapeic 
(serving even unto suffering) self opening toward (participating in, contributing to the 
creation of) agapeic community.335  We love God by being agapeic to the other and so 
liken ourselves to the origin.336  Here the agape (the excessive gift) of the origin, 
recognized and celebrated in gratitude, breaks through the closure of the erotic self337 
and effects a reversal from lack to agape—issuing from a prior fullness and seeing the 
other as good.338  This is the union of divine and ethical service (both agapeic 
communication)339 where the latter arises from the former.340 
Here, as gratitude become generosity (thanksgiving become giving), being 
religious involves agapeic being as ontological and regulative.  In gratitude, we 
recognizing our ontologically agapeic being (as a gift, as generously given).  
                                                                                                                                        
reception of the gift and therefore generosity.  Here, Marion is in agreement, inasmuch as the priority 
of the question, “Does anyone love me?” holds it fundamental place.  Milbank, Being Reconciled, pp. 
150, 157, 180-81; Milbank, “Can a Gift be Given?” p. 154; Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, passim. 
334
 In Pickstock’s powerful analysis, receiving and returning are intimately intertwined.  The gift is 
contagious, ever overflowing into more giving, into repeated non-identical return.  Ultimately, the gift 
(God’s gift, out being) is truly received by being “offered humbly back” in gratitude and then “handed 
on” in generosity.  Pickstock, After Writing, pp. 246-48, 250. 
335
 EB 498: “How love God? By enacting in life the truth of the agape of being, and this most 
concretely in service of the neighbor.” 
CWSC 51: “The depth of generosity is sustained by humility in relation to the ultimate.” 
336
 EB 498. 
BB 536: “To give ourselves up means that we consent to the fact that our being and all of being is a 
gift.  The gift is first a giving over by the agapeic origin.  And when we give ourselves up, we liken 
ourselves to the origin in its ontological generosity.” 
337
 DDO 19; PO 211; BHD 331, 333; BB 500; PU 214-15. 
338
 DDO 19, 164, 166-67. 
DDO 167: Desire as goodwill “reveals that desire may be more than an erotic rush from lack to 
wholeness, that it may be an agapeic pouring forth from a wholeness already real.” 
339
 EB 505: “And of course, you cannot separate the divine and the ethical service. Divine service is 
agapeic communication in relation to God; ethical service is agapeic communication in relation to 
creation and human others. There is not one without the other, though there may be an ethical service 
that does not comprehend its ground in divine service, as there may be a love of God so caught up in 
this love that its singular form of ethical service is just to show to others the fruit of that love which is 
holiness.” 
340
 EB 505: “Ethical service arises from God service, though it be often incognito; ethical service is 
enacted God service. God service itself is liturgical, in the sense that liturgy is a public service for the 
people, a feast in service. Moralities are ethical services that, so to say, suffer from amnesia about their 
liturgical origin. Without God service, ethical service becomes a moral ritual of duty without joy, like a 
festive drama that has lost the festivity.” 
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Generosity is our active participation in being agapeic, our seeking to be true to the 
(regulative) agapeic promise of our given being.341  Seeing our being as a gift “given 
over” by (freely given from) the agapeic origin spurs us to “give ourselves up” (to 
freely give) towards the other.342  This agapeic giving to the other then can give rise to 
the community of agapeic service as arising, then ultimately, from gratitude (as 
religious community).343  The human agapeic metaxological community is then 
grounded in the ultimate—as ontologically, so ethically.344 
§4. Generosity 
In religious gratitude, one becomes aware of and celebrates and thanks and 
praises the agapeic origin for its generosity—one affirms what God is like, one 
beholds God’s agape.  In religious generosity, one becomes what God is like—one 
becomes agapeic.  From this perspective, religious gratitude involves a certain 
metaphysical speculation—a wonder before the excessive goodness of being become 
religious regard for God.  Generosity is then the living, living ethically, in light of this 
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 BB 338, 415; PU 157, 215; EB 162. 
PU 119: “Agapeic mind expresses something that is both a regulative ideal and an ontological reality, 
somehow constitutive of our most intimate being.” 
342
 BB 536: “To give ourselves up means that we consent to the fact that our being and all of being is a 
gift.  The gift is first a giving over by the agapeic origin.  And when we give ourselves up, we liken 
ourselves to the origin in its ontological generosity.” 
EB 365: “We must join the meaning of ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom towards.’ The ‘from’ is from the 
origin as giver, but as freeing us, and into gratitude for the gift, even in suffering. This is not ‘freedom 
from’ the other which wants to be outside of community, but freedom given from the agapeic origin, 
and hence a ‘from’ that founds elemental community. And here too ‘freedom towards’ is beyond 
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beyond itself and towards the good as other. This ‘freedom towards’ has a vector that is ontologically 
intimate: both selfless and the deepest selving. One goes towards the good, sometimes sightlessly, in 
agapeic selving.” 
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Pickstock, After Writing, pp. 240-45. 
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regard.  In religious gratitude one has a transfigured metaphysics; in religious 
generosity, a transfigured ethics.  (However, it must be noted that this 
distinction/pairing should not be taken too strictly, for gratitude is already ethical, a 
right way of being before God, and generosity is always metaphysical, regarding the 
excessive metaxological community of being and its origin with agapeic mind.)  In 
beholding the excess of the metaxological community of being, of agapeic creation, 
we revere, thank, praise the agapeic origin.  This transfigured mindfulness, agapeic 
mind, calls us to agapeic being, to become agapeic selves, to make agapeic 
communities—to be agapeic after and with God. 
Religious generosity, the being agapeic of being religious, begins with the 
agapeic mind in which beheld being is transfigured for one.345  Agapeic mind, in 
consenting to seeing being and one’s being as a gift of generosity, solicits generosity; 
it is the turning from grateful beholding to generous becoming.346  Our all too 
common lack of agapeic mind, of agapeic generosity, our erotic selfishness, requires 
gratitude’s awakening.347  In agapeic mind, we are called beyond our self-enclosure to 
agapeic being,348 called by an “immanent exigence”—something immanent within 
being and within us, its being an agapeic gift, that calls us from beyond, from on high.  
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 243 
We are constrained by ultimacy as the agapeic origin of being and our being.349  This 
call of the good ultimately only makes sense in a religious register, by thinking the 
source of being, of the primal ethos,350 for we ethically consider humans to have 
inherent value because they are part of, the crown of, an inherently valuable creation.  
God is the origin (original ground) of both this general and this more particular human 
being and value.351 
Agapeic mind opens onto agapeic being—a transfigured being in the face of 
transfigured being.  Agapeic being, as a more general orientation in one’s being, is a 
generous giving out of one’s excess givenness.352  Agapeic mind become agapeic 
being is a genuine self-transcending toward the other, a being with the other that lets 
the other be as other353—a giving beyond self, not seeking a return.354  This agapeic 
being finds expression in service—in making oneself available to serve, to give to the 
other.355   
For one to actively incarnate this agapeic being is to participate in agapeic 
selving, to become an agapeic self.  Agapeic selving as the highest selving is a selving 
beyond selving.  It is beyond itself “vertically” as a religious selving, a becoming of a 
                                                
349
 PO 159. 
GEW 27: “Within the immanent exigence of the ethical absolute, we find ourselves exceeded by the 
call of an absolute we do not produce ourselves.” 
350
 GEW 26-27: “The call of the good is such that we can never be its master but are always called to 
an obedience to what is absolute.  How make sense of this obedience?  Only by thinking the source of 
the primal ethos: if the primal ethos indicates its truth through the power of the ethical, something 
about that source is communicated as inseparable from the good.” 
351
 PU 227: “The confluence of ethics and metaphysics requires a metamorphosis in our thinking….  
The value of being, and indirectly the value of the human being, has to be thought in relation to an 
other origin of value.” 
352
 BHD 267, 292, 296-97; BB 407; PU 125-26; CWSC 51. 
353
 PO 253, 266, 274; En 150. 
354
 BB 498; PU 177, 250; BR 227. 
BB 33: “We reach out to what is other in self-transcendence, but there is in agapeic mind a 
transcendence different to that of erotic perplexity that wills finally and always to return to self.” 
BB 206: Agapeic mind is “the self-transcendence of mindfulness as it goes towards the other as other, 
and not just simply as a mirror of itself, or a means to mediate with its own self.  It is genuinely self-
transcending, for it is the thinking of the other in its otherness….  It thinks beyond itself, thinks in 
excess of its own self-mediation.  And so such a communicative mindfulness is the living 
exemplification of a coming into the community of being.” 
355
 BB 490; PU 256; EB 161, 356. 
 244 
subject (subject to and) in community with God.356  It is also beyond itself, is a being 
beyond oneself,357 “horizontally”—decentered in willingness to be for other.358  The 
agapeic self is commissioned, called beyond itself to service, to “giving itself” to the 
neighbor,359 and so likens itself to (imitates) the agapeic origin in its agapeic 
generosity.360 
 Being religious reaches its fullest expression in agapeic community—in what 
Desmond calls the religious community of agapeic service.361  This is a community of 
agapeic selves before God existing in mutual service, in true community.  It is a 
community serving God and the neighbor.362  The religious community of agapeic 
service is the consummate community in that it presents the apotheosis of the bond of 
trust that exists in all true human community (the binding together, re-ligare).363  One 
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could say that, as human community as such is based on reaching beyond the self in 
trust and self-giving, so the religious community of agapeic service entails a 
comprehensive “reaching beyond”: “down” to the roots of being as good (as 
trustworthy) and as gift, “up” to God as the agapeic origin and sustainer of being and 
human community, “in” to the self as an inherently (and excessively) valuable and 
freely given donation, “out” to the neighbor as likewise valued and worthy to be 
served.  With God's sustaining aid,364 the community of agapeic service participates in 
the work of God in community with God365: in likening itself to the agapeic origin in 
agapeic service (in giving sustaining aid)366 and in becoming a finite witness to, image 
or, revelation of the agapeic origin in its loving generosity.367 
 
                                                                                                                                        
ligare - Augustine) the human and divine, and out of this transforms the bonds holding humans 
together.” 
364
 EB 494: “Religious community is itself the appeal to the good for that help to be good. We cannot 
do it on our own, as we cannot free ourselves from bewitchment on our own. To ask to be free from the 
idols is to ask for the spiritual strength of a divine service.” 
365
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towards the good of the absolute other.” 
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at the first extreme, erotic sovereignty gives way to mystical consent, at the second extreme the festival 
of a community becomes a sacramental drama.” 
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generosity is both before and points beyond the instrumentality of the network, and the dominion of the 
sovereign.” 
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PART TWO: METAXOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF GOD AND RELIGION VS. 
RELIGION WITHOUT RELIGION 
 
Having summarized William Desmond’s conception of God and religion, I 
will now turn to examine how this conception provides a viable and preferable 
alternative to that represented in the work of John D. Caputo.  Desmond’s position 
can be seen as such an alternative based on three points.  First, Desmond’s position is 
a viable alternative in that it is able to answer Caputo’s critique of metaphysics by 
showing that the understanding of God and religion represented in Desmond’s work is 
not guilty of the errors that Caputo levels against metaphysical understandings of God 
and religion as such.  Second, Desmond’s position is a viable alternative in that it is 
able to genuinely address the motivating concerns that can seen to be inspiring 
Caputo’s treatment of God and religion.  Third, Desmond’s position is an arguably 
preferable alternative inasmuch as it narrates/locates, “out-narrates,” Caputo’s 
position—showing Desmond’s as possessing a broader and greater explanatory reach.  
Along these lines, Desmond’s position can be shown to possess the possibility of 
fulfilling Caputo’s own motivating concerns better than Caputo’s own vision. 
 
Section I: Desmond as Answering Caputo’s Critique of Religion 
Desmond’s vision is a viable alternative to Caputo’s in that it answers 
Caputo’s critiques of religion and God-talk, showing that his critiques need not be the 
case.  Here Desmond shows how a conception of God and religion informed by 
metaphysics escapes Caputo’s narration/location of “metaphysical” conceptions of 
God and religion, as such.  Desmond’s position answers Caputo’s critiques, and thus 
is a possible, viable position on Caputo’s terms. 
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§1. Elevating the knowledge of God to an absolute level 
Caputo critiques traditional metaphysical understandings of God and religion 
as promoting an absolutely stable onto-theo-logical framework in which God is a 
highest being and first cause that functions to guarantee or stabilize such a stabilizing 
framework.  These onto-theo-logical frameworks, however, are never more absolute 
than their finite makers—are always thus “deconstructible.”368  Metaphysical religion 
makes absolute pronouncements about God, but such are never more than contingent 
human artifacts—it confuses the infinite transcendence of God with human religion, 
elevating the latter to the status of the former.369  Such religious systems present 
themselves as attaining a rigorous and certain status which is, in fact, beyond human 
capacities—they are falsely absolute.370 
Desmond’s metaxological metaphysical conception of God and religion can be 
seen to answer this critique in several ways.  Desmond’s metaphysical meditations on 
God and religion have to do with what are, for him, irreducible perplexities—that 
which lies at the limits and extremities of thought.371  It explicitly guards against 
ascribing the absolute to the finite.372  When it comes to God, we have no direct 
access.  From our intermediate position God cannot be determined directly, for we 
cannot be on a par conceptually with a God that no name or image can fully 
capture.373  We always speak of God “from the middle,”374 thus speech about God 
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must be an indirect attempt to name an overdetermined plenitude.375  The best names 
for God are not absolute (utterly univocal determinations) but are metaphysical 
metaphors, indirections that name their failure to be The Name,376 that carry with 
them an affirmative equivocity—the ambiguity and paradox (signifying such a 
saying’s ultimate failure to univocally identify, “pin down,” ultimate transcendence) 
that obtains when one comes to think transcendence, to think that which is beyond 
thought.377  Such sayings of perplexity do not elevate themselves to a falsely absolute 
level, preserving reference to God as that which is beyond our ken, so respecting the 
enigma of the ultimate.378 
§2. God of the same 
Caputo critiques metaphysical understandings of God and religion as fixated 
on universality and static unity.  This happens at the expense of canceling out a proper 
regard for the singular, the fluid, the different.  This kind of theological system 
presents God as an ultimate static unity—as a “God of the same”—that is 
subordinated to Greek ontology.379   
Such a critique misses with regard to Desmond’s metaxological metaphysical 
conception of God and religion.  Central to Desmond’s conception of God as agapeic 
origin is the manner in which such a God gives rise to a genuine plurality.380  God as 
agapeic origin is the source of the metaxological community of being381 as a 
community of difference, plurality and singularity.382  The plurality of the created 
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world is composed of singulars—finite beings are not only other to God but other to 
each other.383  God, for Desmond, functions as first the ground of plurality and 
singularity—of the different—before the Same. 
In Desmond’s metaphysical understanding, God is no static unity.  This is 
what Desmond explicitly rejects in his own critique of the univocal God.  The 
univocal God—which has been, as Desmond recognizes, pervasive in the western 
philosophical tradition384—is a static, univocal eternity that entails an objectifying of 
God that is also an absolutization of univocity,385 an instrumentalization of God, a 
mere univocal explanation.386  This univocal God ends up being self-frustrating, is 
equivocal inasmuch as it is a transcendence without relation; it cannot act in relation 
to the world; it cannot have originated the world; and it cannot be the ground of that 
to which it is antithetical.387  Desmond’s metaxological metaphysical conception of 
God as an intimate stranger, who utterly transcends us and whose indeterminate signs 
and traces utterly surround and indwell us, is explicitly other to such a God of the 
Same. 
§3. A falsely stable foundation  
For Caputo, metaphysical religion functions to give life a false stability.  It 
makes light of and thus undercuts the difficulty of a properly religious faith.  It seeks 
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a “heavenly hook” to “bail us out and lift us above the flux of undecidability.”388  
Metaphysical religion and the metaphysical God make light of the radically finite 
situation of human life in the midst of the flux.  
Desmond’s metaxological metaphysical conception of God and religion 
escapes this characterization and critique.  For Desmond, God cannot be determined 
directly and is to us an enigma to which we have no direct access and is only thought 
indirectly, with a degree of irreducible ambiguity.389  Our perplexity is deepened, not 
quelled, by the hyperbolic thought of God.  Thus, if one is to talk of transcendence 
one must live with the risk of equivocity,390 for such talk is necessarily 
representational and indirect.391  The thought of the infinite God is not an escape from 
finitude but a transformed mindfulness of finitude, an affirmation of the finite as good 
in all its heteromorphic plurality and singularity.  Our religious dwelling with this 
God, far from making things easy, begins with a breakdown, a failure, a reversal of 
our attempts to control life, to subject it to our rational power for our manipulation 
and ease.392  
 
Section II: Desmond as Addressing Caputo’s Motivating Concerns 
Behind Caputo’s critique of religion and his more positive alternative to 
(metaphysical) religion and God-talk, there can be seen to be certain motivating 
concerns.  First, Caputo wants to avoid elevating the knowledge of God to a falsely 
absolute status—he wants thought about God (and in general) to be properly humble.  
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Second, Caputo wants to avoid supplanting a properly religious faith.  Behind both of 
these concerns is a desire to avoid being dependent upon a faithless metaphysics—a 
metaphysics that is an abstract speculation that oversteps the boundaries of human 
thinking and distracts one from genuine religious existence. 
Desmond’s work can be seen to address Caputo’s concern to avoid elevating 
the knowledge of God to a falsely absolute status.  As stated above, Desmond’s 
version of metaphysical speculation about God entails the meditating on irreducible 
perplexities and enigmas—a speaking from the middle of that to which we have no 
direct access.  This chastened metaphysical thought, all too aware of its lack of 
absoluteness in its thought of the absolute, embodies a necessity that our speech about 
God who is qualitatively inexhaustible excess393 be indirect, metaphorical.394  Such a 
metaxological understanding of God is a saying of perplexity that refers to divine 
otherness while respecting the enigma of the ultimate.395  It guards the threshold of 
transcendence, consciously and cautiously maintaining a space between the image and 
God who remains other to our thinking about God.396  If anything, a robust denial of 
the possibility of knowledge of God would be a (falsely absolute) grasp beyond one’s 
reach. 
Desmond’s work can also be seen to address Caputo’s concern to avoid 
supplanting a properly religious faith.  For Caputo, metaphysical religion exchanges 
religious life in all of its difficulty (embodied in a passionate love of God embodied in 
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the love of the other) for a fixation on abstract and certain propositions so as to give 
life a stable foundation.  Generally, Desmond’s metaxological speculative philosophy 
is a mindfulness of what is at work in the middle, the midst of our existence397—in 
particular, of the hyperboles of being as happenings in finite being that point beyond 
themselves.398  It is from this perspective that Desmond sees a metaxological 
metaphysics as contributing positively to genuine religious faith and thought about 
God.  Desmond’s metaphysics arises from a seeking to be faithful to life—a seeking 
to get beyond the modern deracinated ethos that has come to cut off mindfulness from 
the deeper, overdeterminate resources of the primal ethos, or the between.399  The 
relation between philosophy or metaphysics in particular and religion need not be one 
of the former’s domination and contamination of the latter.  Indeed, if one 
understands religious belief—inasmuch as religious belief always has some kind of 
content—in anything short of an anti-intellectual frame, some kind of (even minimal) 
thoughtful reflection seems to be necessary and beneficial.  In this kind of posture, 
philosophy, for Desmond, can refer beyond itself, give way, yield to religion—such 
that his primary configuration of the relation between philosophy and religion is that 
of philosophy’s coming to show an opening, a porosity to divine transcendence.400  
Metaphysical philosophy finds its fulfillment in being called, from within itself, 
beyond itself.401  For Desmond, metaphysics actually contributes to a properly 
religious life—a life of gratitude and generosity toward God and one’s neighbor.  The 
difference between Caputo’s and Desmond’s conceptions of God and religion can 
largely be traced back to their respective understandings of metaphysics. 
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Section III: Desmond as Providing an Arguably Preferable Alternative to 
Caputo’s “Religion Without Religion” 
 
In addition to answering Caputo’s critiques of ethics and addressing Caputo’s 
motivating concerns, Desmond provides a metaphysical alternative to Caputo’s 
alternative to metaphysical religion.  Desmond’s metaphysical understanding of 
religion and God is not only a viable alternative to Caputo’s “religion without 
religion”—as shown in how Desmond’s understanding can answer Caputo’s critiques 
and address his concerns—but is a preferable alternative inasmuch it can locate and 
critique, can “out-narrate,” Caputo’s position in a broader vision. 
§1. Denial of knowledge of God 
Caputo’s post-metaphysical “religion without religion” operates in the wake of 
the death of the God of metaphysics.  Post-metaphysical religion begins with the 
death of the God of metaphysics—of onto-theo-logy—the God that is tailored to fit 
knowledge.402  Such religion is a “religion without religion” that can live with or 
without any particular or determinate claims to religious knowledge.403  Caputo 
ultimately denies the possibility of metaphysical knowledge of the absolute or God 
and rejects it as a mask for absolute knowledge.   
Desmond is likewise critical of such an onto-theological instrumental 
understanding of God, while maintaining some kind of knowledge or understanding 
of God that is not reducible to onto-theology.  Desmond’s understanding is concerned 
with guarding against counterfeit doubles, dead gods amounting to little other than the 
human will to power that projects them.404  The univocal understanding of God as 
static, univocal eternity—absolute in its immutability and stasis beyond time and 
becoming—that has been, as Desmond recognizes, pervasive in the western 
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philosophical tradition.405  This conception of God as a static eternity—as a means of 
securing ourselves in the world, as a self-projection of our power406—self-destructs in 
that it ultimately serves to make God redundant.407  Such a God is unavailable for any 
relationship with the world or humans—for God is defined only negatively, in 
opposition to the world.408  God as static eternity does not serve the intended use of 
securing the world, for such an entity, by definition, cannot originate or ground the 
entities in the world of becoming to which it stands in opposition.  However, this 
univocal-become-equivocal metaphysical understanding is not the only game in town 
for Desmond.  His metaxological understanding of God makes robust claims to 
knowledge about God—as agapeic origin, as the origin and creator of the world that is 
transcendent to the becoming of the world,409 as a singular, “first” and “primal” 
giver410—without aspiring to absolute knowledge. 
For Desmond, God (as mentioned above) cannot be determined directly, 
univocally.  When it comes to God, we must speak indirectly.  No finite determinate 
(univocal, intending to be direct) category will do, for the original that is to be imaged 
is at the boundary of human understanding.411  We must speak indirectly, but speak 
we must.  There is an inevitable risk in naming God for we need images and names to 
speak of God at all while understanding that all names/images fall short of univocally 
determining the transcendent other to which they refer.412  Metaphors are such 
intermediating names beyond univocal determination—concrete sayings of perplexity 
that preserve reference to a beyond, to an otherness, and respect the enigma of the 
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ultimate.413  More specifically, Desmond sees his naming of God in terms of 
hyperbole.  Such is a thought that, in its attending to certain phenomena, has an 
immanent exigency that propels one to the thought of the transcendent—it is 
something in experience, something disproportionate or asymmetrical to finitude in 
the midst of finitude, that suggests something beyond experience, a transcendence.414    
Desmond’s claims to knowledge about God arise from these happenings in our 
experience—from the hyperboles of being.  These are, for Desmond, indirect signs of 
God in our midst, in the between.  Desmond’s hyperboles of external being 
(encounters with external transcendence as suggesting or intimating a transcendent 
ground or origin—the world’s ultimate ground in an origin415) are: the givenness of 
being, of the world’s being given to be at all, that there is something rather than 
nothing416; the plural community of being as a plenitude,417 as a genuine plurality418 
that intimates a particular kind of ground and origin; the intelligibility of the world as 
orderly, ordered, as exhibiting design as a sign that suggests an origin that is the 
ground of our epistemological trust419; and the goodness of being, the ethos of being 
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as charged (if indeterminately) with value—as bearing an inherent or intrinsic 
worth.420  Beyond the external signs of God in our midst, Desmond identifies certain 
hyperboles of internal being, such as: the infinite value of the idiotic self421; desire’s 
urgency of ultimacy, an absolute, infinite restlessness and desire in our finite being for 
the absolute or the ultimate that is not satisfied by any finite good422; desire’s porosity 
or the passio essendi, as a deep openness, an intimate communion with God in the 
interior depths of the self423; and the call of the good, the call into agapeic being, 
selving and community refers one to a ground of the good—a good beyond finite 
goods.424   
§2. Religion as the passion for the impossible as a structure of experience 
Caputo sees religion as a passion for the impossible that constitutes a (if not 
the) structure of experience.  As a passion for the impossible, this religious passion 
looks for the new, the unexpected.425  This structure of experience is the “religious 
side” of everyone.426  Caputo sees this passion for the impossible as the love of God—
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“God” that is the impossible we passionately desire—which is religion.427  The 
passion of life is interchangeable with love of God. 
For Desmond, passion as an structure of experience and religion are closely 
connected as well.  Human being, for Desmond, possesses an infinite desire in the 
midst of finite being.  It is a self-surpassing toward transcendence428—a hyperbolic 
vector of transcendence429—an “urgency of ultimacy”—an infinite restlessness for the 
absolute or the ultimate.430  This impossible passion (actually finite but intentionally 
infinite431) suggests a more radical, disproportionate sense of the infinite, an “actual 
infinitude” in excess of its own infinity.432  For Desmond, there is also a passio 
essendi in human self-transcendence prior to the conatus essendi (the urgency of 
ultimacy).433  This passio essendi is a porosity more basic to desire—an openness, a 
given opening to the other.434  This intimacy, this porosity—our “being given to 
be”—“signifies our disproportion to ourselves” by pointing us beyond ourselves to 
that which gave us to be.435  It is an intimate always-already-being-in-communion 
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with God in the depths of the self—a more passive passion, something given, opened 
prior to our striving.436   
There is, however, a critical difference between Caputo and Desmond (we will 
return to this again below).  There is a difference between saying that x is y—that 
“God” is the impossible part of our impossible passion, the infinity of our desire—and 
that x leads to, or entails y (goes beyond itself toward something other).  “God” is not 
merely the impossible that we desire, keeping the focus on the present passion of our 
experience.  “God,” for Desmond, is the other to which the impossible (in/finite) 
passion of human being points, refers, is thrown.  “God,” for Desmond, is not a 
hyperbolic way of speaking of our excessive desire (the new, the impossible of 
experience)—fully reducible to a generic placeholder for the otherwise indifferent 
object for our uncannily infinite desire.  For Desmond, such experience and desire is 
itself what is hyperbolic.  Such a hyperbole throws beyond itself; it moves from 
experience to something beyond experience, from our being between toward the 
“being above” of transcendence.437  It is an exigency that cannot remain fixated on the 
experience, the happening itself.  Such happenings, “hyperboles of being,” refer 
beyond themselves toward ultimacy.438  The impossible infinity of human desire and 
passion is a sign that is not a sign of itself, but of another.439 
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§3. Heterology 
Heteronomism: tout autre 
The God of Caputo’s religion without religion is the “God of the other.”440  
This God is the “the impossible,” “the coming (l’invention) of the other.”441  Thus, 
true religion for Caputo is closely related to relation to the other in general.  In fact, 
religion is structurally identical to obligation— obligation to a singularity that is 
higher than the universal.442  Religion is the absolute bond (ligare) with the 
Absolute.443  In obligation and religion, one is subject to a call, an unconditional 
solicitation.  The relation that is obligation—that we have with every singular, human 
“other”—is identical with the relation that is religion—that we have with a singular, 
“absolute,” wholly “Other.”444  Every other is wholly other, such that the name of 
God is a “place holder” for the other.445  Religion and God are thus hyperboles of 
obligation, of ethics—religion is a hyperbolic way of speaking of obligation, of one’s 
“hypersensitivity” to the demands of the other.446   
For Desmond too there is a close connection between religion and ethics—
between one’s relation to God and one’s relation to others.  Desmond likewise 
meditates upon the experience of the call of the good into agapeic community, of a 
being commissioned, a being constrained by ultimacy in relation to the other.447  
Desmond thinks of the ethical call of the good as referring one to a ground of the 
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good—a huperagathos that must be disproportionate in order to be proportionate to 
the exorbitant good we experience in the between.448  Desmond also defends God’s 
otherness, God’s genuine transcendence—“vertical,” superior transcendence—an 
absolutely superior otherness449 that has an essentially asymmetrical and 
disproportionate relationship with humans and the world.450  This divine 
transcendence is to be guarded over against potential counterfeits.451   
However, again, the religious for Desmond is not simply reduced to another 
phenomenon (desire above, here obligation).  Religion is not mere hyperbole—an 
exalted way of speaking about something else.452  Obligation or ethics in Desmond’s 
vision, instead finds itself beyond itself, on a trajectory toward an infinite other—
obligation points to something more than obligation.  In Desmond’s hyperbole, again, 
one is propelled from experience to something beyond experience.453  Desmond’s idea 
of the hyperbolic is a kind of reversal of Caputo’s talk of the ultimate as but 
“hyperbolic” (as exaggerated, figurative, “unreal”) talk about a concrete finite 
experience or reality, here human obligation—rather, our understanding of the 
concrete finite realities impels or propels (“gives rise to”) our thinking toward 
something more than the finite that is not sufficient unto itself. 
In Desmond’s conception of religion in which the religious and the ethical are 
connected but not identified, related but not the same, the love of God gives forth 
from its (gratuitous) excess and sustains the love of the neighbor.454  We love God by 
                                                
448
 EB 20, 93, 200, 493, 502-3. 
449
 BB 201, 256-57; HG 3, 59. 
450
 BHD 182; HG 49, 59. 
451
 PU 189; HG 9. 
452
 DDO 151; BB 408, 448. 
453
 BB 218, 222, 256. 
BB 218: “We are thrown towards transcendence by our being.”   Hyperbole “throws mindfulness into 
the huper, the beyond.” 
454
 EB 498: “How love God? By enacting in life the truth of the agape of being, and this most 
concretely in service of the neighbor.” 
 261 
being agapeic to the other and so liken ourselves to the origin.455  The general shape 
of the relation between religious regard for God and ethical regard for the human 
other is that of the latter arising from the former, be it explicitly or implicitly.456  For 
Desmond, love or generosity arises out of, is solicited, called forth by, gratitude for 
the agapeic gift of being.457  Our being called to love the other—to obligation—only 
makes sense, for Desmond, in a religious register, for it calls us to regard humans with 
an inherent value.458  Whence this value?  Ethical obligation, treating one’s neighbor 
as a being of inherent value, only makes sense by thinking the source of such value in 
an agapeic origin.459 
Heteromorphism: undecidability 
The heteromorphism involved in Caputo’s post-metaphysical understanding of 
religion has to do with the fundamental, constitutive undecidability attendant to 
religious belief.460  Religious faith is undecidable inasmuch as it is co-constituted 
with, must include, the anti-religious tragic (nihilist) sense that sees a persistent abyss, 
an anonymous nothing behind life—that sees life and its suffering as an innocent and 
meaningless becoming.461  The tragic view, in which flux rules all, cannot be 
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excluded or silenced—there is undecidability between it and the religious view.462  
Caputo’s religious obligation to the other is thus but a construal on the face of the 
abyss.463  Inhabited by this fundamental undecidability, religion without religion will 
always be other to knowledge. 
For Desmond, a valueless anonymous nothing is not taken for granted, as a 
given.  Such a nihilistic vision is rather, for Desmond, the product of the modern 
milieu of instrumental mind come to self-consciousness in Nietzsche.  Modern 
instrumental mind is manifest in the two-fold process of the objectification of being—
yielding the “degraded” or “deracinated” world as a valueless, inherently worthless, 
thereness464—and the subjectification of value—the “revaluation” of value in terms of 
human self-determination and a projection of value onto the world so as to make what 
is “there” valued as useful—an instrument—to the self.465  Desmond recognizes with 
Caputo that this modern nihilistic vision is severely problematic to religion such that 
Desmond writes of a modern “allergy to transcendence”466 in which the world is 
stripped of signs and traces of the divine.467  But this, however, is not the end of the 
story.  The goodness of being is, for Desmond, fundamentally evident in our 
experience of the world—it is the very opening of thought in astonishment.  Likewise, 
in Desmond’s understanding of God and religion, the thought of God arises from 
one’s experience of the “hyperboles” of external and internal being—it is not 
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reducible to a mere projection (whether of the becoming of the world or of the human 
self).468   
Desmond, in fact, proposes or affirms another nothing—another cosmic 
nothingness.  As created from nothing, the created universe is “shadowed” by the 
nothingness (nihilo) from which (ex) it was made (creatio)—nothingness is 
ontologically constitutive of finite creation.469  However, this nothing does not stand 
in a tension of undecidability with the religious view.  It makes sense in the religious 
narrative.  The between of the religious view (for Desmond) is not the undecidable 
and disjunctive between of faith/nihilism but the affirmative, metaphysical between of 
the community of being suspended between God as agapeic origin (as the origin and 
sustainer of being) and nothingness. 
Likewise, Desmond offers another religious heteromorphism—one not so 
much an undecidability as a fundamental affirmation of the community of created 
being as plural, singular and good.  The agapeic origin is the source of genuine 
difference and plurality470—of a true community of plurality made up of unique 
(idiotic) singularities in communicative relation to one another.471  This affirmation of 
the plural community of being as good is other to any thought of being as a 
meaningless or anonymous abyss.  Thinking the ground of the good in the agapeic 
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origin can provide a way out of the nihilism of instrumental mind.472  Against any 
basic undecidability, Desmond’s religion beholds the goodness of being and affirms 
it.  (This affirmation, indeed any affirmation, trumps undecidability.  An affirmation 
in the face of risk, uncertainty, even a fundamental undecidability is no longer 
undecidable.  The affirmation is a decision—“being is good,” “God is real,” “God 
loves us”: these may be false, but they are not undecidable for one who has affirmed 
them.  Confession and undecidability are mutually exclusive.)  Being religious 
recognizes the goodness of creation beyond one's merely instrumental good.  Religion 
is a “festive being” that celebrates of goodness of being.473  In religion, God is 
affirmed and thanked and praised as the ground of value—the origin of goodness in 
being.474  It is a gratitude for the gift of being that makes no sense without God. 475  
Religious worship, as with all being religious for Desmond, is not undecided; one 
confesses that God is the Good that is the source of the good.476   
§4. “God”/“love” 
For Caputo, there is also an undecidability between God and love.  They are 
subject to an endless substitutability/translatability477 such that one cannot know 
whether “love” is a way of telling us something about God or if “God” is a way of 
telling us something about love.478  Caputo concludes that “God” less a name of a 
who or a what than a “how”—whose force is more pragmatic than semantic.479  
Ultimately is does not matter what, God or love, exemplifies what—only loving 
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action matters.480  It does not matter if a properly religious faith is “religious” (talking 
about God) or not, as long as it is loving.481  One can “be deeply and abidingly 
‘religious’ with or without theology, with or without the religions.”482  Any kind of 
knowledge of God is thus insignificant for religion—it (religion) can do without it 
(knowledge).  The undecidability between God/love is thus meant (by what? whom?) 
to elicit deed.  As religion is reducible to obligation without remainder, so “God” is 
reducible to love without remainder.   
For Desmond, the “religious” and the ethical are connected but not identified.  
There is a kind of union of divine and ethical service where the latter arises from the 
former.483  God, for Desmond, is fundamentally loving, is the agapeic origin.  God 
loves being all the way down to the unique and irreducible singularity of created 
being.484  God’s love is persistent and compassionate—condescending and in 
communication with our sufferings, our weakness.485  We love God by being agapeic 
to the other and so liken ourselves to the origin.486  This likening is not a simple 
identification but a complex relation.  Our loving, our being agapeic is a finite witness 
to, an imitation, image or revelation of the agapeic origin in its loving generosity.  
Love, agapeic selving—a giving beyond self, not seeking a return487 that finds its 
expression in service488—is for Desmond the highest selving, a selving beyond 
selving.  For Desmond, re-ligare and ob-ligare are not interchangeable (the former 
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disappearing into the latter), but both are present together (the latter issuing from the 
former) in the religious community of agapeic service—the consummate community 
that presents the apotheosis of the bond of trust that exists in all true human 
community.489   
Here as elsewhere, the central difference between Desmond and Caputo has to 
do with the place or status of metaphysics.  Caputo’s religion without religion is a 
religion without metaphysics that need amount to anything other than ethics, thus it 
naturally follows that any talk about a supreme being or object of religious devotion, 
God, would shift into the supreme ethical value, love.  Religion “without religion,” 
without metaphysics is a religion of love with (inasmuch as largely identified with 
love itself) or without (as metaphysical) God.  In Desmond’s work, however, a 
metaphysical discourse about God (as superior transcendence and agapeic origin) is 
maintained.  When Desmond speaks of God, he is speaking of something other than 
something we “do.”  What’s more, and quite contrary to Caputo, Desmond sees the 
metaphysical dimension of religion as positively contributing to the ethical dimension 
of religion.  Agapeic generosity is our active participation in our gratefully 
acknowledged ontologically agapeic being and our seeking to be true to the 
(regulative) agapeic promise of our given being.490  Generosity is the ethical living in 
light of what one beholds and affirms in gratitude.  In religious gratitude one has a 
transfigured metaphysics; in religious generosity arising from gratitude, a transfigured 
ethics arising from transfigured metaphysics.  Love does not arise out nothing.  Even 
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are mixed in with much that is idolatrous or potentially so. Religious community binds together (re-
ligare - Augustine) the human and divine, and out of this transforms the bonds holding humans 
together.” 
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 BB 338, 415; PU 157, 215; EB 162. 
PU 119: “Agapeic mind expresses something that is both a regulative ideal and an ontological reality, 
somehow constitutive of our most intimate being.” 
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as lovers, we do not create ex nihilo.  To be honest to love, we must think its 
whence—out of the excess goodness of being given agapeically (thus our 
ontologically agapeic being) by the agapeic origin.491 
The place of gratitude is telling.  The idea of gratitude is largely lacking in 
Caputo, for God as giver is deemed unnecessary—for what would one be thankful?  
One is to give to the other in obligation, but has one received a gift?  No gift, no 
Giver.  For Desmond, however, religion as our being in relation to God is our 
response to the gift of God, and entails our recognition and appreciation of God’s gift 
and our becoming gift-giving ourselves.  This seeing being as gift, and thanksgiving 
for it as such, makes no sense without God. 492  Gratitude shows that true (Dionysian?) 
festivity, true celebration of the goodness of being, is impossible without the 
sacred,493 for to thank is to grant an excessive asymmetry to the giver, to divine 
generosity.494 
For Caputo’s religion without religion, all that matters is that one loves the 
other.  Yet, in Caputo’s schema, how can the other (every other) come to us as if from 
on high demanding ob-ligare, re-ligare?  Is not, must not, this recognition of inherent 
worth and goodness happen within a broader ethos of a broader story about the 
goodness of being as such?  Does the restricted ethos that will say nothing of being 
cut one off from the deeper resources that fund and enliven and nurture our obligation 
to the other?  (Can the LeviNietzschean be surprised when one sees the other as 
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 BHD 267, 292, 296-97; BB 407; PU 125-26; CWSC 51. 
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EB 510-11: “Alternatively, we can live with this beyond of time with a thanks that does not always 
know whom it thanks, yet it knows it is under the need to give thanks. There is a thanks in excess of 
singulars who can be thanked, and the excess spills over into a life whose seedbed is thanks. One gives 
thanks to and for a giver one cannot name always, and yet an indeterminate thanks is asked by the 
goodness of what is come to us. Such thanks is like a religious trust which wakes to itself as entrusted 
with the gift of coming to be, entrusted by a giver it does not determinately know.” 
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 HG 55: “Thanksgiving which grants the excess generosity of divine transcendence, and the very 
asymmetry calls forth the ultimate gratitude.” 
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inherently worthless, as worthless as anything and everything?  Does one’s surprise 
and shock and disgust at cruelty, far from confirming one’s nihilistic vision, demand 
something more than such a vision has to offer?)  Beyond this Desmond recognizes 
that an infinite worth other than human is needed to make sense of, to give one reason 
to believe in the singular infinite worth of the human individual.495  Beyond bare 
obligation, Desmond sees creation itself, the giving of being to be as other and for 
itself, as a gift496—a true gift of love, demanding nothing in return.497  We are 
empowered, inspired to give by the great gifts of God.  Metaphysics is central to this 
empowering.  Only with metaphysics can one say: “this is good,” “this is a gift,” 
“God is the Giver.”  Gratitude says what and whence.  There is no non-metaphysical 
gratitude.  And if we are not grateful how can we love?  How can we give without 
first receiving a gift?  How would we know what love is? 
We need help to love.  We are helped to love.  There is no place for this for 
the LeviNietzschean—the brave lover making otherwise valueless evaluations of the 
other on the face of the abyss.  But is s/he loving?  If so, how?  Caputo’s vision, in the 
end, is neither dark enough (why do we so lack love?) nor light enough (does love not 
surround us?).  For Desmond, God’s giving not only shows us what love is but funds 
and encourages our own generosity.  It is difficult for us to think love, the gift, 
agape—it is foreign to our erotic, selfish thoughts.498  We need God’s help to be 
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immeasurable value, an infinite worth? It exceeds every calculation, and there could be no way to 
objectify it. Were we to have a bank cheque of infinite value, there is no way we could cash it; for there 
is no bank with the resources to deal out what is needed to be on a par with it. What is this strange 
value? And what source could be on a par with making sense of its given reality? For it is a given 
reality; we do not produce or create this end; it is what we are, constitutive of our being.” 
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PU 221: “The metaphysical difficulty of thinking the agapeic origin stems from our disability of being, 
our own being as the living lack of agapeic generosity.  We fail to understand an unconstrained gift.  
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agapeic.  In Desmond’s vision, God works to sustain agapeic community with God’s 
gracious, forgiving, re-creating, sustaining power.499  God is our secret partner in 
loving the other, in creating agapeic community.500  Gratitude recognizes our 
dependence and God’s excessive gift.  Beyond the impossible agonistics of Caputo’s 
religious vision—of ethics versus metaphysics, of love versus God, of generosity 
without gratitude—is the metaxological community of Desmond’s vision—a religion 
that is gratitude and generosity, God and love, metaphysical and ethical and more. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
For  us its excess is too much, something for nothing, purposive in its purposelessness beyond all our 
finite purposes.”  
PU 231: “Since our minds and being are so insistently erotic, such absolute agapeic being seems hardly 
conceivable, much less believable.” 
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without unexpected fruit. The life of agapeic service is impossible if we are alone, and without the 
sustaining power of the good as other. As I suggested before, the familiar word (and I think best word) 
for transcendence itself is God.” 
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good that asks nothing for itself, for its nature as the good is simply to broadcast the good to the other, 
broadcast itself to the other as other, sustaining that otherness.” 
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Conclusion: Divine Hyperbolics, Two Visions, Four Errors 
I see in the representative positions of Desmond and Caputo two 
“postmodern” ways of thinking about religion.  These two ways diverge 
fundamentally and severely on the question of the proper relation between religion 
and metaphysics.  They also represent, in the end, two different understandings of the 
“hyperbolics” involved in religion.  My contention throughout has been that 
Desmond’s positively metaphysical vision of religious belief is a viable and indeed 
preferable alternative to Caputo’s deconstructed, “post-metaphysical” vision of 
religion.   
Summary 
On the way to seeing Desmond’s alternative to Caputo’s vision of religion, I 
have presented Desmond’s distinctive understanding of metaphysics.  Desmond’s 
metaxological metaphysics is an account of (or an accounting by way of) the 
metaxu—the between, the middle, the intermediate—an “interpretive fidelity” to the 
emergent happenings in finitude that is open to signs of the beyond in its midst.  
Situated between the totalizing closure of rigid univocal thinking and the fragmented 
discontinuity of equivocal thinking—metaxological metaphysics works from the basis 
of a vision of being as a community, as a genuine plurality of irreducible singularities 
in interplay. 
For Desmond, the best attempts to speak of God metaphysically are likewise 
metaxological.  Speaking from the middle, from our intermediate position, we find 
that we must speak of God indirectly.  More specifically, Desmond’s sees his naming 
of God in terms of hyperbole.  Such is a thought that, as attending to certain 
phenomena, has an immanent exigency that propels one toward the thought of the 
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transcendent—something disproportionate or asymmetrical to finitude in the midst of 
finitude—something in experience that suggests something beyond experience, a 
transcendence.  Desmond’s claims to knowledge about God arise from these 
happenings in our experience—from the hyperboles of being—from these indirect 
signs of God in our midst, in the between.   
Reflecting on these hyperboles of being, Desmond describes a metaxological 
God that is a superior transcendence—an otherness that has an essentially 
asymmetrical relationship with humans and with the world.  The central metaphor for 
God in Desmond’s work, however, is that of agapeic origin—the source, through a 
radical and gratuitous origination, of the world as a true community of plurality made 
up of unique singularities in communicative relation to one another. 
For Desmond then, being properly religious is being in community with this 
God—with this agapeic origin—by responding to God’s agapeic gift with gratitude 
(recognizing, celebrating, thanking for the gift) and generosity (becoming agapeic 
ourselves in giving to others in community).  Gratitude for the generous creation of 
the agapeic origin inspires “a different ‘return’” of the gift of creation in the generous 
co-creation of agapeic community with God and with others.  Desmond’s 
understanding of God and religion, and the understandings of metaphysics (of our 
metaxological relation to being and of the metaxological community of being) and of 
ethics (of agapeic selving and agapeic community) that it entails, is a viable and 
preferable alternative to that of Caputo. 
Hyperbole 
These two visions—these two ways of thinking about religion in relation to 
metaphysics and ethics—can be seen acutely in their understandings of the 
“hyperbole” involved in religion.  In Caputo’s LeviNietzschean understanding of 
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religious hyperbole, Levinasian ethical religiosity has undergone the Nietzschean 
hammer such that no positive (metaphysical) religious belief can remain—“religion” 
remains as but an exalted way of speaking about ethics.  “God” is here a “place 
holder” for the human other.  Religion and God are hyperbolic ways of speaking of 
one’s “hypersensitivity” to the demands of the other.  This non-metaphysical 
hyperbole keeps to the surface of experience alone.  Yet allowing the surface alone, 
the surface ultimately disappears.  The deconstructability and yet persistence of the 
surface, of the phenomena, points to that beyond the surface—to a needed height or 
depth.  The surface/phenomena then becomes a sign of something other, propelling 
one to think beyond it. 
For Desmond, hyperbolic thought has to do with how something in experience 
(in immanence) suggests something beyond experience (transcendence).  With the 
hyperbolic, we are “thrown,” propelled beyond ourselves and our present experience 
toward the ultimate—thrown from our being between toward the “being above” of 
transcendence.  Whereas Caputo sees talk of the ultimate as merely “hyperbolic” (as 
exaggerated, figurative) talk about the finite (about “reality”), Desmond’s idea of the 
hyperbolic is a reversal of this—it is how our understanding of finite realities cannot 
remain fixated on the experience, the happening itself but entails an immanent 
exigency that drives or impels our thinking toward something more than the finite—
the finite is not sufficient unto itself.  “God,” for Desmond, is not a hyperbolic way of 
speaking of obligation or our excessive desire—not fully reducible to a generic 
placeholder for the strange call to love or the otherwise indifferent object for our 
uncannily infinite desire.  For Desmond, such experience, such obligation, such desire 
is itself what is hyperbolic. 
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Postmodern Theology 
In looking at Desmond and Caputo with an eye toward the project of a 
“postmodern” theology, we come upon a kind of irony.  One might say that Caputo’s 
postmodern theology is, in the end, quite modern.  In its broad reductionist project, it 
is nothing terribly new—yet another apology to religion’s cultured despisers.  One 
hears in the LeviNietzchean dithyrambs the cool echoes of the Enlightenment 
Religion Project to “help” religion—to rehabilitate an old chum that has fallen on 
hard times.  Here one identifies a given domain of human experience as “religious.”  
One then renders religion in the terms of that human domain.  The signs in human 
being and experience of a divine other undergo transmutation—a reductive reversal—
such that the divine is now merely a hyperbolic sign of the human.  Religious 
language is retained as a cipher.  This rendering that is the essence of modern religion 
is a kind of procrustean bed.  God stretched and cut to fit—a holy sheet (shroud?) for 
the now hollow (now hallowed) naught-but-human bed.  So Caputo’s “postmodern 
theology” is neither all that postmodern (its project is modern) nor all that concerned 
about God (its object, in the end, need not be anything but finite humanity). 
Desmond, however, takes these signs in human immanence as…signs—as 
pointing to something that exceeds them, to an agapeic origin, to God.  Desmond, 
though, would disclaim the label “postmodern theology.”  He is simply a philosopher, 
a religious philosopher at best, not a theologian.  And the “postmodern,” for 
Desmond, is little more that modernity’s nihilistic chickens coming home to roost.  
And yet…Desmond’s metaxological understanding of metaphysics and religious 
belief perhaps provides us with a more robust, way forward—a return beyond spent, 
cynical modernity to a constructive and affirmative conception of belief and 
metaphysics that could be construed as truly, if quite differently, “post-modern.”  
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Four Errors 
In closing, I would like to suggest that Desmond’s work can be seen as 
presenting the relation between metaphysics and religion in terms of an affirmative 
“both/and”—by way of a “neither/nor/nor/nor.”  More specifically, by looking at 
Desmond’s thought through the concerns of postmodern theologians like Caputo, one 
sees four errors to avoid when it comes to thinking of and relating to God.  First, one 
must guard against the dubious and unwarranted transition from knowledge of the 
absolute to absolute knowledge—the triumphalistic dogmatism that mistakes truth 
about the divine as a truth that is divine and so unassailable.1  Second, one must guard 
against the dubious and unwarranted transition from knowledge of divine truth as 
necessary for religious existence to seeing such knowledge as sufficient to constitute 
religious existence—one mistakenly moves from the necessary to the sufficient, as if 
assenting to certain propositions was all there was to being religious.  Third, 
recognizing the first error, one must avoid performing a reverse conceptual slippage 
from the impossibility of absolute knowledge to the impossibility of knowledge of the 
divine—that if we cannot think as God (as God thinks), that we may not think of God.  
Fourth, recognizing the second error, one must avoid a reverse conceptual slippage 
from seeing knowledge of the divine as insufficient to constitute religious existence to 
seeing knowledge of divine as unnecessary for religious existence. 
Caputo, and those like him, rightfully exhort us to turn from the two former 
errors only to fall squarely into the two latter errors.  In Desmond’s understanding of 
God and religion, we have a way to affirm some kind of knowledge of the 
absolute/divine (against the third error) while denying absolute knowledge (against 
the first error)—a way to affirm the necessity of such knowledge for religious 
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 Merold Westphal calls this “cognitive transubstantiation.”  Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 289. 
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existence (against the fourth error) while denying its sufficiency (against the second 
error).  Thus, Desmond’s metaxology proposes a metaphysical way of talking about 
God that is possible (through the hyperboles of being) but not absolute (because of 
our middle position)—in which metaphysics is valuable (informing the content of our 
ethical and religious being) but not sufficient (looking toward a more holistic life of 
community between metaphysics, ethics and religion). 
Desmond’s thought—of religion, being-between, metaphysics and the 
postmodern—denies and avoids all four of these errors and so opens a way forward 
toward an affirmative conception of God and religion. 
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